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VROEGTIJDIG OPTREDEN VAN OMSTANDERS TER VOORKOMING VAN 
OORLOGEN EN SCHENDINGEN VAN DE RECHTEN VAN DE MENS 
 
MIJNHEER DE RECTOR 
DAMES EN HEREN 
 
Het is vandaag 10 december, de dag van de rechten van de mens. Vijf en vijftig jaar 
geleden aanvaardde de Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties resolutie 217 in 
Parijs. Deze resolutie is beter bekend als de Universele Verklaring van de Rechten van de 
Mens. Deze universele verklaring was en is de basis van het hele mensenrechtenbouwwerk 
waaruit vele verdragen en toezichtmechanismen zijn voortgekomen. De noodzaak daartoe 
als antwoord op de verschrikkingen in de Tweede Wereldoorlog is evident. Toch waren de 
beginselen van deze verklaring in 1948 zelfs binnen het voorbereidend comité niet 
onomstreden. Naast de leidende rol van mevrouw Roosevelt, die eveneens 55 jaar geleden 
van deze Universiteit Utrecht vanuit de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid een eredoctoraat 
ontving1, zaten in dat voorbereidend comité vanuit Nederland pater Beaufort en Marga 
Klompé met als plaatsvervangster Hilda Verwey-Jonker. Mevrouw Verwey-Jonker, hier 
vanmiddag aanwezig maakte toen mee dat de voorzitter een bijeenkomst opende met de 
mededeling dat hij niet aan vrouwen het woord zou geven want "une femme, qui prend la 
parole en public ce n'est pour moi qu'une femme publique". Daarop vroeg de gedelegeerde 
van de Verenigde Staten, mevrouw Roosevelt het woord, de voorzitter aarzelde en ik citeer 
Hilda Verwey-Jonker vanuit haar autobiografie "Er moet een vrouw in": "toen begonnen er 
allerlei mannetjes naar de voorzitter te hollen en op hem in te praten". Hij gaf haar 
uiteindelijk het woord en zij hield haar reeds voorbereide betoog.2   
 
In de eerste overweging van deze universele verklaring  staat "dat erkenning van de 
inherente waardigheid en van de gelijke en onvervreemdbare rechten van alle leden van de 
mensengemeenschap grondslag is voor de vrijheid, gerechtigheid en vrede in de wereld". 
                                                 
1 De uitreiking vond plaats op 20 april 1948. 
2 Hilda Verwey-Jonker: Er moet een vrouw in; Herinneringen in een kentering van de tijd, De Arbeiderspers, 
Amsterdam, 1988,  p. 210. Interview op 5 februari 2003 te Utrecht. 
4 
Deze relatie tussen de bevordering van de rechten van de mens en de bevordering van 
vrede in de wereld is ook terug te vinden in de preambule van het Handvest van de 
Verenigde Naties en in artikel 55 van dat Handvest staat dat stabiliteit en welzijn nodig 
zijn voor vreedzame betrekkingen en met het oog daarop de VN onder meer universele 
eerbiediging en inachtneming van de rechten van de mens zullen bevorderen. In de kantlijn 
bij de wettenbundel staat dat vermeld als "nevendoeleinden".3 Ik beschouw de bevordering 
van de rechten van de mens en de bevordering van vrede en veiligheid in de wereld als 
even belangrijke doeleinden die bovendien onlosmakelijk met elkaar verbonden zijn.  
Oorlogen veroorzaken altijd grootschalige en flagrante schendingen van de rechten van de 
mens terwijl schendingen van de rechten van de mens als de voorbode van gewelddadige 
conflicten in de wereld zijn te beschouwen. Dit uitgangspunt vormt de hoeksteen voor mijn 
betoog dat ik nader zal uitwerken.  
 
De preventie, het voorkomen van conflicten en schendingen van de rechten van de mens 
staat hier dan ook centraal. Deze preventie wordt ruim opgevat zodat deze zowel het 
uitbreken en ontstaan omvat als de escalatie van conflicten en de toename naar ernst, 
omvang en frequentie van de mensenrechtenschendingen. Als deze al niet kunnen worden 
voorkomen kunnen ze dan niet tenminste worden ingedamd. 
 
De drie actoren, bij oorlogen en mensenrechtenschendingen zijn de daders, de slachtoffers 
en de omstanders.  
 
Mijn stelling is dat de rol van de omstander cruciaal is. Als de omstander geen actie 
onderneemt staat deze toe dat de dader voortgaat. Maar als de omstander wel in actie komt 
ten gunste van het slachtoffer kan dat er toe bijdragen dat aan de wreedheden door de dader 
een einde komt. Kortom in mijn visie is juist de omstander het beste in staat grootschalige 
schendingen van de rechten van de mens in de toekomst te voorkomen of  aan de 
voortzetting van deze schendingen  een halt toe te roepen. 
 
                                                 
3 Kluwer College Bundel 2003-2004, Wetteksten II, Kluwer, Deventer 2003, p. 3629. 
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GEWELDDADIGE CONFLICTEN EN SCHENDINGEN VAN DE RECHTEN VAN DE 
MENS 
 
De centrale vraag in de leer der internationale betrekkingen is de vraag naar het ontstaan 
van oorlogen. De oorzaken kunnen vanuit verschillend analyse niveau worden verklaard.4 
Behalve dat de oorzaken op verschillend niveau kunnen worden onderzocht kan ook naar 
de aanleiding tot een bepaalde oorlog worden gekeken, dat zijn dan gebeurtenissen die aan 
het uitbreken van oorlog voorafgaan. De gedachte is dat als de oorzaak niet of moeilijk kan 
worden weggenomen dan is het misschien mogelijk ter voorkoming van het uitbreken van 
oorlogen de aanleiding aan te pakken. Bij dit laatste tracht men een meer specifieke oorlog 
te voorkomen en niet oorlog in het algemeen uit te bannen.  Men legt zich enigszins neer 
bij de onvolkomenheden zoals het ontbreken van een internationaal centraal gezag.   De 
gebeurtenissen die de aanleiding tot een oorlog vormen zouden aldus een voorspellende 
waarde kunnen hebben in die zin dat wanneer zich die gebeurtenissen voordoen dat dan de 
kans op het ontstaan van oorlog groter wordt. Dergelijke gebeurtenissen kunnen worden 
gecatalogiseerd en gerubriceerd in indicatoren. Een indicator dat de kans op oorlog toenam 
was in het verleden, met sterkere militaire bondgenootschappen dan vandaag de dag, dat de 
hechtheid binnen blokken toenam en de contacten met het andere blok afnamen.  
 
                                                 
4 Bijvoorbeeld vanuit subnationaal niveau is de individuele leider de oorzaak en met het ten val brengen van 
Saddam Hussein wordt deze oorzaak weggenomen. Vanuit nationaal niveau wordt niet zozeer de individuele 
leider maar de structuur van de (dictatoriale) staat als de oorzaak gezien. Met de omverwerping van 
bijvoorbeeld schurkenstaten, als bijvoorbeeld Irak, en deze omvormen tot democratisch bestuurde staten 
wordt deze oorzaak tot oorlog weggenomen. Vanuit het internationale niveau kan de oorzaak worden gezocht 
in de anarchie waar met het ontbreken van een internationaal centraal gezag het staten niet wordt belet oorlog 
te gaan voeren wanneer in hun opvatting hun nationaal belang in gevaar komt. De keuze voor het analyse-
niveau hangt ook samen met de visie zo wordt in de realistische stroming met name het internationale 
analyse-niveau genomen en wordt in de zogenoemde idealistische stroming met name het nationale niveau 
betrokken. Condoleezza Rice heeft het Amerikaanse optreden inzake Irak als een mengeling van deze 
idealistische en realistische opvattingen beschouwd. Zie Condoleezza Rice en de noodzaak tot pre-emptive 
strike: Condoleezza Rice discusses President’s National Security Strategy, October 2002, 
http//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html. 
6 
Eerder heb ik gesteld dat in toenemende mate mensenrechtenschendingen de voorbode tot 
oorlog vormen en het is daarom ook begrijpelijk dat de indicatoren voor 
mensenrechtenschendingen en de kans op oorlog steeds meer gelijkenis zijn gaan vertonen. 
Bovendien zijn oorlogen vaker intra-statelijke oorlogen geworden. Intra-statelijke oorlogen 
zijn oorlogen binnen een staat, die ook wel burgeroorlogen worden genoemd. Oorlogen 
tussen twee of meerdere staten, de interstatelijke conflicten zoals in het Midden-Oosten 
rond de Arabische Golf en het Israëlisch-Arabisch conflict zijn steeds meer uitzondering 
geworden. Zie onderstaande figuur:5 
 
Gewapende conflicten 1946-2000 
 
                                                 
5 N.P. Gleditsch, P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg & H. Strand, Armed Conflict 1946-2000: A 
New Dataset; in: Journal of Peace Research, vol. 39, no 5, 2002, pp. 615-637. 
Geïnternationali-
seerd intra-
statelijk 
Intra-statelijk 
Inter-statelijk 
Overig 
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In deze verzameling van 220 conflicten zitten 157 intra-statelijke conflicten waarvan 25 
geinternationaliseerd intra-statelijk zijn omdat andere staten aan de strijd deelnemen. De 
rubriek overig omvat 21 intra-statelijke conflicten op een ander grondgebied. Resteren 
slechts 42 interstatelijke conflicten in de periode 1946-2000. Zelfs bij wat nog een tamelijk 
klassieke interstatelijke oorlog kan worden genoemd zoals de eerste Golfoorlog en de 
tweede Golfoorlog overtreft het aantal burgerslachtoffers verre het aantal gedode soldaten. 
Burgers, de non-combattanten ondanks de vele regelgeving op dit terrein van het 
oorlogsrecht, zijn in toenemende mate het dodelijke slachtoffer geworden. Met de moderne 
oorlogsvoering kon de coalitie vanuit de lucht de tegenstander trachten uit te putten  
waardoor bij deze bombardementen vele burgerslachtoffers vielen. Met het zo beperkt 
mogelijk houden van slachtoffers onder Amerikaanse en Britse soldaten neemt zo het 
aantal burgerslachtoffers toe. Het wellicht meest fundamentele mensenrecht, namelijk het 
recht op leven, wordt in oorlogen geschonden. Oorlogen leiden ook tot andere 
grootschalige mensenrechtenschendingen die bijvoorbeeld direct te relateren zijn aan de 
stroom ontheemden en vluchtelingen die door oorlogen zijn veroorzaakt. Daarnaast kunnen 
geringere schendingen van de rechten van de mens onder invloed van het oorlogsgeweld 
ernstigere schendingen worden. Wanneer we de Israëlische maatregelen tegen de 
Palestijnen op het terrein van huisvesting in ogenschouw nemen dan constateren we dat 
weliswaar voor de Intifadah enige schending plaatsvond in de zin van het weigeren 
bouwvergunningen aan Palestijnen rond Jeruzalem te verlenen maar dat als gevolg van 
strafmaatregelen tijdens de Intifadah Palestijnen uit hun huizen werden gezet en in een 
tamelijk groot aantal gevallen de huizen doelbewust zijn vernietigd.6 Kortom de schending 
van dit sociaal-economisch mensenrecht is als gevolg van het militaire conflict ernstiger 
geworden.  
 
                                                 
6 Zie tabel 11 op CD-ROM over Israël, bezette gebieden en Palestijnse Autoriteit. 
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Schema over de relatie tussen schendingen van de rechten van de mens en oorlogen
    
GROOTSCHALIGE SCHENDINGEN VAN BURGER- EN POLITIEKE RECHTEN OP PIOOMSCHAAL 
NIVEAU 3, 4 EN 5* 
 
Type   Indicator  Gewelddadig Conflict  Type 
Schending 1         Schending 2 
 
 
 
 
 
       
           
 
 
 
  
 
 
            
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
*   Zie pagina 19 en 20. 
** Zie pagina 22. 
GROOTSCHALIGE SCHENDINGEN VAN ECONOMISCH, SOCIAAL EN CULTURELE RECHTEN OP 
SCHAAL 3, 4 EN 5. 
BURGER- en 
POLITIEKE 
RECHTEN 
 
 
 
schaal  
niveau 1 & 2 
ECONOMISCH 
SOCIAAL en 
CULTURELE 
RECHTEN 
 
 
schaal  
niveau 1 & 2 
Folteringen; 
Buitengerechtelijke 
executies; 
Gevangenis 
omstandigheden en 
de “Freedom house 
schalen”. 
Toegang tot onderwijs; 
Kinder-arbeid, -mishande-
ling, -prostitutie, handel in 
kinderen, straatkinderen en 
kindsoldaten; Discriminatie 
in huisvesting, uitzetting en 
vernieling van huizen; 
Toegang tot voedsel 
MILITAIR 
CONFLICT 
OP NIVEAU:** 
 
1 MC 1 
2 MC 2 
3 MC 3 
BUPO Rechten 
inclusief  aan de 
oorlog gerelateerde 
schendingen van 
burger- en politieke 
rechten. 
 
schaal niveau 3, 4, 5 
ESOCUL Rechten 
inclusief aan de 
oorlog gerelateerde 
schendingen van 
economisch, sociaal 
en culturele rechten. 
 
schaal niveau 3, 4 , 5 
1
3 5
64
2
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Schendingen van de rechten van de mens zijn niet alleen een gevolg van oorlogen maar 
vaak ook de oorzaak van oorlogen. Evenals bij de vraag naar de oorzaken van oorlog 
kunnen we bij schendingen van de rechten van de mens gaan zoeken naar de structurele 
oorzaken op het sub-nationale, het nationale en het internationale analyseniveau. 
Bijvoorbeeld de mens is slecht en in beginsel een racist en dat verklaart zijn handelen.7 Het 
gedrag van de dader tijdens de Shoa8 kan dan verklaard worden vanuit diens antisemitische 
gezindheid. Anderen wijzen op het normale in het karakter van de dader en zoeken de 
verklaring vanuit nationaal niveau in de verhoudingen in een samenleving met een ver 
doorgevoerde bureaucratie.9 Vanuit het internationale niveau geredeneerd, leidt de 
anarchie van de statensamenleving tot niet inmenging van derden en geldt de regel van de 
overleving van de sterkste. Immers de naleving van de rechten van de mens wordt niet 
opgelegd vanuit internationaal niveau.  Hier valt gelukkig inmiddels wel wat op af te 
dingen. Niet alleen worden schendingen op een aantal terreinen in de gaten gehouden 
(monitoren en rapporteren) maar zien we voor de ordehandhaving ook op internationaal 
terrein in toenemende mate activiteiten van peace-keepers en politiewaarnemers en zijn de 
eerste rechters op het toneel verschenen voor de rechtshandhaving in de internationale 
orde. De nauwe relatie tussen enerzijds de handhaving van vrede en veiligheid en 
anderzijds de bescherming van de rechten van de mens in het optreden door de 
                                                 
7 Zie Goldhagen die er van uit gaat dat Duitse militairen en politiebataljons  vanuit antisemitische motieven 
in staat waren de standrechtelijke executies in Oost Europa uit te voeren. Daniel Goldhagen: Hitler's Willing 
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, Boston, 1996. 
8 Wellicht even terzijde opgemerkt dat ik liever het woord Shoa gebruik dan Holocaust. Holocaust betekent 
brandoffer aan God en ik zie geen enkel verband tussen brandoffer en de verdelging der Joden. Shoa betekent 
in het Hebreeuws vernietiging/ondergang en dat vind ik meer van toepassing op de slachtoffers en 
overlevenden. Naomi Kramer, Ronald Headland, The Fallacy of Race and the Shoah, University of Ottawa 
Press, 1998, pp. 326 en 333 in dit bijzonder knap en educatief samengesteld boek. De termen 'verdelging' en 
'ondergang' staan in de titel van het standaardwerk van J. Presser: Ondergang; de vervolging en verdelging 
van het Nederlandse Jodendom, 's-Gravenhage, 1965. 
9 Tony Kushner, 'Pissing in the Wind'? The Search for Nuance in the Study of Holocaust 'Bystanders' in: 
David Cesarani, Paul A. Levine (eds.) 'Bystanders' to the Holocaust: A Re-evaluation, London, 2002,  waarin 
hij het bekende boek van Goldhagen met Duitse 'willing executioners' stelt tegenover het  minder bekende 
werk van Browning met de 'ordinary men', p. 59 Christofer Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police 
Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, New York, 1992.  
10 
Veiligheidsraad van de VN onder Hoofdstuk VII is meer zichtbaar geworden vanaf 1991 
met de bescherming van de Koerden in Noord-Irak10 en ook wel met de instelling van de 
Tribunalen voor Joegoslavië en Rwanda.  Wel dient daarbij bedacht te worden dat 
bindende beslissingen alleen onder Hoofdstuk VII, dat gaat over de handhaving van vrede 
en veiligheid, genomen kunnen worden en dat deze rechters pas achteraf kunnen 
optreden.11 Het laatste decennium is op dit terrein een enorme sprong voorwaarts gemaakt.  
 
Hoe belangrijk de berechting en vooral de waarheidsvinding ook is, voor de gehele 
samenleving en voor de slachtoffers – die zich na deze waarheidsvinding met al dan niet 
berechting van de daders ook niet langer nog louter slachtoffers maar eerder als 
overlevenden zullen gaan voelen12 – de verschrikkingen die zij kunnen berechten hebben al 
plaatsgevonden. Misschien gaat er enige preventieve werking vanuit en zullen de daders op 
mogelijke berechting anticiperen. In 1939 stelde Hitler in een toespraak voor leger 
commandanten in Obersalzburg de retorische vraag "Wie maakt zich vandaag de dag nog 
druk over de vernietiging van de Armeniërs?"13 en ging voort me het opzetten van de 
volgende genocide. Evenals bij oorlogen kunnen we ook bij schendingen van de rechten 
van de mens ook de aanleidingen gaan bestuderen, kortom zijn er aanwijzingen voor 
                                                 
10 Zie onder meer de bijdragen van Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty versus Human Rights? A Tale of UN 
Security Council Resolution 688 (19991) on the Protection of the Kurdish People (pp. 347-357) en Fred 
Grünfeld, Human Rights Violations: A Threat to International Peace and Security (pp. 427-441) in: Monique 
Castermans-Holleman, Fried van Hoof & Jacqueline Smith (eds.), The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st 
Century; Human Rights, International Organisations and Foreign Policy - Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr, 
The Hague/Boston/London, 1998. 
11 Zie de oratie van Geert Jan Knoops, International and Internationalized Criminal Courts: the new face of 
international peace and security?, op 13 november 2003 aan de Universiteit Utrecht. Resolutie 827 over de 
oprichting van het Joegoslavië Tribunaal dateert van 25 mei 1993.  
12 Zie ook Theo van Boven, Cees Flinterman, Fred Grünfeld en Ingrid Westendorp (eds.) The Right to 
Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation, SIM Special no. 12, Utrecht/Maastricht, 1992. 
13 Stanley Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the Policing of the 
Past, Law and Social Inquiry, 1995, p. 20.  Raya Cohen, The Lost Honour of Bystanders? The Case of Jewish 
Emissaries in Switzerland in: David Cesarani, Paul A. Levine (eds.) 'Bystanders' to the Holocaust: A Re-
evaluation, London, 2002, p. 154 en dat is gebaseerd op V. Dadrian, Histoire du Genocide Arménien, Paris, 
1966. 
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grootschalige mensenrechtenschendingen te vinden. Bepaalde gebeurtenissen of 
ontwikkelingen kunnen daar aan vooraf gaan. Wanneer deze kunnen worden getraceerd, 
zou erger kunnen worden voorkomen. Inderdaad wederom de gelijkenis met oorlogen, 
wellicht kunnen ook schendingen van de rechten van de mens niet worden uitgebannen 
maar kunnen bepaalde schendingen worden voorkomen of enigszins binnen de perken 
worden gehouden. Met dat laatste bedoel ik dat de ernst en de schaal van deze schendingen 
beperkt blijft, bij voorkeur afneemt en ieder geval niet escaleert. Daar is mijn onderzoek op 
gericht.  
 
Zoek deze indicatoren en breng die in kaart en maak deze bekend als zijnde een 
betrouwbare vroegtijdige waarschuwing met het oog op vroegtijdig optreden ter 
voorkoming van een ernstige situatie. Dat vroegtijdig optreden is dan vooral een taak voor 
de derde actor, de omstander. 
 
VROEGTIJDIGE WAARSCHUWING EN VROEGTIJDIG OPTREDEN 
 
Vroegtijdig optreden is mogelijk na de ontvangst van een vroegtijdige waarschuwing. Net 
als de ontwikkelde waarschuwingen voor natuurrampen als orkanen, aardbevingen en 
vulkaanuitbarstingen, zouden ook aanwijzingen ontwikkeld kunnen worden voor de niet 
door de natuur maar door de mens veroorzaakte rampen als gewelddadige conflicten en 
grove mensenrechtenschendingen.14 Het vinden van betrouwbare aanwijzingen, die we 
indicatoren noemen, is een belangrijke taak in mijn onderzoek.  Preventie vereist vroeg-
tijdige actie, terwijl vroegtijdige actie pas mogelijk is na de ontvangst van vroegtijdige 
waarschuwing. De vroegtijdige waarschuwingen zijn dus wezenlijk en kunnen gezien 
worden als een noodzakelijke voorwaarde. Let wel, het voorspellen van welke gebeurtenis 
op welk moment zal plaatsvinden is niet mogelijk maar het doel is over de 
                                                 
14 Zie bijvoorbeeld ook de definitie van het West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, Accra-Ghana, 2000, p. 
11: “Early warning is the collection and analysis of information about potential and/or actual conflict 
situations, and the provision of policy options to influential actors at the national, regional and international 
levels that may promote sustainable peace”; zie ook http://www.fewer.org/resources/methodology_38.html. 
 
12 
waarschijnlijkheid van het uitbreken van mensenrechtenschendingen een oordeel te geven.  
De vraag is dan welke indicatoren kunnen die aanwijzing geven en zijn die indicatoren 
voor militaire conflicten en mensenrechtenschendingen gelijk, verschillend of aan elkaar 
gerelateerd. Dat ga ik onderzoeken. Ik zal niet verhelen dat anderen deze benadering 
afwijzen op grond van de volgende argumenten. Vele conflicten en mensenrechten-
schendingen zijn volstrekt verschillend, niet alleen door de specifieke context maar ook 
door het grote verschil in type schendingen. Elke generalisatie – zo wordt wel beweerd – is 
onmogelijk en het begin van zelfs maar enige voorspelling  op dit terrein is tot mislukking 
gedoemd want menselijk gedrag is onvoorspelbaar.15  Bovendien leidt early warning tot 
het averechtse effect want het zal investeringen in dat land afschrikken16 of als zichzelf 
vervullende voorspelling werken want de waarschuwing lokt juist het conflict uit. 17 Dit 
laatste is in het licht van de oorlog in Irak van het afgelopen voorjaar interessant. Er lijkt 
sprake te zijn geweest van het zogenoemde “aandikken” van de informatie om voor een 
vroegtijdige actie publieke en politieke steun te verwerven. In de toespraak van de Britse 
premier Blair op 24 september 2002 voor het Britse parlement stelde hij dat de Iraakse 
militairen in staat zijn binnen 45 minuten na een beslissing massavernietigingswapens in te 
zetten. De 45 minuten frase stond niet in het oorspronkelijke dossier maar werd op verzoek 
van Blair toegevoegd.18 De prijs van een dergelijke overdrijving is niet alleen de kritiek 
van parlementaire zijde maar ook dat het een volgende keer nog moeilijker zal worden de 
politiek en de publieke opinie te overtuigen voor vroegtijdig optreden. Dat leidt tot 
                                                 
15 Ibidem, p. 10 de zogenoemde desillusie stelling. 
16 Ibidem, p. 10 de zogenoemde afleiding (diversion) stelling. 
17 Ibidem, p. 10 de zogenoemde perversie stelling: “warning may spark pre-emptive actions, particularly 
from state actors against the agitators predicted. In short, warning intended to forestall a conflict is often 
likely to exacerbate it by defining it, altering the balance of power, or delaying necessary adjustments”. 
18 Tony Blair zei toen in het House of Commons: “His weapons of mass destruction program is active, 
detailed and growing. The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to 
do so.” Na de oorlog die plaatsvond van 20 maart 2003 tot 14 april 2003, stelde de BBC televisie op 29 mei 
op grond van informatie – naar later bleek – van de wapendeskundige Kelly: “It [the dossier] was 
transformed in the week before it was published to make it sexier. The classic example was the claim that 
weapons of mass destruction were ready for use within 45 minutes. That information was not in the original 
draft. It was included in the dossier against our wishes, because it wasn’t reliable  … [it] was transformed at 
the behest of Downing Street.” Time, September 8, 2003, The war of the words, pp. 26-27. 
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afkalving van vroegtijdig optreden en humanitaire interventie en de versterking van degene 
die de soevereiniteitsgedachte beklemtonen.  
 
Drie type aanwijzingen zijn ontwikkeld:19  
1. de structurele oorzaken – betrekking hebbend op de lange termijn – waarin over 
het algemeen niet op korte termijn verandering kan worden bewerkstelligd. dat zijn 
voorwaarden en structurele factoren die conflicten voeden want hun aanwezigheid 
in een samenleving verhoogt de kans op een gewelddadig conflict Te denken valt 
aan de achterliggende oorzaken zoals aan armoede, bewapening, analfabetisme 
etcetera.20 
2. de aanleiding die pas zichtbaar wordt vlak voor het uitbreken van het conflict, 
zoals de schoten in Sarajevo op 28 juni 1914 op de Oostenrijkse troonopvolger 
Frans Ferdinand die de eerste Wereld Oorlog ontketenden of het neerschieten van 
een vliegtuig met aan boord de Rwandese president Habyarimana op 6 april 1994 
dat de directe aanleiding voor de genocide in Rwanda vormde. De aanleiding zelf 
is niet te voorspellen want de gebeurtenis komt onverwachts.21 
3. de korte termijn (operationele) oorzaken, daarbij valt te denken aan een 
verandering in de bevolkingssamenstelling, de toevoer van wapens Het zijn in het 
bijzonder de korte termijn oorzaken die de kans op het uitbreken van conflicten en 
mensenrechtenschending het meest bepalen.22 Deze operationele oorzaken, heb ik 
                                                 
19 FEWER, Forum on Early Warning and Early Response: Conflict Analysis and Response Definition, 
Abridged Methodology, April 2001 en: Susan Ampleford, Methodology Review, Discussion Paper Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy, July 2000; en: WANEP Preventive Peacebuilding in West Africa, October 
2000, www.fewer.org. 
20 ibidem, Structural Causes of Root Causes genoemd. 
21 ibidem, Triggers genoemd. 
22 ibidem, Proximity Causes of Accelerators genoemd. In de vergelijking van Waltz ten aanzien van de 
oorzaken van oorlog zijn de structurele oorzaken eerder te vergelijking met de permissive causes en de korte 
termijn oorzaken eerder te zien als de directe oorzaken vergelijkbaar met de staatsstructuur van het 
oorlogsgeneigde land. Kenneth Waltz: Man, the State and War uit 1954 en Theory of International Relations 
uit  1979; zie ook de uitleg van deze benadering door Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory, A 
Critical Introduction, Routledge, London, New York, 2001, pp. 14-22. 
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op het oog en daarvoor wil ik de indicatoren ontwikkelen.  Niet de hoogte van het 
analfabetisme – als de structurele oorzaak – maar de discriminerende maatregelen 
die de toegang tot het onderwijs verhinderen – als de operationele oorzaak –  staan 
dan voorop. Het gaat over mensenrechtenschendingen die de staat te verwijten te 
zijn, waar de betreffende staat voor verantwoordelijk kan worden gehouden en die 
als een schendingen kunnen worden vastgesteld. 
 
De aanwijzingen voor gewelddadige conflicten en de aanwijzingen voor 
mensenrechtenschendingen kunnen gelijk zijn. Bijvoorbeeld een wijzigende 
bevolkingssamenstelling kan tot spanningen en discriminatie leiden. De demografische 
factoren zouden de structurele lange termijn oorzaken kunnen worden genoemd. Een 
plotselinge vluchtelingenstroom die demografische verhoudingen verandert, is dan de korte 
termijn oorzaak. De mensenrechtenschending is dan veelal discriminatie, terwijl 
discriminatie zowel burger- en politieke rechten als sociaal-economische rechten schendt. 
Een door mij gebruikte indicator daarvoor is de belemmerde toegang tot het onderwijs en 
de woningmarkt. In de situatie van Macedonië werden deze signalen door de internationale 
gemeenschap en met name de OVSE in de persoon van Van der Stoel vroegtijdig23 
opgepikt. Bijvoorbeeld zijn optreden als de hoge commissaris voor de minderheden in 
Macedonië is illustratief. In 1997 nam de Albanese minderheid met 10 %  toe, terwijl deze 
gevoelige demografische verandering tussen de Slavische Macedoniërs en de etnische 
Albanezen in Macedonië niet tot een gewelddadig conflict leidde. Inzake de taalkwestie 
lukte het Van der Stoel niet zodanig te bemiddelen dat de Albanese minderheid tot de 
universiteit werd toegelaten. Vervolgens heeft hij in Europa geld geworven en is 
overgegaan tot de stichting van een particuliere universiteit waar deze Albanese 
minderheid wel werd toegelaten. Daarmee werd een mogelijke oorzaak voor het uitbreken 
                                                 
23 Wanneer de vroegtijdige waarschuwing ook door de direct betrokkenen ter harte wordt genomen zou een 
vroegtijdig optreden zelfs achterwege kunnen blijven en wanneer met optreden de conflicthaard wordt 
weggenomen zou geen waarschuwing meer nodig zijn. Max van der Stoel:’My job is to issue early warnings 
to avoid action, and to take action to avoid early warnings’ uit Quentin Peel, ‘OSCE Minorities chief aims for 
early action’, Financial Times (19 mei 2000) in: W.A. Kemp (ed.), Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The HCNM, 
Kluwer Law International, Ashgate 2000, p. 34. Deze optimistische kijk gaat vaak niet op en is wel degelijk 
een handelen nodig op grond van de waarschuwing.  
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van een gewelddadig conflict aangepakt. De Albanezen voelden zich namelijk in 
Macedonië als tweederangs burgers behandeld met onvoldoende mogelijkheden tot 
ontplooiing.24 De Grondwet voorzag niet in de stichting van een Albaneestalige 
universiteit. Van der Stoel vroeg aan de Macedonische regering begrip voor deze gevoelige 
onderwijs/taalkwestie.25 De controverse stond centraal en van der Stoel ging op zoek naar 
een alternatief in het oprichten van een particuliere universiteit door een internationale 
stichting met een aantal Europese onderwijsdeskundigen in het bestuur.26 Dat is gelukt 
want met de financiering door een aantal EU lidstaten, de Europese commissie en de 
Verenigde Staten kon in 2002 de South-Eastern University starten.27  
 
Aan dit optreden lag ten grondslag dat de signalen van discriminatie en door een 
wijzigende bevolkingssamenstelling de kans op een gewelddadig conflict aannemelijk 
maakte zodat optreden geboden was.28 Kortom vroegtijdige waarschuwing en vroegtijdig 
optreden lagen in elkaars verlengde. 
 
                                                 
24 M. van der Stoel, Conflictpreventie - de lessen van Kosovo en Macedonië, oratie, universiteit van Tilburg, 
25 januari 2002,  p. 22. 
25 M. van der Stoel, Conflictpreventie - de lessen van Kosovo en Macedonië, oratie, universiteit van Tilburg, 
25 januari 2002,  p. 23. 
26 M. van der Stoel, Conflictpreventie - de lessen van Kosovo en Macedonië, oratie, universiteit van Tilburg, 
25 januari 2002,  p. 24.  
27 OVSE Jaarrapport 2002. 
28 Bijvoorbeeld een heuvel werd door Macedonië geclaimd in juni 1994 waarop prompt Servische militairen 
de heuveltop gingen bezetten. De VN vredesmacht die daar gesitueerd was nam dit waar en reageerde door 
de heuveltop onder de VN controle te plaatsen en te bepalen dat daar de bufferzone liep. Zonder ernstig 
gezichtverlies werd dit vroegtijdig opgelost. Uit: A.Williams, Preventing War, The United Nations and 
Macedonia, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp. 73, 93, 94.  
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OORZAKEN EN INDICATOREN 
 
De informatie voor de indicatoren kan worden afgeleid uit oorzaken van conflicten en 
mensenrechtenschendingen. Zoals zojuist gesteld zijn er structurele en operationele 
oorzaken. Ook elk optreden wordt daardoor bepaald en zo is een onderscheid gemaakt 
tussen preventief structureel optreden en preventief operationeel optreden. Deze lijn wil ik 
hier doortrekken naar indicatoren zodat het mogelijk is een onderscheid te maken naar 
indicatoren afgeleid uit structurele oorzaken en gericht op het optreden op de lange termijn, 
naast de indicatoren die worden afgeleid uit de operationele oorzaken en er dan ook op 
gericht zijn om als signaal te dienen voor het optreden op de korte termijn. Het doel daarbij 
is steeds zowel het voorkomen van het uitbreken van gewelddadige conflicten en 
mensenrechtenschendingen als het voorkomen van een escalatie in het aan de gang zijnde 
conflict of de schendingen van de rechten van de mens. Deze ruimere definitie is van Luc 
Reychler29 die met conflictpreventie zowel het uitbreken van conflicten als het escalatie 
proces en het weer oplaaien van gewelddadige conflicten op het oog heeft.  
 
Een mensenrechten indicator geeft enige informatie over de mate waarin een recht wordt 
vervuld of genoten in een bepaalde situatie.30 Statistieken zijn op zichzelf nog geen 
indicatoren maar deze kunnen daar wel toe dienen, bijvoorbeeld het aantal dagelijkse 
calorieën van beschikbaar voedsel voor de schending van het recht op voedsel. Een 
mensenrechten indicator verwijst zowel naar de mate waarin een regering aan zijn 
verplichtingen voldoet als naar de mate waarin ieder individu van de gegarandeerde 
rechten gebruik kan maken.31 Eigenlijk zijn die benaderingen niet zo verschillend want bij 
een recht hoort een verplichting en bij niet nakoming daarvan hebben we te maken met een 
schending32. Bovendien wordt bij de rapportage verplichtingen van staten aan Genève33 
                                                 
29 L. Reychler, Democratic Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention: The devil is in the transition, Leuven, 
1999, p. 11 die dat pro-actieve en re-actieve conflict preventie noemt. 
30 Maria Green: Current Approaches to Human Rights Measurement, in Human Rights Quarterly, 23 (2001), 
pp. 1062-1097, p. 1065. 
31  Ibidem, “government compliance en individual enjoyment”, p. 1085-1088. 
32 Ibidem, “where there is a right there is a duty, and where the duty is not met there is a violation.” p. 1086. 
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ook naar beide facetten gevraagd. Het is evenmin het geval dat indicatoren voor burger en 
politieke rechten louter op overheidsverplichtingen duiden en de economische en sociale 
rechten alleen gericht zijn op de gebruikmaking van die rechten.34 Bij beide rechten 
kunnen overheidsuitgaven gemoeid zijn. De voortgaande realisatie is met name voor de 
sociaal-economische rechten een belangrijke maatstaf om het al dan niet bestaan van een 
schending te kunnen vaststellen. Dat geldt zowel voor de rijke als de arme landen en 
daarom is armoede in deze zin niet per definitie een schending van sociaal-economische 
rechten. Ik verwijs in dit verband naar de uitwerking in de "Maastricht Guidelines".35 Er is 
in elk geval sprake van een directe schending wanneer sprake is van discriminatie bij de 
toekenning van ook de sociaal-economische rechten.36 Bij huisvesting of onderwijs ben ik 
deze schending vaak tegengekomen in mijn onderzoek, waarover dadelijk meer.37  
 
Empirisch onderzoek naar de relatie tussen de sociaal-economische mensenrechten en de 
burger- en politieke rechten is nog beperkt.38 Bij de opzet van onderzoeken op dit terrein 
worden de sociaal-economische rechten – als deze er al bij worden betrokken – soms gelijk 
gesteld met het bruto nationaal product en als men dan bedenkt dat de welvaartsverdeling 
binnen een land relevant is dan vult men daar enkele statistische gegevens als 
analfabetisme, levensverwachting en dergelijke voor in. Daarmee meet men nog geen 
schendingen maar hooguit de relatie tussen welvaartspeil en de mate van vervulling van 
enkele basisbehoeften. Vervolgens blijft men steken in de constatering dat er geen negatief 
                                                                                                                                                    
33 De rapportage van staten aan de toezichthoudende comités van de verschillende mensenrechtenverdragen 
waar zij partij bij zijn; die comités zetelen grotendeels in Genève.  
34  Maria Green, p. 1091. 
35 Theo van Boven, Cees Flinterman, Ingrid Westendorp, Human Rights, Maastricht Perspectives, Maastricht 
Centre for Human Rights, 1999, pp. 21-30. 
36  Maria Green, p 1071. 
37 Enkele door mij gebruikte indicatoren zijn ook door Maria Green vermeld op p. 1074 zoals toegang tot 
voedsel, geen gedwongen huisuitzetting, toegang tot onderwijs, geen dwangarbeid en adequate 
arbeidsomstandigheden. 
38 Zie voor een goed overzicht Wesley T. Milner, Steven C. Poe en David Leblang: Security Rights, 
Subsistence Rights and Liberties: A Theoretical Survey of the Empirical Landscape; in: Human Rights 
Quarterly 21 (1999) pp. 403-443, p. 405, 411. 
18 
verband bestaat tussen economische ontwikkeling en de burger- en politieke rechten. 39  Bij 
het bepalen van de relatie tussen de beide type rechten speelt de visie op het karakter van 
de sociaal-economische rechten eveneens een rol. Zo stelt de één dat beide rechten los van 
elkaar verwezenlijkt kunnen worden omdat de politieke rechten geen beroep op 
beschikbare middelen doen hetgeen bij sociaal-economische rechten wel het geval zou 
zijn.40 Anderen zien wel een samenhang en menen daarom dat pas na verwezenlijking van 
basale sociaal-economische rechten  de politieke rechten kunnen worden gerealiseerd. Niet 
om met Brecht te spreken “Erst kommt das Fressen und dann die Moral” maar omdat 
onderdrukking van de politieke elite pas dan minder nodig is aangezien de armoede geen 
mobilisatie factor meer is. Howard en Donally verzetten zich tegen een dergelijke 
opeenvolging waarbij de realisering van burger- en politieke rechten kan worden 
opgeschort.41 Ook Jan Pronk wees op het belang van de participatie in de besluitvorming 
voor de eerlijke verdeling van de hulpbronnen.42 Burger- en politieke rechten zijn dan 
zowel middelen voor de realisering van sociaal-economische rechten als doeleinden op 
zich zelf. Een nauwe relatie en onderlinge verbondenheid van de beide type rechten leidt 
dan juist niet tot opschorting van het een tot het ander is gerealiseerd maar tot een 
inspanning beide te realiseren. Een opeenvolging kan zowel door de donorlanden als door 
de doelstaten voor eigen doeleinden misbruikt worden waardoor noch de economische 
ontwikkeling noch de rechten van de mens worden bevorderd. In de notitie over het 
conflictpreventiebeleid van de Nederlandse regering wordt deze relatie onderkend door te 
stellen dat wanneer er geen beroep kan worden gedaan op elementaire burger- en politieke 
                                                 
39 Ibidem, p. 412.  
40 Ibidem p. 417 waarin Paul Streeten, Basic Needs and Human Rights, 8 World Dev 107 (1980) wordt 
aangehaald. 
41 Ibidem p. 407, 416, 417. waarin wordt aangehaald: Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and 
Practice (1989), p. 165, 166. Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights take priority 
over Civil and Political Rights? : Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 Human Rights Quarterly, 1983, p. 
470, 482. 
42 Peter Baehr, Monique Castermans-Holleman, Fred Grünfeld, Human Rights in the Foreign Policy of the 
Netherlands, Antwerpen/Oxford/New York, 2002, p. 18 uit: Een wereld van Verschil, p. 61, Tweede Kamer, 
1990-1991, 21 813, no. 1-2. 
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rechten daarmee de toegang tot economische en sociale rechten wordt geblokkeerd.43 In 
deze notitie wordt armoede als voedingsbodem voor geweld naar voren gebracht en aldus 
de preventie van mensenrechtenschending met de preventie van gewelddadige conflicten in 
verband gebracht.  
 
VOORBEELDEN 
 
In mijn onderzoek voor deze leerstoel en in afwachting van de officiële benoeming, heb ik 
reeds enkele onderzoeksresultaten kunnen presenteren in Turijn, Tel Aviv en Tilburg. Ik 
ben elf staten gaan bestuderen die in de periode van na de Koude Oorlog (de periode 1989-
2002) soms in een situatie verkeerden waarin de rechten van de mens slechts in geringe 
mate en op kleine schaal werden geschonden44 maar op andere tijdstippen te kampen 
kregen met ernstige flagrante en grootschalige mensenrechten schendingen.45  De vijf 
PIOOM niveau’s zijn: 
Schaal Niveau 1: Mensen leven in een veilige rechtsstaat, er vindt geen gevangenschap op 
grond van opvattingen plaats, marteling is uitzonderlijk en een politieke moord is bijzonder 
zeldzaam. 
Schaal Niveau 2: Enkelen worden gevangengezet vanwege niet-gewelddadige politieke 
activiteiten. Mishandeling en marteling zijn uitzonderlijk en politieke moord vindt zelden 
plaats. 
 Schaal Niveau 3: Gevangenschap vanwege politieke opvatting komt veel voor. Executies, 
politieke moorden en wreedheden zijn gebruikelijk. Gevangenisstraf, al dan niet na een 
proces, voor onbepaalde tijd vanwege politieke opvattingen is aanvaard. 
Schaal Niveau 4: Veel meer mensen dan bij niveau  3 worden gevangen gezet vanwege 
hun politieke opvattingen. Moorden, verdwijningen en martelingen zijn gebruikelijk en 
alledaags.  De getroffenen zijn vooral degenen met belangstelling voor politiek en andere 
opvattingen.  
                                                 
43 Conflictpreventiebeleid, Tweede Kamer 2001-2002, 28 065, nr. 1. 
44 PIOOM schaal 2. 
45 PIOOM schaal 3, 4 en 5. 
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Schaal Niveau 5: De hele bevolking  is doelwit van geweld geworden. De leiders uit deze 
samenlevingen zullen zonder enige beperking en met gebruikmaking van alle middelen 
hun persoonlijke of ideologische doeleinden nastreven.  
 
Van 11 staten heb ik de ernst (mishandeling - marteling), frequentie (sporadisch - vaak) en 
de reikwijdte (alleen politieke tegenstanders - gehele bevolking) van de schendingen van 
de rechten van de mens op burger- en politiek terrein evenals op sociaal-economisch 
terrein in kaart gebracht op basis van door anderen verzamelde rapporten. Het is dan ook 
een op rapporten gebaseerd onderzoek en niet op basis van ter plaatse zelf onderzochte 
gebeurtenissen.46 In Harvard wordt nu onderzoek verricht naar de gebeurtenissen in Sri 
Lanka, later zal ik die onderzoeksresultaten met mijn gegevens gaan vergelijken.   
 
Kwantitatieve indicatoren verschaffen een snel overzicht over een situatie en 
vergemakkelijken vergelijkingen tussen staten. Kwantitatieve gegevens zijn aldus goede 
signalen voor vroegtijdige waarschuwingen. Wil je echter over een grondiger kennis van 
de situatie beschikken dan heb je kwalitatieve gegevens nodig. Deze diepgaande studies 
met gegevens over de mensenrechtensituatie in een bepaalde staat in een bepaald jaar 
worden verricht door gouvernementele en non-gouvernementele organisaties. Het is goed 
mogelijk deze kwalitatieve gegevens om te zetten in kwantitatieve gegevens. Zo zijn de 
ernst, frequentie en reikwijdte van verschillende mensenrechtenschendingen 
gekwantificeerd. De Purdue/Pioomschaal is zo juist gepresenteerd en het Freedom House 
heeft een zespuntsschaal ontworpen voor burger- en politieke mensenrechten-
schendingen.47 Beide heb ik in mijn studie gebruikt. Een voorbeeld van een abrupte daling 
in de Freedom House schaal is te vinden in Mali dat in 1992 van een dictatuur in een 
democratie veranderde. Dat leidde tot een daling in de schending van de politieke rechten 
van 6 naar 2 en in de burgerrechten van 4 naar 3.48 Daarnaast heb ik andere kwalitatieve 
                                                 
46 Voor het onderscheid naar kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve waarschuwingssystemen en indicatoren zie onder 
meer A. Austin, Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science? In: Berghof Handbook for Conflict 
Transformation, 2003.  
47 Zie voor de uitleg over burger- en politieke rechten van Freedom House op CD-ROM. 
48 Zie de tabel 4 op CD-ROM over Mali. 
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gegevens uit de jaarrapporten van het Amerikaanse Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 
omgezet in kwantitatieve gegevens. Voor schendingen van de rechten van het kind heb ik 
gewerkt met kindermishandeling, kinderarbeid, gedwongen kinderarbeid, kinderprostitutie 
en handel in kinderen voor prostitutiedoeleinden. Ik heb – na een pilotstudie – besloten de 
gegevens uit de Amerikaanse jaarrapporten te verzamelen. In een vooronderzoek heb ik de 
gerapporteerde schendingen voor de twaalf staten over een jaar – 2000/2001 – door drie 
landen, te weten Noorwegen, Nederland en de Verenigde Staten, twee algemene non-
gouvernementele mensenrechten organisaties, Amnesty International en Human Rights 
Watch en enkele gespecialiseerde mensenrechtenorganisaties49 op het terrein van 
kindsoldaten, huisvesting, kinderrechten, kinderprostitutie en voedsel vergeleken. De 
resultaten van dit vooronderzoek zijn kort geleden gepubliceerd en de conclusie is dat de 
Amerikaanse bron goed en zeer uitgebreid is en eveneens veel aandacht schenkt aan 
sociaal-economische schendingen naast de burger en politieke schendingen. 50 Een 
vertekening in hun berichtgeving op grond van hechte bilaterale relaties met een bepaald 
land kon niet worden geconstateerd. Een Amerikaanse vooringenomenheid was in deze 
periode van onderzoek afwezig. Dat laatste wordt bevestigd vanuit ander Brits-Amerikaans 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek.51 Kortom de toegevoegde waarde van de andere bronnen als 
informatieverschaffers voor de schendingen was gering en het onderzoek kon worden 
voortgezet met de zeer bruikbare rapporten van het Amerikaanse State Department. In het 
vooronderzoek concludeerden Alette Smeulers en ik dat de Verenigde Staten zijn 
dominante positie in de wereld ook inzake de rapportage van mensenrechtenschendingen 
waarmaakt. 
 
                                                 
49 Respectievelijk CSUCS, COHRE, DFCI, ECPAT en FIAN. 
50 Fred Grünfeld en Alette Smeulers, NGO’s als informatieverschaffers in vergelijking met statelijke actoren; 
uit: Cees Flinterman en Willem van Genugten (red.). Niet-statelijke actoren en de rechten van de mens; 
gevestigde waarden,  nieuwe wegen; Den Haag, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2003, pp. 93-118. 
51 Steven C. Poe, Sabine C. Carey, How are these pictures different? A quantitative comparison of the US 
State Department and Amnesty International Human Rights Reports 1976-1995, Human Rights Quarterly 23 
(2001) pp. 650-677. De rapporten van voor 1993 waren echter van veel minder kwaliteit en toonden wel de 
vooronderstelde vooringenomenheid.  
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Daarnaast ben ik voor de staten de veiligheid gaan onderzoeken met gebruikmaking van 
een driedeling waarbij als gevolg van overheidsgeweld in een jaar tijd respectievelijk 
minder dan 100, tussen de 100 en 1000 en meer dan 1000 doden zijn gevallen. De 
driedeling voor gewelddadige conflicten is: 
MC 1: gewelddadig politiek conflict met minder dan 100 doden per jaar. 
MC 2: militair conflict van lage intensiteit met tussen de 100 en 1000 doden per jaar. 
MC 3: militair conflict van hoge intensiteit met meer dan 1000 doden per jaar.  
 
De informatie over aantallen was minder eenvoudig te verzamelen dan ik veronderstelde. 
De relatie tussen oorlogshandelingen en mensenrechtenschendingen kon vervolgens nader 
worden onderzocht. Beoogd is ook een opeenvolging aan te kunnen brengen in de zin van 
wat gaat aan wat vooraf om tot een vroegtijdige waarschuwing te komen.  
 
Ik zal nu enkele resultaten van dit onderzoek naar elf staten dat een periode van 13 jaar 
(1989-2002) omvat geven. De bestudeerde staten zijn Kenia, Algerije, Tunesië, Mali, 
Georgië, Kroatië, El Salvador, Paraguay, Thailand, Sri Lanka met het gebied van de 
Tamils en Israël met de Palestijnse gebieden. De gegevens zijn vanaf vandaag beschikbaar 
op een cd-rom, die u na afloop bij het verlaten van deze zaal krijgt. Het wordt 
gedocumenteerd met 1081 bronnen. In deze oratie beperk ik mij tot slechts enkele 
voorbeelden. 
 
1. Kenia 
 
Binnen Kenia spelen meerdere conflicten tegelijkertijd. De algehele situatie in Kenia wordt 
gekenmerkt door veel geweld en erg veel onderdrukking. Deze onderdrukking is 
toegenomen van Pioom-schaal 2 in 1989, naar schaal 3 in 1990/1991 en vervolgens naar 
schaal 4 in 1992/1997 waarna de situatie iets verbeterde naar schaal 3. Deze onderdrukking 
op de politieke terreur schaal weergegeven, komt overeen met de ernst van de schendingen 
van de burger- en politieke rechten van de mens. Nagenoeg de gehele periode op het 
hoogste niveau van zeer ernstige schendingen. Vanaf 1989 stijgt het aantal folteringen 
steeds meer. Er is enige variatie in het geweldsniveau te constateren want er was meer 
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geweld in 1992/1993 en 1997/2002 dan in de daaraan voorafgaande en tussenliggende 
perioden. Wanneer we vervolgens de verschillende schendingen bestuderen valt de 
continuïteit in de ernstige schendingen op en kunnen we nauwelijks verschillen als gevolg 
van de verheviging van geweld ontdekken buiten de voor de hand liggende toename in 
buitengerechtelijke executies vanaf 1996. Daarnaast sterven veel mensen in gevangenissen 
– ongeveer elk jaar 800 mensen –  als gevolg van martelingen, ziekten, het ontbreken van 
medische zorg en gebrek aan voedsel. Het is echter lastig te bepalen of deze grove 
schending de staat is aan te rekenen. Wellicht alleen  wanneer het een bewuste nalatigheid 
betreft maar Kenia heeft meestal te lijden gehad van de droogte met als gevolg voedsel 
tekort in het hele land.  
 
2. Algerije       
 
De ontwikkeling in Algerije is spectaculair te noemen. De eerste jaren bestonden de 
schendingen slechts uit kinderarbeid en enige gevallen van marteling. Echter vanaf 1992 
vinden martelingen en buitenrechtelijke executies op grote schaal plaats. De noodtoestand 
geldt en een storm van geweld raast door het land gedurende het hele decennium. In 1998 
en in 1999 kwamen elk jaar bijvoorbeeld ruim zeven duizend mensen om het leven, terwijl 
de president in 1999 toegaf dat 100.000 mensen in de voorafgaande acht jaar zijn gedood. 
Zowel de burgerrechten als de politieke rechten werden continu zeer ernstig geschonden 
vanaf 1992. De toename van militair geweld gaat hier dan ook hand in hand met een 
toename in de schending van de burger en politieke rechten. Lijfstraffen was een bekend 
fenomeen in Algerije maar als gevolg van het geweld waarbij families van het platteland 
naar de stad zijn gevlucht nam de bescherming af en het huiselijk geweld toe.  In dit laatste 
geval is deze schending van de rechten van het kind een gevolg van het militair geweld. De 
omstandigheden in de gevangenis zijn de laatste jaren verbeterd mede als gevolg van 
inspecties van het Internationale Rode Kruis en andere internationale omstanders. 
 
De verslechtering startte echter in 1991 met de schending van de BUPO rechten in het 
afgelasten van de verkiezingen en het verbod op de belangrijkste politieke partij het FIS. 
Algerije past wat dat betreft in het voor dit onderzoek ontworpen basis schema: 
24 
Kortom de tamelijke gering BUPO-schending in schaal 2 leidt tot een militair conflict dat 
steeds gewelddadiger wordt en leidt tot zeer ernstige schendingen van de mensenrechten 
tot in schaal 5. 
 
3. Tunesië 
 
In Tunesië vindt gedurende de hele periode veel onderdrukking plaats. De regering heeft 
de repressie stevig in de hand en de onderdrukking is gericht tegen de specifieke groep in 
de politieke en maatschappelijke elite.  Dat blijkt uit de terreurschaal die rond de 3/4 (in 
reikwijdte is de schending beperkt vanwege de selecte onderdrukte groep) schommelt en 
uit het hoge niveau van de aard van de schendingen van de burger- en politieke rechten die 
op niveau 5/6 zit. Opvallend is dat hierin geen verandering komt en de staatkundige 
hervormingen worden dan ook als cosmetisch beschouwd. Het instellen van een ministerie 
van mensenrechten klinkt mooi maar de leden van de liga van de mensenrechten en 
anderen worden er niet minder door vervolgd, gemarteld en soms buitenrechtelijk 
geëxecuteerd. Buitengerechtelijke executies en martelingen komen steeds voor met als 
belangrijkste verschil dat daar de laatste jaren iets meer over naar buiten komt. Naast de 
staatscensuur is er veel zelfcensuur bij de Tunesische media en ook de buitenlandse media 
wordt de toegang veelal ontzegd. Kinderarbeid vindt in Tunesië zowel op het platteland als 
in de stad plaats en ook hierin is geen verbetering te constateren.  Het grote verschil met 
buurland Algerije is dat in Tunesië geen excessief geweld plaatsvindt met de vele doden.  
 
4. Mali 
 
Mali is de derde ex-Franse kolonie in Noord-Afrika die is onderzocht. Aan staten als Mali 
en Tunesië wordt in de internationale fora weinig aandacht besteed. Frankrijk weet haar 
oud-koloniën vaak goed te beschermen tegen een veroordeling. Katerina Tomasevski heeft 
dat onderzocht52 en Stanley Cohen formuleerde de zogenoemde Tsjaad regel die inhoudt 
                                                 
52 Katarina Tomasevski: Responding to Human Rights Violations, 1946-1999, Kluwer Law International, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London, 2000, ISBN 90-411-1368-1, schrijft op p. 
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dat  niemand in Tsjaad geïnteresseerd is, nauwelijks weet waar het ligt en de voornamelijk 
in het Frans gesteld informatie voor velen niet toegankelijk is. In mijn vergelijkende 
pilotstudie kon ik dit bevestigen voor de zowel de informatie door staten in het bijzonder 
Nederland en Noorwegen en de NGO's als Amnesty International en Human Rights Watch.  
Amnesty International en Human Rights Watch melden over zowel 2000 als 2001 geen 
enkele schending van de rechten van de mens, Nederland meldt de slechte 
gevangenisomstandigheden en de kindermishandeling terwijl Noorwegen zich beperkt tot 
de melding over het tekort aan voedsel. Het State Department geeft de meeste informatie 
en toont Mali als een staat waar in 2001 de gevangenisomstandigheden slecht zijn, 
kinderarbeid en handel in kinderen voor kinderarbeid plaatsvindt naast sterke aanwijzingen 
voor foltering en buitengerechtelijke executies. Het schenden van de rechten van het kind 
is een constante in Mali en omvat bijna alle door ons onderzochte schendingen zoals de 
beperkte toegang van slechts 20 % tot het basisonderwijs, kindermishandeling, 
Kinderarbeid inclusief gedwongen kinderarbeid en handel in kinderen ten behoeve van 
kinderarbeid, slechte gevangenisomstandigheden voor kinderen. De schendingen blijven in 
de niet gewelddadige tijden met een democratisch bestuur grotendeels tot deze 
schendingen beperkt hetgeen valt te constateren over de periode 1995-2002.  De relatie 
tussen de schendingen van kinderrechten en armoede dringt zich weer op. Mali is 
interessant omdat het van 1991 op 1992 van een dictatuur in een democratie veranderde 
terwijl het geweld nog voortduurde. De voortduring van het geweld werd veroorzaakt door 
de strijd tegen rebellerende Toearegs met als gevolg voortdurende buitengerechtelijke 
executies (1990-1994). Maar met de democratisering werden andere burger- en politieke 
rechten nauwelijks nog langer geschonden hetgeen tot uiting komt in de abrupte daling van 
rond de 6 naar rond de 2 op de vrijheidsschaal bij de vergelijking van het dictatoriaal 
versus het democratisch bewind.  Dit komt ook tot uiting in de sindsdien erkende vrijheid 
van vakvereniging en het stakingsrecht. 
  
                                                                                                                                                    
239:"Differently from publicity in Anglophone countries, French speaking African countries have been 
immune to international scrutiny. ´ Stanley Cohen, States of Denial, Polity, 2001, p. 173. 
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5. Georgië 
 
Georgië werd in 1992 onafhankelijk van de Sovjet Unie maar werd al snel geconfronteerd 
met afscheidingsbewegingen in Abchazië en Zuid-Ossetië – zo vielen er in de strijd om 
Abchazië in 1993 al meer dan duizend doden. Bovendien wilden in 1992 en 1993 de 
aanhangers van de afgezette president Zviad Gamsakhurdia de macht heroveren en 
daarmee nam het geweld in het land toe. Daarnaast kwamen er veel vluchtelingen uit 
Tsjetenië naar Georgië en het gevolg daarvan was instabiliteit en economische neergang. 
De economische neergang leidde tot andere schendingen van de rechten van de mens zoals 
de opkomst van straatkinderen en kinderprostitutie. Een jaar na de onafhankelijkheid 
bevond Georgië zich al op het hoogste geweldsniveau (MC 3) en gold de noodtoestand. 
Het geweld nam vervolgens af – mede dankzij de VN bemiddeling (de internationale 
omstander) voor een staakt-het-vuren – tot op het midden niveau in 1993/1994 (MC 2). 
Staatkundige hervormingen met een Grondwet en parlementsverkiezingen vonden in 1995 
plaats en het geweld nam vervolgens verder af tot op het niveau van een gewelddadig 
politiek conflict met minder dan 100 doden per jaar (MC 1). De mate van geweld is 
gerelateerd aan de ernst en de reikwijdte van de schendingen van de rechten van de mens, 
zoals in onderstaande tabel is weergegeven. 
 
Militair Conflict/ Mate van 
geweld 
Politieke terreur schaal/Pioom Burger- en Politieke Rechten/ 
Freedom House  
MC 1 2 - 3 3 - 4 
MC 2 2 - 3 - 4 4 - 5 
MC 3 4 - 5 5 
 
Wanneer we de verschillende schendingen in detail bekijken, is echter de afname in 
schendingen bij de vermindering van geweld nauwelijks meer te zien. Het aantal 
martelingen nam in ieder geval niet af nadien. Daarnaast stierven bijvoorbeeld in 1998  88 
mensen in de gevangenis grotendeels als gevolg van fysiek misbruik, marteling en  
inhumane omstandigheden met onvoldoende bedden, voedsel, medische zorg. In feite is de 
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situatie nog slechter omdat de aan de afscheidingsbeweging van Abchazië toe te rekenen 
schendingen niet eens zijn meegenomen.  
 
6. Kroatië 
 
Met het uitroepen van de onafhankelijkheid in 1992 brak de oorlog tussen de Serviërs en 
de Kroaten uit waarbij 9.000 doden vielen. Bemiddeling met de komst van VN 
vredesmachten leidde tot het einde van dit MC 3 conflict en de overgang naar MC 2 in 
1993, en zelfs MC 1 in 1994 maar weer naar MC 3 in 1995 vanwege de hernieuwde strijd 
over de Servische enclaves die in 1995 door Kroatië werden ingenomen en waarbij ruim 
600 Serviërs stierven. Vervolgens eindigde het geweld en de mensenrechtenschendingen 
op de Pioom schaal daalden ook van 5 naar 2/3 terwijl buitengerechtelijke executies niet 
meer voor kwamen. Hoewel de grote oorlogsgerelateerde schendingen verdwenen zoals 
het opblazen van 10.000 huizen van Kroatische Serviërs bleven de schendingen ten 
aanzien van specifieke minderheden bestaan. Dat zijn in de eerste plaats de Moslims en de 
Serviërs (in 1995 vluchtten 200.000) aan wie het recht op terugkeer wordt ontzegd of de 
gedwongen huisuitzetting van degenen die bleven en discriminatie in huisvesting voor 
degenen met een Servische of gemengde Servisch/Kroatische achtergrond. Bij de toegang 
tot het onderwijs werden de Roma en degenen met een half Hongaarse achtergrond 
blijvend gediscrimineerd. Buiten deze kleinere schendingen kunnen we constateren dat de 
grotere schendingen van de rechten van de mens overduidelijk  samenhingen met het 
hogere geweldsniveau ten tijde van de oorlogshandelingen.  
 
7. El Salvador 
 
De onderzoeksperiode start voor El Salvador in 1989 met de staat van beleg met zeer veel 
geweld (MC3 met meer dan 3000 doden) en een hoge mate van onderdrukking 
(terreurschaal 4) en dat duurt voort tot aan het vredesakkoord en de implementatie daarvan 
eind 1992. Vanaf 1993 kunnen we dan ook een verbetering constateren. Voor deze 
gewelddadige periode 1989-1992 hebben we Amerikaanse gegevens vergeleken met die 
van Amnesty International want voor deze periode was de Amerikaanse 
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vooringenomenheid bekend en dat gold in het bijzonder voor die staten waar het zelf nauw 
bij betrokken was. De frequentie van de martelingen werd dan ook door AI  hoger gezien 
dan door de VS.   
De verbetering vanaf 1993 blijkt uit zowel het lagere niveau op de terreurschaal naar 3 en 
vervolgens naar 2 als uit de verbetering van de burger- en politieke rechten waardoor het 
vanaf 1997 zelfs als "vrij" (binnen de driedeling niet vrij, gedeeltelijk vrij en vrij) wordt 
beschouwd. Toch geven de meer gedetailleerde gegevens een minder rooskleurig beeld. 
Dat minder rooskleurige beeld heeft vooral betrekking op de sociaal-economische 
schendingen zoals die tot uiting komen in onvoldoende toegang tot het onderwijs en 
schendingen van de kinderrechten, kindermisbruik, kinderarbeid inclusief gedwongen 
kinderarbeid53 en kinderprostitutie54 naast handel in kinderen voor kinderarbeid en 
kinderprostitutie en ook de ondervoeding heeft vooral betrekking op kinderen. De laatste 
jaren is rond de 20 % van de kinderen ondervoed. Een voorzichtige conclusie is dat in El 
Salvador wel een verband is te constateren tussen de mate van geweld en de mate van 
schendingen van burger- en politieke rechten maar dat die relatie niet opgaat voor de 
sociaal economische rechten. De relatie tussen schendingen van beide categoriën 
mensenrechten is in vredestijd voor de armere landen veel minder aanwezig dan werd 
verondersteld.   
 
8. Paraguay 
 
In Paraguay start in 1989 de overgang van een militaire dictatuur naar democratie. Wel 
vindt continu enige onderdrukking plaats en het  wordt als gedeeltelijk vrij beschouwd. 
Evenals bij El Salvador valt de flagrante schendingen van de rechten van het kind op alle 
terreinen op.  Van 1993 tot en met 1997 leed zelfs de meerderheid van alle werkende 
kinderen – en vergeet daarbij niet dat een op de drie kinderen werkt – aan ondervoeding. 
Daarnaast trof de ondervoeding vooral de inheemse bevolking en juist deze selectiviteit 
                                                 
53 Niettegenstaande de ratificatie op 15 juni 2000 van de ILO Conventie 182 inzake de ergste vormen van 
kinderarbeid.  
54 Volgens UNICEF bestaat in 2002 10 a 25% van de zichtbare prostitutie uit kinderen  en vormen kinderen 
maar liefst 40% van de verborgen prostitutie.  
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maakt dat van een sociaal economische schending gesproken kan worden waar de staat 
voor aansprakelijk is. Een bewering die – op basis van de “Maastricht principles” – nu wel 
voor Paraguay gedaan kan worden, waar dat voor Kenia  nog niet zo goed mogelijk was. 
Discriminatie van minderheden is een vast patroon in Paraguay en werd geconstateerd voor 
Indianen, Chinezen en Koreanen, het betrof zowel de huisvesting als de toegang tot het 
onderwijs. De discriminatie betekent dan een schending voor beide categoriën rechten van 
de mens en vindt gelijktijdig plaats. Kortom, er is dan geen grond voor de aanname dat de 
ene categorie aan de andere voorafgaat. 
 
9. Thailand 
 
In Thailand grepen de militairen in 1991 en 1992 de macht. Demonstraties in Mei 1992, 
die weliswaar 52 mensen het leven kostte en waarbij 200 mensen verdwenen, leidden tot 
herstel van de democratische procedures. In de beide schalen wordt de onderdrukking uit 
1991/1992 weerspiegeld. Echter ook nadien nemen de schendingen nauwelijks af want 
martelingen duren voort en veel buitenrechtelijke executies vinden tijdens voorarrest en in 
gevangenschap plaats terwijl de rechten van het kind evenmin verbeteren. Kindermisbruik, 
-arbeid, -prostitutie en handel in kinderen voor de prostitutie is ook een constante in 
Thailand.   
 
10. Sri Lanka en de Tamils 
 
In het conflict tussen de Tamiltijgers en de Singalezen zijn de afgelopen 19 jaar ruim 
65.000 mensen om het leven gekomen. Dit zeer hoge geweldsniveau heeft zich nagenoeg 
over de gehele periode voorgedaan met uitzondering van een onderbreking in 1994/1995 
vanwege een tijdelijk bestand en vervolgens het abrupt einde aan het conflict in 2002 
vanwege het vredesverdrag en de erkenning van de Tamiltijgers (LTTE55). Gedurende het 
                                                 
55 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In de tabellen hebben we de schendingen die aan de Tamil tijgers zijn 
toe te schrijven kunnen onderscheiden van de schendingen die aan de Sri Lankese overheid zijn toe te 
schrijven. De gegevens van het Freedom House betreffen geheel Sri Lanka en zijn voor de tabel over de 
Tamils weggelaten. 
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hoge geweldsniveau was de onderdrukking ook maximaal volgens de PIOOM-schaal op 
niveau 4 en 5 terwijl die in 1994 en 2002 overeenkomstig lager waren met minder 
buitengerechtelijke executies.56  De direct oorlogsgerelateerde mensenrechtenschendingen 
zijn terug te vinden in het voedsel tekort vanaf 1999 vanwege de sluiting van de grenzen en 
de in beslagname van het voedsel door de Tamiltijgers waarmee het aan de bevolking in 
het Noorden werd onthouden. Anderzijds meldt "artsen zonder grenzen" dat ook in het 
oorlogsvrije Zuiden veel – vooral kinderen – aan ondervoeding lijden. In het gebied van de 
Tamils worden kinderen bovendien gedwongen tot arbeid dat geldt zowel voor de indirecte 
oorlogsinspanningen (loopgraven en bunkerbouw) als voor de directe oorlogsinspanningen 
als kindsoldaat. Kinderen worden door de LTTE al vanaf de leeftijd van 10 jaar 
gerecruteerd. De overige zeer massale en flagrante schendingen van de rechten van het 
kind op Sri Lanka komen eerder voort uit de armoede dan de oorlog en duren dan ook nog 
na het vredesverdrag voort. De tweeduizend kinderen die volgens de regering in de 
prostitutie zitten, zijn volgens andere bronnen nog geflatteerd want volgens de VN 
bedraagt dat aantal dertigduizend. In Sri Lanka vinden in het door de regering 
gecontroleerde gebied wel nog tamelijk vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen plaats waardoor de 
gegevens van het Freedom House gunstig afsteken bij de geconstateerde grove 
schendingen in de gevangenis, bij martelingen en buitengerechtelijke executies en de 
onderdrukking in het door de LTTE beheerste gebied.  
 
11. Israël en de Palestijnse gebieden 
 
In Israël binnen de groene lijn blijven de mensenrechtenschendingen in de periode 1989-
2000 beperkt en vindt er weinig geweld plaats. De schendingen zijn vooral constant de 
beperkte toegang tot onderwijs en de discriminatie in huisvesting voor de Arabische 
Israëliërs. De weerslag van het geweld in de bezette gebieden tijdens de eerste Intifadah 
wordt niet weerspiegeld in Israël. Daarentegen heeft de tweede Intifadah wel degelijke 
zware gevolgen voor de situatie in Israël zelf. Er wordt op grotere schaal gemarteld, de 
                                                 
56 Bij vergelijking van de buitengerechtelijke executies buiten de directe oorlogshandelingen over de jaren 
1993, 1994 en 1995 zijn de cijfers: 80, 10, 72. Betrekken we daar de burgerslachtoffers bij, waaronder ook 
buitengerechtelijke executies zitten, dan zijn de aantallen: 250, 150 en vierhonderd.  
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gevangenisomstandigheden verslechteren en buitengerechtelijke executies van 13 
Arabische Israëliërs in 2000 bij een demonstratie vinden plaats. In 2000, 2001 en 2002 
worden respectievelijk 22, 200 en 469 Israëliërs vermoord als gevolg van de 
zelfmoordaanvallen. De geweldspiraal verhevigt de al eerder geconstateerde schendingen. 
Kortom de schendingen in de meer vreedzame tijden zijn te zien als indicatoren voor de 
schendingen in de meer gewelddadige tijd.     
Wanneer we naar de door Israël bezette gebieden kijken en de aan de staat Israël toe te 
schrijven schendingen in kaart brengen, constateren we een constante zeer slechte 
mensenrechtensituatie. In de periode 1989 tot 1995 tijdens de eerste Intifadah was het 
geweld hoog met een groot aantal buitengerechtelijke executies. Dit nam af in de daarop 
volgende periode tot september 2002 bij het uitbreken van de tweede Intifadah. In 2000, 
2001 en 2002 zijn respectievelijk 307, 509 en 990 Palestijnen door het Israëlische leger 
gedood. De geweldspiraal heeft ook grote gevolgen voor andere mensenrechten 
schendingen. Zo constateren we voor de hele periode de gebrekkige toegang tot onderwijs 
omdat de Palestijnse universiteiten veelvuldig werden gesloten. Deze schending nam toe in 
omvang tijdens de gewelddadige jaren toen de noodklok werd ingesteld en schoolklassen 
voor een belangrijk deel gesloten waren of niet langer te bereiken. In deze oorlogsjaren 
2000-2002 vinden gedwongen huisuitzettingen plaats, naast het vernietigen van huizen dat 
als de constante over de hele periode is te zien. Het meest zichtbare en direct aan de 
oorlogssituatie te relateren schending is het gebrek aan voedsel en water. De honger als 
gevolg van de oorlog vindt plaats in 2001 en 2002. De periode 1995-2000 was de beste 
periode in de bezette gebieden. Het Palestijns gezag kon in die periode aan de opbouw 
werken in het gebied dat aan hen werd over gedragen. Kijken we tenslotte naar de 
Palestijnse gebieden die door de Palestijnse autoriteit zijn bestuurd dan zien we eveneens 
de verslechtering van de laatste jaren. Martelingen, slechte gevangenisomstandigheden en 
buitengerechtelijke executies vonden ook al tevoren plaats maar verslechterde als gevolg 
van het geweld. Ook hier constateren we een constante in de belemmering op de toegang 
van het onderwijs voor Arabische meisjes maar de verslechtering nadien door de noodklok 
die we zo even constateerden maakte het voor alle scholieren en studenten vaak 
onmogelijk de school te bereiken.  
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CONCLUSIES VAN DIT ONDERZOEK TEN AANZIEN VAN VROEGTIJDIGE 
WAARSCHUWINGEN 
 
1. Er bestaat een samenhang tussen de mate van geweld en de mate van 
mensenrechtenschendingen. 
2. Bij afname van geweld constateren we wel een afname van de burger- en politieke 
schendingen maar niet een afname van de economische en sociale mensenrechten-
schendingen. 
3. We vinden geen verband tussen het plaatsvinden van de burger- en politieke 
schendingen en de economische en sociale mensenrechtenschendingen. 
4. We constateren evenmin dat het ene type schendingen voorafgaat aan het andere 
type schendingen. 
5. Vroegtijdig optreden om schendingen op niveau twee in te dammen kan militair 
geweld voorkomen en kan een toename in de ernst, frequentie en reikwijdte van 
mensenrechtenschendingen eveneens voorkomen.  
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OMSTANDER 
 
Nu we kennis hebben kunnen nemen van vroegtijdige waarschuwingen, is het tijd de 
volgende stap te zetten naar vroegtijdig optreden. De vraag of en onder welke 
omstandigheden vroegtijdige waarschuwing ook tot vroegtijdig optreden zal leiden, wil ik 
de komende jaren gaan onderzoeken. Enkele gedachten over de richting van dat onderzoek 
kan ik nu naar voren brengen. Meer en meer staat de omstander en niet langer de dader 
centraal in onderzoek en educatie. Dat laatste heeft te maken met het gegeven dat we hoe 
langer hoe meer kennis nemen van wreedheden overal en daarmee de rol van de omstander 
vervullen. Transparante samenlevingen met massacommunicatie en spionage satellieten 
leggen zogezegd de hele wereld bloot. Daarmee worden we allemaal getuige en zitten in de 
rol van omstander.57 
    
In het geval van genocide is de omstander verplicht dat te voorkomen en te bestraffen 
binnen de jurisdictie van de eigen staat.58 Een verplichting tot ingrijpen in een andere staat 
stond niet in de Genocide conventie uit 1948 maar uit de parlementaire debatten kwam 
naar voren dat men gebonden was al het mogelijke te doen doelgerichte massamoord uit te 
bannen.59 Dat kan de staat zelfstandig doen maar de staat kan ook de Verenigde Naties 
vragen maatregelen te nemen ter voorkoming of beëindiging van handelingen als het 
samenspannen of aanzetten tot genocide, het (mede) plegen van genocide en de pogingen 
                                                 
57 Tony Kushner, 'Pissing in the Wind'? The Search for Nuance in the Study of Holocaust 'Bystanders' in: 
David Cesarani, Paul A. Levine (eds.) 'Bystanders' to the Holocaust: A Re-evaluation, London, 2002, p. 60. 
58 Artikel I, :"Genocide, whether commited in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international 
law which they  [de staten die partij zijn] undertake to prevent and to punish.  
59 Samantha Power, 2002, p. 245-246, "The Convention's language was vague on precisely how the UN 
member states would meet their obligations, making no mention of military intervention and trusting that 
domestic prosecution of future 'genocidists' would deter massacres. Still the lively debates over ratification 
that occurred in national legislatures testified to the seriousness with which delegates believed they were 
committing their country's resources and prestige to banning targeted slaughter."  
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tot  genocide.60 In mei 1994 hebben bijvoorbeeld de Verenigde Staten bewust vermeden de 
volkerenmoord in Rwanda ook genocide te noemen.61 De VS woordvoerder diende dat 
woord te vermijden en gebruikte in plaats daarvan genocidale gebeurtenissen en 
voorvallen.62 Stanley Cohen merkt op dat hoewel met het gebruik van de term genocide 
men nog niet verplicht is tot interventie, het weigeren deze term te gebruiken het 
gemakkelijker maakt niet te interveniëren.63 Samantha Power voegt daar aan toe dat zij ook 
het morele stigma verbonden aan deze ultieme moord wilden vermijden.64 Aangezien 
aanzetten tot genocide ook onder de genocide conventie vallen en discriminatie van 
etnische, raciale, nationale of godsdienstige groeperingen veelal aan genocide voorafgaan –  
met inbegrip van dehumanisering van de medemens die eerder als object dan als subject 
                                                 
60 Artikel II, III en VIII van het Verdrag inzake de Voorkoming en Bestraffing van Genocide, 9 December 
1948 aanvaard in Parijs door de Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties en op 12 januari 1951 in 
werking getreden. 
61 A. Suhrke, and B, Jones, Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda: Failure to Act or Failure of Actions, pp. 238-
264, uit: B.W. Jentleson (ed.), Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized. Preventive Diplomacy in the 
Post-Cold War World, Rowman & Littlefield 2000. 
62 In Nederland verweet de CDA buitenland woordvoerder in de Kamer, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, voor het 
TV-programma NOVA van 18 juli 1995 minister Pronk dat hij Srebrenica genocide noemde; uit: de Groene 
Amsterdammer, 11 oktober 2003 en NRC Handelsblad 23 september 2003. De dag na het interview vroeg De 
Hoop Scheffer aan premier Kok of  de opmerkingen van minister Pronk wel sporen met het regeringsbeleid 
om in publieke uitlatingen terughoudenheid te betrachten met het oog op de Nederlandse VN militairen. 
Premier Kok antwoordde dezelfde dag dat de uitlatingen van Pronk niet met deze beleidslijn in strijd zijn. 
Tweede Kamer, 1994-1995, Aanhangsel, Vraag nr. 1071 van 19 juli 1995, p. 2205. 
63 Stanley Cohen, States of Denial; Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering, Polity, Cambridge, 2001, p. 162 
"Although legal application of the term 'genocide' does not ensure intervention, a refusal to use the term 
makes it easier not to intervene".  
64 Samantha Power, Raising the Cost of Genocide, pp. 245-264 in The New Killing Fields, Massacre and the 
Politics of Intervention, Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner (eds.), Basic Books, Perseus Books Group, Oxford, 
2002, p. 250 "This decision was made partly out of fear of triggering their [ze doelt hier op Europeanen en 
Amerikanen] obligations under the Genocide Convention, but mainly it was done to avoid the moral stigma 
associated with allowing what Lemkin described as 'the ultimate crime'." Zie verder Samantha Powers, 
Bystander to Genocide, The Atlantic Monthly, September 2001, p. 85. Zie ook: Michael Barnett, Eyewitness 
to a Genocide; The United Nations and Rwanda, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2002 en 
Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell; America and the Age of Genocide, Flamingo, London, 2002 met 
daarin hoofdstuk 10 Rwanda: "Mostly in a Listening Mode", pp. 329-389. 
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wordt beschouwd – dringt zich de noodzaak maar ook de mogelijkheid weer op van 
vroegtijdig optreden. Zo is een norm en wetsbepaling in het Nederlands strafrecht dat je 
verplicht bent hulp te verlenen aan degene die in onmiddellijk levensgevaar verkeert. 65 
Deze verplichting voor de intermenselijke relaties binnen een staat kan niet zonder meer 
worden omgezet tot een verplichting in de internationale en interstatelijke betrekkingen. 
Toch redenerend vanuit een mensenrechten eigen “bottom up” gedachte dien je aan een 
mogelijke analogie evenmin voorbij te gaan. Wat mij betreft kan artikel 450 strafrecht [Hij 
die, getuige van het ogenblikkelijk levensgevaar waarin een ander verkeert, nalaat deze die 
hulp te verlenen of te verschaffen die hij hem zonder gevaar voor zichzelf of anderen 
redelijkerwijs te kunnen duchten, verlenen of verschaffen kan, wordt, indien de dood van 
de hulpbehoevende volgt, gestraft met..] als moreel uitgangspunt66 dienen en als 
rechtvaardigheidsgrond bij internationale interventie. Volgens sommigen zou dit op den 
duur kunnen uitgroeien tot internationaal gewoonterecht.67  
 
De term omstander heeft een ongunstige (pejoratieve) betekenis gekregen. Veelal nog 
ongunstiger dan termen als voorbijganger, toeschouwer, buitenstaander, waarnemer of 
getuige. Oms tanders worden dan gezien als degenen die onverschillig staan ten opzichte 
                                                 
65 Art. 450 Wetboek van Strafrecht: Hij die, getuige van het ogenblikkelijk levensgevaar waarin een ander 
verkeert, nalaat deze die hulp te verlenen of te verschaffen die hij hem zonder gevaar voor zichzelf of 
anderen redelijkerwijs te kunnen duchten, verlenen of verschaffen kan, wordt, indien de dood van de 
hulpbehoevende volgt, gestraft met hechtenis van ten hoogste drie maanden of geldboete van de tweede 
categorie.  
66 Johannes Houwink ten Cate wijst in zijn oratie van 8 mei 2003 aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam , De 
naamgeving van de misdaad en de persoonlijkheid van de schrijftafelmoordenaar, op de verschillende 
dimensies van het begrip genocide waaronder ook de moreel-juridische naast de internationaal-
strafrechtelijke dimensie. 
67 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, Canada, 
December 2001, schrijft op p. 16 over "an emerging guiding principle in favour of military intervention for 
human protection purposes is also supported by a wide variety of legal sources" en op p. 50 "it may 
eventually be that a new rule of customary international law to this effect comes to be regocnized, but as we 
have already acknowledged it would be quite premature to make any claim about the existence now of such a 
rule". 
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van de slachtoffers en een passieve houding innemen. Dit beeld komt tot uiting in de 
toeschouwer in Sighet door Elie Wiesel als volgt beschreven68: 
 
“Mijn ouders en ik stonden bij het hek. …. Toen opeens zag ik hém. Een gezicht achter het 
raam aan de overkant. …… Een onbeduidend, alledaags, verveeld, gezicht: door geen 
enkele hartstocht aangedaan. Ik bleef er lang naar kijken. Hij keek naar buiten, drukte geen 
medelijden, geen vreugde, geen geschoktheid, zelfs geen woede of belangstelling uit. 
Onbewogen, koel, onpersoonlijk. Het schouwspel liet hem onverschillig. Wat! Die mensen 
gaan sterven? Dat is niet zijn schuld, kom nou; hij heeft de beslissing niet genomen. Hij is 
niet pro-joods en niet anti-joods: alleen maar een toeschouwer, dat is alles. 
Zeven dagen lang liep de binnenplaats van de oude synagoge vol en weer leeg. Hij stond 
achter de gordijnen te kijken. De politieagenten sloegen vrouwen en kinderen: hij kwam 
niet van zijn plaats. Het ging hem niet aan. Hij was slachtoffer noch beul: getuige dat was 
hij. Hij wilde zijn rust. …… De anderen, alle anderen, dat was hij. De derde hoek van de 
driehoek. Tussen slachtoffers en beulen bestaat een geheimzinnige band: zij behoren tot 
dezelfde wereld ……. Met de ander is dat echter niet zo. De getuige ontgaat ons geheel. 
Hij kijkt zonder gezien te worden. Hij is er zonder op te vallen. Het voetlicht beschermt 
hem. Hij applaudisseert niet, hij protesteert niet: zijn aanwezigheid is vaag, verplicht hem 
minder dan afwezig te zijn. Hij zegt geen ja en geen nee, ook geen misschien. Hij zegt 
niets. Hij is er, maar hij doet of hij er niet is. Erger hij doet alsof wij er niet waren.” 69 
 
In beginsel is de omstander noch dader, noch slachtoffer maar de derde partij die er wel bij 
aanwezig is of er zich bewust van zou kunnen zijn maar niet op voorhand tot de groepering 
van de daders of van de slachtoffers gerekend kan worden. In bovenstaand voorbeeld waar 
de omstander niet handelt, laat deze de dader zijn gang gaan en door niet te handelen 
                                                 
68 Elie Wiesel die in 1986 de Nobelprijs voor de vrede (!) had ontvangen ontving in 2002 de hoogste 
onderscheiding van Roemenië (de orde van de ster van Roemenië). Bij deze uitreiking vroeg hij om meer 
ruchtbaarheid wat in de Tweede Wereldoorlog de Roemeense joden en Roma is aangedaan. NRC-
Handelsblad, 31 juli 2002. In oktober 2003 wordt Elie Wiesel benoemd tot voorzitter van een 
onderzoekscommissie naar de Shoa in Roemenië. 
69 Elie Wiesel, De stad van het geluk, Uitgeverij BZZToH, ’s-Gravenhage, 1987, pp. 136-137. 
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maakt de omstander mogelijk dat de dader zijn wreedheden voortzet. Wiesel schreef: “Men 
was getuige van een ontzettende vereenvoudiging. Aan de ene kant de beulen, aan de 
andere kant de slachtoffers. En de toeschouwers, de neutralen? De neutralen helpen altijd 
de beulen, zuiver en alleen al door hen hun gang te laten gaan.”70 
 
Het kan ook anders want er zijn ook omstanders die hun solidariteit tonen zoals Cleveringa 
indertijd. Job Cohen wees vorig jaar in zijn Cleveringa-lezing op de keuzemogelijkheid 
van de omstanders.71 Zij kunnen de ander tot een vreemde bestempelen of zij kunnen deze 
het gevoel geven er bij te horen. Het "er bij horen" is wezenlijk voor de bevordering van de 
rechten van de mens. Theo van Boven schreef in dit verband over de praktijk van 
uitsluiting en de beginselen van insluiting.72 
 
Een ander voorbeeld van een omstander die wel handelt is de onderduikgever in Nederland 
tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Ik citeer uit het werk “Daders, slachtoffers, omstanders” 
van Raul Hilberg: "Toen de transporten begonnen, bestond de voornaamste hulp die de 
joden geboden werd uit onderduikadressen. In deze samenzweerderige activiteit raakten de 
Nederlanders heel bedreven. Helpers werden door de Nederlandse ondergrondse 
aangemoedigd en financieel gesteund. Als ze gepakt werden hoefden ze niet bang te zijn 
                                                 
70 Elie Wiesel: Een Jood, vandaag; Gooi en Sticht bv, Hilversum, 1978, p. 13. Zie ook Staub die stelde: "the 
bystander plays a central part in the establishment and maintenance of human rights abuses. By turning away 
or remaining passive in the face of threats to human life, the conditions for genocide are maximised." 
Geciteerd in A. Austin, 2003, p. 13. Uit zijn standaardwerk: E.Staub, The roots of evil - the origins of 
genocide and the other group violence, Cambridge, 1989 stelt hij aan de andere kant op p. 78 "Bystanders can 
exert powerful influence …. Even the behavior of governments can be strongly affected by bystanders - 
individuals, groups or other governments. Repeatedly when they faced substantial opposition, the Nazis 
backed away. ….A lack of protest can confirm the perpetrators' faith in what they are doing." 
71 Job Cohen, Vreemden, Cleveringa-lezing op 26 november 2002, Universiteit Leiden. 
72 Theo van Boven, Human Rights and Rights of Peoples, oorspronkelijk in European Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 6, 1995, pp. 461-476 en opgenomen in: Fons Coomans, Cees Flinterman, Fred Grünfeld, Ingrid 
Westendorp and Jan Willems (eds.), Human Rights from Exclusion to Inclusion; Principles and Practice - An 
Anthology from the Work of Theo van Boven, op p. 277 "It is the notion and principle of inclusion as 
opposed to the practice of exclusion … which is to be regarded as a core idea of United Nations'approaches 
to human rights." 
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dat ze automatisch de doodstraf kregen. Duizenden werden gearresteerd omdat ze joden of 
joodse eigendommen verborgen hielden, maar het Duitse beleid was om die mensen maar 
betrekkelijk korte tijd in een kamp in het land vast te houden en in ernstige gevallen hun 
bezittingen in beslag te nemen."73 Dit is een constatering achteraf  en geeft nog geen 
inzicht in de verwachtingen vooraf over het risico dat onderduikgevers liepen. Verder 
onderzoek naar de rol van de omstanders in Nederland lijkt me erg gewenst waarbij ook de 
vele tegengestelde bevindingen nader geanalyseerd kunnen worden.74  
 
Het voorbeeld vanuit Nederland contrasteert sterk met het voorbeeld uit de Oekraïne waar  
“iedere Oekraïner die een jood verborgen hield, zich aan acuut gevaar bloot stelde. Zo 
schoot een Duitse politiecompagnie in het dorp Samary, Volhynia, een hele Oekraïense 
familie dood – een man, twee vrouwen en drie kinderen – omdat zij een joodse vrouw in 
huis hadden.”75 De visie van de Duitsers op de Slavische Oekraïeners lijkt verschillend van 
die op de Germaanse Nederlanders in deze strafmaatregel. De positie van de omstander en 
                                                 
73 Raul Hilberg:Daders slachtoffers omstanders; De joodse catastrofe 1933-1945, Becht, Haarlem, 1993, p. 
184. Deze passage is gebaseerd op twee bronnen: Rapport van de commandant van de Sicherheitspolizei in 
Nederland over 1942 en van 15 augustus 1944. Gehaald uit National archives of the United States, record 
group 242, T 175, roll 670. Er wordt nog aan toegevoegd in deze noot op p. 273  "Per 13 augustus 1944 
waren 1997 mensen geïnterneerd omdat ze joden hadden geholpen, zonder in staat van beschuldiging te zijn 
gesteld." Dit werd mij bevestigd (28-07-2003) door prof. dr. J. Houwink ten Cate, hoogleraar Genocide 
studies aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam: “Het is inderdaad waar dat gepakte onderduikgevers vanaf het 
najaar van 1943 standaard zes maanden KZ-Vught kregen, soms na verhoor in de Scheveningse 
Cellenbarakken. Hierover moet er een Erlass (verordening) van het RSHA zijn geweest, maar wij hebben de 
tekst ervan nooit kunnen vinden. Wij leiden dit dus af uit de systematische behandeling van individuele 
gevallen. Degenen die gearresteerd werden wegens illegaal werk in georganiseerd verband konden zwaarder 
worden gestraft.” 
74 Te denken valt aan de discrepantie tussen de passiviteit van de meerderheid en de hulp van een kleine 
minderheid waarnaar koningin Beatrix in 1995 verwees, het bijzonder hoog aantal van 4.464 Yad Vashem 
penningen – een kwart van het totaal, op Polen na verreweg de meeste – dat aan Nederlanders werd 
toegekend, het relatieve hoogste percentage gedeporteerde Joden van alle West-Europese staten. Martin 
Gilbert, The Righteous - The unsung heroes of the holocaust, Doubleday, London, 2002, p. 402.  Daarnaast 
stelt Gilbert op pag. 291: “For every Dutch person who helped a Jew there was another seemingly ready to 
betray the rescuers.” Van de 25.000 ondergedoken Joden overleefden 16.000 de oorlog. 
75 Raul Hilberg, p. 176. 
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het risico dat de omstander loopt verschilt per situatie en is mede afhankelijk van de rol die 
de dader voor de omstander in gedachte heeft. De voorzichtigere houding waarmee de 
Duitsers met de West-Europese omstanders omgingen verschilt eveneens met die in Oost-
Europa. In de woorden van Hilberg: “De joden uit Duitsland waren verscheept: ze werden 
niet aan de Rijn doodgeschoten. De joden van Riga en Kaunas waren echter vlak bij hun 
huis afgeslacht”.76 Er werd gebruik gemaakt van de medewerking die omstanders konden 
bieden, omstanders die openlijk profiteerden van bijvoorbeeld het getto van Lvov.  
Hoe voorzichtig de eerste Duitse maatregelen tegen de Nederlandse Joden ook waren – 
zoals de verplaatsing van Joodse musici van de voorgrond naar de achtergrond bij het 
Residentie orkest en het Concertgebouworkest of de verplaatsing van Joden uit de 
Hollandse kuststreek – er ontstond wel verzet zoals de februari-staking uit 1942 terwijl 
desondanks helaas het eindresultaat wat betreft de deportatie voor Nederland nog 
bedroevender was dan voor andere West Europese bezette staten. 
 
Ook in de alledaagse situatie komen situaties van geweld en mishandeling veelvuldig voor 
waarbij derden niet ingrijpen. Een voorbeeld dat vaak wordt aangehaald is dat van Kitty 
Genovese die in 1964 op straat werd aangevallen en gedurende 40 minuten werd 
mishandeld. Ze schreeuwde en riep maar geen van de 38 mensen die haar hoorde, greep in 
of belde de politie.77  We hebben in dat geval, bekend onder de vreemde term "zinloze 
moord", te maken met de directe getuige. Een ander bekend voorbeeld van de stille getuige 
is het ophalen bij de buren van de dochter in Argentinië in een Ford Falcon toen de junta 
daar aan de macht was. In deze gevallen is de waarneming direct maar is de interpretatie 
van de gebeurtenis door de omstander van belang voor zijn houding.  De oorspronkelijke 
vraagstelling verschuift van “wie wist wat” naar 1. Op welk  moment werd de informatie 
ontvangen; 2. Hoe werd deze informatie geïnterpreteerd; en 3. Welke beslissingen werden 
                                                 
76 Ibidem, p. 174. 
77 Stanley Cohen 2001, pp. 3, 68-69, 143. Zie verder: A.M. Rosenthal, Thirty-Eight Witnesses: The Kitty 
Genovese Case, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999. Alexander Austin stelt dat zij verkracht en 
vermoord is en wijst er op dat er minder snel hulp wordt geboden als het slachtoffer tot een andere groep 
behoort of tot een ver weg gelegen andere groep of wanneer er meerdere omstanders zijn. A. Austin, Early 
Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science? In: Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, 2003, p. 
13. 
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op grond daarvan al dan niet genomen.78 Met deze veranderde vraagstelling wordt de 
geschiedschrijving van de omstander steeds meer het verhaal van wat hij niet heeft 
gedaan.79 De schuldvraag wordt dan soms vooral bij de omstander gelegd en verdwijnt de 
dader uit het zicht. Zo omschrijft het Holocaust Museum in Washington in haar actie tot 
bewustwording van de bezoekers de omstanders als de onopzettelijke schuldigen. 80   
 
De rol van de omstander op individueel niveau is niet mijn onderzoeksonderwerp al schenk 
ik daar wel in het onderwijs veel aandacht aan, temeer daar een vroegtijdig bewustzijn kan 
leiden tot verzet op het moment dat zulks nog mogelijk is omdat de repressie niet verder is 
voortgeschreden. Hoefnagels heeft daarvoor een model opgesteld.81 Een model dat ook 
zeer bruikbaar is voor de rol van omstanders op het nationaal niveau. Wanneer zullen en/of 
kunnen derde staten ingrijpen is dan de vraag die ik nu stel. 
 
OMSTANDERS OP INTERNATIONAAL NIVEAU 
 
Ook op het internationaal niveau komt deze verschuiving inclusief de negatieve klank over 
omstanders terug. Ik zal dadelijk op de Nederlandse rol in Srebrenica ingaan maar eerst 
nog even aandacht vragen voor de omstanderstaten in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Zo stelt 
Levine dat hoe minder je van de Shoa weet hoe meer je de Verenigde Staten en het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk prijst maar hoe meer je er van weet des te meer je bent geneigd hen te 
                                                 
78 Raya Cohen, The Lost Honour of Bystanders? The Case of Jewish Emissaries in Switzerland, p. 149 in: 
Cesarani en Levine, 2002. Passage gebaseerd op Leni Yahil, The Holocaust, Oxford University Press New 
York, 1990. 
79 Ibidem, p. 150. 
80 Stanley Cohen, 2001, p. 167 citeert de directeur van dat museum:”The understanding of the passive 
bystander’s inadvertent guilt is probably the most important and most relevant moral lesson the museum can 
teach to its visitors. Its importance lies in its broad applicability to contemporary historical and social 
phenomena as well as to occurrences in everybody’s daily life.” Uit: Jeshajahu Weinberg, From the Director, 
in Michael Berenbaum: The World Must Know: The History of the Holocaust as Told in the United States 
Holocaust Museum, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1993, p. xv.  
81 Marjo Hoefnagels, Political violence and peace research, pp. 29-39 in: Repression and repressive violence, 
Amsterdam/Lisse, 1977. 
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kritiseren voor wat ze deden en vooral wat ze niet deden.82 Te veel wordt dan de aandacht 
gericht op wat had behoren te gebeuren dan dat er een analyse plaatsvindt van wat is 
gebeurd. Zo’n interessante analyse werd verricht door een Amerikaanse aio, Meredith 
Hindley, die de geallieerde reacties op de Shoa met die op de voedselschaarste vergeleek. 83 
Voor de geallieerden telde bovenal de oorlogsvoering en dat betekende dat zij in geen 
geval mochten meewerken aan een versterking van de Duitse oorlogsinspanning.84 Het 
redden of helpen van burgers was daar aan ondergeschikt.85  Het embargo op voedsel naar 
Europa werd gehandhaafd vanuit de overtuiging dat het de taak van de Duitsers was de 
bevolking, ook in de bezette gebieden, van voedsel te voorzien en Churchill zei in het 
Britse parlement dat de voedselblokkade ook voor bezet Frankrijk om die reden werd 
gehandhaafd.86 
Ook het Joods Wereld Congres volgde deze lijn en stuurde bijvoorbeeld in 1941 geen 
voedselpaketten naar het ghetto van Warschau terwijl 10 % in 1941 door uithongering 
stierf.87 Een andere joodse hulp organisatie RELICO stuurde wel voedselpakketten die ook 
allemaal op de juiste bestemming aankwamen. Het beleid was een sanctie politiek te 
volgen met het oog de tegenstander te verzwakken op economisch terrein en daarmee aan 
gevechtscapaciteit te laten inboeten.88 Ook Hilberg trekt deze conclusie uit het beleid van 
de geallieerden in de Tweede wereldoorlog89: "De westerse geallieerden wilden niet dat 
hun eigen bevolking de oorlog zag als een poging de joden te bevrijden. Er mocht geen 
toespeling gemaakt of impliciete conclusie getrokken worden dat de geallieerde troepen 
                                                 
82 Paul A. Levine, Attitudes and Action: Comparing the Responses of Mid-level Bureaucrats to the 
Holocaust, p. 212 in: Cesarani en Levine, 2002. 
83 Meredith Hindley, Constructing Allied Humanitarian Policy, pp. 77-102 in: Cesarani en Levine, 2002. 
84 Ibidem, p. 85. 
85 Ibidem, p. 79. 
86  Ibidem, p. 87, Curchill in House of Commons op 20 Augustus 1940. 
87 Raya Cohen, The Lost Honour of Bystanders? The Case of Jewish Emissaries in Switzerland, p. 161 en 
165 in: Cesarani en Levine, 2002.  
88 Bij de sancties tegen Irak van de afgelopen 13 jaar kan dat ook een rol hebben gespeeld. De sancties tegen 
Irak werden ingesteld op 2 augustus 1990 met S/RES/661 en werden beëindigd op 22 mei 2003, S/RES/1483  
Zie ook: Fred Grünfeld, Sancties, Ars Aequi, 51 (2002) 7/8, pp. 93-101. 
89 Raul Hilberg, Daders, Slachtoffers , Omstanders; De Joodse Catastrofe 1933-1945, Becht, Haarlem, 1992, 
p. 223. 
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huursoldaten voor de joodse  zaak waren. Het was al moeilijk genoeg om een Brit of 
Amerikaan uit te leggen waarom er oorlog werd gevoerd…. Gezien dit standpunt kon de 
bevrijding van de joden slechts een nevenproduct van de overwinning zijn."  
 
Interessant is vervolgens de rol van een omstanderstaat te bestuderen die niet bij de 
militaire strijd was betrokken. Zweden bijvoorbeeld stelde zich tot 1942 uiterst 
terughoudend op ten opzichte van de Jodenvervolging. Het liet nauwelijks vluchtelingen 
toe90 mede omdat het bevreesd was voor de eigen werkgelegenheid en een verstoring van 
de handel met nazi Duitsland.91 In november 1942 wordt het Zweedse beleid radicaal 
gewijzigd en dat heeft alles te maken met de deportatie van achthonderd Joden uit 
Noorwegen.92 Een belangrijke rol werd daarbij vervuld door de Zweedse onder secretaris-
generaal bij het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Gösta Engzell,  die al eerder was 
geïnformeerd over de uitroeiing in Mauthausen, Lodz, Belzec, de Baltische staten maar pas 
tot een actieve radicale beleidswijziging kwam nadat op 26 november 1942 de deportatie 
per boot van 532 mannen, vrouwen en kinderen uit Noorwegen voorpagina nieuws werd.93 
Binnen een week verklaarde Zweden alle overgebleven Joden uit Noorwegen op te willen 
vangen. Noorse Joden behoorden tot verwante Scandinaviërs.94 Onverschilligheid was 
geen optie meer.95 Nadat deze drempel eind 1942 genomen was, werd het beleid zo veel 
mogelijk Joden te redden en volgden de reddingspogingen van de Deense Joden in 1943, 
de Hongaarse Joden in 1944 – door onder meer Raoul Wallenberg – en vervolgens werden 
                                                 
90 Zweden telde in 1939 twee duizend Joodse vluchteling, evenveel als Luxemburg op dat moment. Paul A. 
Levine, Attitudes and Action: Comparing the Responses of Mid-level Bureaucrats to the Holocaust, p. 219 
in: Cesarani en Levine, 2002. 
91 Sven Nordlund: ‘The War is Over - Now You Can Go Home!’ Jewish Refugees and the Swedish Labour 
Market in the Shadow of the Holocaust, pp. 171-198 in: Cesarani en Levine, 2002. 
92 Karen Kvist, A Study of Antisemitic Attitudes within Sweden’s Wartime Utlänningsbyrân, pp. 207-208. 
93 Paul A. Levine, Attitudes and Action: Comparing the Responses of Mid-level Bureaucrats to the 
Holocaust, p. 225 in: Cesarani en Levine, 2002. 
94 Ibidem, p. 226. 
95 Paul A. Levine, Attitudes and Action: Comparing the Responses of Mid-level Bureaucrats to the 
Holocaust, p. 227 in: Cesarani en Levine, 2002. 
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in 1945 nog zoveel mogelijk mensen met bussen96 – mede georganiseerd door Folke 
Bernadotte –  uit de kampen gehaald waaronder drie duizend vrouwen uit Ravensbrück.  
 
Afgelopen jaar speelde de vraag naar de rol van Nederland in de kwestie Srebrenica. Deze 
verantwoordelijkheid werd door de regering Kok zo hoog opgevat dat het Kabinet Kok 
besloot af te treden, een unieke gebeurtenis die mijns inziens te weinig aandacht heeft 
gekregen. Ik citeer nu uit de regeringsverklaring die Kok op 16 april 2002 uitsprak:97 
 
“Ik ben tot de slotsom gekomen dat de ernst van de bevindingen van het NIOD ….  niet zonder politieke 
consequenties mag blijven98. ….. Het NIOD-rapport is volstrekt duidelijk over de vraag wie verantwoordelijk 
moet worden gesteld voor de val van Srebrenica en de daarop volgende massamoord; de schuld daarvoor ligt 
bij de Bosnische Serviërs, in het bijzonder bij generaal Mladic. …..De internationale gemeenschap is 
tekortgeschoten in het bieden van voldoende bescherming aan de mensen in de "safe areas". Daarmee is ook 
de Nederlandse regering als lid van die internationale gemeenschap tekortgeschoten. De consequenties die 
thans worden getrokken zijn niet verbonden aan één specifieke gebeurtenis of één specifiek moment, maar 
vloeien voort uit de opeenstapeling van tekortkomingen gedurende verschillende kabinetsperiodes. Met dit 
besluit wordt integraal verantwoordelijkheid genomen voor het gevoerde beleid gedurende een reeks van 
jaren…..  Nederland neemt uitdrukkelijk niet de schuld op zich voor de gruwelijke moord op duizenden 
Bosnische moslims in 1995. Wél wordt op deze wijze de politieke medeverantwoordelijkheid van Nederland 
voor de situatie waarin dit kon gebeuren, zichtbaar gemaakt. “De internationale gemeenschap” is anoniem en 
kan niet op een zichtbare manier verantwoordelijkheid nemen tegenover de slachtoffers en nabestaanden van 
Srebrenica. Ik kan en doe dat wel.”99 
 
Nederland is uitdrukkelijk niet de dader maar wel medeverantwoordelijk. Een omstander 
die er bij betrokken was en derhalve medeverantwoordelijk is. Bij de behandeling van het 
                                                 
96 Sune Persson, Folke Bernadotte and the White Buses, pp. 237-268, in: Cesarani en Levine 2002.  
97 Kamerstukken 28 506 heeft betrekking op het rapport van de Enquêtecommissie Srebrenica terwijl 26 122 
betrekking heeft op het NIOD rapport. Verklaring Minister President Kok over aftreden kabinet, Handelingen 
2001-2001, nr. 68 (16-4-2002), Tweede Kamer, p. 4539-4541. 
98 Ibidem p. 4539. 
99 Ibidem, p. 4540. 
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rapport van de parlementaire enquêtecommissie zei Balkende op 18 juni 2003 in de 
Tweede Kamer:100 
 
“Dat brengt mij bij het moeilijke vraagstuk van schuld en verantwoordelijkheden….Ik wil wel duidelijk zijn 
over het standpunt van de regering. Vanuit moreel en ethisch oogpunt zijn de daders van de massamoord 
schuldig. …Het is van allergrootste belang dat zij ook in juridische zin schuldig worden bevonden. De 
regering blijft zich inspannen om de daders voor het Joegoslavië-tribunaal te krijgen…. Naast schuld is er 
verantwoordelijkheid. Deze ligt bij de schuldigen, maar daarnaast ook bij de internationale gemeenschap en 
de staten die daarvan deel uitmaken.”101 
 
Vervolgens vraagt Marijke Vos van GroenLinks of de verantwoordelijkheid ook inhoudt 
dat Nederland excuses zal gaan aanbieden:  
 
“Natuurlijk ligt de schuld bij Mladic en de Serviërs. Daar bestaat geen twijfel over. Nederland draagt echter 
wel verantwoordelijkheid en Nederland is tekortgeschoten in de bescherming die het had moeten bieden aan 
de bewoners aldaar. In dat licht lijkt het mij zeer goed mogelijk om excuses aan te bieden, zonder dat 
daarmee de schuld die bij de Serviërs ligt op de schouders wordt genomen. Dat vraag ik de regering.”102 
 
Balkenende antwoordt daarop:  
 
"Wij voelen de pijn van de bevolking en wij dragen onze medeverantwoordelijkheid, maar excuses moeten in 
relatie worden gezien met de schuldvraag103… de schuldigen daarvan zijn de moordenaars en hun 
superieuren. Ik wil in geen geval de indruk wekken dat de schuldvraag elders komt te liggen dan waar die 
hoort. Die indruk zou kunnen ontstaan bij het aanbieden van excuses. Ik wil de heer Eurlings (CDA) hier 
naspreken die gisterenavond in een interruptie debatje zei dat Nederland in ieder geval met goede 
bedoelingen heeft getracht iets te doen aan de wreedheden in Bosnië. Veel landen lieten de beker aan zich 
voorbijgaan. Nederland hoeft zich niet op de borst te slaan, zeker niet gelet op de gebeurtenissen in 1995, 
maar excuses vind ik niet de juiste vorm waarin ook dit kabinet de medeverantwoordelijkheid voor de 
                                                 
100 Voortzetting van de behandeling van het Rapport van de Enquêtecommissie Srebrenica (debat met de 
Regering), Handelingen 2002-2003, nr. 79 (18-6-2003), p. 4473-4529. 
101 Ibidem, p. 4475. 
102 Ibidem, p. 4478. 
103 Ibidem. p. 4478 na de vraag van mevrouw Vos. 
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ontstane situatie meent te moeten dragen…... Het aanbieden van excuses behoort bij het dragen van 
schuld…. Dat is, wat mij betreft, een stap te ver.”104 
 
De rol van omstander is aangescherpt. Het kabinet Balkenende herhaalt de 
medeverantwoordelijkheid en schaart zich volledig achter de door het kabinet Kok 
gevolgde lijn. Geen Nederlands Kabinet is eerder door het parlement ten val gebracht of is 
afgetreden vanwege een onderwerp uit de buitenlandse politiek. Ditmaal was Nederland 
omstander bij de gruwelijke gebeurtenissen in Srebrenica en voelt zich als deel van de 
internationale gemeenschap – deelnemer aan de VN vredesmach  – mede verantwoordelijk. 
Het Kabinet treedt af, een unieke gebeurtenis die het belang van de rol van de omstander 
nog eens onderstreept.  
 
 
De Verenigde Naties 
 
De belangrijkste internationale omstander, de vertegenwoordiger bij uitstek van de 
internationale gemeenschap, is de Verenigde Naties. Deze Verenigde Naties en dan in het 
bijzonder haar belangrijkste orgaan de Veiligheidsraad (VR) heeft alleen in een zeer nauw 
omschreven situatie mandatoire bevoegdheden. Deze situatie bevindt zich niet aan het 
prille begin van de conflictsituatie of mensenrechtenschending maar de dreiging dat vrede 
en veiligheid in het geding is, moet manifest zijn. Dat wil niet zeggen dat er al gevochten 
moet worden (vredesbreuk of agressie) voordat de VR kan gaan optreden maar toch 
worden deze mandatoire bevoegdheden meestal niet gezien in het kader van de preventie. 
Alleen al het onderscheid tussen hoofdstuk VI en hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest geeft dat 
aan. Toch beweer ik hier dat dat wel kan, zeer gewenst is en juist in deze tijd noodzakelijk 
is. Het kan zowel juridisch als politiek, het is zeer gewenst en in overeenstemming met de 
doeleinden van de Verenigde Naties waarbij de bescherming van de Rechten van de Mens 
en het bewaren van de internationale vrede en veiligheid samengaan.105 Van der Stoel 
                                                 
104 Ibidem, p. 4478 voorafgaand aan de vraag van mevrouw Vos. 
105 Zie daartoe vooral de preambule van het Handvest naast artikel 55 van het Handvest van de Verenigde 
Naties. 
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verzet er zich eveneens tegen dat pas zou kunnen worden ingegrepen bij "onomstotelijk 
vaststaande systematische schendingen van de mensenrechten van de meest ernstige aard" 
106want dan misken je de VN doelstelling van de bescherming van de mensenrechten. 
Anderzijds bestaat er ook het gevaar dat er wèl wordt ingegrepen op grond van 
"vermeende, maar onvoldoende overtuigend aangetoonde schendingen van de 
mensenrechten".107 Ook Menno Kamminga wees in zijn oratie – twee jaar geleden – op het 
gevaar van misbruik wanneer buiten de VN om uit humanitaire overwegingen wordt 
ingegrepen. Hij zei: "De pijlers van het internationaal recht zijn er niet voor niets."108 Kofi 
Annan stelde in zijn toespraak op 23 september 2003 voor de Algemene Vergadering van 
de Verenigde Naties eveneens dat met unilaterale acties of ad hoc coalities zonder VN 
toestemming aan de beginselen van de afgelopen 58 jaar voor vrede en stabiliteit wordt 
getornd. Dat kan leiden tot een verspreiding van eenzijdig, onrechtmatig gebruik van 
geweld. De Veiligheidsraad dient zich daarover te buigen en "need to begin a discussion on 
the criteria for an early authorisation of coercive measures to address certain types of 
threats …. And they still need to engage in serious discussions of the best way to respond 
to threats of genocide or other comparable massive violations of human rights".109  
 
Kortom vroegtijdig optreden met dwangmaatregelen tegen bepaalde bedreigingen inclusief 
de dreiging van genocide of andere vergelijkbare grootschalige mensenrechtenschendingen 
staat hoog op de internationale agenda. Het vanuit deze leerstoel te ondernemen onderzoek 
lijkt me dan ook relevant. Ik sluit af. 
 
                                                 
106 M. van der Stoel, Conflictpreventie - de lessen van Kosovo en Macedonië, oratie, universiteit van Tilburg, 
25 januari 2002, p. 14. 
107 M. van der Stoel, Conflictpreventie - de lessen van Kosovo en Macedonië, oratie, universiteit van Tilburg, 
25 januari 2002, p. 15. 
108 Menno T. Kamminga, De humanisering van het volkenrecht, oratie van 23 maart 2001 aan de Universiteit 
Maastricht, p. 15. 
109 The Secretary-General Address to the General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2003. 
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Aanwijzingen voor op handen zijnde gewelddadige conflicten en grootschalige 
mensenrechtenschendingen zijn over het algemeen beschikbaar.110 De betrouwbaarheid 
van deze aanwijzingen is – met name door de terugslag van de vermeende 
massavernietigingswapens in de aanloop tot de oorlog in Irak111 – nog wel een punt van 
zorg. Een groter probleem is echter de omzettingen van waarschuwingen in actie, kortom 
het optreden van de omstander zelf. De politieke mobilisatie in de staten van de 
omstanders om tot optreden te komen bij voorkeur in internationaal verband, vergt de 
meeste aandacht. Het serieus nemen van de eerste signalen, temeer als die niet in het 
bestaande beeld passen, is een groot probleem. Veelal schuiven politici dat het liefst voor 
zich uit. Met mislukte interventies verlies je de verkiezingen in eigen land terwijl een 
succesvol vroegtijdig optreden zich vaak aan het zicht zal onttrekken. Zelfs wanneer de 
besluitvormers ervan overtuigd zijn dat met hun vroegtijdig optreden een ramp is 
voorkomen is dat moeilijk te bewijzen en win je daar de verkiezingen niet mee. Het is 
moeilijk steun te verwerven voor vroegtijdig optreden terwijl juist dan de kans op succes 
het grootst is.112 Pas bij verdergaand geweld en zeer ernstige mensenrechtenschendingen 
klinkt de roep voor interventie maar op dat moment is het moeilijker, kostbaarder en met 
meer risico's op mislukking omkleed.113 Hoe langer je wacht, hoe moeilijker het ingrijpen 
wordt maar pas dan verwerf je voor dat optreden politieke steun onder de eigen bevolking. 
Al lijkt met vroegtijdig optreden het beste resultaat tegen de minste kosten te kunnen 
worden bereikt, het ligt het minst voor de hand dat zo'n optreden ook daadwerkelijk zal 
plaatsvinden. Een onderzoeksonderwerp waar ik als politicoloog de komende jaren graag 
mijn tanden in wil zetten en waar deze leerstoel mij de gelegenheid voor biedt. 
 
 
                                                 
110 Ik verwijs naar Zweden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog en de Verenigde Naties in de aanloop tot de genocide 
in Rwanda. 
111 Deze oorlog startte op 20 maart 2003 en werd op 1 mei 2003 als beëindigd beschouwd. 
112 B.W. Jentleson (ed.). Opportunities Missed,  Opportunities Seized. Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-
Cold War World, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 
113 Ibidem, pp. 21-38, A.L. George en J.E. Holl, The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities 
in Preventive Diplomacy. 
48 
DANKWOORD 
 
Enkele mensen kan ik in de nog beschikbare tijd bedanken, de anderen graag na afloop van 
deze oratie.  
 
Graag wil ik het bestuur van de Stichting PIOOM bedanken voor deze leerstoel en mijn 
benoeming. De Stichting PIOOM staat voor Stichting ter Bevordering van Projecten voor 
Interdisciplinair Onderzoek naar de Oorzaken van Mensenrechtenschendingen. In het 
bijzonder wil ik de vorige en huidige voorzitter Ellie Lissenberg en Johan Scholten voor 
hun inspanningen bedanken. Graag betrek ik hier het College van Curatoren voor deze 
bijzondere leerstoel bij, dat mij voor deze benoeming heeft voorgedragen en op deze 
leerstoel en mijn functioneren toezicht houdt. Toen Ellie Lissenberg namens het College 
van Curatoren mij bijna drie jaar geleden belde over het vertrouwen in mij voor het 
bezetten van deze leerstoel, zei ik haar mij zeer verheugd en vereerd te voelen. Ik kan u 
zeggen dat ik dat nog steeds zo voel. 
 
Het College van Bestuur  en de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid van de Universiteit Utrecht 
wil ik bedanken dat zij met de vestiging van deze leerstoel en met mijn benoeming hebben 
ingestemd.  Daartoe zijn zij geadviseerd door het college van promoties en de 
zusterinstellingen die ik eveneens dank. Het College van Bestuur is niet over een nacht ijs 
gegaan met deze benoeming. 
 
Een benoeming die mogelijk is gemaakt door de enthousiaste en voortvarende 
medewerking vanuit Maastricht. In het bijzonder wil ik hiervoor de decaan indertijd 
Gerard Mols en mijn vakgroep voorzitter Menno Kamminga bedanken. 
 
Ik ben de tweede bekleder van deze leerstoel. Op woensdag 10 december 1997 hield Piet 
van Reenen vanaf deze plaats zijn oratie. Hij heeft het onderzoek op het terrein van politie 
en mensenrechten opgezet en uitgebouwd. Ik zal mijn best doen jou na te volgen in deze 
leerstoel weliswaar op een ander terrein. Fijn dat jouw professoraat wordt voortgezet. 
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Aan onderwijs en onderzoek op het terrein van de mensenrechten in internationaal en 
nationaal verband heb ik de afgelopen jaren kunnen meewerken. In internationaal verband 
is dat het European Master Programme in Human Rights and Democratisation en ik wil 
daar graag de voorzitters Horst Fischer en Manfred Nowak voor bedanken. In nationaal 
verband heeft de samenwerking binnen de onderzoekschool voor de rechten van de mens 
mij enorm gestimuleerd. De voorzitter Willem van Genugten, wil ik daar graag dank voor 
zeggen. Utrecht is gelukkig bij beide verbanden betrokken en zo kan ik deze 
samenwerking in de onderzoekschool en EMA/EJUC ook vanuit hier voortzetten.    
 
De Stichting Albert Horstman Fonds heeft zich bereid verklaard het onderzoek dat ik 
vanuit deze leerstoel verricht naar staten en internationale organisaties als omstanders bij 
het ontstaan van grootschalige fundamentele mensenrechtenschendingen financieel te 
ondersteunen. Ik ben bijzonder dankbaar voor deze steun en de belangstelling die tot uiting 
kwam in het contact met Ies Heertje. De financiële steun is bestemd voor onderzoeks-
assistentie waardoor het afgelopen jaar Jan de Vries en Selke Schimmel konden worden 
aangesteld. Ik wil Jan en Selke graag bedanken voor deze wezenlijke assistentie.  
 
Studenten. Het geven van onderwijs is de enig vastgelegde taak voor deze leerstoel. In 
deze ook maatschappelijk gerichte leerstoel staat in het onderwijs een bewustzijn van de 
processen tot onderdrukking in een vroeg stadium centraal. Het vroegtijdig onderkennen 
van die mechanismen maakt het mogelijk verzet aan te tekenen op het moment dat zo iets 
ook beter mogelijk is. In Maastricht ben ik met en op initiatief van Alette Smeulers dit 
onderwijs op gaan zetten. Graag wil ik Alette daarvoor dank zeggen. Mijn voorkeur voor 
interactie in kleine groepen neem ik vanuit Maastricht naar Utrecht mee en daar heb ik al 
enige ervaring mee bij de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid en het University College in 
beide steden. Gelukkig zijn er steeds veel studenten in dit onderwerp geïnteresseerd, zo 
wordt dit onderwijsblok op dit moment gegeven aan het University College Maastricht, 
aan het Post Doctorale MIC programma 114 in Maastricht en in het Masters programma in 
                                                 
114 MIC staat voor Magister Iuris Communis een Master in Comparative, European and International Law 
(LL.M.)  en het onderwijs vindt plaats binnen de specialisatie Globalisation and Human Rights. 
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Utrecht voor Socrates en LLM studenten. Het trekt nu al in Utrecht ruim 50 studenten. Het 
enige vreemde is dat ik nu Nederlands spreek terwijl dat in het onderwijs steeds Engels is. 
 
Educatie is gestart door mijn ouders in een prettig milieu met veel affectie thuis. In mijn 
opvoeding stonden kennis, cultuur, non-discriminatie en maatschappelijk bewustzijn 
voorop. Bijzonder vind ik ook dat mevrouw Verwey-Jonker, die vandaag hier aanwezig is, 
niet alleen aan de wieg stond van de Universele Verklaring van de Rechten van de Mens 
maar haar naam stond ook op het vals persoonsbewijs van mijn ouders waarmee zij in 
1943 naar een ander onderduikadres konden reizen.115 
 
Docenten hebben zich voor mij ingezet van jongs af aan. Bijzonder neutraal basis- 
onderwijs, rooms-katholiek middelbaar onderwijs, gereformeerd universitair onderwijs 
volgden. Zelf verkoos ik aan openbare universiteiten in Leiden, Maastricht en nu in 
Utrecht te gaan werken.  
 
In Leiden zette ik mijn eerste stappen op dit terrein bij de B4 werkgroep onder de 
inspirerende leiding van Philip Everts. De vier B's staan voor binnenlandse beïnvloeding 
van het buitenlands beleid, een fantastisch interuniversitair samenwerkingsverband. Zonder 
B4 zou ik nu geen wetenschapper zijn.  
In Maastricht nam ik deel aan de spannende uitbouw van een Faculteit met veel 
vernieuwing en mogelijkheden tot ontplooiing. Met vele vrienden en collega's, waaronder 
Jan Willems en Fons Coomans, werk ik daar samen in onderwijs en onderzoek op het 
terrein van de rechten van de mens. Jan en Fons, ik wil dat graag met jullie en anderen van 
internationaal recht uit Maastricht als Ingrid Westendorp, Menno Kamminga en Koen de 
Feyter voortzetten. 
  
Degenen die betrokken waren bij mijn promotie in 1991 hebben mij ook nadien 
gestimuleerd. Ik noem graag de paranimfen Rob Bakker en Huub Winthagen, de 
leescommissie Joop Ellemers, Fred van Staden en Job Cohen en vooral mijn drie 
promotores Theo van Boven, Cees Flinterman en Peter Baehr  
                                                 
115 Ongepubliceerd Dagboek van Wilma Grünfeld-van Dam, 1942-1943. 
 51 
 
Theo jouw maatschappelijke gedrevenheid, verwondering en verbazing over het 
wereldgebeuren in combinatie met de menselijke maat en warmte van jou en Anne-Marie 
hebben mij gesterkt.  
Cees, jij ging mij voor zowel op je reis van Leiden naar Maastricht als van Maastricht naar 
Utrecht. Jouw belangstelling en enthousiasme is steeds groot en dat stimuleert. Ik verheug 
me erop met jou en de andere medewerkers in het multidisciplinaire verband van zowel het 
SIM als de Onderzoekschool opnieuw en intensief samen te werken.  
Peter ik voel mij bevoorrecht dat jij niet alleen mijn promotor wilde zijn, van wie ik veel 
heb geleerd, maar mij ook de gelegenheid bood nadien samen met jou en Monique 
Castermans een boek te schrijven over de   mensenrechten in het buitenlands beleid van 
Nederland. Ik zie je als het politicologisch mensenrechtelijk rolmodel met fijnzinnigheid, 
humor en wijsheid. En dat is wat mij betreft niet te veel eer, al zal je daar zelf in al je 
bescheidenheid misschien anders over denken 
 
De familie is een vertrouwde omgeving. Ik ben blij dat mijn oom Frans, de Prof. Dr. F. 
Grünfeld uit Goirle bij deze oratie aanwezig is. Mijn beide zusjes Joyce en Nynke wil ik 
ook noemen. Mijn beide zonen Joram en Samme: Samme met jouw humor en sociale 
vaardigheden en Joram met jouw grote interesse en betrokkenheid vormen jullie de kern 
van mijn bestaan. Ten slotte mijn grootste liefde: Marij. Ditmaal mag ik jou noemen omdat 
niemand kan denken, nu de zonen eenmaal het huis uit zijn, dat het schrijven van deze 
oratie ten koste is gegaan van mijn zorgtaken thuis. Jouw emancipatiedrang, belette me je 
in mijn dissertatie te bedanken. Nu mag ik dat gelukkig wel, en dan wil ik voorop stellen 
dat bij jou het kernbegrip van de mensenrechten, de menselijke waardigheid en het 
volmondig respect voor de medemens steeds gewaarborgd is. Daarmee, en met nog heel 
veel meer, maak je mij als jouw naaste heel gelukkig.   
 
Ik heb gezegd. 
 
  
Source: www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ke.html 
 
KENYA 
(population: 31,639,091) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Political 
Terrorscale 2/2 3/3 3/3 4/4 
Conflict Level  
Violent political 
conflict (20 deaths in 
pro democracy 
demonstrations) 
Violent political 
conflict (tensions in 
Rift Valley; Student 
riots) 
Violent political 
conflict; Low 
intensity conflict 
(ethnic violence in 
Rift Valley: 800 
deaths) 
Freedom 
House 6/6/NF 6/6/NF 6/6/NF 4/5/PF 
U.S. State 
Department1 
(e)2, P3, t4, CA5, CL6, 
R7  
(e)8, t9, CA10, CL11,  
R12 
(E)13, P14, t15, CL16, 
IF17 
e18, P19, t, CA20, 
CL21,  IF22 
Amnesty 
International T
23, P24 25 t26, (P)27 T T28, P29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Political 
Terrorscale 3/4 4/4 4/3 4/4 
Conflict Level Low intensity conflict (Rift Valley) 
Violent political 
conflict (Rift Valley; 
Burnt Forest; 
Mombasa, between 
coastal groups and 
Luos; Turkana) 
Violent political 
conflict (Rift Valley; 
Turkana; Maela; 
Nairobi slums; FEM 
guerrillas) 
Violent Political 
conflict (Rift Valley; 
Turkana) 
Freedom 
House 5/6/NF 6/6/NF 7/6/NF 7/6/NF 
U.S. State 
Department 
e30, T31, P32, , CA33, 
CL34 , IF35 
e36, T, P37, S38, CA39, 
CL40, FE/R41 
e42, T, P43, S44, CA45, 
CL46,  FE/R47 
E, T48, P49, AE50, 
CA51,CL52, CP53, S54, 
R55, IF56 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Political 
Terrorscale 4 3  3 
Conflict Level 
Low intensity 
conflict (etnic 
violence along coast: 
at least 100 deaths); 
Violent political 
conflict (etnic 
violence between 
Pokots-Marakwets, 
Turkanas-Samburus, 
Maasais-Kisiis, and 
violence in Isiolo, 
Meru/Nyambene, 
Garissa, and Kilgoris, 
and violence from 
ethiopian rebels)  
Low Intensity 
conflict (rift Valley: 
more than 100 
deaths; Pokots, 
Marakwets, Maasai, 
Turkanas, Kisiis) and 
violent political 
conflict (Mombasa; 
Ethiopian incursions) 
Low Intensity 
conflict (Rift Valley; 
Moyale-Marsabit;) 
and violent political 
conflict 
(Boranas/Somalis 
Pokot, Marakwet, 
Baringo: at least 65 
killed) 
Low Intensity 
conflict and violent 
political conflict; 
in all ethnic violence 
claimed an average 
of 75/100 deaths per 
month 
Freedom 
House 6/6/NF 6/5/NF 6/5/NF 6/5/NF 
U.S. State 
Department 
E, T57, P58, AE59, 
CA60, CL/FL61, CP62, 
S63, IF64 
E65, T66, P67, AE68, 
CA69, CL/FL70, CP71, 
S72, IF73 
E74, T75, P76, AE77, 
CA78, CL/FL79, CP80, 
S81, IF82 
E, T83, P84, AE85, 
CA86, CL/FL87, CP88, 
S89, IF90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2001 2002 
Political 
Terrorscale   
Conflict Level 
Low intensity 
conflict (Rift Valley; 
Kerio Valley: Pokots 
vs. Marakwets vs. 
Baringo; Moyale-
Marsabit, OLF); 
Violent political 
conflict (muslims vs. 
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spilled over from and 
to neighbouring 
countries); In all 
ethnic violence 
claimed an average 
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month 
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Working conditions: 
 
1989: Health and safety regulations are only applicable to work in factories, construction and 
the docks, and does not cover agriculture. However many rural workers are exposed to 
dangerous pesticides. The Government has vowed to expand the “Factories Act” to the 
agricultural sector. Inspections are inadequate. Although they have the power to make surprise 
visits they rarely do. The “Factories Act” does not contain provisions that protect the worker 
who files complaints. 
1990: The “Factories Act” was amended to include the “non-industrial sector”. Inspections are 
inadequate. Although they have the power to make surprise visits they rarely do. Inspectors 
usually only inspect after a complaint. The “Factories Act” does not contain provisions that 
protect the worker who files complaints. 
1991: Inspectors are now vested with the right to issue notices “enjoining employers from 
practices or activities which involve a risk of serious personal injuries.” Workers that lodge a 
complaint are not protected by law. The government exempted enterprises in the export 
processing zones from the occupational health and safety requirements of the Factories Act. 
There were between 2000 and 3000 inspections. 
1992: Inspectors are now vested with the right to issue notices “enjoining employers from 
practices or activities which involve a risk of serious personal injuries.” Workers that lodge a 
complaint are not protected by law. The government exempted enterprises in the export 
processing zones from the occupational health and safety requirements of the Factories Act. 
There were between 2000 and 3000 inspections. 
1993: A s a result of an amendment in 1990 inspections have the power to ‘issue notices 
enjoining employers from practices or activities which involve a risk of serious personal 
injuries.’ Inspections increased from 3,000 in 1992 to 16,132 in 1993.  
1994: There are 65 health and safety inspectors attached to the Ministry of Labour’s 
Directorate of Occupational Health and Safety Services. They inspect factories and work sites 
and have the power to ‘issue notices enjoining employers from practices or activities which 
involve a risk of serious personal injuries.’ The inspections maintained their level, which had 
increased dramatically in 1993. There was a slight decline in work related accidents and 
illnesses.  
1995: Inspections continued at a high level. 
1996: Inspections remained at a high level. Though workers are not forced by law to remain in 
hazardous working conditions, many would do so because of the high unemployment problem. 
1997: Inspections remained at a high level. Though workers are not forced by law to remain in 
hazardous working conditions, many would do so because of the high unemployment problem. 
1998: Inspections remained at a high level. As a result of a new amendment, factories of over 
20 employees must have a health and safety committee with worker’s representation. However 
only a quarter of the country’s very largest factories had such a committee by years’ end. 
Though workers are not forced by law to remain in hazardous working conditions, many would 
do so because of the high unemployment problem. 
1999: Inspections remained at a high level. As a result of a new amendment, factories of over 
20 employees must have a health and safety committee with worker’s representation. However 
less than half of the country’s very largest factories had such a committee by years’ end. 
Though workers are not forced by law to remain in hazardous working conditions, many would 
do so because of the high unemployment problem. 
2000: Inspections remained at a high level. As a result of a new amendment, factories of over 
20 employees must have a health and safety committee with worker’s representation. However 
less than half of the country’s very largest factories had such a committee by years’ end. 
Though workers are not forced by law to remain in hazardous working conditions, many would 
do so because of the high unemployment problem. 
2001: Inspectors have no authority to inspect factories in the EPZ’s. Labour and NGO’s 
criticized health and safety conditions in the EPZ’s.  Inspections remained at a high level. As a 
result of a new amendment, factories of over 20 employees must have a health and safety 
committee with worker’s representation. However less than half of the country’s very largest 
factories had such a committee by years’ end. Though workers are not forced by law to remain 
in hazardous working conditions, many would do so because of the high unemployment 
problem. 
2002: Inspectors have no authority to inspect factories in the EPZ’s. Labour and NGO’s 
criticized health and safety conditions in the EPZ’s. The government undertook steps to revoke 
the exception. Conditions in the EPZ’s were illustrated by conditions in the cut flower industry. 
There were numerous violations worker rights in that industry, including “use of hazardous 
pesticides and fertilizers without adequate protection, low wages and casualization (hiring long 
term “seasonal workers” without proving any benefits or job security)”. As a result of a new 
amendment, factories of over 20 employees must have a health and safety committee with 
worker’s representation. However less than half of the country’s very largest factories had such 
a committee by years’ end. Though workers are not forced by law to remain in hazardous 
working conditions, many would do so because of the high unemployment problem. 
 
Brief historical/political overview: 
 
AMENSTY INTERNATIONAL: 
1990: Many people who criticised the Government were detained or harassed. Many were pro-
democracy advocates and human rights activists. The ruling KANU did not want to let go of 
the one-party system, though it did propose to reform the party itself, the electoral system, the 
protection of judges and Public Prosecutors. 
1991: Multiparty democracy reintroduced. Change in constitution allows more political parties. 
The change was forced by donors who threatened to postpone aid for six months until 
democratic rights and human rights ameliorated. However President Daniel Arap Moi 
continued to control ‘a governing system in which power is centred in the office of the 
President and the President’s party, the former single party, the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU).  
1992: Elections, considered ‘controversial’ (violence intimidation, fraud, and other 
irregularities). But it brought about a modest strengthening of democratic institutions. 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT: 
1989: World coffee prices decline and lead to payment problems. Many were unemployed. 
1990: The tourist sector suffers serious losses due to riots in 1990 and subsequent political 
tension. Unemployment continues to be a growing major problem. The demand for a 
multiparty system leads to serious rioting from July 7 until July 11 in Nairobi. Leaving 20 
dead, more than 70 injured and over 1000 arrested. The Government set minor steps towards 
political change. Electoral laws are changed (minor changes).  
1991: President Daniel T. Arap Moi recommends that Kenya adopt legislation to pave the way 
to a multiparty system. The legislation is passed on December 10. Tourism grows a little less 
due to the Gulf War. Unemployment is serious and growing. Several politicians in the Rift 
Valley attended a rally purported to “ban” members of the FORD from entering the Valley. 
“They threatened reprisals against members of the Kikuyu ethnic group and multiparty 
supporters settled in the region”. 
1992: Elections are held on December 29. However “the conduct of these elections left unclear 
the ability of the Kenyan people to change their government by democratic means.” Moreover 
the President continues to control the governing system. Government assisted violence directed 
at political opponents and certain ethnic groups caused hundreds of casualties and thousands of 
displaced people. The Government used assets of State including the judiciary, to clamp down 
on dissent. In 1992 without any rebuke from the President KANU politicians continued to 
heighten tribal tension in the Rift Valley. In several regions “tribal” clashes resulted in 800 
deaths and thousands of homeless people. 
1993: KANU holds a majority in Parliament, but no two-thirds majority which is required to 
pass constitutional amendments. The party applies great pressure (bribes and blackmail) to 
entice or coerce opposition MP’s to defect to KANU. After 2 years the Government finally 
took some action ‘to curb ethnic violence centred in the Rift Valley’. The Government still has 
to get used to multi party politics. There were a serious setbacks ‘in the Government’s 
commitment to human rights, ethnic and political tolerance, and the rule of law’.  
1994: The Government took some steps to improve its human rights practices. 
1995: Human rights situation worsened in 1995. On children’s rights, the Government proposes 
new legislation to establish a National Council of Children’s services ‘to supervise the planning 
and financing of child welfare activities’. However the legislation does not mention 
homelessness, female circumcision, forced labour, sexual abuse, and education. 
1996: Human rights situation showed some signs of improvement. The Government established 
a standing committee on human rights and started a dialogue with human rights organisations. 
Legislation on children’s rights was still not passed. A motion to outlaw Genital mutilation was 
defeated. 
1997: President Daniel Arap Moi was re-elected in December. The elections were imperfect, 
but generally reflected the ‘popular will’. In the first eight months of the year the human rights 
situation deteriorated. In the last four months of the year the situation improved significantly. 
The improvement was due to the brokering by bipartisan Interparty Parliamentary Group 
(IPPG) of a package of wide ranging political reforms, paving the way to the December 
elections. Ethnic violence along the coast in August and September caused major setbacks in 
tourism and foreign investment. 
1998: Human rights record remained poor, although there were some improvements in some 
areas. In August a car bomb exploded at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi killing more than 200 
people and injuring thousands. 
1999: Human rights record remained poor. Some improvements in some areas, but worsening 
in other areas. 
2001: June, 4 members (amongst which the leader) of the National Development Party are 
appointed to the Cabinet. KANU and NDP have forged an alliance and are contemplating a 
merger. 
2002: On December 27, Mwai Kibaki of the opposition NARC party (a coalition of more than 
a dozen parties) won the Presidential elections. Former President Arap Moi stepped down on 
December 30. There were five candidates for the presidency, Arap Moi did not stand again, 
because constitutionally he was not allowed to go for another term. The ruling KANU party 
also lost the parliamentary elections, and consequently lost its majority in parliament, a 
majority now held by NARC. There were violent incidents in the pre-election period and on 
election day. Overall the elections were peaceful and observers concluded they generally 
reflected the popular will and were free and fair. The Government (of Arap Moi) continued to 
discriminate publicly against ethnic groups, leading to violence, and causing a number of 
deaths. 
 
                                                 
1 Following a directive by Secretary of State Warren Christopher some changes in reporting were made as of the 
1993 report. The changes include a stronger emphasis on prison conditions and a new section on “discrimination 
based on race, sex, religion, disability, language or social status. This new section also includes a paragraph on 
discrimination against children. 
2 There were a number of deaths in prison under suspicious circumstances. 
3 Detainees and prisoners complain of poor food, beating, corruption, and inadequate facilities and medical care. 
The spread of meningitis is a serious problem. At least 32 prisoners died of meningitis during the year. 
4 It is unclear how many cases of torture there were. The number of allegations declined, but torture and police 
brutality remained “an important issue”. 
5 Female circumcision is still practiced. 
6 Child labour in the formal sector is not a widespread problem. However many children work in the agricultural 
sector. They do not fall under the minimum age legislation. 
7 Refugees were denied permanent resettlement.  
8 At least one death in custody. The Foreign Minister died in “mysterious” circumstances. In clashes with police 
20 demonstrators died. It is unclear what the exact circumstances of these deaths were. 
9 Prisoners were frequently beaten and otherwise abused. A number of cases of torture are described. 
10 Female circumcision is still practiced. 
11 Child labour in the formal sector is not a widespread problem. However many children work in the agricultural 
sector. They do not fall under the minimum age legislation. 
12 Some 12,000 refugees were refused permanent resettlement. 
13 One student was shot in the head during rioting. 37 Somali refugees drowned after allegedly being  forcibly 
expelled from Kenya. Kenyan Navy towed two unseaworthy boats into rough water. There they capsized. The 
Navy has been accused of gross negligence. The Ministry of Home Affairs  exonerated the Navy. 
14 There is overcrowding and insufficient funding for prison operations. Corruption and sexual abuse occur. Food 
and medical supplies are inadequate.  
15 Prisoners were frequently beaten and otherwise abused. A number of cases of torture are described. 
                                                                                                                                                           
16 Child labour in the formal sector is not a widespread problem. However many children work in the agricultural 
sector. They do not fall under the minimum age legislation. 
17 Malnutrition affects many nursing and pregnant women in prison. 
18 Tribal clashes caused 800 deaths. The clashes were provoked by government officials. Reports state that 
“Fighters” used to terrorize certain groups were transported in government vehicles and financed by the 
government. One person died in custody allegedly beaten to death. At least 6 unarmed demonstrators died through 
use of excessive force by the police. At least 500 people died in mob violence. The conduct of the security forces 
was mixed, some helped the victim, others turned a blind eye.   
19 Food and health care were inadequate. Bedding is in short supply and toilet facilities are inadequate. Sexual 
abuse is common. 
20 Female Genital Mutilation is still practiced. Rape is considered a serious problem in Kenyan schools. 
21 Child labour in the formal sector is not a widespread problem. However many children work in the agricultural 
sector. They do not fall under the minimum age legislation. 
22 Prisoners, especially nursing women with their infants, did not get adequate food. 
23 Especially of political prisoners. Secret or illegal detention facilitated the use torture. 
24 A.I. only mentions prison conditions for political detainees. These conditions were harsh. There was extensive 
use of solitary confinement and prisoners were permitted to leave their cells only one hour per day. ‘Medical 
treatment and hygiene were poor and access to reading material was limited. Visits and correspondence from 
relatives were also severely restricted.’ 
25 There is a report entitled: “Kenya: Silencing Opposition to One-Party Rule”. 
26 Some political prisoners were tortured. 
27 One political prisoner accused the government of placing him in a prison where conditions amounted to 
‘inhuman and degrading treatment’. Notably he said the cells were under water. 
28 Amongst other methods, women were raped during questioning. 
29 Conditions were especially bad in Kamiti-prison in Nairobi and the prison for female prisoners Langata in 
Nairobi. 
30 There was one clear extrajudicial killing. Some deaths in prison could be related to beatings or use of excessive 
force. There is evidence that high ranking officials instigate and promote ethnic clashes which claimed over 1,000 
lives. Mob violence cannot be directly attributed to the Government, but they can be held responsible for the fact 
they have not made it a priority. Mob violence claimed 508 lives. 
31 Other than the use of torture, political opposition are often the target of police brutality, and abuse. 
32 Conditions are life threatening. The Government does not have the will to curb the problem. There was no 
adequate food, and healthcare. There was a lack of quality food and bedding materials, and cells were often 
flooded and unheated. Sexual abuse is a problem. 977 prisoners died in the previous three years. 
33 Female genital mutilation continues to be widespread. 
34 Children often work as domestics in private homes, in the informal sector, and in family businesses and farms. 
Child employment in the formal wage sector is not a significant problem. 
35 A lack of (quality) food in prisons. 
36 There were a few cases in which police used excessive lethal force, at least one person dies in police custody as 
a result of a beating. 
37 Conditions are life threatening. There is sexual abuse (male and female), severe overcrowding, a poor diet, 
inadequate health care, substandard bedding materials, and flooded or unheated cells. Several hundreds died in 
prison. 
38 Many homeless streetchildren, because of ‘economic displacement, a high population growth rate, and the 
ethnic clashes. There are tens of thousands streetchildren and the rate is growing by 10% annually.  
39 Streetchildren suffer from inhumane treatment by police. Female genital mutilation is still widespread. 
40 Children often work as domestics in private homes, in the informal sector, and in family businesses and farms. 
Child employment in the formal wage sector is not a significant problem. 
41 People wanting to return to the Rift Valley after the Government’s establishment of security zones and the 
resulting decrease in violence, were prevented from resettling and forcibly removed by the Government. 
42 The number of extrajudicial killings is not reported. It is clear however from the report that there were 
extrajudicial executions. 
43 Conditions are life threatening. Sexual abuse continued to be a serious problem. And there was inadequate 
water, severe overcrowding, a poor diet, inadequate health care, substandard bedding materials, and flooded or 
unheated cells. More than hundred people died in prison. 
44 Many homeless streetchildren, because of ‘economic displacement, a high population growth rate, and the 
ethnic clashes. There are tens of thousands streetchildren and the rate is growing by 10% annually. 
45 Streetchildren suffer from inhumane treatment by police. Female genital mutilation is still widespread. Child 
rape and molestation is increasingly becoming a problem. 
46 Children often work as domestics in private homes, in the informal sector, and in family businesses and farms. 
Child employment in the formal wage sector is not a significant problem. 
47 Displaced persons in the Rift Valley were again forcibly removed and prevented from returning to their homes. 
48 KHRC (Kenyan Human Rights Commission), an NGO,  reported 90 cases of torture, including 17 deaths in the 
first nine months of 1996. 
49 Prisons at times are life-threatening. There was severe overcrowding, deficient health care, poor diet, inadequate 
water, and substandard bedding. Rape and AIDS are growing problems in prisons. A judge called the prisons 
“Death chambers”.  The Home Affairs minister reported that 814 prisoners had died of disease in the first nine 
months of 1995. Independent monitoring of prisons is not permitted. 
                                                                                                                                                           
50 Education is compulsory up to grade 12, but since free education has given way for a ‘cost sharing’ system, 
education has become too expensive for many Kenyans. There is also a great shortage in schools. 
51 Streetchildren suffer from inhumane treatment by police. Female genital mutilation is still widespread. Child 
rape and molestation is increasingly becoming a problem. 
52 Children often work as domestics in private homes, in the informal sector, and in family businesses and farms. 
Child employment in the formal wage sector is not a significant problem. 
53 Child prostitution has emerged as a major problem. It is often connected with the tourist trade. 
54 Many homeless streetchildren, because of ‘economic displacement, a high population growth rate, and the 
ethnic clashes. There was an increase in the number of street children from 33,000 in 1990 to 44,000 in 1996. 
55 People displaced because of ethnic clashes did not return home (despite the Government’s attempts to forcibly 
relocate them). There still was a great sense of insecurity. 
56 Moreover a drought, followed by floods, kept upward pressure on food prices. 
57 Torture of pre-trial detainees and prisoners occurred. In February Kenya acceded to the Convention against 
Torture. The KHRC reported at least 55 cases of torture, 12 resulted in deaths. 
58 Prisons often are life-threatening. There was severe overcrowding, deficient health care, poor diet, inadequate 
water, and substandard bedding. 631 prisoners died ‘in jails during the year, due chiefly to anaemia, heart attack, 
malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, tuberculosis, and AIDS. Rape of male and female inmates is a serious problem. 
No independent monitoring of prison conditions is permitted (also see ‘childabuse’). 
59 Education is compulsory up to grade 12, but since free education has given way for a ‘cost sharing’ system, 
education has become too expensive for many Kenyans. There is also a great shortage in schools. 
60 Child rape is a grave problem. Female genital mutilation is widespread. According to a Human Rights Watch 
report, street children ‘face harassment as well as physical and sexual abuse from the police and within the 
juvenile justice system simply because they are poor and homeless. They are held in deplorable conditions in 
crowded police station cells, often without toilets or bedding, with little food, and inadequate supplies. They are 
often incarcerated with adults and frequently beaten by police.’ 
61 Children often work as domestics in private homes, in the informal sector, and in family businesses and farms. 
Child employment in the formal wage sector is not a significant problem. There were some instances of children 
being loaned out to pay off debts. 
62 Child prostitution is a growing and major problem. It is often connected to the tourist trade. 
63 There are 45,000 streetchildren (also see ‘childabuse’). Many homeless streetchildren, because of ‘economic 
displacement, a high population growth rate, and the ethnic clashes. 
64 A drought, followed by floods, kept upward pressure on food prices. 
65 There was an increased number of extrajudicial executions. 
66 Torture is used as an interrogation technique and as punishment, for both pre-trial detainees as convicted 
prisoners. KHRC reported 98 cases during the year. 10 cases resulted in death. 
67 Prisons often are life-threatening. There was severe overcrowding, deficient health care, poor diet, inadequate 
water, and substandard bedding. 536 prisoners died ‘in jails during the year, due chiefly to anaemia, heart attack, 
malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, tuberculosis, and AIDS. Rape of male and female inmates is a serious problem. 
No independent monitoring of prison conditions is permitted. 
68 Education is compulsory up to grade 12, but since free education has given way for a ‘cost sharing’ system, 
education has become too expensive for many Kenyans. There is also a great shortage in schools. Four million 
children between 6 and 14 or out of school. 
69 Child rape is a grave problem. Female genital mutilation is widespread. According to a Human Rights Watch 
report, street children ‘face harassment as well as physical and sexual abuse from the police and within the 
juvenile justice system simply because they are poor and homeless. They are held in deplorable conditions in 
crowded police station cells, often without toilets or bedding, with little food, and inadequate supplies. They are 
often incarcerated with adults and frequently beaten by police.’ 
70 Children often work as domestics in private homes, in the informal sector, and in family businesses and farms. 
Children working in the informal sector is difficult to control, but the problem is significant (also see ‘child 
prostitution’). Child employment in the formal wage sector is not a significant problem. There are some cases in 
rural areas of children being loaned as workers to pay off debts. 
71 Child prostitution is a growing and major problem. It is often connected to the tourist trade. 
72 There are about 50,000 streetchildren. Many homeless streetchildren, because of ‘economic displacement, a 
high population growth rate, and the ethnic clashes. (also see ‘childabuse’) 
73 A drought, followed by floods, kept upward pressure on food prices. 
74 Increased number of extrajudicial killings. 
75 In the first nine months 24 cases of torture resulted in death. 
76 Prisons often are life-threatening. There was severe overcrowding, deficient health care, poor diet, inadequate 
water, and substandard bedding. 196 prisoners died in prisons during the first 9 months of the year, ‘due chiefly to 
anaemia, heart attack, malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, tuberculosis, and AIDS’. Rape of male and female 
inmates is a serious problem. No independent monitoring of prison conditions is permitted. 
77 Education is compulsory up to grade 12, but since free education has given way for a ‘cost sharing’ system, 
education has become too expensive for many Kenyans. There is also a great shortage in schools. Four million 
children between 6 and 14 or out of school. 
78 A human Rights Watch Report released in September highlighted the problem of corporal punishment in Kenya, 
resulting in excessive caning and abuse of pupils by teachers. There were reports of children being killed for body 
parts to be used by people practicing healing rituals. Child rape is a grave problem. Female genital mutilation is 
widespread. According to a Human Rights Watch report, street children ‘face harassment as well as physical and 
                                                                                                                                                           
sexual abuse from the police and within the juvenile justice system simply because they are poor and homeless. 
They are held in deplorable conditions in crowded police station cells, often without toilets or bedding, with little 
food, and inadequate supplies. They are often incarcerated with adults and frequently beaten by police.’ 
79 Children often work as domestics in private homes, in the informal sector, and in family businesses and farms. 
Children working in the informal sector is difficult to control, but the problem is significant (also see ‘child 
prostitution’). Child employment in the formal wage sector is not a significant problem. There are some cases in 
rural areas of children being loaned as workers to pay off debts. 
80 Child prostitution is a growing and major problem. It is often connected to the tourist trade. The problem is 
growing due to the spread of HIV/AIDS which makes many orphans. 
81 There are about 50,000 streetchildren. Many homeless streetchildren, because of ‘economic displacement, a 
high population growth rate, and the ethnic clashes. (also see ‘childabuse’). 
82 Drought and famine in some rural areas. 
83 In the first nine months 49 cases of torture resulted in death. 
84 Prisons often are life-threatening. There was severe overcrowding, deficient health care, poor diet, inadequate 
water, and substandard bedding. 658 prisoners died in prisons during the first 10 months of the year, ‘due chiefly 
to anaemia, heart attack, malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, tuberculosis, and AIDS’. Rape of male and female 
inmates is a serious problem. No independent monitoring of prison conditions is permitted. However senior public 
officials, such as the Attorney General and a District Commissioner have criticised prison conditions. Courts are 
primarily responsible for overcrowding, because of the backlog of cases.   
85 Education is compulsory up to grade 12, but since free education has given way for a ‘cost sharing’ system, 
education has become too expensive for many Kenyans. There is also a great shortage in schools. Four million 
children between 6 and 14 or out of school. 
86 There was a problem of corporal punishment in schools. There were reports of children being killed for body 
parts to be used by people practicing healing rituals. Child rape and child molestation (also by teachers) is a grave 
and growing problem. Female genital mutilation is declining. Efforts by the Government and certain tribes, as well 
as NGO and press attention have led to a sharp decline. In December 169 girls suffered FGM, compared to 12,000 
girls during the same month in the previous four years. According to a Human Rights Watch report, street children 
‘face harassment as well as physical and sexual abuse from the police and within the juvenile justice system 
simply because they are poor and homeless. They are held in deplorable conditions in crowded police station cells, 
often without toilets or bedding, with little food, and inadequate supplies. They are often incarcerated with adults 
and frequently beaten by police.’ 
87 Children often work as domestics in private homes, in the informal sector, and in family businesses and farms. 
Children working in the informal sector is difficult to control, but the problem is significant (also see ‘child 
prostitution’). Child employment in the formal wage sector is not a significant problem. There are some cases in 
rural areas of children being loaned as workers to pay off debts. By the end of the year parliament had not ratified 
ILO Convention 182. 
88 Child prostitution is a growing and major problem. It is often connected to the tourist trade. The problem is 
growing due to the spread of HIV/AIDS which makes many orphans 
89 There are about 60,000 streetchildren. Many homeless streetchildren, because of ‘economic displacement, a 
high population growth rate, and the ethnic clashes. (also see ‘childabuse’). 
90 Drought and famine in some rural areas. Food shortage in some prisons (while generally prisoners receive three 
meals, some guards would appropriate meat). 
91 KHRC reported 49 deaths through torture. Another NGO (People Against Torture) reported 70 cases and was 
still documenting cases by year’s end. 
92 Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening. There was severe overcrowding, deficient health care, poor diet, 
inadequate water, and substandard bedding. 464 prisoners died in prisons during the first 10 months of the year, 
‘due chiefly to anaemia, heart attack, malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, tuberculosis, and AIDS’. Rape of male and 
female inmates is a serious problem. No consistent independent monitoring of prison conditions is permitted.  
However some NGO’s have started working with the Government in evaluating torture cases, performing 
autopsies and inspecting prisons. However senior public officials, such as the Attorney General and a District 
Commissioner have criticised prison conditions. Courts are primarily responsible for overcrowding, because of the 
backlog of cases. 
93 Education is compulsory up to grade 12, but since free education has given way for a ‘cost sharing’ system, 
education has become too expensive for many Kenyans. There is also a great shortage in schools. Four million 
children between 6 and 14 or out of school. 
94 Child rape and child molestation (also by teachers) is a grave and growing problem. Female genital mutilation is 
declining. Efforts by the Government and certain tribes, as well as NGO and press attention have led to a sharp 
decline. According to a Human Rights Watch report, street children ‘face harassment as well as physical and 
sexual abuse from the police and within the juvenile justice system simply because they are poor and homeless. 
They are held in deplorable conditions in crowded police station cells, often without toilets or bedding, with little 
food, and inadequate supplies. They are often incarcerated with adults and frequently beaten by police.’ 
95 Children often work as domestics in private homes, in the informal sector, and in family businesses and farms. 
Children working in the informal sector is difficult to control, but the problem is significant (also see ‘child 
prostitution’). Child employment in the formal wage sector is not a significant problem. According to a survey, 
there are 1.9 million children working, of whom 1.4 million work full time and 500,000 work while attending 
school. However the number of children working might be as high as 5 million. There are some cases in rural 
areas of children being loaned as workers to pay off debts. By the end of the year parliament had not ratified ILO 
Convention 182. 
                                                                                                                                                           
96 Child prostitution is a growing and major problem. It is often connected to the tourist trade. The problem is 
growing due to the spread of HIV/AIDS which makes many orphans. 
97 There are more than 60,000 streetchildren. Many homeless streetchildren, because of ‘economic displacement, a 
high population growth rate, and the ethnic clashes. (also see ‘childabuse’). 
98 Drought and famine in some rural areas.  
99 According to the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) police committed more than a thousand 
extrajudicial executions in the last decade. This year police killed 117 suspected criminals, and another 11 
suspects and detainees died while in police custody. Bystanders in shootouts with criminals also died. Persons died 
from torture while in custody. 
100 Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening. There was severe overcrowding, deficient health care, 
inadequate water, diet and bedding. There were frequent instances of torture and abuse. Rape (primarily by fellow 
inmates) of male and female prisoners was a serious problem. Incidence of HIV/AIDS was increasing. Prisoners 
were detained in unsanitary conditions, and did not have adequate access to health care, thus making the spread of 
disease easier. As a consequence disease was widespread and the death rate was high. According to the 
government 536 prisoners died in prisons, ‘due chiefly to anaemia, heart attack, malaria, typhoid fever, dysentery, 
tuberculosis, and AIDS’. 
101 The problem is widespread. There were hundreds of cases during the year. KHRC reported 49 torture-related 
deaths in 2001. People Against Torture (PAT) reported 70 torture related deaths and a total of 238 cases of torture 
in 2001.  
102 Education is compulsory up to grade 12, but since free education has given way for a ‘cost sharing’ system, 
education has become too expensive for many Kenyans. There is also a great shortage in schools. Four million 
children between 6 and 14 or out of school. According to the Minister of Home Affairs, “Three million children 
who should e in school were not and 8.6 million more do not have access to basic needs”. 
103 FGM was widespread and in contrast with earlier figures is the number of FGM performed is not dramatically 
declining. Corporal punishment in schools was formally banned, but did not cease completely. Child rape is a 
serious problem. Street children ‘face harassment as well as physical and sexual abuse from the police and within 
the juvenile justice system simply because they are poor and homeless. They are held in deplorable conditions in 
crowded police station cells, often without toilets or bedding, with little food, and inadequate supplies. They are 
often incarcerated with adults and frequently beaten by police.’ 
104 Children often work as domestics in private homes, in the informal sector, and in family businesses and farms. 
Children working in the informal sector is difficult to control and increasing due to economic hardship and the 
spread of HIV/AIDS, in any case the problem is significant (also see ‘child prostitution’). Child employment in 
the formal wage sector is not a significant problem. According to a survey, there are 1.9 million children working, 
of whom 1.3 million work full time and 600,000 work while attending school. However the number of children 
working might be as high as 5 million. There are some cases in rural areas of children being loaned as workers to 
pay off debts. In cooperation with the ILO and NGO’s the Kenyan government has set up schemes to sensitise 
employers and return children back to school. 
105 Child prostitution is a growing and major problem. It is often connected to the tourist trade. The problem is 
growing due to the spread of HIV/AIDS which makes many orphans. The ILO reported there were 30,000 girls 
under the age of 19 working as a prostitute. 
106 Juveniles were often kept with adults. Juvenile detention centres were understaffed, there was minimal social 
and exercise time. All detention centres were severely overcrowded. Accommodation, food and medical care were 
inadequate. There was no separation between the majority of children arrested on the streets “as victims of neglect 
or children in need of care and discipline”, and the more serious offenders. No consistent independent monitoring 
of prison conditions is permitted.  However some NGO’s have started working with the Government in evaluating 
torture cases, performing autopsies and inspecting prisons. Courts are primarily responsible for overcrowding, 
because of the backlog of cases. 
107 There were an estimated 60,000 street children in Nairobi in 2000. A newspaper reported that there were a total 
of 250,000 (a conservative estimate) street children in urban areas in Kenya. 
108 Overcrowding in prisons led to food and water shortages. The food and water that was present was qualitively 
inadequate. 
109 Because of fear for renewed violence many displaced persons have not returned to the Rift Valley. 
 
Source: www.cia.gov 
ALGERIA 
(population: 32,818,500) 
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Political 
Terrorscale 2/2 2/2 3/3 4/4 
Conflict Level   
low-intensity 
confllict (300 killed 
during rioting) 
Low-intensity 
conflict (70 killed in 
rioting, more than 
200 killed in terrorist 
attacks) 
Freedom 
House 6/4/PF 4/4/PF 4/4/PF 7/6/NF 
U.S. State 
Department1 CL
2 t3, CL4 t, CL5 (E)6, t7, CL8 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Political 
Terrorscale 4/5 5/5 5/5 5/5 
Conflict Level 
High intensity 
conflict (500 
terrorists killed, 300 
security forces, and 
an unknown number 
of civilians) 
High intensity 
conflict (security 
forces killed 
hundreds of 
‘terrorists’, terrorist 
groups killed 
hundreds, including 
security forces, 
civilians, journalists, 
lawyers and 
foreigners) 
High intensity 
conflict (including 
deaths of civilians 
and terrorists by 
security forces; 
deaths in targeted 
killings as well as 
indiscriminate attacks 
on security forces 
and civilians by 
Islamist groups 
resulting in perhaps 
‘thousands of 
deaths’.  
High Intensity 
conflict (hundreds 
killed in terrorist 
bombings) and 
violent political 
conflict (Kabilye) 
Freedom 
House 7/6/NF 7/7/NF 6/6/NF 6/6/NF 
U.S. State 
Department E
9, T10, CA11, CL12 E13, T14, CA15, CL16 E
17, T18, p19, CA20, 
CL21 
E22, T23, p24, CA25, 
CL26 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Political 
Terrorscale 5 5  4 
Conflict Level 
High Intensity (6,000 
to 7,000 killed) and 
low intensity conflict 
(Kabilye) 
High intensity (7,000 
killed) and low 
intensity conflict 
(Kabilye) 
High Intensity (3,000 
killed) and low 
intensity conflict 
(Kabilye) 
High Intensity (2,500 
killed) and low 
intensity conflict 
(Kabilye) 
Freedom 
House 6/6/NF 6/5/NF 6/5/NF 6/5/NF 
U.S. State 
Department 
E27, T, p28, CA29, 
CL30  
E31, T, p32, CA33, 
CL34 
E35, t36, p37, IF38, 
CA39, CL40  
E41, t42, p43, CA44, 
CL45 
 
 2001 2002 
Political 
Terrorscale   
Conflict Level 
High Intensity (1,980 
killed) and low 
intensity conflict 
(Kabilye) 
High intensity (1,386 
killed) and low 
intensity conflict  
Freedom 
House 6/5/NF 6/5/NF 
U.S. State 
Department E
46, t47, CA48, CL49 E50, t51, CA52, CL53 
 
 
Working conditions: 
 
1989: Enforcement of strict occupational and health regulations is lax. 
1990: Enforcement of strict occupational and health regulations is lax. 
1991: Enforcement of strict occupational and health regulations is lax. 
1992: Enforcement of strict occupational and health regulations is lax. 
1993: Minimum wage is insufficient to support a family. Enforcement of laws regarding 
working conditions is inconsistent. It is not known whether a worker can remove himself from 
hazardous work situations without risking being fired. 
1994: Minimum wage risen. Further pay rises being negotiated. Enforcement of laws regarding 
working conditions is inconsistent. No reports of workers being removed for refusing to work 
in hazardous conditions. 
1995: Minimum wage risen. Enforcement of laws regarding working conditions is inconsistent. 
No reports of workers being removed for refusing to work in hazardous conditions. 
1996: Minimum wage risen. Enforcement of laws regarding working conditions is inconsistent. 
No reports of workers being removed for refusing to work in hazardous conditions. 
1997: Minimum wage risen, but inadequate to support family. Enforcement of laws regarding 
working conditions is inconsistent. No reports of workers being removed for refusing to work 
in hazardous conditions. Standard working week reduced to 40 hours. 
1998: Minimum wage risen, but inadequate to support family. Enforcement of laws regarding 
working conditions is inconsistent. No reports of workers being removed for refusing to work 
in hazardous conditions.  
1999: Minimum wage inadequate to support family. Enforcement of laws regarding working 
conditions is inconsistent. No reports of workers being removed for refusing to work in 
hazardous conditions.  
2000: Minimum wage risen, but inadequate to support family. Enforcement of laws regarding 
working conditions is inconsistent. No reports of workers being removed for refusing to work 
in hazardous conditions.  
2001: Minimum wage risen, but inadequate to support family. Enforcement of laws regarding 
working conditions is inconsistent. No reports of workers being removed for refusing to work 
in hazardous conditions. Standard workweek reduced to 37.5 hours. 
2002: There are very well developed occupation and health regulations codified in the law, but 
enforcement was lacking. There were no reports of workers being removed for refusing to 
work in hazardous conditions. Because employment was based on very detailed contracts, 
workers were rarely subjected to conditions they were not aware off. High unemployment does 
give the advantage to the employer over the employee.   
 
 
Brief historical/political overview: 
 
1962: Independence. Single-party state dominated by military leadership and supported by 
FLN. 
1988: Eruption of urban violence (combined with deteriorating economic conditions) forces 
steps towards a more open, multiparty political system. 
1989: Referendum on Constitution which guarantees fundamental human rights and stipulates 
transfer to a pluralist republic with a strong president. FLN still only represented party in the 
National Assembly, as National Assembly elections are still to be held. The local and 
provincial elections are postponed until the first half of 1990 in order “to give new political 
parties more time to organize”. State Security Court is abolished. President Bendjedid promises 
prosecution of those responsible for the large scale killings and numerous cases of torture that 
occurred during the 1988 riots. There is no evidence such action has effectively been 
undertaken. 
1990: President Bendjedid dramatically loosens the party’s grip on government policy. Local 
and provincial elections result for the first time in rule by Islamic and other parties. A general 
amnesty is given to those involved in the events of 1988. The promise to prosecute is thus not 
kept. National Assembly elections are to be held in June 1991. 
1991: In April the National Assembly presents an electoral districting law which is vehemently 
opposed by FIS. In June FIS organises an (unsuccessful) general strike and calls for early 
presidential elections. This leads to violent demonstrations in which as many as 300 people die 
(mostly due to excessive force by security forces). The President declares a state of siege which 
lasts 4 months. FIS President Abassi Madani and FIS vice-president Ali Belhadj are arrested. 
At the end of the year (December 26th) the first round of parliamentary elections are held. FIS 
clearly win the election.  
1992: FLN’s rule ends. Dissolution of parliament. President Chadli Benjedid resigns on 
January 11 after the first round of the elections are won by the FIS (Military and elements in 
the Government force president out). A day after the regime cancels the second round of 
parliamentary elections. The second round would most likely have been won by the Islamic 
Salvation Front. Mohamed Boudiaf heads five-member High State Committee. FIS banned and 
many leaders in jail. Armed Islamist groups seek to overthrow government and impose Islamic 
state. In February a state of emergency is announced. Boudiaf is assassinated in June and 
replaced by Ali Kafi. New antiterrorist law into force. 
1993: Human rights situation further deteriorates. Government postpones elections for another 
2 or 3 years. State of emergency is extended. 
1994: Armed campaign against Government is intensified. Reprisal intensified. Human rights 
situation further deteriorates. 
Jan. 1994: President Zeroual replaces High State Committee. 
President opens up talks with political parties and informal contacts with FIS leaders. 
Nov. 1 1994: Talks have failed. Presidential elections announced in 1995. State of emergency 
remains in force. 
Nov. 16 1995: Presidential elections. Many opposition parties refuse to participate. In the end 
four candidates. Zeroual wins 60% of the vote. Some allegations of fraud and coercion. Not 
enough to alter the result. Legislative elections and move towards democracy are announced. 
1995: Special camps to detain people, administered by the army, are closed. Special Security 
Courts are abolished. Many organisations contended these courts did not abide by the rule of 
fair trial. 
1996: There is a slight improvement of the human rights situation. 
1996: Promise to hold parliamentary elections in the first half of 1997. 
1996: President and a few opposition parties sign a national charter encompassing ideas on 
political reform, review of the constitution and review of electoral laws. The ideas are put to 
the people in a referendum. They are approved, but referendum was flawed. 
1997: Some improvements of the human rights situation. Increase in massacres by armed 
groups. 
1997: Parliamentary elections are held in June and municipal and provincial elections in 
October. They are the first ever. There are many problems with the conduct of the elections.  
1998: There were improvements in some areas of the human rights situation. The number of 
security incidents involving armed groups and terrorists decreased during the year (and became 
more localised). 
1998: President Zeroual announces he will resign after the completion of multiparty elections 
to be held before the end of April 1999. 
1999: President Abdelaziz Bouteflaki is elected in April (he spent two decades outside of 
Algeria, but has previously served as a Foreign Minister). Before the elections the six other 
presidential candidates withdraw, credibly charging the military of massive fraud. The turnout 
was 30%. After his election Bouteflaki announces that a total of about 100,000 persons have 
been killed in the previous 8 years. Bouteflaki draws up a peace plan (which includes an 
amnesty program for the extremists fighting to overthrow the Government). The peace plan is 
put to the people and approved by a 98% majority. There were fewer security incidents 
involving armed groups and terrorists (and the incidents were more localised). After the 
elections, about 5000 political prisoners were released. In November the judiciary is 
reorganised by Bouteflaki. As a result of a report by a commission set up by Bouteflaki 80% of 
all the heads of lower courts and 99% of the Presidents of the higher level courts are reassigned 
or fired. There are more women heading courts (19).  
2000: Killings by armed groups increases by 20%. 
2001: The human rights situation continues to improve. Violence by armed groups decreases. 
Fifty demonstrators are killed in Kabylie.  
2002: Allegations of abuse continued to decline. There were parliamentary elections on May 
30th, and local elections on October 10th. There was a decline in the number of deaths attributed 
to terrorist groups. During the year 1,386 civilians, terrorists, and security force members died 
as a result of ongoing violence, a decline from the 1,980 deaths in the previous year. A new 
trend was reported in that security forces used prolonged detention ranging from 8 to 18 
months, this was often reported as a ‘disappearance’. 
 
                                                 
1 Following a directive by Secretary of State Warren Christopher some changes in reporting were made as of the 
1993 report. The changes include a stronger emphasis on prison conditions and a new section on “discrimination 
based on race, sex, religion, disability, language or social status. This new section also includes a paragraph on 
discrimination against children. 
2 The problem is not widespread, but due to economic hardship the number of children working in the informal 
sector is increasing. 
3 There were a number of cases of torture. A number of recaptured escapees from Blida prison were tortured by 
guards. One person accused of car theft was tortured. According to the Algerian League of Human Rights 22 
people were tortured after being arrested at violent demonstrations in Tenes.  
4 The problem is not widespread, but due to economic hardship the number of children working in the informal 
sector is increasing. 
5 The problem is not widespread, but due to economic hardship the number of children working in the informal 
sector is increasing. 
6 Reportedly between 30 and 60 civilians died in demonstrations and rioting due to use of excessive force by 
security forces. It is unclear from the report if they should be counted as extrajudicial executions. 
7 There were reports of torture, but less than in previous years. 
8 The problem is not widespread, but due to economic hardship the number of children working in the informal 
sector is increasing. 
9 Reliable sources report that that are many extrajudicial executions. 
10 There is a systematic use of torture. Some sources say anti terrorism legislation have made torture and other 
abuse ‘easy’. 
11 It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the problem. Hospitals treat dozens of children annually for injuries 
sustained through abuse, but many cases go unreported. Corporal punishment in school is common. 
12 The problem is not widespread, but many children have to work informal jobs, such as street vending, out of 
pure economic necessity. 
13 Security forces are accused of having killed hundreds of people in retaliation to extremist attacks. 
14 Many died as a result of torture. Torture mainly affects suspected islamists. 
15 It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the problem. Hospitals treat dozens of children annually for injuries 
sustained through abuse, but many cases go unreported. 
16 The problem is not widespread, but many children have to work informal jobs, such as street vending, out of 
pure economic necessity. 
17 A prison uprising lead to hundreds of deaths. It is possible these people were executed. 
18 Torture mainly affects suspected islamists. 
19 Overcrowding. Prison conditions are impossible to verify for no independent assessment of the conditions is 
allowed. 
20 It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the problem. Hospitals treat dozens of children annually for injuries 
sustained through abuse, but many cases go unreported. 
21 The problem is not widespread, but many children have to work informal jobs, such as street vending, out of 
pure economic necessity. 
22 Many were extrajudicially executed, but fewer than in recent years. 
23 Torture mainly affects suspected islamists. 
24 Prison conditions are poor. There is severe overcrowding and limited access to medical attention. Independent 
monitoring of prison conditions is not permitted. 
25 It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the problem. Hospitals treat dozens of children annually for injuries 
sustained through abuse, but many cases go unreported. 
26 The problem is not widespread, but many children have to work informal jobs, such as street vending, out of 
pure economic necessity. 
27 Political opponents, particularly persons suspected of being sympathizers of armed groups, were killed by 
security forces. Serious doubts arose about the way security forces were (not) protecting villagers under attack. 
Three separate incidents are reported in which hundreds of people were massacred while army barracks were only 
a few hundred meters away and the army had been called on one occasion by villagers under attack. 
                                                                                                                                                           
28 Prison conditions are poor. There is severe overcrowding and limited access to medical attention. Independent 
monitoring of prison conditions is not permitted. 
29 It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the problem. Hospitals treat dozens of children annually for injuries 
sustained through abuse, but many cases go unreported. 
30 The problem is not widespread, but many children have to work informal jobs, such as street vending, out of 
pure economic necessity. 
31 Security forces (and progovernment militias) were responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings. Serious 
doubts arose about the way security forces were (not) protecting villagers under attack. 
32 Prison conditions are poor. There is severe overcrowding and limited access to medical attention. Independent 
monitoring of prison conditions is not permitted. However an agreement was reached between the International 
Red Cross and the government on visits to a limited number of prisons after the 1999 elections. A U.N. panel of 
eminent persons visited one prison. 
33 It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the problem. Hospitals treat dozens of children annually for injuries 
sustained through abuse, but many cases go unreported. 
34 The problem is not widespread, but many children have to work informal jobs, such as street vending, out of 
pure economic necessity. 
35 By security forces (and progovernment militias). Serious doubts arose about the way security forces were (not) 
protecting villagers under attack. 
36 It is impossible to ascertain the exact number of cases of torture. There are many instances of excessive force. In 
any case there were fewer allegations of torture and a number of torture techniques were known not to used in 
1999. 
37 Prison conditions were poor. Prisons were severely overcrowded. There was a lack of medical treatment, food, 
and reading material. The Government does not permit independent monitoring. However the ICRC was permitted 
to visit prisons and open an office in Algiers (they did not visit FIS leaders). 
38 Prisoners complained of a lack of food. 
39 Hospitals treat dozens of children annually for injuries sustained through abuse, but many cases go unreported. 
Child abuse is a problem. Local NGO’s attribute an increase in domestic violence to the “culture of violence” 
developed during the years since 1992 ‘and the social dislocations caused by the movement of rural families to the 
cities to escape terrorist violence’. 
40 The problem is not widespread, but many children have to work informal jobs, such as street vending, out of 
pure economic necessity. 
41 Security forces still committed numerous extrajudicial killings, mainly in clashes with armed terrorist groups. 
The number of extrajudicial killings decreased again (by Approx. 10%). Serious doubts arose about the way 
security forces were (not) protecting villagers under attack. 
42 There still were some reports of torture, but considerably less than in past years. Torture mainly affected those 
suspected of having sympathies for, or being involved in, armed insurgency groups. 
43 Although prison conditions were poor, they considerably ameliorated in 2000. Overcrowding is still a problem, 
but there was a decrease of prisoners. Prisoners are in good health and they have sufficient food, but medical 
attention was still insufficient. The ICRC is permitted to monitor prison conditions. 
44 Hospitals treat dozens of children annually for injuries sustained through abuse, but many cases go unreported. 
Child abuse is a problem. Local NGO’s attribute an increase in domestic violence to the “culture of violence” 
developed during the years since 1992 ‘and the social dislocations caused by the movement of rural families to the 
cities to escape terrorist violence’. 
45 The problem is not widespread, but many children have to work informal jobs, such as street vending, out of 
pure economic necessity. 
46 Mostly in clashes with armed terrorist groups. The number of executions decreased by about 19%. 
47 Torture mainly affected those suspected of having sympathies for, or being involved in, armed insurgency 
groups. 
48 Hospitals treat dozens of children annually for injuries sustained through abuse, but many cases go unreported. 
Child abuse is a problem. Local NGO’s attribute an increase in domestic violence to the “culture of violence” 
developed during the years since 1992 ‘and the social dislocations caused by the movement of rural families to the 
cities to escape terrorist violence’. 
49 The problem is not widespread, but many children have to work informal jobs, such as street vending, out of 
pure economic necessity. 
50 Most extrajudicial executions took place during clashes with terrorist groups. However 71 civilians were also 
killed (the majority of those deaths occurred during protests in the Kabylie region). 
51 Police at times resorted to torture mainly against those suspected of being involved with, or having sympathies 
for, armed insurgency groups. The number of allegations of torture decreased according to the International Red 
Cross. 
52 Child abuse is a problem. Local NGO’s attribute an increase in domestic violence to the “culture of violence” 
developed during the years since 1992 ‘and the social dislocations caused by the movement of rural families to the 
cities to escape terrorist violence’. 
53 Many children have to work informal jobs, such as street vending, out of pure economic necessity. 
 
Source: www.cia.gov 
 
TUNISIA 
(Population: 9,924,742) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Political 
Terrorscale 2/2 3/3 4/3 3/3 
Conflict Level     
Freedom 
House 5/3/PF 5/4/PF 5/5/PF 6/5/PF 
U.S. State 
Department t
1, CL2 (e)3, T4, CL5 e6, T7, CL8 (e)9, T10, CL11 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Political 
Terrorscale 3/3 4/3 4/2 3/2 
Conflict Level     
Freedom 
House 6/5/NF 6/5/NF 6/5/NF 6/5/NF 
U.S. State 
Department t
12, CL13 (e)14, t15, CL16 (e)17, CL18 p19, t20, CL21 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Political 
Terrorscale 2 3  3 
Conflict Level     
Freedom 
House 6/5/NF 6/5/NF 6/5/NF 6/5/NF 
U.S. State 
Department (e)
22, p23, t24, CL25 (e)26, p27, T28, CL29 e30, p31, T, CL32 e33, p34, T35, CL36 
 
 2001 2002 
Political 
Terrorscale   
Conflict Level   
Freedom 
House 6/5/NF 6/5/NF 
U.S. State 
Department e
37, p38, T39, CL40 e41, p42, T, CL43 
 
 
 
Working conditions: 
 
1989: Legislation on “rehabilitation” and compulsory work on economic and social 
development projects is not in conformity with ILO Convention on Forced Labour. Inadequate 
enforcement of health and safety regulations in hazerdous jobs. 200 work related deaths.  
1990: Legislation on “rehabilitation” and compulsory work on economic and social 
development projects is not in conformity with ILO Convention on Forced Labour.Inadequate 
enforcement of health and safety regulations in hazerdous jobs. In Tunis inspections are good, 
but outside of Tunis, where most of the construction work is done in the informal sector, 
inspections are lacking. 
1991: Legislation on “rehabilitation” and compulsory work on economic and social 
development projects is not in conformity with ILO Convention on Forced Labour.Inadequate 
enforcement of health and safety regulations in hazerdous jobs. In Tunis inspections are good, 
but outside of Tunis, where most of the construction work is done in the informal sector, 
inspections are lacking. 
1992: Legislation on “rehabilitation” and compulsory work on economic and social 
development projects is not in conformity with ILO Convention on Forced Labour.Inadequate 
enforcement of health and safety regulations in hazerdous jobs. In Tunis inspections are good, 
but outside of Tunis, where most of the construction work is done in the informal sector, 
inspections are lacking. In 1992 a new labour code on work related illnessess and accidents was 
enacted. 
1993: There are special government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as 
mining, petroleum engineering, and construction. Inadequate enforcement of health and safety 
regulations in hazerdous jobs. In Tunis inspections are good, but outside of Tunis, where most 
of the construction work is done in the informal sector, inspections are lacking. Working 
conditions tend to be better in firms that are export oriented. Workers are free to remove 
themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardising their employment, and they may 
take legal against employers who retaliate against them for exercising this right. 
1994: There are special government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as 
mining, petroleum engineering, and construction. Inadequate enforcement of health and safety 
regulations in hazerdous jobs. In Tunis inspections are good, but outside of Tunis, where most 
of the construction work is done in the informal sector, inspections are lacking. Working 
conditions tend to be better in firms that are export oriented. Workers are free to remove 
themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardising their employment, and they may 
take legal against employers who retaliate against them for exercising this right. Reported 
workplace accidents during the first six months of 1994 indicate a decline of 0.9 % in mishaps 
over the same period in 1993. Work-related deaths increased to 82 in the first six months of the 
year, compared to 76 from the same period in 1993. 
1995: There are special government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as 
mining, petroleum engineering, and construction. Inadequate enforcement of health and safety 
regulations in hazerdous jobs. In Tunis inspections are good, but outside of Tunis, where most 
of the construction work is done in the informal sector, inspections are lacking. Working 
conditions tend to be better in firms that are export oriented. Workers are free to remove 
themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardising their employment, and they may 
take legal against employers who retaliate against them for exercising this right. 
1996: There are special government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as 
mining, petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions tend to be better in firms 
that are export oriented. Workers are free to remove themselves from dangerous situations 
without jeopardising their employment, and they may take legal against employers who 
retaliate against them for exercising this right. 
1997: There are special government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as 
mining, petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions tend to be better in firms 
that are export oriented. Workers are free to remove themselves from dangerous situations 
without jeopardising their employment, and they may take legal against employers who 
retaliate against them for exercising this right. 
1998: There are special government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as 
mining, petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions tend to be better in firms 
that are export oriented. Workers are free to remove themselves from dangerous situations 
without jeopardising their employment, and they may take legal against employers who 
retaliate against them for exercising this right. 
1999: There are special government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as 
mining, petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions tend to be better in firms 
that are export oriented. Workers are free to remove themselves from dangerous situations 
without jeopardising their employment, and they may take legal against employers who 
retaliate against them for exercising this right. 
2000: There are special government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as 
mining, petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions tend to be better in firms 
that are export oriented. Workers are free to remove themselves from dangerous situations 
without jeopardising their employment, and they may take legal against employers who 
retaliate against them for exercising this right. 
2001: There are special government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as 
mining, petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions tend to be better in firms 
that are export oriented. Workers are free to remove themselves from dangerous situations 
without jeopardising their employment, and they may take legal against employers who 
retaliate against them for exercising this right. 
2002: There are special government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as 
mining, petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions tend to be better in firms 
that are export oriented. Workers are free to remove themselves from dangerous situations 
without jeopardising their employment, and they may take legal against employers who 
retaliate against them for exercising this right. 
 
Brief historical/political overview 
 
1987: President Ben Ali assumes power. 
1989: President Ben Ali is reelected. He was unopposed. His ruling Constitutional Democratic 
Party (RCD) won all seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Voting was influenced by the winner-
take-all voting system, the inability of many voters to register, and heavy-handed RCD tactics. 
Although Islamist independents averaged 18 percent of the vote wherever they ran, the Islamist 
party An Nahda continued to be denied legal status. 
1990: Some members of the previously little independent Chamber of Deputies voiced 
criticism on the press laws and challenging drafted legislation. Two parliamentary by-elections 
were boycotted by the opposition. New legislation introduced modified proportional 
representation for the June municipal elections, but these were also boycotted by the 
opposition. The elections continued to be influenced by the same factors as in 1989. The 
regime became increasingly repressive, especially against Islamists (and police stepped up their 
presence around universities and mosques). One demonstration by Islamists turned violent. 
1991: By-elections in October were boycotted by the opposition, because of the lack of press 
freedom and access to government controlled media and the ruling party’s monopoly over the 
administration. The largest opposition party, the islamist An Nahda, suffered enormous setback 
as islamists attacked a RCD bureau killing one guard and injuring another. Members of the 
Executive Bureau of An Nahda resigned, and the government announced the arrest of 238 
persons in connection with an alledged plot to overthrow the Government. In the aftermath of 
the alledged coup the human rights situation deteriorated. 4,000 islamists were arrested. 
1992: An Nahda was dealt a severe blow as 265 of its top memebers were sentenced to prison 
sentences ranging from 1 year to life after being convicted by two military tribunals for plotting 
to assassinate the President and overthrow the Government. The Government undertook serious 
initiatives in the human rights area, but significant restrictions remained. The crackdown on An 
Nahda was completed, but memebrs and their family continued to be harassed. New legislation 
led to the closure of the Tunisian League for Human Rights. The Govenrment guaranteed more 
accountability for human rights abuses and further opened the media to opposition party views. 
1993: Arrests of of Islamists and some leftists continued in 1993. 
1994: Ben Ali is elected for a second five-year term in March. He ran unopposed. The RCD 
won 144 out 163 seats. The 19 remaining seats are held by four nominal opposition parties. 
Two self-proclaimed presidential candidates, as well as an opposition candidate for Parliament 
who complained to a foreign journalist about the results of the national elections, were 
imprisoned by the Government. Arrests of of Islamists and some leftists continued. 
1995: In municipal elections the RCD won 4,084 of 4,090 seats. Human rights situation 
ameliorated somewhat in the first half of the year, but deteriorated in the second half of the 
year. The LTDE was refused visits to prisons. 
1996: Human rights situation did not improve. Repression of civil liberties continued, as well 
as continued reports of torture, poor prison conditions and impunity. The European passed a 
resolution criticising Tunisia’s human rights policy. They expressely linked economic 
cooperation with respect for human rights and democratic principles. Upon this the 
Government allowed periodic  monitoring of the human rights situation and to engage in 
discussions on human rights with its European partners. 
1997: Human rights performance by the Government improved in some important areas, 
however serious abuses continued to be committed. 
1998:  
1999: Elections were overwhelmingly won by the ruling RCD. Following a reform in the 
Constitution two candidates were allowed to run against the President in the presidential 
elections, this was the first time ever in the history of Tunisia. The Electoral Code also 
provided for 20% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies to go to the opposition (up from 10% at 
the previous election.  
2000:  
2001: The constitution provides for that a person may serve only three terms as President. 
However the RCD has requested President Ben Ali to seek a fourth term. This would require a 
constitutional amendment. 
2002: On June 1 nearly half of the constitution was amended after the Government initiated 
changes that, among other things, removed term limits for the presidency, raised the age limit 
of presidential candidates, granted immunity to the President for acts committed while in 
office, and created a second legislative chamber. In May the Government had put the 
amendments to a national referendum and stated that it passed with 99.52% of the vote. 
Credible reports indicate the vote was characterised by intimidation and that there was no 
secret ballot. In June LTDH released a report, the first of its kind since 1994, indicating the 
human rights situation had deteriorated. Pro-Palestinian demonstrations mostly at universities 
and high schools erupted into spontaneous demonstrations. Some resulted in violent 
confrontations between demonstrators and police. A terrorist attack outside a synagogue, on 
April 11 killed 21 people. 
                                                 
1 Of opposition supporters: islamists and communists. 
2 Young children often perform agricultural work in rural areas and sell food and other items in urban areas. 
3 Four deaths in suspicious circumstances. 
4 Torture increased. There were 120 complaints of torture in the first nine months of the year. 
5 Young children often perform agricultural work in rural areas and sell food and other items in urban areas. The 
problem of child labour has increased, because child labour is frequently disguised as an apprenticeship. 
6 There were seven deaths under suspicious circumstances. Probably due to torture. There were five students killed 
in rioting. The government called the deaths accidental. However independent observers reported the deaths were 
due to excessive use of force. 
7 There were an increased number of credible reports of torture. Especially due to the alledged coup against the 
Government. In the face of national and international criticism against the human rights situation in Tunisia, the 
Government established a committee to investigate the allegations. The Committee’s chairman acknowledged 
excesses and recommended a number of changes in laws. It seems the Government is more willing to prosecute 
offenders. 
8 Young children often perform agricultural work in rural areas and sell food and other items in urban areas. The 
problem of child labour has increased, because child labour is frequently disguised as an apprenticeship. 
9 There was one death under suspicious circumstances. 
10 There were credible reports that torture continued to be used. It would seem from the report the problem is not 
increasing. Most of the victims were islamists. Police officers were increasingly given training in human rights 
                                                                                                                                                           
and the Government seems to prosecute offenders more often. However it is to premature to state that the culture 
of impunity has been reversed. 
11 Young children often perform agricultural work in rural areas and sell food and other items in urban areas. The 
problem of child labour is serious. Child labour is frequently disguised as an apprenticeship. 
12 Torture persists, but is not systematic or widespread any more. 
13 Young children often perform agricultural work in rural areas and sell food and other items in urban areas. The 
problem of child labour is serious. Child labour is frequently disguised as an apprenticeship. Young girls from 
rural areas are sometimes placed as domestics in urban homes by ytheir fathers, who collect the child’s wages. 
14 Three persons died in police custody. Two alledgedly commited suicide. One alledgedly died of pneumonia. A 
fourth death in custody remained unconfirmed. 
15 Complaints of torture declined. 
16 Young children often perform agricultural work in rural areas and work as vendors in urban areas. Child labour 
is frequently disguised as an apprenticeship. Young girls from rural areas are sometimes placed as domestics in 
urban homes by ytheir fathers, who collect the child’s wages. 
17 Two prisoners died while in custody. One died alledgedly by committing suicide, the other was alledgedly killed 
by another inmate. The Government confirmed the death in August 1994 of an Islamist who had been in prison 
since his conviction in 1991-1992. The Government claims he died of a heart attack. However the family of the 
deceased claim foul play. 
18 Young children often perform agricultural work in rural areas and work as vendors in urban areas. Child labour 
is frequently disguised as an apprenticeship. Young girls from rural areas are sometimes placed as domestics in 
urban homes by ytheir fathers, who collect the child’s wages. 
19 Prison conditions range from spartan to poor. There was overcrowding and inadequate medical care. The regime 
was more severe for political prisoners. Only after the President visited certain prisons this year, was the National 
Human Rights Commissioner allowed to make unannounced visits (which it subsequently did in two separate 
facilities). 
20 Security forces employ various means of torture. However allegations of torture are difficult to substantiate. 
21 The minimum age for working in manufacturing was raised from 15 to 16. Many children work in agriculture in 
rural areas and street vending in urban areas.   
22 There were three cases of possible killings. One case was that of an older lady who’s house was searched as her 
son was arrested. She was alledgedly pushed over by security forces and died of her injuries. Another cases was 
the case of an activist in prison who died from a hunger strike. NGO’s alledge negligence from the authorities 
killed him. The last case was that of an asthmatic who died after the authorities alledgedly failed to provide him 
with adequate medical attemtion. 
23 Conditions ranged from spartan to poor, as there was overcrowding, lack of access to water and toilet facilities. 
24 Security forces employ various means of torture. However allegations of torture are difficult to substantiate. 
25 Many children work in agriculture in rural areas and street vending in urban areas, primarliy during summer 
vacation.   
26 There was one possible killing. A former islamist prisoner died in custody in suspicious circumstances. 
27 Conditions ranged from spartan to poor, and did not in some cases meet minimum international standards. There 
was overcrowding, insufficient water and toilet facilities. There were serious sanitation problems. Once more rules 
were more stringent for political prisoners.  
28 FIDH is quoted saying torture is systematic. 
29 Many children work in agriculture in rural areas and street vending in urban areas, primarliy during summer 
vacation. The use of child labour under the disguise of apprenticeship remains an area of concern. It is reported 
that the placing of teenage girls in families in order to let them work as domestics is common. The families of the 
girls aim to collect the girl’s wages.   
30 The report states that according to one prison report of Khemais Ksila published by AI one prisoner died of 
torture. The State Department report does not mention a reply by the authorities. This leads to believe the prison 
report is credible and reflects what happened.  
31 Conditions ranged from spartan to poor, and did not in some cases meet minimum international standards. There 
was overcrowding, insufficient water and toilet facilities. There were serious sanitation problems. Once more rules 
were more stringent for political prisoners.  
32 Many children work in agriculture in rural areas and street vending in urban areas, primarliy during summer 
vacation. The use of child labour under the disguise of apprenticeship remains an area of concern. It is reported 
that the placing of teenage girls in families in order to let them work as domestics is common. The families of the 
girls aim to collect the girl’s wages. 
33 There were two cases of extrajudicial killing and one case of gross negligence by prison authorities. 
34 Conditions ranged from spartan to poor, and did not in some cases meet minimum international standards. There 
was overcrowding, insufficient water and toilet facilities. There were serious sanitation problems. Once more rules 
were more stringent for political prisoners.  
35 It is the first time a report itself mentions the routine use of torture. There were allegations of severe beatings at 
demonstrations in February and October. 
36 Many children work in agriculture in rural areas and street vending in urban areas, primarliy during summer 
vacation. The use of child labour under the disguise of apprenticeship remains an area of concern. It is reported 
                                                                                                                                                           
that the placing of teenage girls in families in order to let them work as domestics is common. The families of the 
girls aim to collect the girl’s wages. Child labour is decling due to serious government efforts. 
37 There were four deaths in custody in which security forces were directly involved or in which they were accused 
of complicity. 
38 Conditions ranged from spartan to poor, and did not in some cases meet minimum international standards. There 
was overcrowding, insufficient water and toilet facilities. There were serious sanitation problems. Once more rules 
were more stringent for political prisoners. There were several hunger strikes during the year. There seems to be 
some attempt to reform the prison system, as the authority was referred from the Ministry of the Interior to the 
Ministry of Justice. This has not as yet resulted in any change. 
39 Once again there were severe beating during demonstrations. RCD students attacked opposing candidates 
running for scientific councils. 
40 There is some child labour. Many children work in agriculture in rural areas and street vending in urban areas, 
primarliy during summer vacation. The use of child labour under the disguise of apprenticeship remains an area of 
concern. It is reported that the placing of teenage girls in families in order to let them work as domestics is 
common. The families of the girls aim to collect the girl’s wages.  
41 There were deaths in which security forces were directly or indirectly implicated. 
42 Conditions ranged from spartan to poor, and did not in some cases meet minimum international standards. There 
was overcrowding, insufficient water and toilet facilities. There were serious sanitation problems. Once more rules 
were more stringent for political prisoners. There were several hunger strikes during the year. There seemed to be 
some attempt to reform the prison system in 2001, as the authority was referred from the Ministry of the Interior to 
the Ministry of Justice. This has still not resulted in any change. 
43 There is some child labour. Many children work in agriculture in rural areas and street vending in urban areas, 
primarliy during summer vacation. The use of child labour under the disguise of apprenticeship remains an area of 
concern. It is reported that the placing of teenage girls in families in order to let them work as domestics is 
common. The families of the girls aim to collect the girl’s wages. This practice, as well as child labour in general, 
declined during the year, due to government involvement. 
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Working conditions: 
1989: Constitution provides liberties to workers, but in reality workers’ right of association is 
limited. High government influence and control in Mali’s only recognised workers’ 
organisation (UNTM). Strikes are rare because of fear of losing jobs, unemployment rate is 
high. Strike for political reasons are illegal and mostly reprisals follow. ILO Committee on 
Freedom of association concluded that the actions of the government towards a teachers strike 
were an infringement of the freedom of association. No true collective bargaining because of 
Mali’s unitary party system. Reports show that there is still a form of traditional slavery in 
some isolated parts of the country. Children in rural areas join the workforce more early then 
legally 14 years or 12 years with consent of the parents. No protection against unjust 
compensation excessive hours and capricious discharge. Lack of inspectors for acceptable 
conditions of work.  
1990: Constitution provides liberties to workers, but in reality workers’ right of association is 
limited. High government influence and control in Mali’s only recognised workers’ 
organisation (UNTM). But the UNTM takes positions independent of the Government. Strikes 
are rare because of fear of losing jobs, unemployment rate is high. Strike for political reasons 
are illegal and mostly reprisals follow. No true collective bargaining because of Mali’s unitary 
party system. Reports show that there is still a form of traditional slavery in some isolated parts 
of the country, mostly debt slavery in salt mining communities north of Timbuktu. Work is 
under primitive and dangerous conditions. Debt and obligation often passes from one 
generation to the next. Children in rural areas join the workforce more early then legally 14 
years or 12 years with consent of the parents. No protection against unjust compensation 
excessive hours and capricious discharge. Lack of inspectors for acceptable conditions of work.  
1991: The new Constitution specifically provides for the freedom of workers to form or join 
unions and does not limit them to the National Union of Malian Workers (UNTM). The UNTM 
this time was a leading force in changing the regime. Three of its members are now in the 
Transitional Government. There is an explicit right to strike and this right has been used several 
times this year. They were generally resolved by negotiations between the labour unions and 
the new Government.  There also was a reduction is constraints for workers to organize and 
bargain collectively. Next to that there still is some debt slavery in salt mining in the North 
where also children are probably active. Important to note is that since the change of the regime 
many of those treated as slaves have refused to continue working under those conditions. 
Children in rural areas join the workforce more early then legally 14 years or 12 years with 
consent of the parents. No protection against unjust compensation excessive hours and 
capricious discharge. Lack of inspectors for acceptable conditions of work.  
1992: The new Constitution specifically provides for the freedom of workers to form or join 
unions and does not limit them to the National Union of Malian Workers (UNTM). The UNTM 
this time was a leading force in changing the regime. There also was a reduction is constraints 
for workers to organize and bargain collectively. Next to that there still is some debt slavery in 
salt mining in the North where also children are probably active. Important to note is that since 
the change of the regime many of those treated as slaves have refused to continue working 
under those conditions. And the Government does not force the fled slaves back to go to work. 
It has even helped some former slaves to settle in villages. Children in rural areas join the 
workforce more early then legally 14 years or 12 years with consent of the parents. No 
protection against unjust compensation excessive hours and capricious discharge. Lack of 
inspectors for acceptable conditions of work.  
1993: idem 1992. 
1994: idem 1992 + Virtually all salaried employees are organised in unions now. True 
collective bargaining still doesn’t take place. 
1995: idem 1994 
1996: idem 1995 
1997: idem 1996 + UNTM fragmented into small groups over a dispute of leadership. But they 
almost all reconstituted. The growth of independent unions has led to more direct bargaining 
between unions and their employers. Labour code adopted that has specific policies pertaining 
child labour. It enforces the protection of children through labour inspectors, but resources are 
limited. Regulations are often ignored in practice and Labour Code has no effect on the vast 
number of children in the rural areas. 
1998: idem 1997+ more emphasis on the Labour Code for Children. But still regulations are 
ignored and even now there are cases of trafficking sold children to Cote D’Ivoire into forced 
labour. The Government is taking steps against this and 55 children were returned to their 
parents and arrested some traffickers.  
1999: idem 1997+ more emphasis on the Labour Code for Children. But still regulations are 
ignored and even now there are cases of trafficking sold children to Cote D’Ivoire into forced 
labour. The Government is taking steps against this and 5 children were returned to their 
parents but did not arrest traffickers. 
2000: idem 1998 + The government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child 
labour on July 14. Combat against Child Labour is getting stronger and the government and 
ngo’s are more active. Some 50 children were returned from TL in Cote D’Ivoire. 
2001: In June in Bamako bus drivers attacked the police following the death of a bus driver. 
The drivers Union agreed to use union funds o pay for repairs to traffic lights and other public 
facilities damaged in the riots. Government keeps on taking steps to halt child trafficking. 
Some 300 children were returned to their families (=children that went through welcome 
centres, others were not counted). In August 2000 the government signed a treaty with Cote 
D’Ivoire to cooperate in combating trafficking. Around 10 traffickers were arrested. 
2002: In 2001 the Government negotiated with all labour unions a social pact, intended to 
encourage more discussions between workers and employers, thus lessening the risks of strikes. 
TL/CL/FL remain a persistent problem.  
 
Brief historical/political overview: 
 
Background: 
The Sudanese Republic and Senegal became independent of France in 1960 as the Mali 
Federation. When Senegal withdrew after only a few months, the Sudanese Republic was 
renamed Mali. Rule by dictatorship was brought to a close in 1991 with a transitional 
government, and in 1992 when Mali's first democratic presidential election was held. After his 
re-election in 1997, President Alpha KONARE continued to push through political and 
economic reforms and to fight corruption. In keeping with Mali's two-term constitutional limit, 
he stepped down in 2002 and was succeeded by Amadou TOURE. 
 
Economy - overview: 
Mali is among the poorest countries in the world, with 65% of its land area desert or semi 
desert. Economic activity is largely confined to the riverine area irrigated by the Niger. About 
10% of the population is nomadic and some 70% of the labour force is engaged in farming and 
fishing. Industrial activity is concentrated on processing farm commodities. Mali is heavily 
dependent on foreign aid and vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices for cotton, its main 
export. In 1997, the government continued its successful implementation of an IMF-
recommended structural adjustment program that is helping the economy grow, diversify, and 
attract foreign investment. Mali's adherence to economic reform and the 50% devaluation of 
the African franc in January 1994 have pushed up economic growth to a sturdy 5% average in 
1996-2000. In 2001, GDP decreased by 1.2% mainly due to a 50% drop in cotton production in 
2000-01. 
 
1989: Military still has a strong and privileged position since the military coup of 1968 and 
the new Constitution of 1974. Good rainfalls for the second year in a row increased agricultural 
production and permitted some export of grain, but malnutrition and poor food distribution 
remain persistent problems. Military regime controls large parts of media and judiciary.  
Baha’i, a religious group, has the right to practice at home, but not proselytise or establish 
houses of worship. Female Genital Mutilation (FMG) is practised widely, including 
infibulation (most extreme form).Women’s position overall harsh conditions. Citizens have no 
ability to change their government and only limited and infrequent opportunity to influence it.  
1990: Although some human rights restrictions eased in 1990, the government’s response to 
Tuareg dissidence in the North resulted in numerous credible reports of human rights 
violations. There have been attacks and fights between the Toearegs and the government 
supposingly because of the fact that the Toearegs felt that the government didn’t come up for 
their causes (primarily because a very poor coordinated repatriation of several thousands 
Malians, mainly Tuaregs, from Algeria in 1990 because of the drought of previous years. Next 
to that there is longstanding resentment among Tuaregs at being ruled by a government 
composed of a number of other ethnic groups. Libya admits that it military trained many 
Malian Tuaregs.) The Government states that there where about 50 people that died, but other 
sources talk about almost 600 people. 300 deaths per side. Forced eviction, Destruction of 
Houses and a lot of extra judicial executions followed this conflict.   
(US State Dep. Report, in contrast to the Amnesty report doesn’t mention Habib Ben Wahab 
who died in prison, nor the FE or D.)  
1991: This year brought several changes. The 23 year old single party military dictatorship of 
President Moussa Traore was overthrown. This led to the establishment of a transitional 
government, which pledged to establish a multiparty democracy with free elections in 1992. 
There was intensive rioting, rebel activity and due to this a lot of E, and some D. This 
happened primarily during the days of antigovernment rioting. Lt. Amadou Toumani TOURE 
became head of State during the transition period. The CTSP (Transitional Committee for the 
Salvation of the People) became the ruling body. The rebel activity that started in 1990 was 
still sporadic due to dissident rebel groups who didn’t follow the accords signed with the 
previous regime. Both sides killed civilians and abducted people. About 39 civilians are 
reported to been killed by Tuareg rebels in at least 29 attacks. Military reprisals on civilians 
due to the killing of several soldiers and government supporter Mohamadoum Ag hamani and 
eight of his people in his house-hold.  
Next to that the military’s credibility was profoundly shaken when it used lethal force to put 
down the anti-regime demonstrations, even peaceful demonstrations. Although there were 
significant violations of Human Rights in 1991, especially those that were associated with the 
conflict in the North and the end of the Traore regime, the change in government in most 
respects improved the Human Rights situation. Political rights were greatly expanded and 
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association increased significantly. The new 
constitution provides broad protection of Human Rights and civil liberties. Because of good 
media coverage of the events more Malians became aware of their rights and were less afraid to 
file complaints when these rights were violated. Next to that the transitional Government 
declared the judiciary independent of the legislative and executive power. The end of the year 
looked promising. One can see for instance the Freedom House figures moving from 1990-
1992 from ‘Not Free’ into ‘Free’. But the E this year consisted out of many different killings by 
the military (see footnotes). There were a lot of reprisals by the military to attacks towards 
them from rebels. And although the president repudiated the behaviour of the military, no one 
was arrested or tried. The Transitional Government however later arrested and charged a 
number of senior military officials who were believed to be responsible for issuing live 
ammunition to the troops. A wave of vigilante justice erupted after the overthrow of the 
previous regime. This ended in the end of 1991. But in the wake of massive jailbreaks, lack of 
confidence in the security system, mobs in Bamako and other cities hunted down about 15 
suspected thieves and captured and killed them. However, in several cases, special police units 
rescued threatened individuals and treated them in accordance with the law.  
1992:Mali became one of Africa’s newest democracies in 1992. President Alpha Oumar 
Konare took office after a 14-month transition period. They ratified the new Constitution, 21 
political parties emerged in the elections. There still is insurgency in the north that affects the 
country because of dissidents to the National Peace pact of 1991. Halfway the year hostilities 
reduced through the implementation by the Government of the National peace Pact, but the 
peace remained uneasy. Although there were extra judicial killings and violations of human 
rights because of the rebellion in the north of the country, the Government kept on the right 
track to improve human rights. A commission of inquiry to investigate the deaths on both sides 
was established, but end 1992 the commission has not done any work due to lack of consensus 
on the selection of foreign members. Still, the government shows action towards punishment, 
but none of the soldiers have been arrested or tried for these cases. 
1993:  Improved security situation relieved some domestic pressure, but allowed other 
problems to come out. Violent student demonstrations over government efforts to restrict 
scholarships in April forced the resignation of the first government of the Third Republic. The 
President tried to solve these problems consensually by incorporating several former opposition 
political parties into the second Government. Mali continues to be a myriad of economic 
problems including a sagging economy, a huge national debt, dependency on international 
donors, inadequate government revenues and other related problems. There were human rights 
abuses notably due to Governments inability to process the large backlog of judicial cases in 
accordance with the law. Resulting in people languishing in prison for several years awaiting 
trail. The Commission of inquiry that was supposed to be set up to investigate the extra judicial 
killings by the Military, had not been created by year’s end. Moussa Traero, overthrown in 
1991, remained in prison. He was held responsible for the deaths of over a hundred people 
during the demonstrations that led to the overthrow. Amnesty report states that he and three 
high functionaries got the death penalty for this. 
1994: The new Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita is heading the new Government. 
Violent student demonstrations flared up in February against government restrictions on 
financial aid, the same issue that had forced the resignation of the first government in 1993. 
The Government and students resolved their differences. Maur and Tuareg rebels and bandits 
in the north increased their attacks on civilian targets. They killed several civilians. On one 
instance in July they killed an estimated 40. These attacks led to reprisals. Estimated 300, 
mostly civilians, were killed. There is a lack of discipline among the security forces. They have 
committed extra judicial killings. There were human rights abuses notably due to Governments 
inability to process the large backlog of judicial cases in accordance with the law. Resulting in 
people languishing in prison for several years awaiting trail. 
1995:  Keita is still heading the constitutional democracy. In January the government reached 
agreement with the majority of Tuarg and Muar rebels in the north. Thus ending several years 
of rebellion. All parties held to the agreement. No reports of extra judicial killings according to 
the State Dep. Report, where AI states that there were at least 14 extra judicial killings. Mali 
continues to have large economic problems due to its dependency on foreign assistance, lack of 
industrial sector and the already mentioned problems. Female genital Mutilation is still 
common. No proposed legislation by Government, but support to educational efforts. 
1996: Mali remains poor. It is still very dependent on adequate rainfall for it’s economic well-
being. A literacy rate of only 23 % and a high population growth rate, also contribute to Mali’s 
poverty. There were no developments in the killing of the Swiss Cooperation Mission Director. 
No attempts were made to expedite the case. 
1997: Head of State, president Alpha Oumar Konare, was re-elected to a second 5 year term. 
Keita was reappointed as prime Minister. Election related violence resulted in the deaths of 
four persons. A bomb exploded in may in a crowded Bamako market on the day of the 
presidential elections, killing a young street vendor and wounding several others. In July 
persons shot into a group of voters in front of a polling station, killing 2 and wounding several 
others. In August a mob beat a police officer to death in Bamako outside an opposition party 
meeting. 
1998: A collective of 18 opposition parties that boycotted the presidential elections in 1997 
also boycotted the June municipal elections. Members of the security forces were responsible 
for a few human rights violations. The Justice minister initiated an overall review of prison 
conditions and in December confirmed that poor prison conditions persist.  There was an 
incident of mob violence against Christian missionaries that resulted in several injuries and 
significant property damage. In another incident traditionalist Muslims killed a judge who had 
detained some of the sect’s members. Amnesty International remains reporting that there are 
incidents of torture.  
1999: Mali is now implementing still the decentralisation following local elections. It 
instituted far reaching administrative reforms during this year. There were two violent incidents 
between Fulani herders and Sarakole farmers in the western region of Kayes over natural 
resource management. Negotiations brought peace. 
2000: This year Mali kept working on the implementation of a decentralised government. 
Children were still trafficked, put into forced Labour and Child Labour. 
2001: Idem 2000. 
2002: Idem 2000. Mali keeps heavily depending on donor countries, good rainfalls, FGM is 
still practised with young girls (almost 95%), there is minimal foreign investment. 
                                                 
1 Probably some form of child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the 
family farming work force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of 
the parent’s)  
2 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. 
3 Report mentions abuse of detainees and although the infamous ‘Taodenit’-prison, that caused a large number of 
deaths, is closed since 1988, there still is are harsh prison conditions that are characterized by inadequate medical 
facilities and food supplies. 
4 Good rainfalls for the second year in a row have increased agricultural production and permitted some export of 
grains. However, malnutrition, poor food distribution systems remain persistent problems. 
5 Probably some form of child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the 
family farming work force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of 
the parent’s)  
6 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. 
7 Numerous credible reports stated that as many as 29 persons were summarily executed. Government denied, but 
there were sufficient number of reports and enough credible to warrant an independent investigation, which the 
government refused. 
8 There are still are harsh prison conditions that are characterized by inadequate medical facilities and food 
supplies. 
9 Credible reports suspected Tuareg dissidents were tortured during interrogation.  
10 Probably some form of Child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the 
family farming work force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of 
the parent’s) 
11 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. Next to that there still is some 
debt slavery in salt mining in the North where also children are probably active. Important to note is that since the 
change of the regime many of those treated as slaves have refused to continue working under those conditions.  
12 This E consists out of several actions by he military.  Credible reports of extra judicial killings by the military. 
These were numerous accounts by security forces using excessive force in putting down anti-regime 
demonstrations in Bamako and with dealing with the rebellion in the North.  The security forces in Bamako and 
other cities opened fire on demonstrators, killing 216 and wounding 717. Some killings were done when 
demonstrators were looting, many others occurred during peaceful demonstrations. In addition there are credible 
reports that 65 persons died when security forces set fire to a building into which demonstrators had fled. There 
were reprisals on Tuaregs and Maurs by the military as a response to rebellion activities. These consisted out of 
executing 10 Tuareg civilians, murdering leading Tuareg notables, executing 34 nomads in Lere, 15 nomads near 
Tonka. The number of deaths in the conflict seems difficult to estimate, but credible reports put total civilian 
Tuareg deaths at the hands of the military at around 70.  Various rebel and bandit groups lost around 150 people. 
13 During the time of the Transitional Government things have changed to the better (e.g. the ICRC conducted 
seminars for prison officials on the treatment of officials and they responded and acted upon these seminars in a 
positive way), but fact remains that many prisons outside the capital still have very harsh prison conditions due to 
a lack of basic needs like medical facilities and food supplies.  
14 The new constitution prohibits torture and the Transitional Government made strides to end this physical abuse 
of suspects, which sometimes occurred during police interrogation. Next to that people became more aware of 
their rights due to the good media coverage and were not afraid to complain more. But fact remains that there are 
strides to end it, but it hasn’t ended yet. No figures are given, but it is probable that there is still some torture. 
15 Many nomads lost cattle herds and commercial enterprises were destroyed. They were destroyed by the military, 
but also by the rebels. There are no statistics to show who did what in what amount. 
16 Several instances by security forces in the north in reprisal of rebel attacks against unarmed Tuaregs (over one 
hundred say credible reports) and Maurs (no real estimation, only reports on 24 people executed in a raid other 
reports not stating numbers).  
17 The government took action when it heard about Tuareg allegations of mistreatment of prisoners by sending a 
high-level team to investigate. Prison facilities are more adequate, and the Government takes action, but still, 
conditions are still harsh, medical facilities inadequate and food supplies short. 
18 Many nomads lost cattle herds and commercial enterprises were destroyed. They were destroyed by the military, 
but also by the rebels. There are no statistics to show who did what in what amount 
                                                                                                                                                           
19 Probably some form of child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the 
family farming work force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of 
the parent’s)  
20 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. 
21 Allegedly torturing of 2 men who were held in military custody. 
22 Soldiers from the government raided camps and destroyed properties and the camp itself. 
23 Soldiers of the government forced people in camps at the boarder of Algeria to evict their camps and they 
chased them (under whom elderly people and children) into the desert, where they died from thurst.  
24 Political prisoners are held under poor prison conditions. 
25 Habib Ben Wahab was tortured in the police station. 
26 Habib Ben Wahab died because of the physical abuse and torture. Next to that more then 50 people where 
extrajudicialy executed by the government. The people that where evicted from their camps and where chased into 
the desert should also be taken into account with these extra judicial killings. 
27 During demonstrations 200 people were killed by security forces (many shot in the back),  an unspecified 
number of Tuareg and Maur were killed by security forces in the North, an additional 80 students were killed in 
March during demonstartions by security forces, In mai 23 Maur were killed and 25 Tuareg (these numbers were 
specified), in july between 15-50 Tuareg were killed in their civilian vehicles when they were shot at by military 
forces, in nov/dec more then 20 Tuaregs were killed in a retaliation by the military. 
28 Reported torturing of prisoners in detention and even children under the age of 12. The detainees were severely 
beaten, put in the sun without water and all of them packed into 1 cel. Men, women and children. 
29 All detainees were put into one cell without sanitairy or washing possibilities.  
30 All detainees were put into one cell without sanitairy or washing possibilities, also the children. 
31 Around 10 or more Tuareg were killed by the military. In april-september around 60 Tuaregs were killed by 
security forces. In may around 20 Tuaegs and Maur cattle keepers were killed by security forces as a retailliation.  
32 According to some reports  prisinors were allegedly beaten to give a confession.  
33 Juvenile offenders are generally held in the same prison as adult offenders.  
34 Three Tuareg refugees were killed. Report is not yet released. Government states they were shot in a firefight 
because of an earlier attack on a transport convoy. Probably they were extrajudicialy killed. 
35 Only 20% of children have access to basic education. Government’s resources are insufficient to meet the basic 
health care and education needs of Malian Children. 
36 Probably some form of child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the 
family farming work force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of 
the parent’s)  
37 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. 
38 Security forces committed an undetermined number of extra judicial killings of Tuaregs and Maurs in June, July 
and August. 50 more were killed by security forces. In April the military killed 4 and wounded 12. In October 
reports of a military patrol that killed the Swiss Cooperation Director and two Malian colleges.  Inquiries were 
made, reports apparently written by the Government, but nothing concrete has come out of it. No prosecution. 
39 Many prisons outside the capital still have very harsh prison conditions due to a lack of basic needs like medical 
facilities and food supplies. Next to that the prisons are overcrowded.  
40 Probably some form of child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the 
family farming work force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of 
the parent’s)  
41 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. 
42 Only one in five children have access to basic education.  
43 Juvenile offenders are generally held in the same prison as adult offenders.  
44 Many prisons still have very harsh prison conditions due to a lack of basic needs like medical facilities and food 
supplies. Next to that the prisons are overcrowded.  
45 Juvenile offenders are generally held in the same prison as adult offenders.  
46 Only one in five children have access to basic education.  
47 Probably some form of child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the 
family farming work force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of 
the parent’s)  
48 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. 
49 Many prisons still have very harsh prison conditions due to a lack of basic needs like medical facilities and food 
supplies. Next to that the prisons are overcrowded. They remain under the minimum international standards. ICRC 
visits and worked to improve their conditions. 
50 Juvenile offenders are generally held in the same prison as adult offenders. In Bamako juvenile offenders are 
usually held in the same prison as adult offenders, but in separate cells. In regional prisons outside the capital men 
and women are housed in the same building but separate cells. Children here are sharing cells with the adult 
prisoners of the same sex. 
                                                                                                                                                           
51 Only one in five children have access to basic education.  
52 Probably some form of child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the 
family farming work force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of 
the parent’s)  
53 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. This traditional enslavement 
persists. Especially to all the people of the Bellah ethnic group. Although people of the Bellah group get some 
wages in the salt mines, these wages are meager. 
54 Amnesty report claims there were 20 extra judicial killings. 
55 Amnesty report claims that at least 170 unarmed civilians were killed by government forces as reprisal for 
attacks by armed political groups. 
56 Amnesty report states that at least 14 people were extrajudicialy killed. 
57 Journalists and opposition party sympatisants were arrested and beaten with wooden sticks and systematically 
tortured, in the presence of high officials of the leading party, during detention. 
58 Many prisons still have very harsh prison conditions due to a lack of basic needs like medical facilities and food 
supplies. Next to that the prisons are overcrowded. They remain under the minimum international standards. ICRC 
visits and worked to improve their conditions. 
59 Juvenile offenders are generally held in the same prison as adult offenders. In Bamako juvenile offenders are 
usually held in the same prison as adult offenders, but in separate cells. In regional prisons outside the capital men 
and women are housed in the same building but separate cells. Children here are sharing cells with the adult 
prisoners of the same sex. 
60 Only one in two children receives basic education.  
61 Child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the family farming work 
force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of the parent’s) Labour 
code adopted that has specific policies pertaining child labour. It enforces the protection of children through labour 
inspectors, but resources are limited. Regulations are often ignored in practice and Labour Code has no effect on 
the vast number of children in the rural areas. 
62 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. This traditional enslavement 
persists. Especially to all the people of the Bellah ethnic group. Although people of the Bellah group get some 
wages in the salt mines, these wages are meager. 
63 State department mentions that Amnesty International reports accuse the Government of instances of Torture. 
This AI report was published on 01/11/1997 and  dealt with the basic liberties at risc, including an allegation of 
torture. This report is not a country year report! 
64 Many prisons still have very harsh prison conditions due to a lack of basic needs like medical facilities and food 
supplies. Next to that the prisons are overcrowded. They remain under the minimum international standards. ICRC 
visits and worked to improve their conditions. 
65 Juvenile offenders are generally held in the same prison as adult offenders. In Bamako juvenile offenders are 
usually held in the same prison as adult offenders, but in separate cells. In regional prisons outside the capital men 
and women are housed in the same building but separate cells. Children here are sharing cells with the adult 
prisoners of the same sex. 
66 Only one in two children receive basic education.  
67 Child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the family farming work 
force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of the parent’s) Labour 
code adopted that has specific policies pertaining child labour. It enforces the protection of children through labour 
inspectors, but resources are limited. Regulations are often ignored in practice and Labour Code has no effect on 
the vast number of children in the rural areas. 
68 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. This traditional enslavement 
persists. Especially to all the people of the Bellah ethnic group. Although people of the Bellah group get some 
wages in the salt mines, these wages are meager. But now also connected with the TL. 
69 State department mentions that Amnesty International reports accuse the Government of instances of Torture. 
This AI report was published on 01/10/1998 and specifically dealt with torture and the allegation that there were 
instances of torture in mali also that year. This report is not an AI country year report! 
70 Some Malian children were sold into forced labour in Cote D’Ivoire. 
71 Gendarmes, military veterans and local hunters killed 11 members of a traditional Muslim sect in a skirmish 
following the jailbreak. Not clear if/how much this can be seen as purely extra judicial killings.  
72 Many prisons still have very harsh prison conditions due to a lack of basic needs like medical facilities and food 
supplies. Next to that the prisons are overcrowded. They remain under the minimum international standards. ICRC 
visits and worked to improve their conditions. Minister confirms the persisting poor prison conditions, but they are 
improving. 
73 Juvenile offenders are generally held in the same prison as adult offenders. In Bamako juvenile offenders are 
usually held in the same prison as adult offenders, but in separate cells. In regional prisons outside the capital men 
and women are housed in the same building but separate cells. Children here are sharing cells with the adult 
prisoners of the same sex. 
                                                                                                                                                           
74 Only one in two children receive basic education.  
75 Child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the family farming work 
force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of the parent’s) Labour 
code adopted that has specific policies pertaining child labour. It enforces the protection of children through labour 
inspectors, but resources are limited. Regulations are often ignored in practice and Labour Code has no effect on 
the vast number of children in the rural areas. 
76 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. This traditional enslavement 
persists. Especially to all the people of the Bellah ethnic group. Although people of the Bellah group get some 
wages in the salt mines, these wages are meager. But now also connected with the TL. 
77 Some Malian children were sold into forced labour in Cote D’Ivoire. 
78 According to media reports the children that are forced to work are often abused physically 
79 Many prisons still have very harsh prison conditions due to a lack of basic needs like medical facilities and food 
supplies. Next to that the prisons are overcrowded. They remain under the minimum international standards. ICRC 
visits and worked to improve their conditions. Justice Minister confirms the persisting poor prison conditions, but 
they are improving. Training programs and extensive discussions try to improve the prison conditions. 
80 Juvenile offenders are generally held in the same prison as adult offenders. In Bamako juvenile offenders are 
usually held in the same prison as adult offenders, but in separate cells. In regional prisons outside the capital men 
and women are housed in the same building but separate cells. Children here are sharing cells with the adult 
prisoners of the same sex. No reports of juveniles being abused by other inmates or guards. 
81 Only 50 percent of children receive basic education.  
82 Child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the family farming work 
force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of the parent’s) Labour 
code adopted that has specific policies pertaining child labour. It enforces the protection of children through labour 
inspectors, but resources are limited. Regulations are often ignored in practice and Labour Code has no effect on 
the vast number of children in the rural areas. 
83 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. This traditional enslavement 
persists. Especially to all the people of the Bella ethnic group. Although people of the Bellah group get some 
wages in the salt mines, these wages are meager. But now also connected with the TL. 
84 State department mentions that there were reports that accuse the Government of two instances of Torture by 
security forces in order to extract confessions, after this hey were killed in custody. These reports do not originate 
from Amnesty International. The source of the reports is not mentioned. 
85 Security forces tortured and killed two suspects in custody according to reports. 
86 Some Malian children were sold into forced labour in Cote D’Ivoire. An estimated 15,000 children between 9 
and 12 have been sold into forced labour on the cotton, coffee and cocoa plantages. Some 50 children were 
returned to their families. 
87 According to media reports the children that are forced to work are often abused physically.  
88 Many prisons still have very harsh prison conditions due to a lack of basic needs like medical facilities and food 
supplies. Next to that the prisons are overcrowded. They remain under the minimum international standards. ICRC 
visits and worked to improve their conditions. Justice Minister confirms the persisting poor prison conditions, but 
they are improving. Training programs and extensive discussions try to improve the prison conditions. 
89 Juvenile offenders are generally held in the same prison as adult offenders. In Bamako juvenile offenders are 
usually held in the same prison as adult offenders, but in separate cells. In regional prisons outside the capital men 
and women are housed in the same building but separate cells. Children here are sharing cells with the adult 
prisoners of the same sex. No reports of juveniles being abused by other inmates or guards. 
90 Only 56 (46% for girls) percent of children receives basic education.  
91 Child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the family farming work 
force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of the parent’s) Labour 
code adopted that has specific policies pertaining child labour. It enforces the protection of children through labour 
inspectors, but resources are limited. Regulations are often ignored in practice and Labour Code has no effect on 
the vast number of children in the rural areas. The report now states clearly: Child Labour is a problem. 
92 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. This traditional enslavement 
persists. Especially to all the people of the Bellah ethnic group. Although people of the Bellah group get some 
wages in the salt mines, these wages are meager. But now also connected with the TL. 
93 Some Malian children were sold into forced labour in Cote D’Ivoire. An estimated 15,000 children between 9 
and 12 have been sold into forced labour on the cotton, coffee and cocoa plantages. Some 300 children were 
returned to their families. This number is without the children that do not go through ‘welcome-houses’. 
94 According to media reports the children that are forced to work are often abused physically.  
95 Many prisons still have very harsh prison conditions due to a lack of basic needs like medical facilities and food 
supplies. Next to that the prisons are overcrowded. They remain under the minimum international standards. ICRC 
visits and worked to improve their conditions. Justice Minister confirms the persisting poor prison conditions, but 
they are improving. Training programs and extensive discussions try to improve the prison conditions. 
                                                                                                                                                           
96 Juvenile offenders are generally held in the same prison as adult offenders. In Bamako juvenile offenders are 
usually held in the same prison as adult offenders, but in separate cells. In regional prisons outside the capital men 
and women are housed in the same building but separate cells. Children here are sharing cells with the adult 
prisoners of the same sex. No reports of juveniles being abused by other inmates or guards. 
97 Only 56 (46% for girls) percent of children receives basic education. Large shortages of teachers and materials.  
98 Child labour because of the fact that the report states that Children in rural areas join the family farming work 
force at a much younger age then the minimum age of 14 years (or 12 years with consent of the parent’s) Labour 
code adopted that has specific policies pertaining child labour. It enforces the protection of children through labour 
inspectors, but resources are limited. Regulations are often ignored in practice and Labour Code has no effect on 
the vast number of children in the rural areas. Next to that most street vendors are children as well. The report 
now states clearly: Child Labour is a problem. 
99 Probably some Forced Child labour because the report mentions that there are some reports from Mali that a 
form of traditional slavery is still practised in some isolated parts of the country. This traditional enslavement 
persists. Especially to all the people of the Bellah ethnic group. Although people of the Bellah group get some 
wages in the salt mines, these wages are meager. But now also connected with the TL. 
100 Some Malian children were sold into forced labour in Cote D’Ivoire. An estimated 15,000 children between 9 
and 12 have been sold into forced labour on the cotton, coffee and cocoa plantages. No mention of returned 
children. 
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GEORGIA: 
(population: 4,934,413) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Political 
Terrorscale    4/2 
Conflict Level    
3 low intensity 
conflicts: Abkhazia 
(a few hundred 
killed);  South 
Ossetia; Zviadists 
(between 100 to 
several hundred 
killed) 
Freedom 
House   6/5/NF 4/5/PF 
U.S. State 
Department1    E
2, t3, R4 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Political 
Terrorscale 4/5 2/4 3/3 2/3 
Conflict Level 
2 High intensity 
conflicts (Abkhazia: 
hundreds killed on 
both sides; Zviadists: 
violence erupted into 
civil war no number 
for casualties), 
violent political 
conflict (South 
Ossetia: occasionnal 
killings)  
Low intensity 
conflict (Abkhazia: 
800 hundred killed), 
violent political 
conflict (South 
Ossetia: occasionnal 
killings)  
Low intensity 
conflict (Abkhazia), 
violent political 
conflict (South 
Ossetia) 
2 violent political 
conflicts (Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia) 
Freedom 
House 5/5/PF 5/5/PF 4/5/PF 4/4/PF 
U.S. State 
Department e
5, P6 , T7, D, FE8, R9 e10, P11,  t12, R13  E
14, P15, t16, AE17, S18 
R19 
e20, P21, t22, AE23, S24, 
R25 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Political 
Terrorscale 3 3  2 
Conflict Level 
Violent political 
conflict (South 
Ossetia) and Low 
intensity conflict 
(Abkhazia: increase 
in partisan violence) 
Violent political 
conflict (South 
Ossetia) and Low 
intensity conflict 
(Abkhazia: at least 
239 killed) 
2 violent political 
conflicts (Abkhazia: 
some violent 
incidents, but 
decrease from 1998; 
South Ossetia) 
2 Violent Political 
Conflicts (Abkhazia: 
some violent 
incidents, but 
decrease from 1999; 
South Ossetia) 
Freedom 
House 3/4/PF 3/4/PF 3/4/PF 4/4/PF 
U.S. State 
Department 
e26, P27, t28, AE29, 
CP30, S31, R32 
e33, P34, t35, AE36, 
CP37, S38, D39, FE40, 
R41 
e42, P43, t44, AE45, 
CP46, S47, R48 
e49, P50, T51, AE52, 
CP53, PC54, S55, R56 
 
 2001 2002 
Political 
Terrorscale   
Conflict Level 
2 Violent Political 
Conflicts (Abkhazia, 
violence erupted in 
October: 81 killed;  
and South Ossetia) 
2 violent political 
conflicts (Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia) 
Freedom 
House 4/4/PF 4/4/PF 
U.S. State 
Department 
e57, P58, T59, AE60, 
CP61, PC62, S63, R64 
e65, P66, T67, AE68, 
CP69, PC70, S71, R72 
 
 
 
Working conditions: 
 
1993: Although workers in hazardous conditions may obtain higher wages, or may refuse the 
work, these provisions are considered inadequate for worker well-being. 
1994: Workers in hazardous conditions may obtain higher wages, or may refuse the work if it 
endangers their life. 
1995: Workers in hazardous conditions may obtain higher wages, or may refuse the work if it 
endangers their life. 
1996: Workers in hazardous conditions may obtain higher wages, or may refuse the work if it 
endangers their life. 
1997: Workers in hazardous conditions may obtain higher wages, or may refuse the work if it 
endangers their life. 
1998: Workers in hazardous conditions may obtain higher wages, or may refuse the work if it 
endangers their life. 
1999: Workers in hazardous conditions may obtain higher wages, or may refuse the work if it 
endangers their life. 
2000: Workers in hazardous conditions may obtain higher wages, or may refuse the work if it 
endangers their life, without loosing their job. Old Soviet Labour codes are still in force. A new 
labour code has not been adopted. 
2001: Workers in hazardous conditions may obtain higher wages, or may refuse the work if it 
endangers their life, without loosing their job. 
2002: Workers in hazardous conditions may obtain higher wages, or may refuse the work if it 
endangers their life, without loosing their job. 
 
Brief historical/political overview 
 
General comment: The stability of the country is continuously undermined, by great refugee 
flows from South Ossetia and Abkhazia (and later on from Chechnya), by conflicts in South 
Ossetia, Abkhazia and ongoing violence from and directed against supporters of the President 
that was ousted after a military coup in 1992: Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and by the fact Ajara is an 
area which operates quasi-autonomously, but has an undefined status. In Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia and Ajara the government has no effective control. 
 
1992: On April 9, 1991 Georgia declared its independence. Popularly elected President Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia was overthrown in January 1992 as his increasingly dictatorial rule led to an 
armed insurgency. A military council of insurrection leaders took control and imposed a state 
of emergency and a curfew in Tblisi and certain other areas. In April Eduard Shevarnadze was 
invited to return to Georgia by the Council. He tried to establish a responsible government. He 
set up the State Council, a civilian legislative body, and he was elected Chairman of its four-
member executive Presidium. Acknowledging that this Government lacked legitimacy, 
Shevarnadze promised elections. The country remained wracked separatist conflicts in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and violence linked to supporters of the ousted president (Zviadists). 
The ex-president even attempted to seize power, but the coup failed. The conflict in South 
Ossetia led to a largely successful cease-fire during the year. The conflict in Abkhazia 
sharpened somewhat as the Abkhazian minority in the regional parliament voted to restore the 
1925 Abkhazian Constitution which acknowledges Abkhazia to be a separate Union Republic. 
The Georgian State Council directly declared the resolution to be null and void. On August 14 
Zviadists took eleven senior Georgian officials hostage including the Minister of Interior. A 
large armed force was sent to rescue the hostages and secure railroads in Abkhazia. In 
Abkhazia they met fierce resistance from Abkhazian guards and Caucasian “volunteers”. The 
violence claimed at least a few hundred lives and is ongoing. On October 11 there were 
successful elections in 75 of 84 districts. Parliament was elected and Shevarnadze was voted in 
without a challenge. Despite some irregularities the vote was considered fair. By the end of the 
year there was still no constitution, but a temporary law was passed allocating many powers to 
the President. Parliament also became a strong entity.     
1993: In August-September a confrontation between Shevrdnadze and the Parliament over the 
Head of State’s right to confirm ministerial appointees, resulted in the resignation of 
Shevardnadze, only for him to return after 24 hours with the guarantee that the Parliament 
declare the state of emergency and suspend its own activities for 2 months. The conflict in 
Abkhazia continued. After unequal implementation of a cease fire, the military advantage 
gained by the separatists was used to launch an assault. The capital of Abkhazia was captured 
and the Abkhazian forces committed many human rights abuses. The conflict with Zviadists 
also continued. The Zviadists captured a number of towns, but Georgian forces regained them 
within 1993.  
1994: A U.N. brokered cease fire in Abkhazia was agreed upon. Ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia 
continued. Hundreds of ethnic Georgians and other non-Abkhaz were tortured, raped, killed, 
expelled and imprisoned. A CIS peacekeeping force was deployed. 
1995: On August 24, 1995 a new constitution was adopted by Parliament providing for a 
unicameral legislature, an independent judiciary, and an executive branch which reports to the 
President. Moreover the Constitution proscribes the creation of an Office of Human Rights 
Defender. The Government complied with this. On November 5 Shevardnadze was elected 
President and a new Parliament was elected in elections considered “consistent with democratic 
norms.” The Constitution entered into force on November 18. Internal conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia remained unresolved. Although there were no hostilities in South Ossetia the 
government has no effective control over the territory. On August 29 an attempted 
assassination of then Chairman Shevardnadze failed. Abkhazians commit a great number of 
human rights abuses in a bid to ethnically cleanse Abkhazia. 
1996: Internal conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain unresolved. Abkhaz separatists 
continue to commit gross human rights abuses. The Office of the Human rights defender 
created in 1995 is not yet functioning.   
1997: Although cease fires were in force both internal conflicts, in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, remained unresolved. There were no large-scale armed hostilities in both areas, but 
partisan warfare in Abkhazia increased. “Citizen awareness of democratic values, and growth 
of civil society provided some check on the excesses of law enforcement agencies.” New law 
on the Courts was aimed at bringing greater judicial independence. The place of the Human 
Rights defender (the ombudsman) was filled, but the office remained inoperative. 
1998: Both internal conflicts remained unresolved. In Abkhazia (the Gali region) violence 
broke out in May resulting in 239 casualties. Abkhaz forces burned an estimated 50% of homes 
in some areas, and 40,000 of the residents of Gali who had fled their homes have not yet 
returned. The Government delayed implementation of the new Criminal Procedures Code, 
passed in November 1997, until May 1999. In February there was an unsuccessful 
assassination attempt on President Shevardnadze. The Ombudsman started his work and 
focussed social and economic rights and not so much on abuse by law enforcement agencies. 
First local elections were held in November. The elections were “not perfect”, but constituted a 
“very positive step in Georgia’s nascent election reform movement”. 
1999: On October 31 parliamentary elections are held, characterised by the OSCE as a “step 
forward Georgia’s compliance with OSCE commitments”. Internal conflicts in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia remained unresolved. Cease fires are in effect in both areas, although sporadic 
violence occurs in Abkhazia. A new Criminal Code was passed in June. The Criminal 
Procedures Code underwent substantial amendments following complaints by security forces. 
Many of the original powers of the security forces were reinstalled. In April Georgia gained 
accession to the Council of Europe. The war in Chechnya affected the situation in Georgia. In 
August Russian warplanes dropped cluster bombs on the Georgian village of Zemo Omalo, 
wounding three persons.  
2000: President Shevardnadze is elected for a second term. The elections were marred by 
serious irregularities. The conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia remained unresolved. The 
human rights situation worsened. 
2001: The conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia remained unresolved. Following clashes in 
October the Georgian government passed a non binding resolution to remove CIS (Russian) 
peacekeeping forces from Abkhazia. The human rights situation remained poor and worsened 
in some areas. There were some 5,000 refugees from Chechnya. 
2002: Local and municipal elections were held in June. The elections were marred by 
irregularities. Observers criticised the elections “citing hasty and poor organization by 
authorities and inaccurate voter registers.” Human rights record remained poor, but improved 
in certain areas. The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained unresolved. There were 
some 3,900 refugees from Chechnya. In Abkhazia, the Abkhazian Ministry of Education 
announced a ruling prohibiting the instruction in Georgian in schools in Abkhaz-controlled 
territory (as this is a decision by a non-recognised entity in Georgia it will not be marked with 
“AE” in the table, just like abuses by Abkhazian forces have not been marked in the table, but 
mentioned in the “brief political/historical overview”).  
                                                 
1 Following a directive by Secretary of State Warren Christopher some changes in reporting were made as of the 
1993 report. The changes include a stronger emphasis on prison conditions and a new section on “discrimination 
based on race, sex, religion, disability, language or social status. This new section also includes a paragraph on 
discrimination against children. 
2 At least one politically motivated extrajudicial execution. There are believed to be several others (the report 
names 10 possible cases). In the conflict in Abkhazia there were reports (credible reports) of a number of summary 
executions. 
3 Police beatings were widespread and routine. The beatings of teenage boys were a disturbing pattern. Some of 
the beatings were severe thus placing it under the definition of torture. 
4 There remains a problem regarding the Georgian’s apparent refusal to allow some 200,000 Muslim now living in 
central Asian Republics and parts of Russia, resident of the Meshketi region, deported from Georgia in 1999 by 
Stalin, to return to Georgia. In South Ossetia, Georgian refugees were still to afraid to return. 
5 Some prisoners were killed by Georgian military and paramilitary units.  
6 Because of the decline in the economic and political situation prisoners were given Spartan meals. Conditions 
overall were extremely primitive, with no bathing facilities, no place to lie down, and no toilet. 
7 There are many examples of severe beatings.  
8 The conflict in Abkhazia forced many civilians to. Moreover there were credible reports of ethnic cleansing in 
which civilians were forced out of their houses. 
9 There remains a problem regarding the Georgian’s apparent refusal to allow some 200,000 Muslim now living in 
central Asian Republics and parts of Russia, resident of the Meshketi region, deported from Georgia in 1999 by 
Stalin, to return to Georgia. In South Ossetia, Georgian refugees were still to afraid to return. Moreover those who 
fled the conflict in Abkhazia have not been allowed to return. 
10 It is difficult to discern exact figures from the report. The report notes it is very difficult to make a distinction 
between political killings or criminal killings. The report also notes a report by the State Committee on Human 
Rights and Interethnic Relations (SCHR) in which it is stated that in 1993, 50 detainees died while being detained 
in Tblisi interrogation cells. 
11 Prison officials could not provide prisoners with adequate food or medication. Infirmaries lacked medicines to 
counter outbreaks of diseases. Prisons were severely overcrowded, and interrogation cells are extremely cramped 
and unsanitary. Prisoners are not protected from violence and brutal treatment.  
12 Detainees are routinely beaten. Severe beatings take place. However it is not possible to discern exact numbers 
from the report. Human rights groups report significantly less abuses than in 1993. Most of the abuse takes place 
in pre-trial detention. Some abuse also takes place during trials. 
13 The 250,000 people that fled fighting in Abkhazia have not been allowed to return. Legislation to allow the 
Mshketians to return had not been passed yet. 
14 Forty people died in pre-trial detention, some because of poor conditions, but some also of physical abuse and 
torture. There was a series of assassinations (and attempts) against political figures. The Governments and the 
Ministry of Interior have accused the SGB (former KGB) of involvement.  
15 Conditions are inhumane. Cells, medicine and food are inadequate. In one pre-trial detention facility there is 
such severe overcrowding that prisoners must sleep in shifts as there are not enough beds. Lack of sanitation, 
medical care, and food poses a serious threat to life and health. 
16 Although torture is not systematic as such, lack of professionalism and lack of training often lead to abuse. 
There are a number of cases of torture in the report. 
                                                                                                                                                           
17 Education is officially free. However many parents can not afford the books and school supplies, effectively 
depriving their children of education. 
18 There is a dramatic rise in the number of homeless children. There are an estimated 1,000 street children in 
Tblisi. 
19 Non-Abkhazians still face many problems trying to return to Abkhazia. In South Ossetia there is also 
considerable reluctance for those who fled to return. The problem regarding the Meshkatian remains unresolved, 
although pilot programs for small groups to return have been continuing. 
20 There were 13 deaths in pre-trial detention and 74 died in prison. However the majority of these deaths were due 
to medical causes. In some deaths physical abuse and torture also played a role. 
21 Conditions are inhumane. Cells, medicine and food are inadequate. In one pre-trial detention facility there is 
such severe overcrowding that prisoners must sleep in shifts as there are not enough beds. Lack of sanitation, 
medical care, and food poses a serious threat to life and health. The spread of tuberculosis is a particular problem. 
Moreover the ICRC was allowed unlimited access to prisons, however visits with prisoners were sometimes 
supervised. 
22 There were instances of torture. The most serious instances of abuse take place in pre-trial detention. Most 
abuse is caused by improper and lack of training of guards and investigators. 
23 Education is officially free. However many parents can not afford the books and school supplies, effectively 
depriving their children of education. 
24 There is a dramatic rise in the number of homeless children. There are an estimated 1,000 street children in 
Tblisi. 
25 Though officially supporting the repatriation of Meshketian Muslims all pilot programs to resettle a number of 
families were never started and Meshketian still face a lot of opposition to their return. Abkhazian separatists 
prevented the nearly 270,000 displaced people from returning. In South Ossetia separatists also prevented 
displaced people from returning. 
26 92 people died while in prison or pre-trial detention. All of these deaths were attributed to medical causes. 
However torture and abuse also played in role in the mortality rate. 
27 Conditions are inhumane. Cells, medicine and food are inadequate. In one pre-trial detention facility there is 
such severe overcrowding that prisoners must sleep in shifts as there are not enough beds. Lack of sanitation, 
medical care, and food poses a serious threat to life and health. The spread of tuberculosis is a particular problem. 
Moreover the ICRC was allowed unlimited access to prisons and prisoners. The issuing of a decree by President 
Shevardnadze calling for the halt to torture and inhuman or degrading treatment was followed by greater 
cooperation between government officials and international human rights monitors. 
28 The report mentions beatings and abuse of detainees and prisoners is routine. These beatings when severe fall 
within the realm of the definition of torture. It is clear from the report a number of beatings and certain abuse is 
torture and practised by security forces. However it is not clear how many cases that fit the definition of torture 
have been reported. 
29 Education is officially free. However many parents can not afford the books and school supplies, effectively 
depriving their children of education. 
30 In order to survive children increasingly turn to (criminal activity, narcotics and) prostitution. 
31 There is a dramatic rise in the number of homeless children. There are an estimated 1,000 street children in 
Tblisi. In the winter street children die of exposure. 
32 Though officially supporting the repatriation of Meshketian Muslims Meshketians still face a lot of opposition 
to their return. Abkhazian separatists prevented the nearly 270,000 displaced people from returning. In South 
Ossetia separatists also prevented displaced people from returning. 
33 88 persons died in prison and in pre-trial detention. “These deaths were caused in part by physical abuse, 
torture, and inhuman prison or pre-trial detention conditions”. Although this language is clearer than previous 
reports in which some of the deaths could in part be attributed to torture and abuse, it still is unclear how many 
were cases of torture there were. Georgian partisans in the Abkhazian conflict committed political killings, in 
previous years these partisans were supported by the government. The government claims that this is no longer the 
case. 
34 Conditions are inhumane. Cells, medicine and food are inadequate. In one pre-trial detention facility there is 
such severe overcrowding that prisoners must sleep in shifts as there are not enough beds. Lack of sanitation, 
medical care, and food poses a serious threat to life and health. The spread of tuberculosis is a particular problem. 
Moreover the ICRC was allowed unlimited access to prisons and prisoners. The issuing of a decree by President 
Shevardnadze calling for the halt to torture and inhuman or degrading treatment was followed by greater 
cooperation between government officials and international human rights monitors. 
35 As in previous reports it is unclear how many cases of torture there were. It is however more clear in this report 
that there was torture as this is explicitly mentioned. The report also mentions that there was a decline in the 
number of cases of torture and abuse, because Georgian society was opening up more, there was “increased 
intolerance of police misconduct, greater public awareness off civil rights, and pressure from the international 
community. Interestingly a report of Amnesty International is briefly mentioned. This report states that there were 
many cases of torture. However it is difficult to place within the report. It is impossible to discern from this 
passage whether State Department endorses this view. 
36 Education is officially free. However many parents can not afford the books and school supplies, effectively 
depriving their children of education. 
                                                                                                                                                           
37 In order to survive children increasingly turn to (criminal activity, narcotics and) prostitution. 
38 Due to economic hardship, families break up and children end up on the street. There are now more than 2,500 
children on the streets of Tblisi. 
39 In Gali region in Abkhazia many houses were burnt. 
40 As violence erupted in the Gali region in Abkhazia many civilians (40,000) were forced to flee as their houses 
were being looted and burned. 
41 Though officially supporting the repatriation of Meshketian Muslims Meshketians still face a lot of opposition 
to their return. Meshketians live as stateless persons. A new law to rehabilitate victims from the Soviet era 
(including the Meshketians) is probably going to be passed in 1999. Abkhazian separatists prevented the nearly 
270,000 displaced people from returning. In South Ossetia separatists also prevented displaced people from 
returning. 
42 57 prisoners died and 9 prisoners died while in pre-trial detention. NGO’s and the press allege physical abuse, 
torture and prison or pre-trial detention conditions contributed to the pre-trial deaths. Georgian partisans in the 
Abkhazian conflict committed political killings, in previous years these partisans were supported by the 
government. The government claims that this is no longer the case. 
43 Conditions are inhumane. Cells, medicine and food are inadequate. In one pre-trial detention facility there is 
such severe overcrowding that prisoners must sleep in shifts as there are not enough beds. Lack of sanitation, 
medical care, and food poses a serious threat to life and health. The spread of tuberculosis is a particular problem. 
A new law was passed in accordance with the requirements of the Council of Europe. The new law provides for 
transfer of responsibility for prisons from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of justice. this is seen as a move 
that will improve conditions. 
44 As in previous reports it is unclear how many cases of torture there were. It is however more clear in this report 
that there was torture as this is explicitly mentioned. The report also mentions that there was another decline in the 
number of cases of torture and abuse, because Georgian society was opening up more, there was “increased 
intolerance of police misconduct, greater public awareness off civil rights, and pressure from the international 
community. A HRW report is mentionned and seems to be endorsed, stating that mistreatment and abuse of 
detainees continued to be rampant. 
45 Education is officially free. However many parents can not afford the books and school supplies, effectively 
depriving their children of education. In orphanages, children received inadequate education. 
46 In order to survive children increasingly turn to (criminal activity, narcotics and) prostitution. 
47 Due to economic hardship, families break up and children end up on the street. There are now more than 2,500 
children on the streets of Tblisi. 
48 The Meshketian still were unable to return as there was great societal opposition. Those who live in the area 
they want to return to are concerned the ethnic balance of the area will be upset. The law passed in 1997 on the 
rehabilitation of Soviet victims was not adopted. Instead, in compliance with Council Of Europe recommendations 
the Government undertook to begin the process of Meshketian repatriation within three years. Abkhazian 
separatists prevented the nearly 270,000 displaced people from returning. In South Ossetia separatists also 
prevented displaced people from returning. 
49 61 prisoners died in prison, and 5 died while in pre-trial detention. Some of the deaths are the result of security 
force abuses. Georgian partisans in the Abkhazian conflict committed political killings, in previous years these 
partisans were supported by the government. The government claims that this is no longer the case. 
50 Conditions are inhumane. Cells, medicine and food are inadequate. Lack of sanitation, medical care, and food 
poses a serious threat to life and health. The infrastructure is crumbling. The spread of tuberculosis is a particular 
problem. A new law was passed in 1999 in accordance with the requirements of the Council of Europe. The new 
law provides for transfer of responsibility for prisons from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of justice. The 
transfer did not go accompanied by fiscal changes. The consequent lack of resources resulted in a worsening of the 
situation. 
51 There was an increase in abuse following the April elections. Part of this abuse was torture. The report mentions 
the fact that domestic human rights advocates reported an increase in torture. The report also mentions the fact that 
police sometimes beat and rape prostitutes, beat members of religious minorities and harassed and abused street 
children. 
52 Education is officially free. However many parents can not afford the books and school supplies, effectively 
depriving their children of education. In orphanages, children received inadequate education. The Ministry of 
Education said it was beginning an overhaul of the educational system. However no action has as yet been taken. 
53 In order to survive children increasingly turn to (criminal activity, narcotics and) prostitution. 
54 The Isolator for street children (not a prison or detention centre as such) in Gldani is overcrowded and the 
children are frequently abused. 
55 Due to economic hardship, families break up and children end up on the street. There are now more than 2,500 
children on the streets of Tblisi. Police frequently abused and harassed street children. 
56 The Meshketian still were unable to return as there was great societal opposition. Those who live in the area 
they want to return to are concerned the ethnic balance of the area will be upset. The law passed in 1997 on the 
rehabilitation of Soviet victims was not adopted. Instead, in compliance with Council Of Europe recommendations 
the Government undertook to begin the process of Meshketian repatriation within three years. Abkhazian 
separatists prevented the nearly 270,000 displaced people from returning. In South Ossetia separatists also 
prevented displaced people from returning. 
                                                                                                                                                           
57 In the first ten months of the year 27 prisoners died in prison, of which nine died of tuberculosis. Some of the 
deaths are the result of security force abuses.  
58 Prisons are overcrowded, unsanitary, understaffed, and are in desperate need of repair. There is lack of proper 
ventilation, plumbing, lighting, waste disposal, and/or sanitary medical facilities. The problem of lack of 
electricity and poor (or no) pay for guards were worsened by the transfer of responsibility for prisons to the 
Ministry of Justice. Some steps were taken to alleviate the problem of overcrowding, but the problem remained. 
Torture and abuse of prisoners was a problem and led to deaths in custody. The spread of disease (especially 
tuberculosis) was a great problem. Rape of inmates was common. Suicides and self mutilation increased as 
conditions declined. 
59 There was an increase in abuse following the April 2000 elections. Part of this abuse was torture. The report 
mentions a report by HRW which states that torture increased again during the year. The report also mentions the 
fact that police beat and rape prostitutes, beat members of religious minorities and harassed and abused street 
children. There are conflicting reports on whether the abuse is worse outside the great cities. The State Department 
believes it is. However the also quote from a report of a local NGO that states that at village level personal 
relationships work to prevent abuse. 
60 Education is officially free. However many parents can not afford the books and school supplies, effectively 
depriving their children of education. In orphanages, children received inadequate education. The Ministry of 
Education said it was beginning an overhaul of the educational system. However no action has as yet been taken. 
61 In order to survive children increasingly turn to (criminal activity, narcotics and) prostitution. 
62 The Isolator for street children (not a prison or detention centre as such) in Gldani is overcrowded and the 
children are frequently abused. 
63 Due to economic hardship, families break up and children end up on the street. There are now more than 2,500 
children on the streets of Tblisi. Police frequently abused and harassed street children. 
64 The Meshketian still were unable to return as there was great societal opposition. Those that live in the area they 
want to return to are concerned the ethnic balance of the area will be upset. The law passed in 1997 on the 
rehabilitation of Soviet victims was not adopted. Instead, in compliance with Council Of Europe recommendations 
the Government undertook to begin the process of Meshketian repatriation within three years. Abkhazian 
separatists prevented the nearly 270,000 displaced people from returning. Although it seems IDP’s from Gali 
region travel back and forth to tend to their property. The report states 40,000 now live in the Gali Region. In 
South Ossetia separatists also prevented displaced people from returning. 
65 There were 34 deaths in custody. 31 deaths were attributed to suicide disease or sickness. Some of the deaths are 
the result of security force abuses.  
66 According to the U.N. and many NGO’s conditions in prisons remained life threatening and inhumane. Prisons 
are overcrowded, unsanitary, understaffed, and are in desperate need of repair. There is lack of proper ventilation, 
plumbing, lighting, waste disposal, and/or sanitary medical facilities. The problem of lack of electricity and poor 
(or no) pay for guards were worsened by the transfer of responsibility for prisons to the Ministry of Justice. Some 
steps were taken to alleviate the problem of overcrowding, but the problem remained. Typically though some 
prisons were at 50% capacity while in others there were 16 or more to cell designed for 10 to 12 prisoners. Torture 
and abuse of prisoners was widespread. The spread of disease (especially tuberculosis) was a great problem. Rape 
of inmates was common. Suicides and self mutilation increased as conditions declined. The Council of Europe 
expressed satisfaction with some of the progress achieved by the Ministry of Justice in its attempt to reform prison 
administration and conditions. 
67 The report states a report by the UNHCR which states torture continued. It also states reports by HRW that 
torture and abuse of detainees was a major problem. Increasingly confessions are made in police stations instead 
of pre-trial detention centres. To counter abuse and torture the Human Rights Ombudsman instituted a rapid 
reaction group in January with the support of the OSCE. “This pilot project had the mandate to provide immediate 
response to all claims of human rights violations during the most critical phase, the first 72 hours of a person’s 
detention.” There were no reports of police beating and raping prostitutes or beating members of religious 
minorities. There was an increase in the number of cases of abuse investigated by the Prosecutor General’s office.  
68 Education is officially free. However many parents can not afford the books and school supplies. Moreover 
many parents were forced to pay some form of tuition fee or teacher’s salary. Most children of school age attended 
school. However in some places schools did not function, because teachers were not paid and facilities were 
inadequate (especially in the winter as some schools could not afford to heat the buildings). There was a lack of 
libraries or even blackboards. In orphanages, children received inadequate education. The Ministry of Education 
said it was beginning an overhaul of the educational system. However no action has as yet been taken. 
69 In order to survive children increasingly turn to (criminal activity, narcotics and) prostitution. 
70 The Isolator for street children (not a prison or detention centre as such) in Gldani is overcrowded and the 
children are frequently abused. 
71 Due to economic hardship, families break up and children end up on the street. There are now more than 1,500 
children on the streets in the country (1,200 of which in Tblisi). Police increasingly abused and harassed street 
children. 
72 The Meshketian still were unable to return as there was great societal opposition. Those who live in the area 
they want to return to are concerned the ethnic balance of the area will be upset. The law passed in 1997 on the 
rehabilitation of Soviet victims was not adopted. Instead, in compliance with Council Of Europe recommendations 
the Government undertook to begin the process of Meshketian repatriation within three years. However no 
                                                                                                                                                           
legislation on this subject has been passed as of today. Abkhazian separatists prevented the nearly 270,000 
displaced people from returning. Although it seems IDP’s from Gali region travel back and forth to tend to their 
property. The report states 40,000 now live in the Gali Region. In South Ossetia separatists also prevented 
displaced people from returning. 
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Working conditions: 
 
1994: Government does not effectively enforce health and safety regulations. 
1997: Health and safety standards are not effectively enforced. 
1998: Health and safety standards are not effectively enforced. 
1999: Health and safety standards are not effectively enforced.  
2000: Health and safety standards are not effectively enforced.  
2001: Health and safety standards are not effectively enforced.  
2002: Health and safety standards are not effectively enforced.  
 
Brief historical/political overview 
 
1992: The Republic of Croatia declared its independence on June 25 1991, and sought 
international recognition. This move precipitated a war with the federal (Yugoslav) authorities 
in which they sent the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) led predominantly by Serbian and 
Montenegrin officers against Croatian towns and cities. The JNA established control over a 
number of areas where Croatian residents of Serbian nationality were predominant, as well as 
over areas where Serbs had been the minority. The JNA was assisted by paramilitary forces and 
Serb irregulars. These elements were often led by JNA officers or their surrogates and all were 
directly supplied weapons and ammunition by the JNA. On January 3 a cease fire agreement, 
known as the Vance Plan, was agreed upon. The agreement provided for demilitarisation, 
return of displaced persons and the establishment of a Croatian government authority. Part of 
the agreement provided for a UN protection force (UNPROFOR) to be deployed to areas of 
Croatia occupied by the Serbs. The Serbs would have to leave and the UN force would have 
taken their positions in the spring or summer. However many Serb troops stayed on in the 
occupied areas and converted themselves into special police forces. The JNA finally only left 
in the first week of November. Croatia was recognised by the EU on January 15 and by the US 
on April 8. On July 18 Serbian ‘authorities’ declared the ‘Serbian Autonomous Region of 
Krajina” and set up “governmental institutions”. In presidential and parliamentary election 
Franjo Tudjman was re-elected for a five year term. Ethnic cleansing continued. Both sides 
were guilty of this practice. However the Serbs used ethnic cleansing massively. There is 
serious discrimination against Serbs. 
1993: Little progress was made implementing the Vance plan. The UNPROFOR was not able 
to prevent outbreaks of fighting between Croats and Serbs as well as the daily shelling of Zadar 
and other areas along the Dalmatian coast from the Serb-controlled areas of the UN Protected 
Areas. In February the UN Security Council passed a resolution to create a war crimes tribunal. 
The “ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs in the Republic of Serbian Krajina is largely a fait 
accompli. In March the International Federation of Journalists suggested that Croatia’s 
admission to the Council of Europe should be delayed, because it was “very concerned” about 
the freedom of the press in Croatia. 
1994: One-quarter of Croat land continued to be occupied by rebel Serbs. No progress was 
made in implementing the Vance Peace Plan. A March ceasefire created a 2-kilometer-wide 
zone of separation and led to a dramatic decrease in violence. In December the Government 
and the rebel Serbs agreed upon a package of economic and confidence-building measures, the 
implementation of which began with the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway to civilian 
traffic on December 21. Government influence weakens the nominally independent judiciary. 
The use of violence by security forces against Serbs in government-controlled areas declined, 
cases of disappearances and harassment continued near the frontline areas. There were few new 
cases of disappearances reported. Many attacks in Bosnia Herzegovina were initiated from 
Croat and Serb-controlled territory (such as attacks launched on the Bihac pocket from RSK, 
and the forcible recruiting of Croatian citizens originally from Bosnia into Bosnian Croat 
paramilitary forces). 
1995: Government influence weakens the nominally independent judiciary. The overwhelming 
dominance of one political party tend to stifle the expression of diverse views. The 
Government launched two major offensives in May and August against three rebel Serb-held 
zones and recovered the territory after 4 years of breakaway Serb occupation. Only the Eastern 
area of Croatia remains outside effective government control, although both the Government 
and local Serb leaders signed an agreement in mid-November to bring this area under complete 
government control after a transitional period of 1 to 2 years. A report of the Croatian Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights. stated that in the 1995 offensive by Croatian troops (operation 
“Storm”) some 600 Serbs were killed (report published in 1999). Government’s human rights 
record worsened with respect to minority groups, especially ethnic Serbs. The bulk of violent 
abuses were committed in recaptured territory. Prior to the offensive in May there had been 
building tensions. However the direct pretext for the attack was the murder of three Croats, 
who were shot on the highway from behind Serb lines. In October elections for the House of 
Representatives were won by the ruling HDZ. The elections were considered flawed on certain 
points. All minorities in Croat and Serb controlled areas were discriminated against. 
1996: Government influence weakens the nominally independent judiciary. The overwhelming 
dominance of one political party tend to stifle the expression of diverse views. Croatia 
normalized relations with neighbouring Serbia-Montenegro on August 23. In Eastern Slavonia 
the U.N. established a Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia. Cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was uneven. There were several 
reports of ethnically motivated killings by unknown persons. The vast majority of victims were 
Serbs. The murders were fewer than last year, but continued a pattern begun in 1995 of 
murders intended to intimidate Serbs who stayed behind after Croatia reclaimed areas and 
discourage those Serbs who fled from returning. Serbs suffered particular and increasingly 
open discrimination. Other minorities were less discriminated against than Serbs. 
1997: Franjo Tudjman is re-elected in June for a second five-year term, in elections 
international observers called fundamentally flawed. The ruling HDZ uses its entrenched 
majority position to deny opposition parties the ability to compete on fair and equal terms in 
elections. Government influence circumscribes and weakens the judiciary. This and other 
elements make Croatia’s nominally democratic system in reality authoritarian. The United 
Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia mandate was ended on January 1998. 
In September the European Convention on Human Rights is ratified. Cooperation with ICTY 
remained uneven. There still were a number (though lower than previous years) of ethnically 
motivated murders which affect in great majority ethnic Serbs. There was an increase in 
Western Slavonia and Krajina of attacks on Serb homes. Discrimination of Serbs is ever 
present and often open. There is also discrimination, though not to the same extent, of other 
minorities, Muslims, Slovaks, Czechs, Italians, Hungarians and Roma. 
1998: Though the country is nominally democratic its system is in reality authoritarian. The 
judicial system is subject to executive and political influence. Cooperation with the ICTY was 
mixed. There were a small number of ethnically motivated murders. Violent incidents, 
particularly in the Danubian region and in the former Sector South, rose in the summer months. 
Since 1996 47,000 ethnic Serbs left Croatia, with 20,000 leaving in 1997 alone. Destruction of 
Serb homes continued (without involvement of the authorities, but destruction also went 
unpunished). Early in the year the Parliament decided to omit Albanians, Muslims, and 
Slovenes from those minorities listed in the Constitution on the grounds that they are not 
considered indigenous groups. This elimination effectively denies them rights in the (albeit 
partially suspended) Constitutional Law on the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or 
Minorities.  
1999: In December President Tudjman dies. New parliamentary elections were held in January 
2000, new Presidential elections are to be held in February 2000. Parliament Speaker Vlatko 
Pavletic was named acting President. The country is nominally democratic, but in reality 
authoritarian. However on January 3 the ruling HDZ lost generally well-conducted 
parliamentary elections to an opposition coalition. Cooperation with the ICTY was mixed. 
Ethnic Serbs and Roma were particularly discriminated against. Three ethnically motivated 
killings of ethnic Serbs. Incidents of grenade attacks against property and arson related to 
housing disputes were reported during the year. There was a decrease of ethnically motivated 
violence. Discrimination of other minorities Muslims, Slovaks, Czechs, Italians, Hungarians, 
did not reflect discrimination to the same extent as the Serb community. 
2000: President Stjepan Mesic of the HNS was elected for a 5 year term in February. Ivica 
Racan is the Prime Minister. The elections were “calm and orderly”, the elections were 
generally free, however some problems remain. The combination of a new President and a new 
Parliament (elected I January, see 1999) gave the role of the President more transparency and 
put an end to the blurring of the role of the President, the Government and the ruling party. The 
judiciary gained more independence. However problems of dependence remained. Reports of 
harassment of journalists and censorship virtually ceased. There remained significant 
discrimination of Serbs and Roma, in particular. Though new laws on minorities were passed. 
During the year there were 2 ethnically motivated murders of ethnic Serbs.  
2001: The judiciary began reform and modernization efforts during the year. Cooperation with 
ICTY continued to improve. There remained significant discrimination of Serbs and Roma, in 
particular.  
2002: There remained significant discrimination of Serbs and Roma, in particular.  
                                                 
1 Croatian forces committed major human rights abuses in Bosnia. These will not be mentioned in this table. 
2 CAT/C/16/Add.6 (1996) 
3 CAT/C/16/Add.6 (1996) 
4 There were credible reports of killings of Serbs. 
5 POW’s are generally treated harshly. Beatings were sometimes used. However it is not clear whether the severity 
of the beatings would make it torture. 
6 Bombing of houses and setting fire to houses in an effort to drive people out. 
7 In revenge attacks Croat extremists sometimes drove Serbs out of their homes. 
8 There were numerous killings often with the complicity of local Serb “authorities”. Many disappeared in Serb 
controlled areas of Croatia. 
9 In Serbian controlled areas harsh treatment in places of detention is common. It is not known whether torture 
would fall under this harsh treatment. 
                                                                                                                                                           
10 Bombing of houses and setting fire to houses in an effort to drive people out. The Serbs were especially 
aggressive in ethnic cleansing harassing non-Serbs until they fled and “voluntarily” signed over their property to 
Serbs. 
11 It is the practice of Serb “authorities” to drive non-Serbs out of their homes. These expulsions numbered in the 
thousands in Sectors East and South. The Serbs were especially aggressive in ethnic cleansing harassing non-Serbs 
until they fled and “voluntarily” signed over their property to Serbs. 
12 Displaced Croats were not able to return in Serb controlled areas. 
13 In our view both marks are right. The difference may be explained that in the State Department assesments the 
Serrbian Human Rights violations are taken into account. 
14 The difference may be explained that in the State Department assessment the Serbian Human Rights violations 
are taken into account. Moreover, the State Department mark is in our view not in accordance with the really 
mentioned violations and should be changed in our view to 3 or 4 which was not made by Purdue. 
15 However in two major offensives many civilians were killed. A number of those civilians appear to have been 
executed. Although there were fewer politically motivated or other extrajudicial killings than in 1992. 
16 Children (and women) were especially subjected to violence at the hands of men, including demobilised 
soldiers, acting out their frustrations and stresses. The violence is increasing. 
17 In one major attack Croatian armed forces systematically destroyed a number of villages. 
18 Serbs suffer from discrimination in housing. 
19 Throughout the year military police carried out illegal evictions from state-owned apartments. 
20 Security forces frequently beat and mistreated prisoners during detention and interrogation, particularly early in 
the year. Victims were Serbs and Muslims. Authorities had engaged in torture and beating of prisoners in Lora 
prison in Split. Victims were JNA reservists. 
21 Serbs suffer from discrimination in housing. 
22 Military or civil police carried out evictions by force, involving several hundred families, ethnic Serbs and 
Croats as well as Muslims. 
23 Between 300 and 500 killings in reclaimed parts of Croatia. Most killings were ethnically motivated and 
occurred long after the military offensives were over. Among those implicated in the killings were civilians, civil 
police, and active duty military personnel, especially members of the non-professional “home guard”. Government 
forces were responsible for the indiscriminate deaths of many civilians and UN personnel. 
24 Conditions in short-term detention facilities used to house civilians rounded after military action did not meet 
international minimum standards. 
25 Some instances of torture. However there was no evidence of systematic torture in Croatian jails. 
26 Hungarians complained that only those children whose parents were both registered to be of Hungarian ethnicity 
could register in Hungarian schools, preventing many children of mixed background from attending. 
27 One-third of houses in recaptured areas were burned. Another one-third was heavily damaged and inhabitable. 
28 Serbs suffer from discrimination in housing. 
29 Forced eviction of Muslims from camps. They were then forcibly repatriated to Bosnia. Military police 
continued to carry out forced evictions, involving hundreds of families of all nationalities. Croatian civilians 
entered the homes of ethnic Serbs and other minorities who had lived for years in family apartments. 
30 It looks like new legislation makes it difficult for Serbs to return to their homes to reclaim them. The 
Government refused to allow the almost 200,000 refugees who fled the fighting to return to their homes in the 
former sectors north, south, and west.  
31 Serbs suffer from discrimination in housing. 
32 Forced eviction of Muslims from camps. They were then forcibly repatriated to Bosnia. Military police 
continued to carry out forced evictions, involving hundreds of families of all nationalities. Croatian civilians 
entered the homes of ethnic Serbs and other minorities who had lived for years in family apartments. 
33 Many non-Croats have found themselves effectively exiled from Croatia as they are not able to get the required 
papers in order to return to their homes. 
34 Killings continued to occur in the UNPA’s  as part of the Belgrade-backed Serbs’ program of “ethnic 
cleansing”. Serbs killed numerous civilians in a deliberate and indiscriminate campaign of artillery attacks on 
major Croatian cities and economic targets. 
35 Conditions in prisons within the Serb-controlled UNPA’s  are reliably reported to be abysmal. Harsh treatment 
is commonplace. Some were forced to sleep on concrete floor. Prisoners at one compound are always kept inside 
and fed only twice daily. 
36 In one detention centre there were reports of torture. Harsh treatment also continued. 
37 Since 1991 as many as 10,000 houses many owned by Croatian Serbs, have been blown up or razed. Many 
houses were destroyed in shelling. 
38 Ethnic cleansing resulted in many non-Serbs to be expelled from their homes and the areas they lived in.  
39 There were less killings. However a disproportionate number of homicide victims in the RSK were non-Serbs. It 
is alleged Serbian forces committed several murders along the confrontation line. In retaliation shelling of civilian 
areas of Zagreb six people were killed. 
40 Conditions in prisons within the Serb-controlled UNPA’s  are reliably reported to be abysmal. Harsh treatment 
is commonplace.  
41 There were at least two cases of psychological torture. It is not known whether harsh treatment also entails 
torture. 
42 The practice of forcibly moving Serbian refugees or soldiers into the homes of non-Serb residents continued. 
43 A disproportionate number of victims were non-Serbs. 6 UN soldiers were killed. 
                                                                                                                                                           
44 Conditions in prisons within the Serb-controlled UNPA’s  are reliably reported to be abysmal. Harsh treatment 
is commonplace.  
45 There were credible reports of torture and other abuse. Harsh treatment of non-Serbs was commonplace. It is not 
known whether this harsh treatment amounts to torture. 
46 Shelling caused substantial damage to property. 
47 The practice of forcibly moving Serbian refugees or soldiers into the homes of non-Serb residents continued. 
48 There are occasional beatings of ethnic Serbs and mixed-marriage returnees. It is not known whether these 
beating amount to torture. 
49 Legislation regulating minority language education was deemed unduly restrictive by opponents. 
50 Police was involved in a two-day rampage with Bosnian Croats burning and vandalizing Serb homes. 
51 Ethnic Serbs and at times other minorities suffered from a pattern of ever present and often open discrimination 
in such area as housing. 
52 Forced evictions of ethnic Serbs, Croats and others from former JNA apartments continued in major cities 
throughout the year. Houses are confiscated when the tenants in a six-month absence have acted against the 
interests of Croatia. Membership of the JNA was enough to brand the tenants enemy of the State. Croats also were 
the victims f evictions. Many cases were reported in which desirable apartments were simply confiscated by 
individuals connected with either police or military.  
53 Although the Government reversed its stated opposition to the return of Serbs in July, the barriers erected for 
Serbs to return effectively exiled them from Croatia. Many Serbs were not allowed to return to their homes, even 
when these homes were empty. 
54 One Italian tourist was beaten to death by police. 
55 There are occasional beatings of ethnic Serbs and mixed-marriage returnees. It is not known whether these 
beating amount to torture. 
56 The majority of students continue their education to the age of 18, with Roma being the only group reporting 
any notable exclusion. The Government blamed problems of Roma largely on linguistic and cultural differences 
that make their integration in schools difficult. Romani children face some discrimination and problems, due 
largely to these cultural and linguistic barriers at school. Ethnic Serb children are forced to follow the Croat 
curriculum. The following of a Serb curriculum remained problematical. 
57 Ethnic Serbs and at times other minorities suffered from a pattern of ever present and often open discrimination 
in such area as housing. 
58 In the Danubian region there were forcible evictions of Serbs on a weekly basis. 
59 Despite positive steps in legislation enabling Serbs to return, implementation was slow and many Serbs were 
unable to return to their homes. Croats often occupy these homes. 
60 There are occasional beatings (the report emphasises that Roma are often victim). It is not known whether these 
beating amount to torture. 
61 The majority of students continue their education to the age of 18, with Roma being the only group reporting 
any notable exception. The Government blamed the problems of Roma largely on linguistic and cultural 
differences that make their integration in schools difficult. Romani children face some discrimination and 
problems, due largely to these cultural and linguistic barriers at school. The well-documented pattern of 
discriminatory application of laws and administrative regulations was also evident in education. There are still 
very few classes for Serb pupils who follow the approved Serbian school program. 
62 Ethnic Serbs and at times other minorities suffered from a pattern of open and severe discrimination in such area 
as housing. 
63 The OSCE and local human rights organizations reported forced evictions of ethnic Serbs from Croat-owned 
homes without receiving alternative accommodation on a weekly basis. 
64 The return of Serbs moved slowly, especially due to persistent difficulties, and delays, and contradictory 
requirements by local officials. It still was not possible for Serbs to return to their homes, because they were often 
occupied by ethnic Croats. The problem of houses being occupied when the original occupants had not occupied 
the house for a period of six months still went unresolved. The “six-months rule” affected ethnic Serbs 
disproportionally. 
65 The majority of students continue their education to the age of 18, with Roma being the only group reporting 
any notable exception. Romani children face serious discrimination in schools, and nearly all drop out by grade 
8.The well-documented pattern of discriminatory application of laws and administrative regulations was also 
evident in education. There are still very few classes for Serb pupils who follow the approved Serbian school 
program. 
66 Ethnic Serbs and other minorities suffered from a pattern of open and severe discrimination in such area as 
housing. 
67 The return of Serbs moved slowly, especially due to persistent difficulties, and delays, and contradictory 
requirements by local officials. The restitution of occupied  private property to, mostly ethnic Serbs, returning to 
the country remained a problem. It still was not possible for Serbs to return to their homes, because they were 
often occupied by ethnic Croats. The problem of houses being occupied when the original occupants had not 
occupied the house for a period of six months still went unresolved. The “six-months rule” affected ethnic Serbs 
disproportionally. The return of Serbs to Croatia did increase by 50%. 
68 The majority of students continue their education to the age of 18, with Roma being the only group reporting 
any notable exception. Romani children face serious discrimination in schools, and nearly all drop out by grade 
8.The well-documented pattern of discriminatory application of laws and administrative regulations was also 
evident in education. There are still very few classes for Serb pupils who follow the approved Serbian school 
program. 
                                                                                                                                                           
69 While there is no pattern of abuse against children, NGO hotlines report numerous cases of abuse. 
70 Ethnic Serbs suffered from a pattern of open and sometimes severe discrimination in such area as housing. 
71 The restitution of occupied  private property to, mostly ethnic Serbs, returning to the country remained a 
problem. It still was not possible for Serbs to return to their homes, because they were often occupied by ethnic 
Croats. The problem of houses being occupied when the original occupants had not occupied the house for a 
period of six months still went unresolved. The “six-months rule” affected ethnic Serbs disproportionally. The 
return of Serbs to Croatia did increase by 50%. 
72 The majority of students continue their education to the age of 18, with Roma being the only group reporting 
any notable exception. Romani children face serious discrimination in schools, and nearly all drop out by grade 8. 
73 While there is no pattern of abuse against children, NGO hotlines report numerous cases of abuse. 
74 Ethnic Serbs suffered from a pattern of open and sometimes severe discrimination in such area as housing. 
75 The restitution of occupied  private property to, mostly ethnic Serbs, returning to the country remained a 
problem. The problem of houses being occupied when the original occupants had not occupied the house for a 
period of six months still went unresolved. The “six-months rule” affected ethnic Serbs disproportionally.  
 
Source: www.cia.gov 
El Salvador1 
(population: 6,470,379) 
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Political 
Terrorscale 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 
Conflict Level 
High intensity armed 
conflict (FMLN vs. 
Government: Over 
3,000 deaths) 
 (peace accord on 31 December)  
Freedom 
House 3/4/PF 3/4/PF 3/4/PF 3/3/PF 
U.S. State 
Department2 E
3, T4, CL5 E6, t7, CL8 e9, t10, CA11, CL12 e13, t14, CL15 
Amnesty 
International E
16, T17 18 E19, T20 E21, T22 E23, t24, CL25 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Political 
Terrorscale 4/3 3/3 2/3 2/2 
Conflict Level    Violent political conflict 
Freedom 
House 3/3/PF 3/3/PF 3/3/PF 3/3/PF 
U.S. State 
Department 
e26, t27, p28, CA29, 
CL30, IF31 
e32, t33, p34, CA35, 
CL/FL36, IF37 
p38, CA39, CL/FL40, 
S41, IF42  
(e)43, p44,CA45, 
CL/CP46, S47, IF48 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Political 
Terrorscale 3 2  2 
Conflict Level  violent political conflict violent political conflict 
violent 
political 
conflict 
Freedom 
House 2/3/F 2/3/F 2/3/F 2/3/F 
U.S. State 
Department 
(t)49, p50, CA51, 
CL/CP52, S53, IF54 
(e)55, (t)56, p57, AE58, 
CA59, CL/CP/FL60, 
S61, IF62 
(e)63, (t)64, p65, AE66, 
CA67, 
CL/CP/FL/(TL)/(TP)68, 
S69, IF70 
e71, (t)72, p73, AE74, 
CA75, 
CL/CP/FL/TL/TP76, 
IF77 
 
 2001 2002 
Political 
Terrorscale   
Conflict Level 
violent 
political 
conflict78 
 
Freedom 
House 2/3/F 2/3/F 
U.S. State 
Department 
e79, p80, AE81, CA82, 
CL/CP/FL/TL/TP83 
IF84 
e85, p86, t87, AE88, 
CA89, 
CL/CP/FL/TL/TP90 
PC91, IF92
 
 
Working conditions: 
 
1990: The labour code and the constitution require employers to take steps ensuring that 
employees are not subject to risk at the workplace. There were numerous inspections, in which 
many infractions were found. 
1991: The labour code and the constitution require employers to take steps ensuring that 
employees are not subject to risk at the workplace. There were numerous inspections, in which 
many infractions were found. Health and safety regulations are outdated and inadequate 
enforcement remains a problem. 
1992: Health and safety regulations are outdated and inadequate enforcement remains a 
problem. The Ministry of Labour attempts to seek compliance with the laws, but is seriously 
hampered through a lack of power. The Ministry is designing a new labour code. 
1993: Health and safety regulations are outdated and inadequate enforcement remains a 
problem. Women and persons under 18 are forbidden to work in occupations considered 
hazardous. 
1994: Health and safety regulations are outdated and inadequate enforcement remains a 
problem. Women and persons under 18 are forbidden to work in occupations considered 
hazardous. Workers can remove themselves from dangerous working conditions without 
jeopardizing their employment if they present a medical certificate indicating that their health 
is at risk while using certain equipment or substances. 
1995: : Health and safety regulations are outdated and inadequate enforcement remains a 
problem. Women and persons under 18 are forbidden to work in occupations considered 
hazardous. Workers can remove themselves from dangerous working conditions without 
jeopardizing their employment if they present a medical certificate indicating that their health 
is at risk while using certain equipment or substances. 
1996: Health and safety regulations are outdated and inadequate enforcement remains a 
problem. Women and persons under 18 are forbidden to work in occupations considered 
hazardous. Workers can remove themselves from dangerous working conditions without 
jeopardizing their employment if they present a medical certificate indicating that their health 
is at risk while using certain equipment or substances. 
1997: Health and safety regulations are outdated and inadequate enforcement remains a 
problem. Women and persons under 18 are forbidden to work in occupations considered 
hazardous. Workers can remove themselves from dangerous working conditions without 
jeopardizing their employment if they present a medical certificate indicating that their health 
is at risk while using certain equipment or substances. The Government has directed more 
funds to the enforcement of existing laws. 
1998: Health and safety regulations are outdated and inadequate enforcement remains a 
problem. Women and persons under 18 are forbidden to work in occupations considered 
hazardous. Workers can remove themselves from dangerous working conditions without 
jeopardizing their employment if they present a medical certificate indicating that their health 
is at risk while using certain equipment or substances. Increasingly the Ministry of Labour 
imposes fines or other punishment in favour of the workers. There are suspected “sweat shop” 
conditions in the maquila sector. Especially lack of ventilation (problem relating to dust and 
heat), and to a lesser extend the lack of bathrooms, drinking water, and eating facilities, were a 
problem in this sector. 
1999: Health and safety regulations are outdated and inadequate enforcement remains a 
problem. Women and persons under 18 are forbidden to work in occupations considered 
hazardous. Workers can remove themselves from dangerous working conditions without 
jeopardizing their employment if they present a medical certificate indicating that their health 
is at risk while using certain equipment or substances. Increasingly the Ministry of Labour 
imposes fines or other punishment in favour of the workers. There are suspected “sweat shop” 
conditions in the maquila sector. Especially lack of ventilation (problem relating to dust and 
heat), and to a lesser extend the lack of bathrooms, drinking water, and eating facilities, were a 
problem in this sector. 
2000: Ratification of ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labour (June 15th). 
Labour Code and Constitution require government to ensure that employees are not placed at 
risk in their workplaces. Health and safety regulations is outdated and enforcement is 
inadequate. Some maquilas workers were concerned with ‘unhealthy drinking water, unsanitary 
bathrooms, and eating facilities, and inadequate ventilation’. 
2001: Labour Code and Constitution require government to ensure that employees are not 
placed at risk in their workplaces. Health and safety regulations is outdated and enforcement is 
inadequate. Some maquilas workers were concerned with ‘unhealthy drinking water, unsanitary 
bathrooms, and eating facilities, and inadequate ventilation’. May 9, NLC made public a 2000 
report of the ministry of labour on conditions in the maquila sector. The report mentions failure 
to provide basic safety equipment and mandatory overtime policies. Some factories have 
unrealistic quotas for production and workers are required to put in extra hours when they fall 
short of the quota. (And the report describes systematic violation of the workers’ efforts to 
form unions.)  
2002: Labour Code and Constitution require government to ensure that employees are not 
placed at risk in their workplaces. Health and safety regulations is outdated and enforcement is 
inadequate. Some maquilas workers were concerned with ‘unhealthy drinking water, unsanitary 
bathrooms, and eating facilities, and inadequate ventilation’. 
 
 
Brief historical/political overview: 
 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: 
1989: Alfredo Cristiani is inaugurated for five year term. Government’s refusal to postpone 
elections to allow FMLN participation is met by a spate of killings of high level government 
and military officials. November 11th talks between government and rebels fail. Rebels launch 
new offensive. Followed by declaration of a state of siege and a heavy counterattack. The state 
of siege allows for an increase in politically motivated arrests. Under the state of siege the 
period detainees can be held in police custody before being brought before a judge is increased 
from 72 hours to 15 days. 
1990: State of siege ends in April 1990. In March most of those arrested under the state of 
siege are released. New talks with the FMLN take place under the auspices of the U.N. A 
declaration on human rights is signed. The Declaration obliges the parties to take steps to 
prevent, extrajudicial executions, torture, and ‘disappearances’. However the talks are not 
completed by the end of the year and the FMLN renews fighting in the last two months of the 
year. 
1991: The Act of New York is signed on 31 December. The Act includes data for a ceasefire 
and for the signing of an official peace accord. The New York Act is preceded by earlier 
agreements on military, judicial and socio-economic reforms. Constitutional changes lead to 
reform of the judiciary. A National Bureau for a Human Rights Ombudsman is proposed. 
However this bureau has not been set up by year’s end. Constitutional changes leading to 
reform of police and military are not yet endorsed by the Legislative Council. In April the 
Truth Commission is set up. A mission of the U.N. (ONUSAL) is set up to monitor compliance 
with the human rights Declaration. In March council elections and elections for the Legislative 
Council are held. The elections were marred with irregularities. ARENA (the ruling rights wing 
party) loose their absolute majority. Despite peace talks there were great numbers of civilian 
and military casualties. 
1992: On January 16 the Government and the FMLN sign peace accords ending 11 year old 
civil war. On December 15th the conflict officially ended. Though realisation of the peace 
accords is slow, compliance on key elements is achieved. The FMLN is dismantled and 
changed into a political party. In February the Ombudsman for Human Rights is installed. 
However the Bureau is often confronted with death threats. Two days after official instalment 
an employee is paralysed in an attack. The steps taken to get those accused of human rights 
abuses convicted are undermined by the Law on National Reconciliation, which gives amnesty 
to all those not mentioned in the Truth Commission’s Report. ONUSAL continues to monitor 
compliance with the Human Rights Declaration. Despite the peace accords there was an 
increase in the number of violent deaths. 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT: 
1989: El Salvador has a freely elected democratic government and an independent judiciary. 
On June 1 following free and fair elections civilian control of the government passed from one 
party to another. This was the first time in history. Alfredo Christiani of ARENA assumes the 
Presidency. In 1989 the FMLN pursues a campaign to make the country ungovernable. FMLN 
attempted to get an unconstitutional delay of the March elections and refused a cease fire 
proposal. Two cease fire proposals by FMLN were refused. After a number of meetings 
between FMLN and the government, the FMLN launched a new offensive on November 11. 
Following the FMLN offensive detainees can be held in police custody before being brought 
before a judge is increased from 72 hours to 15 days. 
1990: Fewer human rights violations. 
1991: On December 31 an agreement is signed by the Government and the FMLN effectively 
ending the 11 year war. The agreement provides for reintegration of FMLN combatants, 
constitutional reforms (human rights, judicial and electoral reforms), the formation of a truth 
commission and an ad-hoc commission charged with evaluating the human rights record, 
professional competence, and commitment to democracy of each ESAF officer. In addition a 
UN mission (ONUSAL) begins its work of verifying the human rights accord signed in July 
1990 by the government and the FMLN.   
1992: On 16 January an accord is signed to formalize the end of the conflict. On 1 February a 
cease fire officially takes effect. On 15 December full demobilization of the FMLN is realized. 
As part of the peace accords the Government and the FLMN agree on constitutional reforms, 
such as human rights reforms, judicial, and electoral reforms. These reforms are approved by 
the Legislative Assembly. The Truth Commission starts its work but has not yet reported. The 
Ad Hoc Commission gives its confidential report to the President and the UN Secretary 
General. The military is already being reorganized and trained. 
1993: On March 15 the truth commission reports its findings. The Commission recommends all 
those identified as human rights violators be removed from government and military posts. and 
reforms in the military and the judiciary. However the National Assembly approves amnesty 
from criminal prosecution for all those implicated in the report. FMLN is completely 
dismantled. ESAF officer corps is cleared of human rights violators by ad-hoc commission. 
1994: June 1 Armando Calderon Sol is elected president. FMLN are competing for the first 
time (the major opposition party). Both warring fractions have complied with the key measures 
in the peace accords. Human rights abuses declined significantly during the year. Judicial 
reform made some headway. 
1995: Demobilization of military-dominated national police is completed. Complaints against 
ESAF continued to decline significantly. 
1996: Human rights record improved. 
1997: Human rights situation improved somewhat. United Nations special representative 
eliminated. Effectiveness of human rights ombudsman limited and hindered by further 
shrinking budget. New legislation takes effect (New Criminal Procedures Code and the new 
Penitentiary (Sentencing) Code). Government seeks to improve conditions in prisons as a 
reaction to 1996 PDDH report. PDDH and NGO’s launch child awareness campaign. 
1998: Human rights situation improved somewhat. Prosecution of Police officers accused of 
abuses had mixed results. 
1999: Francisco Flores is elected President, and begins his term in June. Government’s record 
on human rights improved somewhat.  
2000: Ratification of ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labour (June 15th). 
2001: Two earthquakes (January and February) killed 1,100 persons and left 1,2 million people 
homeless, and caused over 1.3 Billion dollars in damage. It resulted in a 5-7 year fallback for 
the country (for example, more people living in poverty). In January the official currency 
changed to the dollar. 
 
                                                 
1 Until 1992 El Salvador was the scene of a civil war between government forces (ESAF) and a guerrilla 
movement (FMLN). The guerrilla forces were responsible for numerous human rights abuses, such as extrajudicial 
killings, torture and forced labour. However these violations will not be mentioned in this table. 
2 Following a directive by Secretary of State Warren Christopher some changes in reporting were made as of the 
1993 report. The changes include a stronger emphasis on prison conditions and a new section on “discrimination 
based on race, sex, religion, disability, language or social status. This new section also includes a paragraph on 
discrimination against children. 
3 There were many extrajudicial executions (though only a few are mentioned), amongst which the killing of six 
Jesuit priests, the house maid and her daughter. There also were a great number of political murders (incomplete 
figures indicate an average of 17 murders per month). 
4 Many were tortured, though the report emphasises this is not government policy. 
                                                                                                                                                           
5 Children under the age of 14 are prohibited from working. Exception may be made for instances in which work 
is absolutely indispensable to sustain the minor and his family. To this effect children under 14 often work on the 
family farm.  
6 Difficult to verify how many people were killed. Death squads were responsible for 45 deaths between January 
and June according to AI.  
7 It is impossible to discern an exact number of cases of torture or a pattern of torture. The report says: “In 1990 
there continued to be credible reports of torture and abuse of some detainees by the public security forces and the 
military”. 
8 Children under the age of 14 are prohibited from working. Exception may be made for instances in which work 
is absolutely indispensable to sustain the minor and his family. To this effect children under 14 often work on the 
family farm. 
9 It is difficult to read a number into the report. The report states several people were executed, In addition to that 
the report mentions the U.N. special rapporteur’s remarks on the difficulty in attributing murders to death squads. 
A number of such murders took place during the year. 
10 The report simply states that torture continued. 
11 400 cases of rape were registered between January and July in San Miguel (the third largest city in the country). 
The majority of those rape victims were children.  
12 Children under the age of 14 are prohibited from working. Exception may be made for instances in which work 
is absolutely indispensable to sustain the minor and his family. To this effect children under 14 often work on the 
family farm. 
13 The report is unclear about the number of extrajudicial executions. It simply states there were less than the 
previous year and that there were no known death squad related murders. 
14 The report simply states that torture continued. 
15 Children under the age of 14 are prohibited from working. Exception may be made for instances in which work 
is absolutely indispensable to sustain the minor and his family. To this effect children under 14 often work on the 
family farm. Children often work as vendors and general labourers in small businesses, especially in the informal 
sector. 
16 Military personnel often acting in the guise of Death Squads made many trade unionists and academics 
‘disappear’. A clear allusion is made to link disappearance to extrajudicial executions. Moreover government 
forces or death squads were responsible for over sixty killings of trade unionists, academics, members of political 
parties, and others apparently targeted on account of their opposition to government policies. 
17  Torture is routine. Many political detainees, trade unionists and academics were tortured to extract 
‘confessions’.  Reports of torture increased during the state of siege. 
18 In October AI published a report entitled: “El Salvador: Killings, Torture and ’Disappearances’.” 
19 The number of deaths through death squads more than doubled. Many people were killed by security forces, 
especially in rural areas. A number of people who were arrested by soldiers were secretly sentenced to death and 
executed. (FMLN accused of killing detainees, thought to be informers.) 
20 Especially during incommunicado detention. Torture was most likely to happen before official recognition of 
the arrest. 
21 A number of people were executed by security forces, especially election candidates and rural communities 
were targeted. About 35 murders were ascribed to death squads. It is strongly believed these death squads have 
ties with governmental forces. The number of ‘disappearances’ was significantly reduced. 
22 The use of incommunicado detention facilitated the use of torture. 
23 There were a number of deaths that could be directly attributed to security forces. At least 35 died at the hands 
of ‘death squads’. There were no more ‘disappearances’. (A number of people were executed by the FMLN.) 
24 There was a sharp reduction in the number of cases of torture, however there still were a number of cases. 
25 Children under 14 often work on the family farm. 
26 It is difficult to ascertain the number of extrajudicial executions. The exact phrase used by the State Department 
is: “The end of hostilities (…) led to an immediate and significant reduction in extrajudicial killings.”  An example 
of possible extrajudicial executions is the death of a demonstrator. This is followed by an enumeration of killings 
that could be labelled extrajudicial and that could have been perpetrated by death squads. The existence of death 
squads is not acknowledged, but each enumerated murder is followed by the suggestion that the murder is very 
reminiscent of the 80’s in which death squads were fully operative. 
27 Six confirmed cases. 
28 Prison conditions are bleak. There is severe overcrowding, lack of bedding and lack of food. 
29 Hospitals receive between 4 or 5 cases of sexually abused children per day. Abandonment is also a great 
problem. 
30 Children under 14 often work on the family farm. Children also frequently work as vendors and general 
labourers in small businesses, especially in the informal sector. Poverty forces many children to quit school too 
early. 
31 In prisons. And child malnutrition is a great problem. 
32 ONUSAL confirmed five extrajudicial executions. ONUSAL were still investigating a number of (politically 
motivated) murders. ONUSAL confirmed that there was a decline of extrajudicial killings between 1993 and 1994. 
33 Three reports of torture. 
34 Prison conditions are bleak. There is severe overcrowding, lack of bedding and lack of food. 
                                                                                                                                                           
35 Abuse took place in all forms, that is physical, sexual, abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. The problem has 
taken on greater forms. 
36 Children under 14 often work on the family farm. Children also frequently work as vendors and general 
labourers in small businesses, especially in the informal sector. Poverty forces many children to quit school too 
early. Labour exploitation is a growing problem. Approx. 270,000 children work up to 12 hours a day. 
37 In prisons. And child malnutrition is a problem. 
38 Prison conditions are bleak. There is severe overcrowding, lack of bedding and lack of food. 
39 Abuse took place in all forms, that is physical, sexual, abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. The problem has 
again taken on greater forms. 
40 Children under 14 often work on the family farm. Children also frequently work as vendors and general 
labourers in small businesses, especially in the informal sector. Poverty forces many children to quit school too 
early. Labour exploitation is a growing problem.  
41 Approx. 1200 minors live in the streets of San Salvador. The problem is growing. Protection is lacking. 
42 Approx. 50% of all infants under 5 are undernourished. 
43 There were two cases in which authorities charged PNC officers with extrajudicial killing. 
44 Severe overcrowding was reduced somewhat, but conditions remained poor. The ombudsman stated the 
situation in prisons constituted ‘a systematic violation of human rights’. Inmate violence is a grave problem. 
45 Abuse took place in all forms, that is physical, sexual, abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. The problem has 
again taken on greater forms. Especially the problem of sexual abuse is acute. 
46 Most of the 270,000 working minors are street vendors. They loose the opportunity to education and are 
vulnerable for sexual abuse and exploitation as prostitutes. 
47 An estimated 2,000 street children in San Salvador. 
48 50% of infants under 5 are undernourished. 
49 It is difficult to obtain the exact number, if any, of cases of torture. The report states that the PDDH (office of 
the Ombudsman) received 993 complaints of violation of the right of personal integrity (a category which covers 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, mistreatment, disproportionate use of force, and improper treatment of 
detainees). 
50 Overcrowding worsened. 
51 Abuse took place in all forms, that is physical, sexual, abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. The problem has 
again taken on greater forms. Especially the problem of sexual abuse is acute. 
52 Most of the 270,000 working minors are street vendors. They loose the opportunity to education and are 
vulnerable for sexual abuse and exploitation as prostitutes. 
53 There are no reliable estimates as to the number of street children, but it is a sizable number. 
54 50% of infants under 5 are undernourished. 
55 State Department is somewhat inconsistent. In the introduction of the report (which also contains a summarized 
overview of human rights abuses) State Department states that there were two extrajudicial executions during the 
year. However in the complete overview of abuses in Section 1, under a (‘Political and other Extrajudicial 
Killing’) the report states that there ‘were two cases of suspected extrajudicial executions’ (emphasis added.) 
56 It is difficult to obtain the exact number, if any, of cases of torture. The report states that the PDDH (office of 
the Ombudsman) received 849 complaints of violation of the right of personal integrity (a category which covers 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, mistreatment, disproportionate use of force, and improper treatment of 
detainees).  
57 There was better food, medical care was improved and there was a little less overcrowding (this due to the 
effects of the new sentencing and penal codes in April 1998). However overcrowding was still severe. Gang 
violence is a great problem. 
58 Not all rural areas could provide education until ninth grade to all students. 34% of rural children and 17% of 
urban children did not attend classes. 
59 Abuse took place in all forms, that is physical, sexual, abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. Government is 
working closely with UNICEF. There were more cases of sexual abuse than in 1997. 
60 Most of the 270,000 working minors are street vendors. They loose the opportunity to education and are 
vulnerable for sexual abuse and exploitation as prostitutes. A November study concluded that the main reasons for 
child prostitution were ‘poverty, lack of a strong nuclear family, discrimination against women, and organized 
crime.’ Another study revealed the two main reasons to be poverty and family problems. There are reports that 
children are forced into prostitution.  
61 There are an estimated 1000 children living on their own in the streets. 42% of these children are under the age 
of 5. Children’s rights organisations accuse the PNC of brutality against street children. 
62 Infant malnutrition is a problem. 1998 World Food Program indicated that 12% of children under 5 suffer from 
grave malnutrition, an additional 38% suffer from less severe malnutrition. The Government has a national plan to 
tackle the problem. 
63 There were seven cases of reported extrajudicial executions. 
64 It is difficult to obtain the exact number, if any, of cases of torture. The report states that the PDDH (office of 
the Ombudsman) received 929 complaints of violation of the right of personal integrity (a category which covers 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, mistreatment, disproportionate use of force, and improper treatment of 
detainees). 
65 Prison conditions were poor, but improved significantly. There was better food and better medical care. As a 
result of the 1997 and 1998 implementing of new penal and sentencing laws, the population dropped by 23%. 
                                                                                                                                                           
66 Not all rural areas could provide education until ninth grade to all students. 
67 Abuse took place in all forms, that is physical, sexual, abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. Government is 
working closely with UNICEF. There was an increase in cases of abuse. 
68 Most of the 270,000 working minors are street vendors. They loose the opportunity to education and are 
vulnerable for sexual abuse and exploitation as prostitutes. A study concluded that the main reasons for child 
prostitution were ‘poverty, lack of a strong nuclear family, discrimination against women, and organized crime.’ 
Another study revealed the two main reasons to be poverty and family problems. There are reports that children 
are forced into prostitution. The Government has initiated and participated in a number of programs to combat the 
problems of child labour. Interpol stated that some 20 Salvadorian girls had been taken from prostitution rings in 
the last three years. There were reports that children had been brought in from neighbouring countries and forced 
to beg. 
69 There are an estimated 1000 children living on their own in the streets. 42% of these children are under the age 
of 5. Children’s rights organisations accuse the PNC of brutality against street children. 
70 Malnutrition decreased, but remained a problem. The Government has a national plan to tackle the problem. 
71 The exact number of extrajudicial killings is not available, but the report states ‘the police committed some 
extrajudicial executions’.  
72 At least one case of alleged torture. The report states that the PDDH (office of the Ombudsman) received 724 
complaints of violation of the right of personal integrity (a category which covers torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, mistreatment, disproportionate use of force, and improper treatment of detainees). The number is 
significantly lower than that of 1999. Moreover a commission set up by the President recommended certain 
changes in the procedure to investigate alleged abuses by the PNC. The recommendations were put into action. 
The commission also identified 14 persons suspected of having committed torture in 2000 and prior years. 
73 Overcrowding was reduced, but some facilities still suffered from some overcrowding. Gang related violence 
remained a great problem. 
74 Not all rural areas could provide education until ninth grade to all students. 27% of rural children and 14% of 
urban children did not attend classes. 
75 Abuse took place in all forms, that is physical, sexual, abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. Government is 
working closely with UNICEF. There was a decrease in figures showing the various forms of abuse. 
76 Most of the 270,000 minors work, work as street vendors. They loose their opportunity to an education, often 
fall victim to sexual abuse and are exploited and forced into prostitution. Children, especially those living on the 
street, are trafficked to other countries and forced into prostitution. Children from Honduras have also been used 
as beggars to support traffickers in San Salvador. El Salvador is a source of women and children for trafficking in 
prostitution to Mexico and other countries. 
77 1.1% of infants under 5 suffer from grave malnutrition, an additional 21% experience less severe malnutrition. 
78 Post conflict violence. 
79 Not only has the title of the first paragraph of the first section been changed from “Political and Other 
Extrajudicial Killing” to “Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life”, but police killings are no longer indicated 
as extrajudicial executions or reports thereof, but are merely called ‘killings’. There were some “police killings”. 
80 Overcrowding was reduced, but some facilities still suffered from some overcrowding. Gang related violence 
remained a great problem. 
81 Same data as previous year. Government estimates that about 150,000 children were prevented from going to 
school, because of economic hardship and damage to the school buildings caused by the January and February 
earthquakes. 
82 Abuse took place in all forms, that is physical, sexual, abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. Government is 
working closely with UNICEF. There was a decrease in figures showing the various forms of abuse (though some 
NGO’s do not agree). 
83 UNICEF estimates that there Are 185,000 minors working. Mostly they work for the family (peasants) or as 
street vendors. They loose their opportunity to an education. Children, especially those living on the street, are 
trafficked to other countries and forced into prostitution. Children from Honduras have also been used as beggars 
to support traffickers in San Salvador. El Salvador is a source of women and children for trafficking in prostitution 
to Mexico and other countries. 
84 19% of children suffer from chronic malnutrition. 
85 The police committed some “killings”. The PDDH received 30 complaints of attempted and/or completed 
unlawful killings by police during the year. 
86 Prison conditions were poor. Overcrowding continued. Gang violence is a problem. 
87 One case of torture. The report states that the PDDH (office of the Ombudsman) received 766 complaints of 
violation of the right of personal integrity (a category which covers torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
mistreatment, disproportionate use of force, and improper treatment of detainees), compared with 736 in 2001. 
Most of these cases were classified as mistreatment.  
88 In rural areas 14 percent of primary school aged children (7-11 years) an 32 percent of sixth to eighth grade 
aged children (12-14 years) did not attend school. Only 7 percent of children in rural areas attended school in 
grades 6 to 8. 
89 Abuse took place in all forms, that is physical, sexual, abandonment, exploitation, and neglect. Government is 
working closely with UNICEF. According to ISNA (an autonomous entity) there were 842 cases of physical 
mistreatment, 454 cases of negligence, and 446 cases of abandonment, compared 916 cases of physical 
mistreatment, 366 cases of negligence, and 573 cases of abandonment reported in 2001. Using different criteria, 
                                                                                                                                                           
the ISDEMU recorded 1,694 cases of abuse during the year compared with 1,196 in 2001. ISNA reported 173 
cases of sexual abuse during the year compared with 115 in 2001. 
90 75,000 children between the ages of 5 and 13 worked, as did almost 147,000 children between the ages of 14 
and 17. The Ministry  can give special permission for children to work, when such employment is indispensable to 
the work during harvesting and planting seasons. Child labour in the informal sector is difficult to monitor. 
Children, especially those living on the street, are trafficked to other countries and forced into prostitution. Child 
prostitution is a problem. UNICEF reported that between 10 and 25 percent of visible prostitutes were minors, and 
40 percent of the hidden prostitutes are minors. El Salvador is a source of women and children for trafficking in 
prostitution to Mexico and other South American countries. 
91 Some juvenile detention centres were found to be holding adults as well as juveniles. Some adult detention 
centres were found to be holding juveniles. Gang violence is a major problem in juvenile detention centres. 
92 19% of children suffer from chronic malnutrition. 
 
Source: www.cia.gov 
PARAGUAY 
(population: 6,036,900) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Political 
Terrorscale 2/2 3/2 2/3 2/3 
Conflict Level     
Freedom 
House 4/3/PF 4/3/PF 3/3/PF 3/3/PF 
U.S. State 
Department1 (e)
2, t3, CL4, (FE)5 (e)
6, t7, AE8, CL9, 
DH10, (FE)11 
e12, t13, AE14, CL15, 
DH16,  (FE)17 
e, p18, T19, AE20, 
CL21, DH22, (FE)23, 
IF24 
Amnesty 
International (e)
25, (FE) 26 T27, (FE)28 t29, (FE) 30 t31 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Political 
Terrorscale 2/3 3/2 3/2 3/3 
Conflict Level     
Freedom 
House 3/3/PF 4/3/PF 4/3/PF 4/3/PF 
U.S. State 
Department 
e32, p33, T34, AE35, 
CA36, CL/FL37, CP, 
CS38, PC39, DH40,  
(FE)41, IF42 
e43, p44, T45, AE46, 
CA47, CL/FL48, CP, 
CS49, PC50, DH51, 
(FE)52, IF53 
(e)54, p55, T56, AE57, 
CA58, CL/FL59, CP, 
CS60,(FE)61, IF62  
(e)63, P64, T, AE65, 
CA66, CL/FL67, CP, 
CS, (FE)68, IF69 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 
Political 
Terrorscale 2 2  3 
Conflict Level   violent political conflict  
violent 
political 
conflict 
Freedom 
House 4/3/PF 4/3/PF 4/3/PF 4/3/PF 
U.S. State 
Department 
(E)70, P71, t72, AE73, 
CA74, CL/FL75, CP, 
CS76, (FE)77, IF78 
(E)79, P80, t81, AE82, 
CA83, CL/FL84, CP85, 
CS86, (FE)87, IF 88 
(E)89, P90, t91, AE92, 
CA93, CL/FL94, 
CP/(TP)95, CS96, 
(FE)97, IF98 
E99, P100, t101, AE102, 
CA103, CL/FL104, 
CP/TP105, CS106, 
(FE)107, IF108 
 
 2001 2002 
Political 
Terrorscale   
Conflict Level 
violent 
political 
conflict 
violent political conflict 
Freedom 
House 4/3/PF 4/3/PF 
U.S. State 
Department 
E109, P110, t111, AE112, 
CA113, CL/FL114, 
CP/TP115, CS116, 
IF117  
 
 
 
Working conditions: 
 
1989: The nascent trade union movement has yet to focus on occupational health and safety. 
That coupled with the slowness and relative expense of the labour law system, resulted in 
frequent failure to protect workers. Existing laws were inadequately enforced, due partially to a 
lack of inspectors. 
1990: There was inadequate enforcement of safety and hygiene provisions of the Labour Code, 
this was partly due to a lack of inspectors. 
1991: There was inadequate enforcement of safety and hygiene provisions of the Labour Code, 
this was partly due to a lack of inspectors. 
1992: There was inadequate enforcement of safety and hygiene provisions of the Labour Code, 
this was partly due to a lack of inspectors. 
1993: There was inadequate enforcement of safety and hygiene provisions of the Labour Code, 
this was partly due to a lack of inspectors. 
1994:  There was inadequate enforcement of safety and hygiene provisions of the Labour Code, 
this was partly due to a lack of inspectors. Subsequently the labour movement sponsored 
inspector training programs. Workers do not have the right to remove themselves from 
situations which endanger health and safety without ‘jeopardy to their continued employment’. 
Workers are protected by law when they file complaints about such conditions, but many 
employers did take disciplinary actions against the employee with impunity. 
1995: There was inadequate enforcement of safety, hygiene and comfort provisions of the 
Labour Code, this was partly due to a lack of inspectors. Subsequently the labour movement 
sponsored inspector training programs. Workers do not have the right to remove themselves 
from situations which endanger health and safety without ‘jeopardy to their continued 
employment’. Workers are protected by law when they file complaints about such conditions, 
but many employers did take disciplinary actions against the employee with impunity. 
1996: There was inadequate enforcement of safety, hygiene and comfort provisions of the 
Labour Code, this was partly due to a lack of inspectors. Subsequently the labour movement 
sponsored inspector training programs. Workers have the right to remove themselves ‘from 
situations that endanger health or safety’ without losing their job, but these conditions first 
have to be recognised by the Ministries of labour and health. Workers who file complaints on 
the conditions are protected by law, but employers often take disciplinary action against them. 
1997: There was inadequate enforcement of safety, hygiene and comfort provisions of the 
Labour Code, this was partly due to a lack of inspectors and other resources. The Ministry 
sponsored ‘the reconvening of a tripartite group of government, labour, and employers’ in 
order to update the labour manual and to start a program which should expand ‘transparency in 
the labour inspections process’. Workers have the right to remove themselves ‘from situations 
that endanger health or safety’ without losing their job, but these conditions first have to be 
recognised by the Ministries of labour and health. Workers who file complaints on the 
conditions are protected by law, but employers often take disciplinary action against them. 
1998: There was inadequate enforcement of safety, hygiene and comfort provisions of the 
Labour Code, this was partly due to a lack of inspectors and other resources. The Ministry 
sponsored ‘the reconvening of a tripartite group of government, labour, and employers’ in 
order to update the labour manual and to start a program which should expand ‘transparency in 
the labour inspections process’. On April 30, the new manual was approved by the Ministries 
of Justice and Labour, for the use by inspectors. 2,000 new manuals were distributed. Workers 
have the right to remove themselves ‘from situations that endanger health or safety’ without 
losing their job, but these conditions first have to be recognised by the Ministries of labour and 
health. Workers who file complaints on the conditions are protected by law, but employers 
often take disciplinary action against them. 
1999: There was inadequate enforcement of safety, hygiene and comfort provisions of the 
Labour Code, this was partly due to a lack of inspectors and other resources. The Ministry 
sponsored ‘the reconvening of a tripartite group of government, labour, and employers’ in 
order to update the labour manual and to start a program which should expand ‘transparency in 
the labour inspections process’. Subsequently the manual was updated. Workers have the right 
to remove themselves ‘from situations that endanger health or safety’ without losing their job, 
but these conditions first have to be recognised by the Ministries of labour and health. Workers 
who file complaints on the conditions are protected by law, but employers often take 
disciplinary action against them. 
2000: There was inadequate enforcement of safety, hygiene and comfort provisions of the 
Labour Code, this was partly due to a lack of inspectors and other resources. Workers have the 
right to remove themselves ‘from situations that endanger health or safety’ without losing their 
job, but these conditions first have to be recognised by the Ministries of labour and health. 
Workers who file complaints on the conditions are protected by law, but employers often take 
disciplinary action against them. 
2001: There was inadequate enforcement of safety, hygiene and comfort provisions of the 
Labour Code, this was partly due to a lack of inspectors and other resources. Workers have the 
right to remove themselves ‘from situations that endanger health or safety’ without losing their 
job, but these conditions first have to be recognised by the Ministries of labour and health. 
Workers who file complaints on the conditions are protected by law, but employers often take 
disciplinary action against them. 
 
Brief historical/political overview: 
 
Amnesty International: 
 
1989: General Alfredo Stroessner is overthrown in February after a successful military coup 
led by General Andrés Rodríguez. Stroessner seeks asylum in Brazil. Rodríguez forms a 
provisional government, which is largely composed of civilians. He starts to purge the armed 
forces. The Government brings about important human rights guarantees. In May Rodriguez is 
elected President and the Colorado Party wins in Presidential and congressional elections. The 
elections are marred by widespread irregularities. A congressional human rights commission is 
created in order to oversee judicial steps taken against those accused of torturing or ill-treating 
detainees. Investigations are started into crimes committed under the previous regime. Ill-
treatment and illegal detention is often the consequence of land- and trade union disputes. 
1990: A law that would enable the commission created in 1989 to start its work is blocked by 
President Rodríguez. Investigations into crimes committed under the previous regime 
continued, but hardly made any progress. 
1991: Investigations into past violations continued to make very slow progress. 
1992: New constitution guarantees right to life and forbids the death penalty for ‘ordinary 
crimes’. Investigations into past violations continued to make very slow progress, but there was 
one case in which five high ranking officers were sentenced to prison terms. 
 
State Department: 
 
1989: In early 1989 a new government committed itself to a transition to democracy and 
respect of human rights. It subsequently took important steps towards this goal. On February 2 
General Andres Rodriguez overthrew the 34-year old dictatorship of General Alfredo 
Stroessner. On May 1, General Rodriguez was given a mandate to lead the country to 
democracy, in elections that were generally seen as relatively free and fair. The army and the 
ruling Colorado party remained the principal sources of power. Human rights concerns shifted 
from more basic to more complicated issues. 
1991: Elections for municipal authorities and constitutional convention delegates were 
considered free and fair. 
1992: A new constitution passed in June is an important step towards civilian rule, judicial 
independence, and political accountability. 
1993: In May Juan Carlos Wasmosy becomes the nation’s first freely elected civilian President. 
1994: The Government begins convicting and punishing police officials who committed 
serious human rights abuses. 
1995: Nine-member supreme court is installed in April, in order to reform the judicial system. 
Government’s human rights record improved somewhat. The Government continues to convict 
and punish those who committed human rights abuses during the Stroessner area. (Traffic in 
babies was a serious problem). 
1996: The Supreme Court completely restaffs judicial and prosecutorial positions during the 
year. In April an attempted coup by the then army commander, General Lino Oviedo, fails. The 
Government continues to convict and punish those who committed human rights abuses during 
the Stroessner area. 
1997: Lino Oviedo (coup leader in previous year) is elected by the Colorado Party to become 
potential contender in the May 1998 elections. Human rights record improve somewhat. The 
Government continues to convict and punish those who committed human rights abuses during 
the Stroessner area. (Effective steps are taken, like the 1995 moratorium on international 
adoptions, to tackle the problem of trafficking in babies). 
1998: Raul Cubas Grau of the Colorado Party becomes President. The original Colorado Party 
candidate, Lino Oviedo, is disqualified as a candidate, because he is convicted by a military 
court of sedition and rebellion. Once Raul Cubas Grau takes office he issues a decree ordering 
the release of Oviedo. However this decree is overturned by the Supreme Court. Cubas Grau 
issues another decree that ‘simply noted the decision and ordered it to be filed’. He then sent 
the court’s decision back to the, newly constituted (many pro-Oviedo officers), military court 
for review an implementation. This has cast a great shadow over the independence of the 
judiciary. Also rumours about coup plotting persisted and the changes brought about through 
the elections may influence the military apolitical status. Human rights record improve slightly. 
The Government continues to convict and punish those who committed human rights abuses 
during the Stroessner area. The Pinochet arrest in the United Kingdom focuses renewed 
attention on extrajudicial killings during the Stroessner era. It is alleged Stroessner took part in 
Operation Condor (the regional plan to eliminate leftists). New penal and criminal procedures 
codes entered into force, providing protection of fundamental human rights. 
1999: The year is marked by growing tension. The Government tries to undercut the 
constitutional authority of the executive and the judiciary. On the other hand Congress and the 
Supreme court challenged the President for months. On March 23, Cobas foe and Vice 
President Luis Maria Argana is assassinated, allegedly by supporters of General Lino Oviedo 
(both Oviedo and Cubas are alleged to have been implicated in the assassination). On March 28 
the President resigns before he can be impeached. He than flees the country. Senate President 
Luis Gonzalez Macchi assumes the Presidency. The succession was orderly. It is agreed the 
President will serve the full remainder of the term until 2003. A “National unity” government is 
formed uniting for the first time in 50 years the two main opposition parties. The Supreme 
Court continues reforms, but is still put under pressure by politicians and others. The Pinochet 
arrest in the United Kingdom focuses renewed attention on extrajudicial killings during the 
Stroessner era. It is alleged Stroessner took part in Operation Condor (the regional plan to 
eliminate leftists). New penal and criminal procedures codes entered into force, providing 
protection of fundamental human rights. 
2000: In February  the Liberal Party withdrew from the ‘National Unity Government’ 
weakening it in the process. The Colorado Party has a small majority, but the party has no unity 
and new alliances and coalitions need to made depending upon the issue at hand. On May 18 
members of two army units and a group of National Police Officers tried to overthrow the 
President. The soldiers and police officers were loyal to former General Lino Oviedo. The coup 
lasted 1 day. The failed coup was followed one day later by the passing of an “unpopular state 
of exception” which allowed the Government to imprison those suspected of involvement in 
the coup attempt and limit public meetings and demonstrations. In August Julio Cesar Franco 
of the Liberal Party was voted Vice President. The Supreme Court continued the reform 
process. The new Penal and Criminal procedures code entered  fully into force in March. 
 
                                                 
1 Following a directive by Secretary of State Warren Christopher some changes in reporting were made as of the 
1993 report. The changes include a stronger emphasis on prison conditions and a new section on “discrimination 
based on race, sex, religion, disability, language or social status. This new section also includes a paragraph on 
discrimination against children. 
2 Two strikers were killed by police, it is unclear in what circumstances it happened. 
3 Some isolated cases of torture. 
4 It is estimated 15,000 children, many younger than 12, work in the streets of Asuncion, selling newspapers, 
shining shoes, cleaning car windows, and so forth. 
5 Squatters (campesinos) were violently evicted from land.  
6  One person died in detention in unclear circumstances. Two peasants were killed in unclear circumstances.  
7 There were frequent and credible reports of police brutality, this included the use of torture. Thus it is difficult to 
say whether there were frequent reports of torture alone. However a number of examples of torture are given. 
Police also tortured minors. 
8 Koreans and Chinese do not have equal access to schools. Indigenous Indian community has poor quality 
education. 
9 It is estimated 25,000 children, many younger than 12, work in the streets of Asuncion, selling newspapers, 
shining shoes, cleaning car windows, and so forth. In rural areas it is not unusual to have children as young as 10 
to work beside their parents cutting sugar cane. 
10 Koreans and Chinese are discriminated against in housing. 
11 Landowners and police evicted peasants violently from their land. 
12 There were a number of politically motivated killings and a number of extrajudicial deaths of people in custody 
(seven clear examples are given. 
13 There were credible reports of torture, it is not known however whether torture is 
routine/systematic/widespread. 
14 Koreans and Chinese do not have equal access to schools.  
15 It is estimated 25,000 children, many younger than 12, work in the streets of Asuncion, selling newspapers, 
shining shoes, cleaning car windows, and so forth. In rural areas it is not unusual to have children as young as 10 
to work beside their parents cutting sugar cane. 
                                                                                                                                                           
16 Koreans and Chinese are discriminated against in housing. 
17 Landowners and police evicted peasants violently from their land. 
18 Overcrowding and police brutality and abuse were the main problems. 
19 Torture of criminal suspects is common. Minors are particularly susceptible to abuse. 
20 Koreans and Chinese do not have equal access to schools. Indigenous Indian community has poor quality 
education. 
21 Many thousands of children, many younger than 12, work in the streets of Asuncion, selling newspapers, 
shining shoes, cleaning car windows, and so forth. In rural areas it is not unusual to have children as young as 10 
to work beside their parents cutting sugar cane. 
22 Koreans and Chinese are discriminated against in housing. 
23 Landowners and police evicted peasants violently from their land. 
24 Indigenous people suffer from malnutrition. 
25 Two strikers were killed by police, it is unclear in what circumstances it happened. 
26 Many landless farmers started occupying land from, often absent, big landowners. These families were often 
forcibly evicted by police, army and civilians (allegedly paid by the landowners). 
27 Of evicted (and landless) farmers and minors. 
28 Many landless farmers started occupying land from, often absent, big landowners. These families were often 
forcibly evicted by police, army and civilians (allegedly paid by the landowners). 
29 It is clear there were a number of cases of torture, unclear is how many it were. 
30 Many landless farmers started occupying land from, often absent, big landowners. These families were often 
forcibly evicted by police, army and civilians (allegedly paid by the landowners). Moreover after eviction crops 
were often destroyed as well as property of the peasants. 
31 It is clear there were a number of cases of torture, unclear is how many it were. 
32 There were at least seven extrajudicial killings. 
33 There was overcrowding and much mistreatment of prisoners. The situation was most serious in Panchito Lopez 
youth prison. Buen Pastor prison (a women’s prison) opened a new wing for minor girls, this improved the 
previously abysmal conditions. 
34 Juveniles were more likely to be tortured than adults. 
35 The majority of children working have no access to education. Young girls working as domestic servants or 
nannies are denied access to education. Eighty children of an indigenous community had no access to school. 
36 Young girls working as servants or nannies are mistreated by their employers. Minors are frequently mistreated 
and tortured in police custody. Koreans and Chinese do not have equal access to schools. Indigenous Indian 
community has poor quality education. 
37 There are up to 26,000 children working as street vendors, shoe shiners, or prostitutes. Young girls work as 
servants or nannies (also see AE and CA). Many thousands of children under the age of 12 work in the informal 
sector as shoe shiner, selling newspapers and sundries, and cleaning car windows. Many children in rural areas as 
young as 10 work in the field. 
38 Some minors were forced into obligatory military service before the age of 17. 
39 See ‘p’ and ‘T’.  
40 Koreans and Chinese are discriminated against in housing. 
41 Some landowners removed squatters violently. 
42 The majority of working children suffer from malnutrition. Indigenous people often suffer from malnutrition. 
43 Two extrajudicial killings. 
44 Prison conditions were poor. Overcrowding and mistreatment were the greatest problems. An independent 
investigation in Panchito Lopez youth prison revealed the institution was ‘unsanitary, unsafe, and extremely 
overcrowded’. (the institution was originally built as a single family home, it houses 130 to 150 detainees). 
Tacumbu prison was found to be severely overcrowded. Two prisons in Alto Parana and Canindeyu were deemed 
‘inhuman’ by a Brazilian NGO. 
45 Juveniles were more likely to be tortured than adults. 
46 The majority of children working have no access to education. Young girls working as domestic servants or 
nannies are denied access to education. Koreans and Chinese do not have equal access to schools. Indigenous 
Indian community has poor quality education. 
47 Young girls working as servants or nannies are mistreated by their employers. Minors are frequently mistreated 
and tortured in police custody. 
48 There are up to 26,000 children working as street vendors, shoe shiners, or prostitutes. Young girls work as 
servants or nannies (also see AE and CA). Many thousands of children under the age of 12 work in the informal 
sector as shoe shiner, selling newspapers and sundries, and cleaning car windows. Many children in rural areas as 
young as 10 work in the field. 
49 Some minors were forced into obligatory military service before the age of 17.  
50 See ‘p’ and ‘T’. 
51 Koreans and Chinese are discriminated against in housing. 
52 Some landowners removed squatters violently. 
53 The majority of working children suffer from malnutrition. Indigenous people often suffer from malnutrition. 
54 Two possible extrajudicial executions. 
55 Overcrowding and mistreatment of prisoners. 
56 Although the report dates from 1994, State Department still quotes from an NGO report that suggests minors are 
more likely to be tortured and mistreated than adults. 
                                                                                                                                                           
57 The majority of children working have no access to education. Young girls working as domestic servants or 
nannies are denied access to education. 
58 Young girls working as servants or nannies are mistreated by their employers. Minors are frequently mistreated 
and tortured in police custody. There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Underage conscripts are reported 
to be mistreated. 
59 There are up to 26,000 children working as street vendors, shoe shiners, or prostitutes. Young girls work as 
servants or nannies (also see AE and CA). Many thousands of children under the age of 12 work in the informal 
sector as shoe shiner, selling newspapers and sundries, and cleaning car windows. Many children in rural areas as 
young as 10 work in the field (local NGO’s do not see children harvesting as an abuse of child labour). 
60 Some minors were forced into obligatory military service before the age of 17. 
61 Some landowners removed squatters violently. 
62 The majority of working children suffer from malnutrition. Indigenous people often suffer from malnutrition. 
63 There were two possible extrajudicial executions (and three political killings). Mistreatment in the army lead to 
several deaths. 
64 Conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding, unsanitary conditions and mistreatment were very serious 
problems. During a visit by President Wasmosy he was shocked about the conditions in Panchito Lopez juvenile 
detention centre and ordered the installation of new roofing and sewage system. This work was finished within a 
month. 
65 The majority of children working have no access to education. Young girls working as domestic servants or 
nannies are denied access to education. 
66 Young girls working as servants or nannies are mistreated by their employers. There is no societal pattern of 
abuse of children. Underage conscripts are reported to be mistreated. 
67 There are up to 26,000 children working as street vendors or prostitutes. Young girls work as servants or 
nannies (also see AE and CA). Many thousands of children under the age of 12 work in the informal sector as shoe 
shiner, selling newspapers and sundries, and cleaning car windows. Many children in rural areas as young as 10 
work in the field (local NGO’s do not see children harvesting as an abuse of child labour). 
68 Some landowners removed squatters violently. 
69 The majority of working children suffer from malnutrition. Indigenous people often suffer from malnutrition. 
70 There were allegations of extrajudicial killings. At least two military recruits died (apparently following 
mistreatment and torture). It is difficult to quantify the extrajudicial executions. The State Department gives a 
couple of examples and then points to figures of the Attorney General’s office and the Committee of Churches 
who ‘compiled examples of numerous incidents of police abuse and extrajudicial killings’. 
71 Conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding, unsanitary conditions and mistreatment were very serious 
problems. Another problem are the poor nutritional standards. ‘Well-to-do’ prisoners are far better off. 
72 CAT criticised Paraguay for mistreatment and torture of detainees. Several cases were reported. 
73 The majority of children working have no access to education. Young girls working as domestic servants or 
nannies are denied access to education. 
74 Abuse of children is a problem. According to the Attorney General’s office there are about 200 complaints per 
month about mistreatment and sexual abuse. Young girls working as servants or nannies are mistreated by their 
employers.  
75 There are up to 26,000 children working as street vendors or prostitutes. Young girls work as servants or 
nannies (also see AE and CA). Many thousands of children under the age of 12 work in the informal sector as shoe 
shiner, selling newspapers and sundries, and cleaning car windows. Many children in rural areas as young as 10 
work in the field (local NGO’s do not see children harvesting as an abuse of child labour). 
76 Certain minors are forced into joining units, others are send by poor families to earn money. 
77 Some landowners removed squatters violently. 
78 The majority of working children suffer from malnutrition. (also see ‘P’). Indigenous people often suffer from 
malnutrition. 
79 It is difficult to quantify the extrajudicial executions. The State Department points to figures of the Attorney 
General’s office and the Committee of Churches who ‘compiled examples of numerous incidents of police abuse 
and extrajudicial killings’. In previous years the State Department would point to ‘possible instances’ of 
extrajudicial killings. This points to an ‘E’ between brackets. In this report there is no such precision and no 
examples are given. This explains the brackets. The brackets in this report and previous brackets should thus be 
seen differently. 
80 Conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding, unsanitary conditions and mistreatment were very serious 
problems. Another problem are the poor nutritional standards. ‘Well-to-do’ prisoners are far better off. 
81 Torture (primarily beatings) and brutal and degrading treatment of detainees continued. Several cases were 
reported. 
82 The majority of children working have no access to education. Young girls working as domestic servants or 
nannies are denied access to education. 
83 Child abuse is a problem. Many working children work in unsafe conditions. Some of the 11,500 young girls 
that work as servants or nannies are mistreated. The Attorney General’s Office receives about 200 complaints of 
mistreatment or sexual abuse of minors. 
84 According to the United Nations Children’s Fund one in three children (about 462,000) between the age of 7 
and 17 work, often in unsafe labour conditions. Between 3,600 and 6,000 children work in the streets of Asuncion. 
About 11,500 young girls work as servants or nannies (also see AE and CA). Many children under the age of 12 
work in the informal sector as shoe shiner, selling newspapers and sundries, and cleaning car windows. Many 
                                                                                                                                                           
children in rural areas as young as 10 work in the field (local NGO’s do not see children harvesting as an abuse of 
child labour). 
85 Of all the women who report being sexually exploited, 56.5 % is younger than 16.  
86 Certain minors are forced into joining units, others are send by poor families to earn money. 
87 Some landowners removed squatters violently. 
88 Many of the working children suffer from malnutrition. Indigenous people often suffer from malnutrition. 
89 The report once again is unclear. First, under the heading ‘Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing’, there were 
some extrajudicial killings. Two ‘examples’ are given. The report also mentions that some military recruits died 
‘as a  result of beatings by superior officers’. 
90 Conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding, unsanitary conditions and mistreatment were very serious 
problems. Another problem are the poor nutritional standards. ‘Well-to-do’ prisoners are far better off. 
91 Several cases were reported. 
92 35,000 children leave school every year. Though elementary school is compulsory through seventh grade (and 
in the future through ninth grade) the Government has no way of enforcing this in practice. In rural areas access to 
education for girls is markedly lower than in urban areas. The majority of children working have no access to 
education. Young girls working as domestic servants or nannies are denied access to education. 
93 Child abuse is a problem. Many working children work in unsafe conditions. Some of the 11,500 young girls 
that work as servants or nannies are mistreated. When a family does not have the means to raise a child it is 
common practice to send it to a colleague or relative. Here the child is expected to work in exchange for a room, 
board or access to education. Sometimes these children are abused. The Attorney General’s Office receives about 
200 complaints of mistreatment or sexual abuse of minors. 
94 According to the United Nations Children’s Fund one in three children (about 462,000) between the age of 7 
and 17 work, often in unsafe labour conditions. Between 3,600 and 6,000 children work in the streets of Asuncion. 
About 11,500 young girls work as servants or nannies (also see AE and CA). Many children under the age of 12 
work in the informal sector as shoe shiner, selling newspapers and sundries, and cleaning car windows. Many 
children in rural areas as young as 10 work in the field (local NGO’s do not see children harvesting as an abuse of 
child labour). . When a family does not have the means to raise a child it is common practice to send it to a 
colleague or relative. Here the child is expected to work in exchange for a room, board or access to education. 
95 Of all the women who report being sexually exploited, 58.5 % is younger than 16. There were allegations of 
trafficking of women and girls for prostitution to Brazil.  
96 Though legally all conscripts must be 18 when serving military service, in 1999 only 16% were older than 18. 
Moreover 35% were younger than 15. It is alleged underage youths were forced into units. Others are send by poor 
families to earn money. 
97 Some landowners removed squatters violently. It was reported that in some cases the armed civilians were 
operating in conjunction with police personnel. 
98 Many of the working children suffer from malnutrition. Indigenous people often suffer from malnutrition. 
99 There were 13 extrajudicial executions and at least eight recruits died in questionable circumstances. 
100 Conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding, unsanitary conditions and mistreatment were very serious 
problems. Another problem are the poor nutritional standards. ‘Well-to-do’ prisoners are far better off. 
101 Several cases of torture were reported. Moreover some persons involved in the attempted coup alleged they 
were tortured. 
102 Elementary school is compulsory through eighth grade (and in the future through ninth grade) the Government 
has no way of enforcing this in practice. The majority of children working have no access to education. Young 
girls working as domestic servants or nannies are denied access to education. 
103 Child abuse is a problem. Many working children work in unsafe conditions. Some of the 11,500 young girls 
that work as servants or nannies are mistreated. Sometimes these children are abused. The Attorney General’s 
Office receives about 200 complaints of mistreatment or sexual abuse of minors. . When a family does not have 
the means to raise a child it is common practice to send it to a colleague or relative. Here the child is expected to 
work in exchange for a room, board or access to education. 
104 According to the United Nations Children’s Fund one in three children (about 462,000) between the age of 7 
and 17 work, often in unsafe labour conditions. Some 6,000 children work in the streets of Asuncion. About 
11,500 young girls work as servants or nannies (also see AE and CA). Many children under the age of 12 work in 
the informal sector as shoe shiner, selling newspapers and sundries, and cleaning car windows. Many children in 
rural areas as young as 10 work in the field (local NGO’s do not see children harvesting as an abuse of child 
labour). 
105 Trafficking in young girls for prostitution to Argentina was uncovered in August. 
106 Certain minors are forced into joining units, others are send by poor families to earn money. 
107 Violence erupted several times when police tried to remove squatters from lands they occupied. Armed 
civilians also violently tried to remove a group of indigenous people squatting by the side of a highway. 
108 Many of the working children suffer from malnutrition. Indigenous people often suffer from malnutrition. 
109 Over a dozen extrajudicial executions. 
110 ‘Prison facilities are deficient’. Conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding, unsanitary conditions and 
mistreatment were very serious problems. Another problem are the poor nutritional standards. ‘Well-to-do’ 
prisoners are far better off. In prisons for women there were cases of rape by male guards. An Amnesty 
International report on Panchito Lopez juvenile detention facility in Asuncion concluded there was overcrowding, 
the cells were ‘overheated, with few toilet or washing facilities’. Inmates were kept in isolation cells and they 
                                                                                                                                                           
suffered retaliation for talking to A.I. Five children were tortured during the year. Some children were denied 
food, drink, or access to toilets, for several days. 
111 It is difficult to ascertain how many cases of torture there were in 2001. The report speaks of an NGO reporting 
several cases of torture and names a couple of cases (also see ‘P’). A number of cases from 2000 are further 
clarified. Especially in the aftermath of the failed coup it becomes more clear a number of people were tortured. 
112 The majority of children working have no access to education. Young girls working as domestic servants or 
nannies are denied access to education. 
113 Child abuse and neglect is a problem. Many working children work in unsafe conditions. Some of the 11,500 
young girls that work as servants or nannies are mistreated. Sometimes these children are abused. The Attorney 
General’s Office receives about 200 complaints of mistreatment or sexual abuse of minors. The Childhood and 
Adolescence Act was enacted in December. This sets forth ‘human rights provisions and establishes a mechanism 
for reviewing allegations of abuse’. 
114 According to the United Nations Children’s Fund one in three children (about 462,000) between the age of 7 
and 17 work, often in unsafe labour conditions. Between 3,600 and 6,000 children work in the streets of Asuncion. 
About 11,500 young girls work as servants or nannies (also see AE and CA). Many children under the age of 12 
work in the informal sector as shoe shiner, selling newspapers and sundries, and cleaning car windows. Many 
children in rural areas as young as 10 work in the field (local NGO’s do not see children harvesting as an abuse of 
child labour). 
115 A study identified 619 child victims of sexual exploitation, 33% of them were under the age of 16. Trafficking 
in girls for sexual exploitation was a problem. 
116 There were cases of conscription of minors. 
117 Many of the working children suffer from malnutrition. Indigenous people often suffer from malnutrition. 
 
Source: www.cia.gov 
 
THAILAND* 
(Population: 64,265,276) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Political 
Terrorscale 2/2 3/2 2/2 4/3 
Conflict Level     
Freedom 
House 2/3/F 2/3/F 6/4/PF 3/4/PF 
U.S. State 
Department1 
(e)2, t3, CA, CL4, 
CP5, FE6  
e7, p8, t9, CA, CL10, 
CP/FL11 
E12, p13, (t)14, CA, 
CL15, CP/FL16 
E17, p18, (t)19, CA, 
CL20, CP21 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Political 
Terrorscale 2/3 3/3 2/2 2/3 
Conflict Level     
Freedom 
House 3/5/PF 3/5/PF 3/4/PF 3/3/PF 
U.S. State 
Department 
E22, p23, (t), CA24, 
CL/FL25, CP/TP26 
E27, p28, t, CA29, 
CL/FL30, CP/TP31  
E32, p33, t, (CA)34, 
CL35, CP/TP36 
(E)37, p38, t, (CA) 39, 
CL40, CP41 
 
* Only the period 1989-1996 has been investigated because afterwards no change has been 
observed. 
 
 
 
Working conditions: 
 
1989: Safety and health standards in medium and large-sized factories are often maintained. 
However in the large informal sector health and safety standards are often not upheld or 
understood. The increase in the national force of labour inspectors will remain inadequate in 
pursuing all potential violations. Inspection and enforcement practices are often critisized by 
observers. 
1990: Safety and health standards in medium and large-sized factories are often maintained. 
However in the large informal sector health and safety standards are often not upheld or 
understood. 
1991: Safety and health standards in medium and large-sized factories are often maintained. 
However in the large informal sector health and safety standards are often not upheld or 
understood. 
1992: Safety and health standards in medium and large-sized factories are often maintained. 
However in the large informal sector health and safety standards are often not upheld or 
understood. 
1993: Safety and health standards in medium and large-sized factories are often maintained 
although lax enforcement is still too common. The large informal sector is even less inspected. 
Employers are able to ignore regulations simply because workers do not have access to safety 
and health standards and can thus not report any violations.   
1994: There are reports of sweatshops in the informal sector that physically restrain workers 
from leaving the premises. With the increasing influx of Burmese refugees the opportunities for 
such abuse increase. Safety and health standards in medium and large-sized factories are often 
maintained, but lax enforcement of safety standards is common. In the large informal sector, 
‘the health and safety environment is substandard’. Employers are able to ignore regulations 
simply because non unionised workers do not understand safety and health standards and can 
thus not report any violations. 1994 was designated as “Year of workplace safety”. 
1995: There are reports of sweatshops in the informal sector that physically restrain workers 
from leaving the premises. With the increasing influx of Burmese refugees the opportunities for 
such abuse increase. Safety and health standards in medium and large-sized factories are often 
maintained, but lax enforcement of safety standards is common. In the large informal sector, 
‘the health and safety environment is substandard’. Employers are able to ignore regulations 
simply because non unionised workers do not understand safety and health standards and can 
thus not report any violations. 
1996: There are reports of sweatshops in the informal sector that physically restrain workers 
from leaving the premises. With the increasing influx of refugees from Burma, Cambodia and 
Laos the opportunities for such abuse increase. There are reports of sweatshops in the informal 
sector that physically restrain workers from leaving the premises. With the increasing influx of 
Burmese refugees the opportunities for such abuse increase. Safety and health standards in 
medium and large-sized factories are often maintained, but lax enforcement of safety standards 
is common. In the large informal sector, ‘the health and safety environment is substandard’. 
Employers are able to ignore regulations simply because non unionised workers do not 
understand safety and health standards and can thus not report any violations. 
 
Brief historical/political overview: 
 
1989: Communist insurgent and Muslim separist groups use terrorism to advance their aims. 
Although the Government did much to curb the violence, sporadic violence still occurs in the 
south. 
1991: On February 23 a military coup deposes of the prime minister, the 1978 constitution is 
abrogated and the bicameral system abolished. The military leaders form a “National 
Peacekeeping Council” and name a civilian Prime Minister who chooses a cabinet comosed 
mainly of civilian technocrats. A new constitution is drafted by a council appointed legislative 
assembly and promulgated on December 9. A new electoral law is also approved and 
parliamentary elections are due for March 22 1992. Critics say the new constitution extends the 
influence of the military beyond the election. 
1992: Following the March elections lead to a pro military coalition. Unable to agree on a 
Prime Minister, the parties turn to the mastermind of the coup, General Suchinda Khaprayun. 
Although the General is not an elected M.P. and had previously stated he would not become 
Prime Minister. The naming of the General lead to Pro-democracy demonstrations in May 
which are violently suppressed by the military. The demonstrations lead to 52 deaths with an 
additionnal 200 missing. In an unusual step the King called on both sides to resolve their 
differences. On May 24 the General resigns, and former caretaker Prime Minister Anan takes 
up the role of caretaker Prime Minister once again. Following the May demonstrations, the 
military loose some of its powers and the Council’s members are moved into inctive positions, 
crowd control is moved from the military to the police. In September free and fair elections are 
held. Chuan is prime minister and heads a five-party coalition. Military supports democratic 
government. However the military still is very influential especially outside the capital. 
1993: The government is more committed to human rights. Military supports democratic 
government. However the military still is very influential especially outside the capital. In 
September violence erupts in Southern Thailand. Muslims are blamed for the violence. 
1995: In May the Parliament is dissolved as it was clear that the Government of Prime Minister 
Chuan Leekpai would not survive a no-confidence vote. In July, after democratic elections the 
Chuan administration was replaced by ‘a coalition government headed by Prime Minister 
Banharn Silpa-Archa’. The courts rarely convict police officers of human rights abuses. This 
results in impunity, which is seen as the single most important factor witholding change in 
police behabior. 
1996: The coalition government of Banharn Silpa-Archa was dissolved after a no confidence 
vote. On November 17 elections were held and won by General Chavalit Yongchaiudh’s New 
Aspiration Party. The party formed together with five other parties a coalition government. The 
elctions were free, but fraudulent. 
 
                                                 
1 Following a directive by Secretary of State Warren Christopher some changes in reporting were made as of the 
1993 report. The changes include a stronger emphasis on prison conditions and a new section on “discrimination 
based on race, sex, religion, disability, language or social status. This new section also includes a paragraph on 
discrimination against children. 
2 In the fight against muslim separatists “security forces sometimes shoot first and ask questions later.” This 
resulted in at least 4 deaths in questionable circumstances.  
                                                                                                                                                           
3 At least one person was tortured. In the period between 1983 and 1988 police brutality often during 
interrorgation lead to 132 injuries and 27 deaths. Police is often accused of beatings of prisoners and detainees. 
These beatings can in some cases constitute torture, however it is unclear from the report whether they do. 
4 Child labour was a serious problem. Standards on the prohibition of child labour in Thailand are very low. There 
is a great amount of evidence suggesting that children between the age of 12 and 15 were employed in dangerous, 
unhealthful, or otherwise harmful circumstances. This is against Thai law which allows for children in that age 
group to do light work. However inspections and ressources to enforce the law are inadequate. 
5 Official estimates state there are 30,000 minors working as prostitutes.  
6 Refugees living along the border controlled by the forces of Democratic Kampuchea were frequently forced to 
move, exposing them to shelling and landmines. 
7 In their conflict with muslim separatists security forces sometins kill civilians, claiming this is done mistakingly. 
8 Conditions at Soi Suan Phlu Imigration Detention Center constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 
9 At least two persons were tortured. Police is often accused of beatings of prisoners and detainees. These beatings 
can in some cases constitute torture, however it is unclear from the report whether thay do. 
10 Child labour was a serious problem. Thai government has changed the law raising the minimum age from 12 to 
13. Between 13 and 15 children are permitted to do light work. However there is a great amount of evidence 
suggesting that children between the age of 13 and 15 were employed in dangerous, unhealthful, or otherwise 
harmful circumstances. Inspections and ressources to enforce the law are inadequate. The Department of Labor 
has vowed to triple the amount of inspectors. Thai government has vowed to raise compulsory education from 6 to 
9 years. 
11 There are some well documented cases of children being forced into prostitution and kept as near captives in 
brothels. 
12 In areas outside the capital, particularly in areas with high crime rates police occasionally summarily execute 
suspected criminals. A “shoot to kill” policy has been reported to have been imposed to crack down on car thefts. 
This reportedly lead to 20 deaths. A campaign to surpress “mafia-style” godfathers lead to one death. Poorly 
disciplined policemen engage in criminal activity, “hiring themselves out as contract killers”. In 1991 eight 
policemen were charged with murder in five cases involving seven victims. At least three of these cases involve 
summary execution. There were credible reports of posthumous shooting by the police of prisoners to cover up 
“deaths caused by beatings and physical abuse.” Victims were then reported to have committed suicide.  
13 Conditions at Soi Suan Phlu Imigration Detention Center constitute cruel and unusual punishment. There is 
severe overcrowding, lach of medical care, no possibility of exercise and there are many diseases among 
detainees. 
14 Police is often accused of beatings of prisoners and detainees. These beatings can in some cases constitute 
torture, however it is unclear from the report whether they do. 
15 Child labour is a very serious problem. Between 13 and 15 children are permitted to do light work. However 
there is a great amount of evidence suggesting that children between the age of 13 and 15 were employed in 
dangerous, unhealthful, or otherwise harmful circumstances. Inspections and ressources to enforce the law are 
inadequate. The Department of Labor has doubled the amount of inspectors. Thai government has vowed to raise 
compulsory education from 6 to 9 years. In 1991 the ILO issued a “special paragraph” chastising the Thai 
government for its lack of effective implementation of laws prohibiting child labour. This is the most severe 
rebuke the ILO can hand out to member states. 
16 In one raid police found 31 boys between 13 and 17 to be detained and forced to work 16 hours a day. 
17 In the Northeastern region alone 30 people were summarily executed in the first six months of 1992. At least 50 
canvassers were killed by hired gunmen during both elections. 
18 Conditions at Soi Suan Phlu Imigration Detention Center constitute cruel and unusual punishment. There is 
severe overcrowding, lach of medical care, no possibility of exercise and there are many diseases among 
detainees. 
19 Police is often accused of beatings of prisoners and detainees. These beatings can in some cases constitute 
torture, however it is unclear from the report whether they do. 
20 Child labour is a very serious problem. Between 13 and 15 children are permitted to do light work. However 
there is a great amount of evidence suggesting that children between the age of 13 and 15 were employed in 
dangerous, unhealthful, or otherwise harmful circumstances. Inspections and ressources to enforce the law are 
inadequate. The Department of Labor has doubled the amount of inspectors. Thai government has vowed to raise 
compulsory education from 6 to 9 years. Inspections rose from 100 per month to 1000 per month, prosecutions 
rose and 1992 saw the beginning of a campaign against child labour. 
21 According to one group there are approximately 800,000 prostitutes under the age of 16.  
22 It is difficult for NGO’s to get exact figures. Summary executions are known to happen and one count of only 
34 districts recorded 60 deaths upon arrest or in police custody in 1992. It is not known how many of these deaths 
could have been avoided. Figures for 1993 were unavailable (see 1994). 
23  Prison conditions are not life threatening, but there is a problem with abuse by guards. Conditions in Suan Phlu 
Immigration Detention Facility constitute ‘cruel and unusual punishment’, due to extreme overcrowding and lack 
of medical care. 
24 There is a problem of domestic abuse which also includes child abuse.Abuse in prostitution and labour is 
widespread. 
                                                                                                                                                           
25 The problem is widespread. Government estimates indicate there are up to 100,000 children between the age of 
13 and 15 working. The real figure is probably much higher. Increased inspections found a great number of 
children under 13 working. Many in ‘dangerous, unhealthful, or otherwise harmful circumstances’. 
26 The problem is widespread.  
27 It is difficult for NGO’s to get exact figures. Summary executions are known to happen and one count recorded 
31 deaths upon arrest and 23 in police custody in 1993. It is not known how many of these deaths could have been 
avoided. Figures for 1994 were unavailable (see 1995). 
28 Prison conditions are not life threatening, however there is a problem with abuse by prison guards, solitary 
confinement and the use of heavy leg irons on difficult prisoners. Medical care is inadequate. Conditions at Suan 
Phlu Immigration Detention Center are extremely poor, there is severe overcrowding, lack of medical care, 
inability yo exercise, and physical abuse (including sexual abuse). 
29 Abuse in prostitution and labour is widespread. There is also a problem in domestic (child) abuse. 
30 The problem is widespread. Government estimates indicate there are up to 100,000 children between the age of 
13 and 15 working. The real figure is probably much higher. Inspections increased, but remained inadequate. In 
order to deal with the problem the government made education cumpolsory from 6 to 9 years. 
31 The problem is widespread. A special task force was created and new laws provide tougher sentences. An 
additionnal problem directly related to child prostitution is the AIDS epedemic. ‘Children are particular victims of 
the AIDS epedemic’. 
32 According to the police information center there were 22 extrajudicial executions and 24 suspects who died 
during arrest. The Legal Information Center listed a total of 359 deaths in police or Department of Corrections 
custody in 1994. It is not known how many of these deaths could have been avoided. Figures for 1995 were 
unavailable. There was one political killing. 
33 Conditions are spartan. There is a problem with abuse by prison guards, solitary confinement and the use of 
heavy leg irons on difficult prisoners. Medical care is inadequate. Conditions at Suan Phlu Immigration Detention 
Center are extremely poor, there is severe overcrowding, lack of medical care, inability to exercise, and physical 
abuse (including sexual abuse). 
34 It is unclear whether the problem is widespread. New laws provide harsher punishment, but the police is 
reluctant to pursue abuse cases. 
35 It is estimated 850,000 children work mostly on family farms. Between 240,000 and 410,000 children between 
the ages of 6 to 14 (2 to 4% of that group) ‘are estimated to be in urban employment at particular risk of labor 
abuse’. There are an increased number of inspectors, but enforcement of child lanour laws is not ‘rigorous’. 
36 The problem is widespread. New laws provide tougher sentences. About half of all prostitutes began working 
before they were 18. An additionnal problem directly related to child prostitution is the AIDS epedemic. ‘Children 
are particular victims of the AIDS epedemic’.  
37 Where in other years it was clearly indicated that there were a number of extrajudicial executions the 1996 
report states some police officers ‘summarily executed criminal suspects’. All of the figures that follow are the 
number of deaths that have occurred upon arrest (a number of these deaths can be explained through self defence) 
and in custody (by police or in prison). Those figures are the following. The police information center claims 23 
people were killed during attempted arrest in 1995, and 16 during the first half of 1996. The Attorney General’s 
office reported 324 suspects that died while in ‘custody of government officials’ in 1995, during the first half of 
1996 the number was 205. According to the police 98 died after ‘initial detention’ in 1995 and the first half of 
1996 (the police claim 63 of those were suicides). This does not seem correct as regional authorities documented 
up to 140 deaths in custody. There were two political killings. In any case there is an increase in the number 
extrajudicial killings. 
38 Conditions are spartan. There is a problem with abuse by prison guards, solitary confinement and the use of 
heavy leg irons on difficult prisoners. Medical care is inadequate. Prisoners caught attempting to escape are often 
beaten, sometimes beaten to death.Conditions at Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Center are poor. An increased 
budget improved standards somewhat. However there is severe overcrowding, lack of medical care, and inability 
to exercise. 
39 It is unclear whether the problem is widespread. New laws provide harsher punishment, but the police is 
reluctant to pursue abuse cases. 
40 It is estimated 850,000 children work mostly on family farms. Between 240,000 and 410,000 children between 
the ages of 6 to 14 (2 to 4% of that group) ‘are estimated to be in urban employment at particular risk of labor 
abuse’. There are an increased number of inspectors, but enforcement of child lanour laws is not ‘rigorous’. 
41 There are probably from 20,000 to 40,000 child prostitutes. 
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Working conditions: 
 
1989: Union leaders allege that government enforcement of health and safety standards is poor. 
1990: Government enforcement of health and safety standards is poor. 
1991: Government enforcement of health and safety standards is poor. 
1992: Most workers are not properly instructed on the risks they are taking. 
1993: The graphite industry records the highest number of health hazards. In tea factories, 
asthma and chronic bronchitis are common. Workers have the statutory right to remove 
themselves from situations that endanger their health, but much of the work force is either 
unaware of, or indifferent to, the risks involved in their work. 
1994: Workers have the statutory right to remove themselves from situations that endanger 
their health, but much of the work force is either unaware of, or indifferent to, the risks 
involved in their work. 
1995: Workers have the statutory right to remove themselves from situations that endanger 
their health, but much of the work force is either unaware of, or indifferent to, the risks 
involved in their work. 
1996: Workers have the statutory right to remove themselves from situations that endanger 
their health, but much of the work force is either unaware of, or indifferent to, health risks, and 
fear that they will lose their jobs if they remove themselves. 
1997: Pro-Government militant groups use forced conscription. Tamil youth are forced to join 
these groups under threats to themselves and their families. There are reports that some 
members of the police Special Task Force operating in the Batticaloa area force local villagers 
to work without compensation in clearing jungle and in other manual labor in and near STF 
camps. Industrial Workers have the statutory right to remove themselves from situations that 
endanger their health, but much of the work force is either unaware of, or indifferent to, health 
risks, and fear that they will lose their jobs if they remove themselves. 
1998: Pro-Government militant groups use forced conscription. Tamil youth are forced to join 
these groups under threats to themselves and their families. There are reports that some 
members of the police Special Task Force operating in the Batticaloa area force local villagers 
to work without compensation in clearing jungle and in other manual labor in and near STF 
camps. Industrial Workers have the statutory right to remove themselves from situations that 
endanger their health, but much of the work force is either unaware of, or indifferent to, health 
risks, and fear that they will lose their jobs if they remove themselves. 
1999: Progovernment Tamil groups use forced conscription. There are credible reports that 
Tamil youth in the East in particular have been forced to join these groups under threats to 
themselves and their families. There are reports that some members of the police Special Task 
Force operating in the Batticaloa area force local villagers to work without compensation in 
clearing jungle and in other manual labor in and near STF camps. Industrial Workers have the 
statutory right to remove themselves from situations that endanger their health, but much of the 
work force is either unaware of, or indifferent to, health risks, and fear that they will lose their 
jobs if they remove themselves. There are credible reports of women being trafficked into the 
country for prostitution and forced labor. 
2000: Progovernment Tamil groups use forced conscription.There are credible reports that 
Tamil youth in the East in particular have been forced to join these groups under threats to 
themselves and their families. There are reports that some members of the police Special Task 
Force operating in the Batticaloa area force local villagers to work without compensation in 
clearing jungle and in other manual labor in and near STF camps. There are credible reports of 
women being trafficked into the country for prostitution and forced labor. Industrial Workers 
have the statutory right to remove themselves from situations that endanger their health, but 
much of the work force is either unaware of, or indifferent to, health risks, and fear that they 
will lose their jobs if they remove themselves. Health and safety regulations do not meet 
international standards. 
2001: There are credible reports of women being trafficked into the country for prostitution and 
forced labor. Citizens were trafficked to the United Kingdom for labor exploitation. Industrial 
Workers have the statutory right to remove themselves from situations that endanger their 
health, but much of the work force is either unaware of, or indifferent to, health risks, and fear 
that they will lose their jobs if they remove themselves. Health and safety regulations do not 
meet international standards. 
2002: There are credible reports of women being trafficked into the country for prostitution and 
forced labor. Industrial Workers have the statutory right to remove themselves from situations 
that endanger their health, but much of the work force is either unaware of, or indifferent to, 
health risks, and fear that they will lose their jobs if they remove themselves. Health and safety 
regulations do not meet international standards. 
 
Brief historical/political overview 
 
1989: Tensions in the eighties between Sri Lanka’s majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil 
populations lead to armed conflict between government forces and Tamil separatists. A peace 
accord between the governments of India and Sri Lanka was signed. However radicals from 
both major ethnic groups refused to accept the Accord. In the Sinhalese-majority south, 
government security forces were pitted against the revolutionary Janatha Vmukthi Peramuna 
(JVP) attempting to overthrow the Government by terrorist methods. In the Tamil-mjority 
northeast, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) waged guerilla war against the Indian 
Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF), introduced under the Accord, and India’s Tamil militant allies. 
The attacks by the JVP did not stop even after having tried to bring the JVP into political life 
and legalise the organisation. Thus in 1989 the Government cracked down on the JVP, arrested 
many suspected members and killed much of the JVP’s top leadership. In September a Peace 
Accord was signed between the LTTE and Indian Forces and Tamil allies. In the same months 
India and Sri Lanka agreed on the withdrawal of Indian soldiers. The withdrawal started during 
the year and will be complete by March 31, 1990. In one incident in December withdrawing 
IPKF soldiers clashed with LTTE rebels. The result was 100 combatants dead and 50 civilians 
dead. A new Parliament was voted in February. The elections were marred by the killing of 
hundreds of voters and 14 parliamentary candidates. However the elections were considered 
largely free and fair. The Prevention of Terrorism Act was in effect throughout the year. There 
was a rise of anti-JVP vigilante groups in the south. Observers largely agree these groups are 
manned partly by security personnel operating with the knowledge of the Government. IPKF 
troops used torture. In the South the JVP used intimidation to recruit unwilling members and to 
force participation in demonstrations and other activities liable to subject individuals to 
criminal prosecution. They did this in universities and secondary schools. This resulted in 
much campus unrest and closure of most schools for the rest of the year. India’s Tamil allies 
forcibly recruit young men to provide manpower for the defense of Tamil-majority areas. A 
great number of people disappeared. 
1990: The IPKF withdrew by March 31. JVP cadres were unable to regroup sufficiantly after 
much of their leadership was captured or killed. LTTE seized control of the Jaffna Peninsula, 
while continuing negotiations. The Government ordered the army to take a non-confrontational 
stand. On June 11 LTTE broke of negotiations and attacked a number of police stations in the 
east. The human rights situations, which had ameliorated during peace negotiations, seriously 
deteriorated in the northeast after talks were broken off. In the south the situation ameliorated 
due to the elimination of the JVP leadership. However vigilante groups continued to operate. 
The PTA and Emergency Regulations remained in effect. However some provisions were 
rescinded. A great number of people disappeared. 
1991: The conflict with LTTE continued. JVP terrorism ended. Life in the South was largely 
normal. LTTE operations were largely confined to the north and east. However two bombs in 
Colombo destroyed the Ministry of Defence and left many civilians dead. Number of incidents 
was reduced. 710 civilians died in 1991. PTA and ER remained in force,but were partly 
suspended (except in the northeast) to permit unhindered elections. A great number of people 
disappeared. Though less than in the previous five years. The Government publicly and 
privately declared the war in the east and the north is a war against the LTTE and not against 
the Tamil population, this is believed to have significantly reduced communal violence. The 
bodies of 300 policemen captured in 1991 were recovered. Local Government elections held in 
May are considered free and fair. Opposition tried to impeach the President. 
1992: Peaceful resolution of the conflict was complicated even further. LTTE escalated its 
attacks on the Muslim and Sinhalese population in an effort to drive the communities out of the 
Tamil provinces. As a result of this armed Muslim groups masacred innocent civilians. Some 
200 people disappeared (attributed largely to security forces), which is a sharp decline of 
previous years. 650 civilians died of extrajudicial killings or combat related deaths. There 
seems to an effort to stop human rights abuses by the Government. Attacks on civilians by 
Government forces appear to be the result of lapses of discipline rather than policy decisions. 
Members of opposition groups were increasingly harassed.  
1993: On May 1 President Premadasa is assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber. President 
Dingiri Banda Wijetunga is chosen by the Parliament to succeed Premadasa. About 70 people 
disappeared in the first nine months of the year (a significant decline from the previous year). 
LTTE are also responsible for disappearance, however it is not known how many. It is widely 
believed that the decision to grant the ICRC unhindered access to detention centers, police 
stations and army camps has played an important role in reducing the number of 
disappearances. There was a lull in fighting during the first nine months of the year, but the 
fighting reached new level of intensity in the 4th quarter of the year, as both sides launched 
major offensives. There were increasing attacks on civilian targets by the Sri Lankan army. 
Thee was an increased use of curfews and checkpoints by the Army and LTTE which made 
travel within the country difficult. Especially for young Tamil men, and especially after the 
killing of the President. After the death of the President, organised harassment of the opposition 
ceased. 
1994: In generally free and fair elections the People’s Alliance ended the 17 year control of 
Parliament by the United National Party, and Chandrika Kumaratunga, became Prime Minister. 
A dialogue was initiated with the LTTE. Security forces committed significantly less human 
rights abuses than in previous years. The United National Party’s candidate for the elections 
was killed in a suicide attack. Suspects in several extrajudicial killings were prosecuted. In 
most of the country ER were lifted, this made concealment of extrajudicial killings and 
disappearances difficult. Travel restrictions were eased, but remained strict for young Tamil 
men. 
1995: Cessation of hostilities on January 3. The truce was broken when LTTE attacked security 
forces in April. Governmental forces succeeded in capturing the unofficial capital of the rebels, 
Jaffna City, after major offensives. During cessation governmental forces committed very few 
human rights abuses. With the resumption of hostilities the number of abuses increased. The 
Government moved to correct the worst relapses. The JVP is legalised. Travel restrictions were 
once more applied more strictly. This affected young Tamil men in their freedom of movement. 
1996: A six month military offensive captured the LTTE heartland of the Jaffna Peninsula in 
April. The LTTE inflicted a major military defeat on Government forces at a military base in 
the North killing upwards of 1,500 troops. Intensification of the conflict meant a deterioration 
in the human rights situation. In April the ER was reimposed nationwide. There was no 
evidence the ER were used to conceal extrajudial executions or disappearances. However 
crucial protective safeguards were frequently ignored. Civilian casualties in the renewed 
fighting were limited, because security forces showed much greater restraint in the use of 
excessive force. Moreover troops advanced slowly and methodically. Travel restrictions were 
once more applied more strictly. This affected young Tamil men in their freedom of movement. 
Local elections were postponed by the President under ER. 
1997: In May the Government forces launched a major new offensive aimed at opening a land 
route to the Jaffna Peninsula through LTTE controlled territory. The offensive resulted in 
hundreds killed. The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens in areas 
not affected by the conflict. ER was lifted outside of the north and east and Colombo. Violence 
between supporters of the major political parties worsened and six people including a member 
of Parliament were killed in violence related to local government electionsin March. Civilian 
casualties were limited in the first six months of the year, because security forces showed much 
greater restraint in the use of excessive force. Moreover troops advanced slowly and 
methodically. Elections in the Jaffna Peninsula were postponed untill January 1998. 
1998: The conflict between LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government has claimed over 55,000 
lives so far. The offensive launched in May 1997 ended in December and claimed approx. 
5,000 combattant deaths on both sides. State of emergency was reimposed nationwide. 
1999: The President scheduled early Presidential elections in December. She won the generally 
free and fair elections. However the preelection and election period were marred by violence. 
At least six persons were killed and there was an unsuccessfull assassination attempt on the 
President by the LTTE. The whole conflict between the government and the LTTE has claimed 
60,000 lives so far. The Government gained much territory in a series of offensives. In a 
counterattack the LTTE regained much of the territory lost in the last two years.More than a 
thousand combattants were killed in the fighting. Sine April 1995 at least 761 persons have 
been extrajudicially killed by security forces or have disappeared and are presumed dead. 
2000: Violence and fraud marked the October parliamentary elections. At least seven persons 
died in election related violence. The elections resulted in a reduced majority of the PA. The 
conflict between Government and LTTE claimed 62,000 lives so far. A major offensive on the 
Jaffna Peninsula left many dead (civilians and combatants). Violent clashes continued during 
the year. More than 2,000 combattants and more than 100 civilians were killed in incidents 
related to the conflict. The army was more secretive about missions than in previous years. The 
publicity given to offensives in the past limited civilian casualties. Tamils are frequently 
harassed at checkpoints. 
2001: Parliamentary elections in December were marred by violence, at least 50 deaths, and 
irregularities (including the refusal to allow 40,000 Tamils to vote). A coaltion lead by the 
UNP won a majority in Parliament. The conflict has claimed at least 64,000 lives untill now. In 
April government forces launched a major offensive on the Jaffna Peninsula, this resulted in 
heavy losses. In July LTTE attacked Colombo’s international airport. At year’s end the 
Governmetn and the LTTE had each announced unilateral cease-fires. It is believed as many as 
2,000 combattants and 100 civilians were killed in conflict-related incidents. The army was 
more secretive about missions than in previous years. The publicity given to offensives in the 
past limited civilian casualties. Tamils are frequently harassed at checkpoints. 
2002: The Government and LTTE started a historic process of reconciliation in December 
2001. This process continued in Norwegian-facilitated talks in Thailand and Norway. The talks 
were successful and will continue into 2003. As a result of the peace there was sharp reduction 
in roadblocks and checkpoints around the country, the return of 220,000 internally displaced 
persons, and the opening of investigations into questionnable actions by security forces. On 
September 4 the LTTE was legalized.  
                                                 
1 Human rights abuses that can be attributed to the LTTE will be dealt with in a separate table. This table will not 
deal with abuses by the Indian Peace Keeping Forces and the JVP. However they will be mentioned in the brief 
historical/political overview and in the conflict level. This is due to the fact that deaths attributed to IPKF and JVP 
can not be separated from deaths attributed by other organisations or the Government. 
2 8,500 deaths, mainly civilians. 
3 2,600 non combatant/5,200 combatant deaths 
4 710 non combatant/7,100 combatantant deaths. 
5 650 civilian deaths. 
6 Political killings remains the main problem in Sri Lanka. It is difficult to distinguish between politically 
motivated killings and criminal killings. During the conflict 5,600 civilians were killed. There are also a great 
number of disappeared. Many disappeared at the hands of security forces. Circumstances strongly suggest that 
some “disappeared” have been killed by security forces. 
7 There are probably several thousand of children who work illegally mostly at jobs in rice cultivations, as 
domestics, or as street peddlers. In some cases these children are a major source of income for the family. 
8 Many non combatant deaths. Also, in the fight against the JVP 200 (suspected) members were killed. Many of 
these deaths are extrajudicial killing. Political killings still remains the main human rights problem. Many 
vigilante killings can be attributed to security force members. Reports indicate security forces rounded up large 
groups of Tamils and sumarilly executed them. “Disappeared” were in some cases killed by security forces. 
Security forces killed over 1,000 Tamilsin the Eastern distric between June and September. 
9 It is difficult to ascertain exactly how bad conditions are. They are in any case harsher for security detainees 
(those held under ER measures). They are held in army stockades and prison camps. These prisoners are not under 
the jurisdiction of the prisons department. Beatings and torture do occur in such facilities. 
10 There are probably several thousand of children who work illegally mostly at jobs in rice cultivations, as 
domestics, or as street peddlers. In some cases these children are a major source of income for the family. 
11 710 non combatant deaths. Roughly 380 of these deaths were war related accidental deaths. There were a 
number of anti-JVP vigilante deaths. However this year there were no clear indications the vigilante deaths could 
be attributed to the Governemnt. Vigilante killings in the east were probably the work of security forces. 
12 Especially in the east and the south against suspected members of thre JVP and the LTTE. 
13 Stateless Tamils living in Sri Lanka’s tea-growing highlands have suffered particular discrimination, especially 
in the allocation of education funds. 
14 500,000 youths are employed in breach of regulations on child labor. 10,000 are begging on the streets. There 
are probably tens of thousands of children who work illegally on farms or as domestics or in other menial jobs. 
15 There are an estimated 20,000 youths under the age of 18 working in prostitution. 
16 An estimated 10,000 children are begging on the streets. It is unclear whether they also live on the streets. 
17 At least 125 were reliably attributable to deliberate attacks by government forces. Most occurred in Sri Lanka’s 
Eastern Province. There were less than ten reports of extrajudicial killings in the south. However the record of 
security forces in the Battacaloa district, an eastern province, was particlurly bad. Government troop have been 
accused of numerous extrajudicial executions of suspected LTTE cadres and civilians fleeing the army. Quasi-
independent irregular forces armed by the Government (anti-LTTE -militias) have been responsible for roughly 
120 deaths. 
18 Torture was routinely applied during interrogations. Many detainees reported being tortured. Women are 
sometimes sexually abused.  
19 Stateless Tamils living in Sri Lanka’s tea-growing highlands have suffered particular discrimination, especially 
in the allocation of education funds. 
                                                                                                                                                           
20 500,000 children between the age of 10 and 14 work in the informal labor market. Children work in farming, 
rice milling, coir production, fisheries, passenger transport, and street vending. Many children in Colombo work as 
domestics.  
21 There are an estimated 20,000 youths under the age of 18 working in prostitution. 
22 Number of civilian deaths drops (250 by security forces). 
23 Number of civilian deaths drops (150 by security forces). 
24 The number of political/extrajudicial killings decreased significantly. There were no reprisal attacks on Tamil 
civilians (as there were no massacres of Muslim/Sinhalese civilians by LTTE) and there were no reported vigilante 
killings in the south. Even though there still were 250 civilians killed during military operations most of these 
deaths were the result of indiscriminate use of force and not as in previous years, deliberate attacks on civilians. 
However there still were a number of extrajudicial executions. Moreover more than 80 people disappeared or died 
after being taken into custody by security forces. 
25 Torture was common, especially during interrogation. Common criminals as well as detainees under ER were 
tortured. In the early stages of detention detainees were frequently severely beaten. 
26 Stateless Tamils living in Sri Lanka’s tea-growing highlands have suffered particular discrimination, especially 
in the allocation of education funds. 
27 There are reports of abuse of rural children working as domestics in urban households (starvation, beatings, 
burnings, sexual abuse, and forces prostitution). 
28 Despite legislation, some child labor still exists. Some children work in the informal sectors, including coir-
making, which is the making of products, such as mats, from coconut fiber, industries; fishing; drying fish; 
wrapping tabacco; street trading; domestic service and on farms. There are reports of abuse of children brought in 
from rural areas in debt bondage to work as domestic servants in urban households (they are in some cases forced 
into prostitution).  
29 Child prostitution is a significant problem, especially in coastal areas. The majority of these prostitutes are boys. 
There are several thousand children thought to be involved. 
30 There were ten disappearances. These disappeared were last seen taken into police custody and are presumed 
dead. All disappearances occurred in the first part of the year. There were no extrajudicial executions. However 
some 150 civilians were killed by the indiscriminate or excessive use of force by security forces. The air force 
introduces new rules of engagement and security forces received human rights training courses, in an effort to 
reduce the number of civilian casualties. 
31 When we look only at extrajudicial executions that are not directly linked to the conflict, thus excluding 
excessive violence in attacks and deliberate killings of civilians in combat, we see such a sharp decrease in the 
amount of disappearances (10) and other extrajudicial executions (none) that a small ‘e’ would be justified. In the 
rest of the table (apart from 2002) the ‘E’ remains big, because even when the extrajudicial executions directly 
linked to the conflict are not counted, there are still a high amount of disappearances and other extrajudicial 
executions. Putting a small ‘e’ here emphasises the fact the violence from the conflict had a direct impact on 
extrajudicial executions and the cease fire  was effective in bringing the number of extrajudicial executions 
significantly down. 
32 Overcrowding and lack of sanitary facilities are the most important problems. 
33 Torture was common, especially during interrogation. Victims were especially alleged LTTE members and JVP 
members. The number of reports of torture was somewhat lower. In January the Government acceded to the U.N. 
Convention against Torture and Othe Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
34 Stateless Tamils living in Sri Lanka’s tea-growing highlands have suffered particular discrimination, especially 
in the allocation of education funds. 
35 There are reports of abuse of rural children working as domestics in urban households (starvation, beatings, 
burnings, sexual abuse, and forces prostitution). 
36 Despite legislation, some child labor still exists. Some children work in the informal sectors, including coir-
making, which is the making of products, such as mats, from coconut fiber, industries; fishing; drying fish; 
wrapping tabacco; street trading; domestic service and on farms. There are reports of abuse of children brought in 
from rural areas in debt bondage to work as domestic servants in urban households (they are in some cases forced 
into prostitution).  
37 Child prostitution is a significant problem, especially in coastal areas. The majority of these prostitutes are boys. 
According to a Governemnt report there are 2,000 child prostitutes. However NGO’s believe this figure is much 
higher. 
38 At least 38 extrajudicial killings. In some cases civilians were murdered in reprisal for killings of security 
forces. In August extrajudicial killings ceased when members of the security forces were arrested. There were 34 
disappearances, they are presumed dead. In two military offensives against Jaffna City some 400 civilians were 
killed. However the security forces tried to minimalise the number of civilian casualties and were quite successful 
in that. 
39 Overcrowding and lack of sanitary facilities are the most important problems. With the resumption of the war 
and the subsequent increase of security detainees poor prison conditions deteriorated even further. 
40 Torture was common, especially during interrogation. Victims were especially alleged LTTE members.JVP 
members were no longer the victim of torture as the party was legalised. The number of reports of torture was 
somewhat lower.  
                                                                                                                                                           
41 Stateless Tamils living in Sri Lanka’s tea-growing highlands have suffered particular discrimination, especially 
in the allocation of education funds. 
42 There are reports of abuse of rural children working as domestics in urban households (starvation, beatings, 
burnings, sexual abuse, and forces prostitution). In the first quarter the Government reported that 1,576 cases of 
crimes against children had been recorded. 
43 Despite legislation, some child labor still exists. Some children work in the informal sectors, including coir-
making, which is the making of products, such as mats, from coconut fiber, industries; fishing; drying fish; 
wrapping tabacco; street trading; domestic service and on farms. There are reports of abuse of children brought in 
from rural areas in debt bondage to work as domestic servants in urban households (they are in some cases forced 
into prostitution).  
44 Child prostitution is a significant problem, especially in coastal areas. The majority of these prostitutes are boys. 
According to a Governemnt report there are 2,000 child prostitutes. However NGO’s believe this figure is much 
higher. 
45 Police and army personnel committed extrajudicial killings in both Jaffna and the Eastern Provinces. Most were 
associated with operations against the LTTE insurgents or interrogation of suspected rebels. 50 people were killed, 
however the number might be higher. There is not enough information due to military censorship.In some cases 
the killings were reprisals for rebel attacks on security forces. A pro-government Tamil militia was responsible for 
a number of killings. However it is unknown how much influence the government exercises on the militias. In 
excess of 300 individuals are believed to have disappeared on the Jaffna Peninsula in the second half of the year, 
and more than 50 elsewhere in the country. These people are presumed dead. (the figure is impossible to verify 
because of military censorship). Progovernment Tamil militias were also responsible for a number of 
disappearances. 
46 Overcrowding and lack of sanitary facilities are the most important problems. An increase in security detainees 
meant poor prison conditions deteriorated even further. 
47 Torture was common, especially during interrogation. Victims were especially alleged LTTE members. The 
number of reports of torture was somewhat lower. However in the Jaffna Peninsula the situation did not improve. 
48 Stateless Tamils living in Sri Lanka’s tea-growing highlands have suffered particular discrimination, especially 
in the allocation of education funds. 
49 There are reports of abuse of rural children working as domestics in urban households (starvation, beatings, 
burnings, sexual abuse, and forces prostitution). In the first half of the year the Government reported that 3,687 
cases of crimes (of all types) against children had been recorded. 
50 Despite legislation, some child labor still exists. According to a Labor Department survey 20,600 children 
between the ages of 10 and 14 were fully employed. Additionnal thousands of children were blieved to be 
employed in domestic service. In addition to domestic service regular employment of children work in the 
informal sectors and in family enterprises. Additionnally some children work in coir-making, which is the making 
of products, such as mats, from coconut fiber, industries; fishing; drying fish; wrapping tabacco; street trading; 
Allthough forced and compulsory labor is virtually non existent there are reports of a few rural children who are 
employed in debt bondage as domestic servants in urban households. 
51 Child prostitution is a significant problem, especially in coastal areas. The majority of these prostitutes are boys. 
According to a Governemnt report there are 2,000 child prostitutes. However NGO’s believe this figure is much 
higher. 
52 Less than 4000 deaths. Figure is from the SIPRI Yearbook 1998, figures to be found on 
http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step2. 
53 Less than 4000 deaths. Figure is from the SIPRI Yearbook 1999, figures to be found on 
http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step2. 
54 More than 3500 deaths. Figure is from the SIPRI Yearbook 2000, figures to be found on 
http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step2. 
55 More than 4000 deaths. Figure is from the SIPRI Yearbook 2001, figures to be found on 
http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step2. The state department report mentions the following figures: More than 
2000 combatants dead, and more than 100 civilians dead. 
56 Police and army personnel committed extrajudicial killings in both Jaffna and the Eastern Provinces. Most were 
associated with operations against the LTTE insurgents or interrogation of suspected rebels. 100 people were 
killed, however the number might be higher. There is not enough information due to military censorship.In some 
cases the killings were reprisals for rebel attacks on security forces. A pro-government Tamil militia was 
responsible for a number of killings. However it is unknown how much influence the government exercises on the 
militias. At least 125 people disappeared. These people are presumed dead. (the figure is impossible to verify 
because of military censorship). Progovernment Tamil militias were also responsible for a number of 
disappearances. 
57 Overcrowding and lack of sanitary facilities are the most important problems. An increase in security detainees 
meant poor prison conditions deteriorated even further. 
58 Torture continued. Especially Tamils suspected of being LTTE insurgents or collaborators were victims. 
Progovernment Tamil militias were also responsible of torture. 
59 Stateless Tamils living in Sri Lanka’s tea-growing highlands have suffered particular discrimination, especially 
in the allocation of education funds. 
                                                                                                                                                           
60 There are reports of abuse of rural children working as domestics in urban households (starvation, beatings, 
burnings, sexual abuse, and forces prostitution). In the first half of the year the Government reported that 1,633 
cases of crimes (of all types) against children had been recorded. 
61 Despite legislation, some child labor still exists. According to a Labor Department survey 26,000 children 
between the ages of 10 and 14 were fully employed. Additionnal thousands of children (between 50,000 and 
100,000) were blieved to be employed in domestic service. In addition to domestic service regular employment of 
children work in the informal sectors and in family enterprises. Additionnally some children work in coir-making, 
which is the making of products, such as mats, from coconut fiber, industries; fishing; drying fish; wrapping 
tabacco; street trading; Allthough forced and compulsory labor is virtually non existent there are reports of a few 
rural children who are employed in debt bondage as domestic servants in urban households. 
62 Child prostitution is a significant problem, especially in coastal areas. The majority of these prostitutes are boys. 
According to a Governemnt report there are 2,000 child prostitutes. However NGO’s believe this figure is much 
higher. 
63 Police and army personnel committed extrajudicial killings. Most were associated with operations against the 
LTTE insurgents or interrogation of suspected rebels. 33 people were killed and in at least 18 other cases people 
were killed near the Army’s forward defense lines, however the number might be higher. Security force bombs 
and artillery fire also killed civilians. There is not enough information due to military censorship.In some cases the 
killings were reprisals for rebel attacks on security forces. Security forces seem to have killed many rebels after 
they were captured.Pro-government Tamil militants were responsible for a number of killings. However it is 
unknown how much influence the government exercises on the militias. At least 11 people disappeared. These 
people are presumed dead. (the figure is impossible to verify because of military censorship). Progovernment 
Tamil militias were also responsible for a number of disappearances. 
64 Overcrowding and lack of sanitary facilities are the most important problems. An increase in security detainees 
meant poor prison conditions deteriorated even further in short-term detention centers.  
65 Torture continued. Especially Tamils suspected of being LTTE insurgents or collaborators were victims. 
Though torture was still widespread its use diminished, especially in Jaffna. Progovernment Tamil militias were 
also responsible of torture. 
66 Stateless Tamils living in Sri Lanka’s tea-growing highlands have suffered particular discrimination, especially 
in the allocation of education funds. 
67 There are reports of abuse of rural children working as domestics in urban households (starvation, beatings, 
burnings, sexual abuse, and forces prostitution). In the first half of the year the Government reported that 1,752 
cases of crimes (of all types) against children had been recorded. A new Child Protection Authority Bill was 
passed through Parliament and welcomed by NGO’s.  
68 Despite legislation, some child labor still exists. According to a Labor Department survey 16,511 children 
between the ages of 10 and 14 were fully employed. Additionnal thousands of children (between 50,000 and 
100,000) were blieved to be employed in domestic service. Those working in domestic work are often subjected to 
physical, sexual, and/or other emotional abuse. A significant portion of the children work outside their families. In 
addition to domestic service regular employment of children work in the informal sectors and in family 
enterprises. Additionnally some children work in coir-making, which is the making of products, such as mats, 
from coconut fiber, industries; fishing; drying fish; wrapping tabacco; street trading; Allthough forced and 
compulsory labor is virtually non existent there are reports of a few rural children who are employed in debt 
bondage as domestic servants in urban households. 
69 Child prostitution is a significant problem, especially in coastal areas. The majority of these prostitutes are boys. 
According to a Governemnt report there are 2,000 child prostitutes. However NGO’s and the UN believe this 
figure is much higher (somewhere between 15,000 to 30,000). 
70 Security forces closed three rooming hotels and left hundreds of Tamils temporarily without lodging. 
71 Police, home guards, and army personnel committed extrajudicial killings in many places. The excact number of 
killings wasimpossible to determine because of military censorship. However the report names at least seven 
killings (one in custody) and at least 57 civilian deaths in fighting.In some cases the killings were reprisals for 
attacks on security personnel. Progovernment Tamil militant groups were responsible for an undetermined amount 
of killings. It is difficult to see how much influence the government exercises on these groups. There were at least 
15 disappearances in the North and the East. However the excact number of disappearances is impossible to 
determine because of military censorship. The disappeared are presumed dead. Progovernment Tamil militants 
were also responsible for disappearances. Instead of taking LTTE combattant prisoner it is believed they are killed 
upon captivity. 
72 Overcrowding and lack of sanitary facilities are the most important problems. The conflict lead to an increase of 
security detainees which meant poor prison conditions deteriorated even further in short term detention centers and 
undeclared detention centers run by progovernment Tamil groups.. 
73 Most torture victims were Tamils suspected of being LTTE insurgents or collaborators, however there also have 
been sporadic reports of the use of torture against suspected criminals. One person died in custody as a result of a 
severe beating. Progovernment Tamil militants also use torture routinely. 
74 Stateless Tamils living in Sri Lanka’s tea-growing highlands have suffered particular discrimination, especially 
in the allocation of education funds. 
                                                                                                                                                           
75 There are reports of abuse of rural children working as domestics in urban households (starvation, beatings, 
burnings, sexual abuse, and forces prostitution). In the first quarter the Government reported that 2,066 cases of 
crimes against children had been recorded. 
76 Despite legislation, some child labor still exists. It is estimated 16,000 children between the age of 10 and 14 
may be fully employed. Additionnal thousands are belived to be working in domestic service (between 50,000 and 
100,000). Some children work in the informal sectors, including coir-making, which is the making of products, 
such as mats, from coconut fiber, industries; fishing; drying fish; wrapping tabacco; street trading, and on farms. 
There are reports of abuse of children brought in from rural areas in debt bondage to work as domestic servants in 
urban households (they are in some cases forced into prostitution). 
77 Child prostitution is a significant problem, especially in coastal areas. The majority of these prostitutes are boys. 
According to a Governemnt report there are 2,000 child prostitutes. However NGO’s believe this figure is much 
higher (somewhere between 15,000 and 30,000). 
78 There were credible reports of children being trafficked in to the country. There also was trafficking inside the 
country. 
79 Repeated closures of the border into LTTE controlled territory meant the distribution of food in the North was 
erratic. NGO’s believe these closures had an impact on food reserves in the Vanni area and may have led to 
worsened nutrition there. 
80 Police, home guards, and army personnel committed extrajudicial killings in many places. The excact number of 
killings was impossible to determine because of military censorship. In one incidents police alledgedly looked on 
and participated in the slaying of 27 Tamil males who were detained in a Government run rehabilitation camp. The 
victims were former child soldiers. This incident caused an eruption of violence which killed at least 14 people 
before the police could restore order a week later. In some cases the killings were reprisals for attacks on security 
personnel. Progovernment Tamil militant groups were responsible for an undetermined amount of killings. It is 
difficult to see how much influence the government exercises on these groups. There were at least 11 
disappearances in the North and the East. However the excact number of disappearances is impossible to 
determine because of military censorship. NGO’s such as AI have reported an increase in the number of 
disappearances in the second half of the year. The disappeared are presumed dead. Progovernment Tamil  
militants were also responsible for disappearances. Instead of taking LTTE combattant prisoner it is believed they 
are killed upon captivity. Many civilians were killed in fighting. 
81 Overcrowding and lack of sanitary facilities are the most important problems. The conflict lead to an increase of 
security detainees which meant poor prison conditions deteriorated even further in short term detention centers and 
undeclared detention centers run by progovernment Tamil groups. 
82 Most torture victims were Tamils suspected of being LTTE insurgents or collaborators, however there also have 
been reports of the use of torture against suspected criminals. Some children also were tortured. One person died 
in custody as a result of a severe beating. Progovernment Tamil militants also use torture routinely. It is widely 
believed the PTA contributes to the use of torture. 
83 Stateless Tamils living in Sri Lanka’s tea-growing highlands have suffered particular discrimination, especially 
in the allocation of education funds. Children working as domestics in homes in the south are deprived of access to 
education. 
84 In the first half of the year  the Government reported 767 cases of crimes against children had been recorded. 
Many children working as domestics suffer from physical, sexual, emotional abuse. 
85 Some children work in the plantation sectors and in nonplantation agriculture. Almost 11,000 children work 
full-time. Another 15,000 are engaged in both economic activity and housekeeping. Some 450,000 children are 
employed by their families in seasonal agricultural work. 8.6% of homes in the south employ children as domestic 
servants. Many of these children suffer from physical, sexual , and emotional abuse. Regular employment of 
children also takes place mainly in the informal sector and in family enterprises. 
86 Child prostitution is a significant problem, especially in coastal areas. The majority of these prostitutes are boys. 
According to a Governemnt report there are 2,000 child prostitutes. However the UN believes there are 30,000 
child prostitutes. 
87 There were credible reports of children being trafficked in to the country. There also was trafficking inside the 
country, especially from the North and the East. 
88 LTTE expropriates food further exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE controlled territory. 
Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE controlled territory and other parts of the Vanni region. Malnutrition 
caused an increase in anemia and a lower birth rate. Malnutrition is caused among others by food shortages. 
However Medecins sand Frontieres found malnutrition to be at about the same level as in war-free South. The 
report states that there are many undernourished children in the country. 
89 More than 1000 deaths. Figure is from the SIPRI Yearbook 2002, figures to be found on 
http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step2. 
90 Less than 25 deaths. Figure is from the SIPRI Yearbook 2003, figures to be found on 
http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step2. 
91 Police, home guards, and army personnel committed extrajudicial killings in many places. Including the killing 
of civilians in connection with the conflict with the LTTE. The excact number of killings was impossible to 
determine because of military censorship. In one incidents police alledgedly looked on and participated in the 
slaying of 27 Tamil males who were. In some cases the killings were reprisals for attacks on security personnel. 
Progovernment Tamil militant groups were responsible for an undetermined amount of killings. It is difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                           
see how much influence the government exercises on these groups. Army, navy, police and paramilitary groups 
were involved in at least 10 disappearances primarily in Vavuniya. Between January and September the HRC 
received 44 reports of disappearances. The excact number of disappearances is impossible to determine because of 
military censorship. The disappeared are presumed dead. Progovernment Tamil  militants were also responsible 
for disappearances.  
92 Overcrowding and lack of sanitary facilities are the most important problems. The conflict lead to an increase of 
security detainees which meant poor prison conditions deteriorated even further in short term detention centers and 
undeclared detention centers run by progovernment Tamil groups. 
93 Most torture victims were Tamils suspected of being LTTE insurgents or collaborators, however there also have 
been reports of the use of torture against suspected criminals. Rape is also used as a method of torture. 
Progovernment Tamil militants also use torture routinely. It is widely believed the PTA contributes to the use of 
torture. 
94 Stateless Tamils living in Sri Lanka’s tea-growing highlands have suffered particular discrimination, especially 
in the allocation of education funds. Children working as domestics in homes in the south are deprived of access to 
education. 
95 In the first half of the year  the Government reported 680 cases of crimes against children had been recorded. 
Many children working as domestics suffer from physical, sexual, emotional abuse. 
96 Some children work in the plantation sectors and in nonplantation agriculture. Almost 11,000 children between 
5 and 14 work full-time. Another 15,000 are engaged in both economic activity and housekeeping. Some 450,000 
children are employed by their families in seasonal agricultural work. 8.6% of homes in the south employ children 
as domestic servants. Many of these children suffer from physical, sexual , and emotional abuse. Regular 
employment of children also takes place mainly in the informal sector and in family enterprises. An awareness 
campaign on child labor lead to an increased number of prosecutions. 
97 Child prostitution is a significant problem, especially in coastal areas. The majority of these prostitutes are boys. 
According to a Governemnt report there are 2,000 child prostitutes. However the UN believes there are 30,000 
child prostitutes. 
98 There were credible reports of children being trafficked in to the country. There also was trafficking inside the 
country, especially from the North and the East. Boys are being trafficked to the Middle East to work as camel 
jockeys. 
99 LTTE expropriates food further exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE controlled territory. 
Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE controlled territory and other parts of the Vanni region. Malnutrition 
caused an increase in anemia and a lower birth rate. Malnutrition is caused among others by food shortages. 
However Medecins sand Frontieres found malnutrition to be at about the same level as in war-free South. The 
report states that there are many undernourished children in the country. 
100 A number of persons were killed by security forces. Alledgedly they used excessive force.  
101 Overcrowding and lack of sanitary facilities are the most important problems. 
102 Especially during interrogation. 
103 Stateless Tamils living in Sri Lanka’s tea-growing highlands have suffered particular discrimination, especially 
in the allocation of education funds. Children working as domestics in homes in the south are deprived of access to 
education. 
104 In the first ten months of the year  the Government reported 613 cases of pedophilia against children had been 
recorded. Many children working as domestics suffer from physical, sexual, emotional abuse. 
105 Some children work in the plantation sectors and in nonplantation agriculture. Almost 11,000 children between 
5 and 14 work full-time. Another 15,000 are engaged in both economic activity and housekeeping. Some 450,000 
children are employed by their families in seasonal agricultural work. 8.6% of homes in the south employ children 
as domestic servants. Many of these children suffer from physical, sexual , and emotional abuse. Regular 
employment of children also takes place mainly in the informal sector and in family enterprises. An awareness 
campaign on child labor lead to an increased number of prosecutions. Some children have served in debt bondage. 
106 Child prostitution is a significant problem, especially in coastal areas. The majority of these prostitutes are 
boys. According to a Governemnt report there are 2,000 child prostitutes. However the UN believes there are 
30,000 child prostitutes. 
107 There were credible reports of children being trafficked in to the country. There also was trafficking inside the 
country, especially from the North and the East. There were unconfirmed reports that boys are being trafficked to 
the Middle East to work as camel jockeys. 
108 LTTE expropriates food further exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE controlled territory. 
Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE controlled territory and other parts of the Vanni region. Malnutrition 
caused an increase in anemia and a lower birth rate. Malnutrition is caused among others by food shortages. 
However Medecins sand Frontieres found malnutrition to be at about the same level as in war-free South. The 
report states that there are many undernourished children in the country. 
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 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Political 
Terrorscale 5/5 5/5 5/4 5/4 
Conflict Level 
High level conflict 
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Working conditions: 
 
1990: The LTTE began forcibly conscripting labor for digging trenches and building bunkers 
beginning in September. 
1991: The LTTE forcibly recruits labor for digging trenches and building bunkers, and ferrying 
supplies.  
1999: The LTTE began a program of compulsory physical training, including mock military 
drills, for most of the population of the areas that it controls, including schoolchildren and the 
aged. 
2000: The LTTE began a program of compulsory physical training, including mock military 
drills, for most of the population of the areas that it controls, including schoolchildren and the 
aged. (It is widely believed this is done to gain tighter control of the poipulation and to provide 
a base for recruiting fighters). 
2001: The LTTE began a program of compulsory physical training, including mock military 
drills, for most of the population of the areas that it controls, including schoolchildren and the 
aged. (It is widely believed this is done to gain tighter control of the poipulation and to provide 
a base for recruiting fighters). 
 
Brief historical/political overview 
 
1989: Tensions in the eighties between Sri Lanka’s majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil 
populations lead to armed conflict between government forces and Tamil separatists. A peace 
accord between the governments of India and Sri Lanka was signed. However radicals from 
both major ethnic groups refused to accept the Accord. In the Sinhalese-majority south, 
government security forces were pitted against the revolutionary Janatha Vmukthi Peramuna 
(JVP) attempting to overthrow the Government by terrorist methods. In the Tamil-mjority 
northeast, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) waged guerilla war against the Indian 
Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF), introduced under the Accord, and India’s Tamil militant allies. 
The attacks by the JVP did not stop even after having tried to bring the JVP into political life 
and legalise the organisation. Thus in 1989 the Government cracked down on the JVP, arrested 
many suspected members and killed much of the JVP’s top leadership. In September a Peace 
Accord was signed between the LTTE and Indian Forces and Tamil allies. In the same months 
India and Sri Lanka agreed on the withdrawal of Indian soldiers. The withdrawal started during 
the year and will be complete by March 31, 1990. In one incident in December withdrawing 
IPKF soldiers clashed with LTTE rebels. The result was 100 combatants dead and 50 civilians 
dead. A new Parliament was voted in February. The elections were marred by the killing of 
hundreds of voters and 14 parliamentary candidates. However the elections were considered 
largely free and fair. The Prevention of Terrorism Act was in effect throughout the year. There 
was a rise of anti-JVP vigilante groups in the south. Observers largely agree these groups are 
manned partly by security personnel operating with the knowledge of the Government. IPKF 
troops used torture. In the South the JVP used intimidation to recruit unwilling members and to 
force participation in demonstrations and other activities liable to subject individuals to 
criminal prosecution. They did this in universities and secondary schools. This resulted in 
much campus unrest and closure of most schools for the rest of the year. India’s Tamil allies 
forcibly recruit young men to provide manpower for the defense of Tamil-majority areas. A 
great number of people disappeared. 
1990: The IPKF withdrew by March 31. JVP cadres were unable to regroup sufficiantly after 
much of their leadership was captured or killed. LTTE seized control of the Jaffna Peninsula, 
while continuing negotiations. The Government ordered the army to take a non-confrontational 
stand. On June 11 LTTE broke of negotiations and attacked a number of police stations in the 
east. The human rights situations, which had ameliorated during peace negotiations, seriously 
deteriorated in the northeast after talks were broken off. In the south the situation ameliorated 
due to the elimination of the JVP leadership. However vigilante groups continued to operate. 
The PTA and Emergency Regulations remained in effect. However some provisions were 
rescinded. A great number of people disappeared. 
1991: The conflict with LTTE continued. JVP terrorism ended. Life in the South was largely 
normal. LTTE operations were largely confined to the north and east. However two bombs in 
Colombo destroyed the Ministry of Defence and left many civilians dead. Number of incidents 
was reduced. 710 civilians died in 1991. PTA and ER remained in force,but were partly 
suspended (except in the northeast) to permit unhindered elections. A great number of people 
disappeared. Though less than in the previous five years. The Government publicly and 
privately declared the war in the east and the north is a war against the LTTE and not against 
the Tamil population, this is believed to have significantly reduced communal violence. The 
bodies of 300 policemen captured in 1991 were recovered. Local Government elections held in 
May are considered free and fair. 
1992: Peaceful resolution of the conflict was complicated even further. LTTE escalated its 
attacks on the Muslim and Sinhalese population in an effort to drive the communities out of the 
Tamil provinces. As a result of this armed Muslim groups masacred innocent civilians. Some 
200 people disappeared (attributed largely to security forces), which is a sharp decline of 
previous years. 650 civilians died of extrajudicial killings or combat related deaths. There 
seems to an effort to stop human rights abuses by the Government. Attacks on civilians by 
Government forces appear to be the result of lapses of discipline rather than policy decisions. 
Members of opposition groups were increasingly harassed. 
1993: No mention of torture in the report. On May 1 President Premadasa is assassinated by an 
LTTE suicide bomber. President Dingiri Banda Wijetunga is chosen by the Parliament to 
succeed Premadasa. About 70 people disappeared in the first nine months of the year (a 
significant decline from the previous year). LTTE are also responsible for disappearance, 
however it is not known how many. It is widely believed that the decision to grant the ICRC 
unhindered access to detention centers, police stations and army camps has played an important 
role in reducing the number of disappearances. There was a lull in fighting during the first nine 
months of the year, but the fighting reached new level of intensity in the 4th quarter of the year, 
as both sides launched major offensives. There were increasing attacks on civilian targets by 
the Sri Lankan army. Thee was an increased use of curfews and checkpoints by the Army and 
LTTE which made travel within the country difficult. Especially for young Tamil men, and 
especially after the killing of the President. After the death of the President, organised 
harassment of the opposition ceased. 
1994: The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined amount of disappearances. In generally 
free and fair elections the People’s Alliance ended the 17 year control of Parliament by the 
United National Party, and Chandrika Kumaratunga, became Prime Minister. A dialogue was 
initiated with the LTTE. Security forces committed significantly less human rights abuses than 
in previous years. The United National Party’s candidate for the elections was killed in a 
suicide attack. Suspects in several extrajudicial killings were prosecuted. In most of the country 
ER were lifted, this made concealment of extrajudicial killings and disappearances difficult. 
Travel restrictions were eased, but remained strict for young Tamil men. 
1995: The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined amount of disappearances. For the first 
time rape was used as a weapon of terror. Cessation of hostilities on January 3. The truce was 
broken when LTTE attacked security forces in April. Governmental forces succeeded in 
capturing the unofficial capital of the rebels, Jaffna City, after major offensives. During 
cessation governmental forces committed very few human rights abuses. With the resumption 
of hostilities the number of abuses increased. The Government moved to correct the worst 
relapses. The JVP is legalised. Travel restrictions were once more applied more strictly. This 
affected young Tamil men in their freedom of movement. 
1996: The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined amount of disappearances. Children as 
young as 10 are said to be recruited and placed for 2 to 4 years in special schools that provide 
them with a mixture of LTTE ideology and formal education. A six month military offensive 
captured the LTTE heartland of the Jaffna Peninsula in April. The LTTE inflicted a major 
military defeat on Government forces at a military base in the North killing upwards of 1,500 
troops. Intensification of the conflict meant a deterioration in the human rights situation. In 
April the ER was reimposed nationwide. There was no evidence the ER were used to conceal 
extrajudial executions or disappearances. However crucial protective safeguards were 
frequently ignored. Civilian casualties in the renewed fighting were limited, because security 
forces showed much greater restraint in the use of excessive force. Moreover troops advanced 
slowly and methodically. Travel restrictions were once more applied more strictly. This 
affected young Tamil men in their freedom of movement. Local elections were postponed by 
the President under ER. 
1997: The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined amount of disappearances. Children as 
young as 10 are said to be recruited and placed for 2 to 4 years in special schools that provide 
them with a mixture of LTTE ideology and formal education. In May the Government forces 
launched a major new offensive aimed at opening a land route to the Jaffna Peninsula through 
LTTE controlled territory. The offensive resulted in hundreds killed. The Government 
generally respected the human rights of its citizens in areas not affected by the conflict. ER was 
lifted outside of the north and east and Colombo. Violence between supporters of the major 
political parties worsened and six people including a member of Parliament were killed in 
violence related to local government electionsin March. Civilian casualties were limited in the 
first six months of the year, because security forces showed much greater restraint in the use of 
excessive force. Moreover troops advanced slowly and methodically. Elections in the Jaffna 
Peninsula were postponed untill January 1998. 
1998: The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined amount of disappearances. Children as 
young as 10 are said to be recruited and placed for 2 to 4 years in special schools that provide 
them with a mixture of LTTE ideology and formal education. The conflict between LTTE and 
the Sri Lankan Government has claimed over 55,000 lives so far. The offensive launched in 
May 1997 ended in December and claimed approx. 5,000 combattant deaths on both sides. 
State of emergency was reimposed nationwide. 
1999: The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined amount of disappearances. Children as 
young as 10 are said to be recruited and placed for 2 to 4 years in special schools that provide 
them with a mixture of LTTE ideology and formal education. The President scheduled early 
Presidential elections in December. She won the generally free and fair elections. However the 
preelection and election period were marred by violence. At least six persons were killed and 
there was an unsuccessfull assassination attempt on the President by the LTTE. The whole 
conflict between the government and the LTTE has claimed 60,000 lives so far. The 
Government gained much territory in a series of offensives. In a counterattack the LTTE 
regained much of the territory lost in the last two years.More than a thousand combattants were 
killed in the fighting. Sine April 1995 at least 761 persons have been extrajudicially killed by 
security forces or have disappeared and are presumed dead. 
2000: The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined amount of disappearances. Violence and 
fraud marked the October parliamentary elections. At least seven persons died in election 
related violence. The elections resulted in a reduced majority of the PA. The conflict between 
Government and LTTE claimed 62,000 lives so far. A major offensive on the Jaffna Peninsula 
left many dead (civilians and combatants). Violent clashes continued during the year. More 
than 2,000 combattants and more than 100 civilians were killed in incidents related to the 
conflict. The army was more secretive about missions than in previous years. The publicity 
given to offensives in the past limited civilian casualties. Tamils are frequently harassed at 
checkpoints. 
2001: The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined amount of disappearances. 
Parliamentary elections in December were marred by violence, at least 50 deaths, and 
irregularities (including the refusal to allow 40,000 Tamils to vote). A coaltion lead by the 
UNP won a majority in Parliament. The conflict has claimed at least 64,000 lives untill now. In 
April government forces launched a major offensive on the Jaffna Peninsula, this resulted in 
heavy losses. In July LTTE attacked Colombo’s international airport. At year’s end the 
Governmetn and the LTTE had each announced unilateral cease-fires. It is believed as many as 
2,000 combattants and 100 civilians were killed in conflict-related incidents. The army was 
more secretive about missions than in previous years. The publicity given to offensives in the 
past limited civilian casualties. Tamils are frequently harassed at checkpoints. 
2002: The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined amount of civilian disappearances. The 
Government and LTTE started a historic process of reconciliation in December 2001. This 
process continued in Norwegian-facilitated talks in Thailand and Norway. The talks were 
successful and will continue into 2003. As a result of the peace there was sharp reduction in 
roadblocks and checkpoints around the country, the return of 220,000 internally displaced 
persons, and the opening of investigations into questionnable actions by security forces. On 
September 4 the LTTE was legalized. 
                                                 
1 There were allegations of torture. 
2 The LTTE was responsible for the deaths of many rival Tamil politicians. In clashes between the LTTE and the 
Government more than 1,500 civilians died. In the attacks on seven police stations on June 11 some 600 police 
officers surrendered. It is widely believed that at least 200 of these police officers were killed by the LTTE. The 
LTTE also killed a great number of muslims, before telling them to leave within a few days. 
3 There were allegations of torture. 
4 Of Muslims. 
5 Two bombs in Colombo on military targets, but in residential areas caused a number of civilian deaths. 182 
civilians were killed in deliberate attacks. 
6 There were allegations of torture. 
7 The LTTE is believed to have committed at least 400 politically motivated killings, most involving 
indiscriminate attacks on civilians. 
8 There were allegations of torture. 
9 There were less deliberate killings of civilians. However there still were a number of summary executions. 
Especially of people thought to be aiding the Governemnt forces. There were two high level assassinations: the 
opposition leader and the President. 
10 High school-age children were sometimes conscripted for work as cooks, messengers, and clerks. There were 
reliable reports of children being used as forced labor to build fortifications. 
                                                                                                                                                           
11 Extrajudicial killings were not restricted to Sri Lanka as an LTTE opponent and four other Tamils were killed in 
Paris. The LTTE also used excessive force, killing an undetermined number of civilians. 
12 Conditions are believed to be poor. 
13 The LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis. Because of the secretive nature of the LTTE, virtually no 
first-hand information is available regarding their use of torture. 
14 High school-age children were sometimes conscripted for work as cooks, messengers, and clerks. There were 
reliable reports of children being used as forced labor to build fortifications. 
15 A great number of extrajudicial killings were committed. Among which the killing of 42 Sinhalese civilians in a 
fishing village, 120 sinhalese civilians, a number of political opponents, 29 suspected government spies and 16 
persons in suicide bombing attacks. The LTTE also used excessive force, killing an undetermined number of 
civilians. 
16 Conditions are believed to be poor. 
17 The LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis. Because of the secretive nature of the LTTE, virtually no 
first-hand information is available regarding their use of torture. 
18 High school-age children were sometimes conscripted for work as cooks, messengers, and clerks. There were 
reliable reports of children being used as forced labor to build fortifications. 
19 LTTE is believed to be using child soldiers. However reports that the LTTE is conscripting children are 
impossible to verify. 
20 LTTE continued to commit extrajudicial executions. More than 185 people were killd in terrorist bombings. 
Numerous assassinations of political opponents were committed. Massacres of civilians continued (14 Sinhalese 
villagers, 11 Sinhalese travelers). Suspected government informants and university professors and members of 
nonviolent Tamil opposition parties, and human rights monitors continued to be killed. 
21 Conditions are believed to be poor. 
22 The LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis. Because of the secretive nature of the LTTE, virtually no 
first-hand information is available regarding their use of torture. 
23 High school-age children were conscripted for work as cooks, messengers, clerks, and in some case to build 
fortifications.   
24 LTTE is believed to be using child soldiers. However reports that the LTTE is conscripting children are 
impossible to verify. 
25 LTTE continued to commit extrajudicial executions. A number of civilians were killed in terrorist attacks. 
Numerous assassinations of political opponents were committed. Suspected government informants and university 
professors and members of nonviolent Tamil opposition parties, and human rights monitors continued to be killed. 
26 Conditions are believed to be poor. 
27 The LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis. Because of the secretive nature of the LTTE, virtually no 
first-hand information is available regarding their use of torture. 
28 High school-age children were conscripted for work as cooks, messengers, clerks, and in some case to build 
fortifications.   
29 There are credible reports the LTTE has warned Muslims displaced from the Mannar area (approx. 50,000 
persons) not to return to their homes untill the war is over. 
30 Extrajudicial executions were regular: terrorist attacks, assassinations, attacks on government installations and 
killings of suspected government informants, and excessive use of force. 
31 Conditions are poor. Former prisoners report they were being handcuffed and shackled for much of their 
captivity. 
32 The LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis.  
33 Many captured rebels were under the age of 18. 
34 High school-age children were conscripted for work as cooks, messengers, clerks, and in some case to build 
fortifications.   
35 The LTTE has expropriated food from internally displaced people, thus exacerbating the plight of such persons 
in LTTE controlled territory. Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE-controlled territory. 
36 The LTTE committed extrajudicial executions regularly. These included targeted attacks and bombings. More 
than hundred civilians were killed in bombings. At least 14 persons were convicted in LTTE self-described courts 
and sentenced to death. The LTTE acknowledge they rather kill soldiers than take them prisoner. Moreover it 
seems they also kill their own injured soldiers so they are not made captive. 
37 Prison conditions were poor. Former prisoners report being handcuffed and shackled during much of their 
detention. The ICRC were permitted to see only a few prisoners. 
38 LTTE reportedly use torture routinely. 
39 High school-age children were conscripted for work as cooks, messengers, clerks, and in some case to build 
fortifications. The LTTE began a program of compulsory physical training, including mock military drills, for 
most of the population of the areas that it controls, including schoolchildren and the aged.   
40 There are credible reports the LTTE has warned Muslims displaced from the Mannar area (approx. 55,000 
persons) not to return to their homes until the conflict is over. 
41 LTTE expropriates food further exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE controlled territory. 
Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE controlled territory and other parts of the Vanni region. Malnutrition 
caused an increase in anemia and a lower birth rate. Malnutrition is caused among others by food shortages. 
                                                                                                                                                           
42 At least170 civilians were killed from January to September in LTTE suicide bombings and other attacks 
outside of the Northern conflict zone. LTTE  killed prisoners taken on the battlefield. LTTE uses excessive force 
in fighting, killing civilians. 
43 Prison conditions were poor. Former prisoners report being handcuffed and shackled during much of their 
detention. The ICRC were permitted to visit detainees in the Vanni regularly. 
44 LTTE reportedly use torture routinely. 
45 High school-age children were conscripted for work as cooks, messengers, clerks, and in some case to build 
fortifications. The LTTE began a program of compulsory physical training, including mock military drills, for 
most of the population of the areas that it controls, including schoolchildren and the aged. It is widely believed this 
is done to gain tighter control of the poipulation and to provide a base for recruiting fighters.  
46 There are credible reports the LTTE has warned Muslims displaced from the Mannar area (approx. 66,000 
persons) not to return to their homes until the conflict is over. 
47 LTTE expropriates food further exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE controlled territory. 
Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE controlled territory and other parts of the Vanni region. Malnutrition 
caused an increase in anemia and a lower birth rate. Malnutrition is caused among others by food shortages. 
However Medecins sand Frontieres found malnutrition to be at about the same level as in war-free South. 
48 It is not known how many extrajudicial executions were committed. LTTE continued to kill civilians outside its 
territory. LTTE continued to bomb civilian targets. LTTE executed people after sentencing in self-described 
courts. LTTE sometimes kills its own troops when they are injured in order to avoid capture. LTTE kills soldiers 
rather than make them prisoner. Many civilians were killed (more than 100). 
49 Prison conditions were poor. Former prisoners report being handcuffed and shackled during much of their 
detention. The ICRC were permitted to visit detainees in the Vanni regularly. 
50 LTTE reportedly use torture routinely. 
51 High school-age children were conscripted for work as cooks, messengers, clerks, and in some case to build 
fortifications. The LTTE began a program of compulsory physical training, including mock military drills, for 
most of the population of the areas that it controls, including schoolchildren and the aged. It is widely believed this 
is done to gain tighter control of the poipulation and to provide a base for recruiting fighters.  
52 There are credible reports the LTTE has warned Muslims displaced from the Mannar area (approx. 66,000 
persons) not to return to their homes until the conflict is over. 
53 LTTE expropriates food further exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE controlled territory. 
Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE controlled territory and other parts of the Vanni region. Malnutrition 
caused an increase in anemia and a lower birth rate. Malnutrition is caused among others by food shortages. 
However Medecins sand Frontieres found malnutrition to be at about the same level as in war-free South.  
54 There were unconfirmed reports that the LTTE committed unlawful killings. However the exact number of these 
killings is impossible to ascertain. Some observers believe that the amount of killings was reduced drastically.  
55 Prison conditions were poor. Former prisoners report being handcuffed and shackled during much of their 
detention. The ICRC were permitted to visit detainees. 
56 LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis. 
57 High school-age children were conscripted for work as cooks, messengers, clerks, and in some case to build 
fortifications. The LTTE began a program of compulsory physical training, including mock military drills, for 
most of the population of the areas that it controls, including schoolchildren and the aged. It is widely believed this 
is done to gain tighter control of the poipulation and to provide a base for recruiting fighters.  
58 LTTE expropriates food further exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE controlled territory. 
Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE controlled territory and other parts of the Vanni region. Malnutrition 
caused an increase in anemia and a lower birth rate. Malnutrition is caused among others by food shortages. 
However Medecins sand Frontieres found malnutrition to be at about the same level as in war-free South.  
 
 
Israel1 
(Population: 6,116,533, without settlers in PA and OT) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Political 
Terrorscale 3/2 2/2 2/2 9/2 
Conflict Level Violent political conflict 
Violent political 
conflict 
Violent political 
conflict 
Violent political 
conflict 
Freedom 
House 2/2/F 2/2/F 2/2/F 2/2/F 
U.S. State 
Department AE
2, DH3 AE4, DH5 AE6, DH7, (FE)8 AE9, DH10, (FE)11 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Political 
Terrorscale 9/2 4/2 4/3 3/3 
Conflict Level Violent political conflict 
Violent political 
conflict 
Violent political 
conflict 
Violent political 
conflict / low 
intensity conflict 
(Israel/Lebanon; 150 
civilians dead) 
Freedom 
House 1/3/F 1/3/F 1/3/F 1/3/F 
U.S. State 
Department p
12, AE13, PC14, DH15 p16, AE17, DH18 
e19, p20, t21, AE22, 
CA23, CL24, PC25, 
DH26 
p27, t28, AE29, CA30, 
CL31, CP32, PC33, 
DH34, FE35 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Political 
Terrorscale 2 2  4 
Conflict Level 
2 Violent political 
conflicts 
(Lebanon/Israel, less 
victims than previous 
year) 
2 Violent political 
conflicts 
(Lebanon/Israel, 79 
casualties) 
2 Violent political 
conflicts 
(Israel/Lebanon, 92 
casualties) 
2 violent political 
conflicts 
(Israel/Lebanon, 
approx. 50 
casualties)36 
Freedom 
House 1/3/F 1/3/F 1/2/F 1/3/F 
U.S. State 
Department 
e37, p38, T39, PC40, 
AE41, CA42, CL43, 
CP44, DH45 
e46, p47, t48, AE49, 
CA50, CL51, CP52, 
PC53, DH54, TP55  
(e)56, p57, t58, AE59, 
CA60, CL61, CP62, 
PC63, DH64, D65 
E66, p67, t68, AE69, 
CA70, CL71, CP72 
PC73, DH74 
 
 2001 2002 
Political 
Terrorscale   
Conflict Level 
Low-intensity 
conflict/Violent 
political conflict 
(border 
Israel/Lebanon) 
Low-intensity 
conflict/Violent 
political conflict 
(border 
Israel/Lebanon) 
Freedom 
House 
1/3/F 1/3/F 
U.S. State 
Department 
p75, T76, AE77, CA78, 
CL79, CP80, PC81, 
DH82 
p83, (P)84, T85, AE86, 
CA87, CL88, CP89, 
PC90, DH91, D92 
 
 
 
Working conditions: 
 
1989: Nonresident Palestinian workers suffer from inequalities with respect to working 
conditions. Access to work can be denied to Palestinians.  
1990: Nonresident Palestinian workers suffer from inequalities with respect to working 
conditions. Access to work can be denied to Palestinians. 
1993: There is no legal safeguard against being fired when refusing to do hazardous work. 
1994: There is no legal safeguard against being fired when refusing to do hazardous work. 
1995: There is no legal safeguard against being fired when refusing to do hazardous work. 
1996: Civil rights groups charge that unscrupulous employers often take advantage of illegal 
worker’s lack of status to hold them in conditions amounting to involuntary servitude. There is 
no legal safeguard against being fired when refusing to do hazardous work. 
1997: Civil rights groups charge that unscrupulous employers often take advantage of illegal 
worker’s lack of status to hold them in conditions amounting to involuntary servitude. There is 
no legal safeguard against being fired when refusing to do hazardous work. 
1998: Civil rights groups charge that unscrupulous employers often take advantage of illegal  
worker’s lack of status to hold them in conditions amounting to involuntary servitude. There is 
no legal safeguard against being fired when refusing to do hazardous work. 
1999: Civil rights groups charge that unscrupulous employers often take advantage of illegal 
worker’s lack of status to hold them in conditions amounting to involuntary servitude. There is 
no legal safeguard against being fired when refusing to do hazardous work. 
2000: Civil rights groups charge that unscrupulous employers often take advantage of illegal 
worker’s lack of status to hold them in conditions amounting to involuntary servitude. There is 
no legal safeguard against being fired when refusing to do hazardous work. 
2001: Civil rights groups charge that unscrupulous employers often take advantage of illegal 
worker’s lack of status to hold them in conditions amounting to involuntary servitude. There is 
no legal safeguard against being fired when refusing to do hazardous work. 
2002: Civil rights groups charge that unscrupulous employers often take advantage of illegal 
worker’s lack of status to hold them in conditions amounting to involuntary servitude. There is 
no legal safeguard against being fired when refusing to do hazardous work. Some foreign 
workers were lured into working in Israel, paying up to $10.000.  
 
Brief historical/political overview 
 
1989: 20 people were killed by Palestinians within pre-1967 Israel and five Palestinians were 
killed within Israel by private citizens in what can be considered retaliation actions.  
1990: There were a few separate incidents in which Israelis and Palestinians were killed (the 
report mentions 8 Palestinians killed by Israelis and 8 Israelis killed by Palestinians). Following 
one incident in which seven palestinians were killed there were seven separate incidents in 
which Israelis were killed by knive by Palestinians. There were some leaflets distributed to 
announce the beginning of “the intifada of the knives”. However the incidents do not appear to 
be part of a pattern.  
1991: 11 Israelis were killed by Palestinians. The murders were linked to Arab nationalist 
motivations. During the Gulf War there were more restrictions on freedom of press. Arab 
language publications are more closely scrutinised than there Hebrew equivalents. It is 
generally asserted that Arab municipalities are underfunded by the Government. Madrid 
Conference sets peace process in motion. 
1992: 13 Israelis were killed by Arabs. The murders were politically motivated. The 
Fundamental Human Rights Bill, “intended to enshrine the principle of equality before the law 
and prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion, nationality, race, or place of national 
origin, is currently being discussed by the Ministerial Committee on Legislation and the 
Knesset Committee of Constitution, Law and Justice.” 
1993: Historical Declaration of Principles is signed with the PLO.At least sixteen Israelis are 
killed by Arabs.  
1994: 52 Israelis were killed by Palestinians inside Israel. 
1995: The peace process continued as an agreement was signed on the redeployment of IDF 
from Palestinian areas in the West Bank, the further transfer of certain powers and 
responsibilities to the Palestinians, and Palestinian elections.The agreement also calls for the 
release of certain Palestinian prisoners. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin is killed on November 4. 
During the year 39 Israelis were killed by suicide bombers, more than 250 people were injured. 
1996: Benjamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister on May 29. A number of Israelis were 
killed by suicide attackers. Fighting along the Lebanese border after the launching by Hizballah 
of rockets from Southern Lebanon resulted in 150 civilian deaths and hundreds of wounded 
civilians on the Lebanese side and dozens of wounded civilians in Israel. 
1997: 24 people were killed in suicide attacks. The attacks happened after the Hebron 
agreement was broken by both sides. Negotiations on Interim Agreement implementation were 
broken off and did not resume at year’s end. The cycle of violence on the Lebanese border 
continued. However after an understanding between both sides not to launch attacks on civilian 
areas on April 26 the number of casualties dropped. The legal system often imposes stiffer 
penalties on Christian, Druze and Arab persons than on Jews. 
1998: Wye River Memorandum is signed by th PA and Israel calling for the continuation of the 
peace process. 8 Israelis were killed and over 100 were wounded in terrorist attacks. 
Government attempted to seize Israeli Arab land. This sparked violent demonstrations leading 
to close to 100 arrests and 90 injuries, including 25 injured police officers. In December the 
Wye River Agreement is frozen by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s  Government. The 
legal system often imposes stiffer penalties on Christian, Druze and Arab persons than on Jews. 
1999: In May the new Prime Minister Ehud Barak took office. The report mentions for the first 
time that the judiciary has in the past frequently acquiesced with the Government’s position 
(however in this year it has ruled against the Government in some major security-related cases. 
New Government signs new memorandum laying out a new comprehensive roadmap. One 
Israeli was killed and over 52 injured in terrorist attacks. The legal system often imposes stiffer 
penalties on Christian, Druze and Arab persons than on Jews. 
2000: On December 9, following the breakdown of his coalition, Barak resigned as Prime 
Minister. Prime ministerial electios were scheduled to be held on February 6, 2001. Intensive 
work-level talks were held between March and June by the PLO and the Israeli Government 
and they met at Camp David in July. No agreement was reached. Since 1897 the Jewish 
National Fund (JNF) purchases and manages land for the Jewish people. They own 8% of the 
country’s land area (including a considerable amount transferred directly from the 
Government) and they manage another 8% on behalf of the Government. In March the High 
Court of Justice ruled that the Government’s use of the JNF to develop public land was 
disciminatory, since the JNF’s statute prohibits the sale or lease of land to non-jews. The 
Government’s  human rights record worsened late in the year regarding its treatment of non-
jewish citizens. In October there was an outbreak of violence in the North of the country. 
Police killed 13 arab citizens, injuring over 300, in demonstrations. There were credible reports 
that police failed to protect Arab lives and property in several incidents in which Jewish 
citizens attacked the homes of Arab citizens. One of the main factors contributing to the 
violence was the lack of tangible steps taken to ameliorate the situation for non-jewish citizens 
in the country. In early October there were many instances of societal violence between Arab 
and Jewish citizens. This coincided with violent events in the country. On event that sparked 
the violence was the visit of the opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount in 
Jerusalem on September 29. Violence in the Occupied Territories coincided with violence in 
Israel. 22 Israelis died and 244 were injured in terrorist attacks carried out by Palestinian 
groups or individuals in Israel and the occupied territories. The legal system often imposes 
stiffer penalties on Christian, Druze and Arab persons than on Jews. 
2001: In February Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon is elected as Prime Minister. Sharon took 
office in March as the head of a broad “unity” government. With thonset of the “Al-Aqsa 
Intifada” in September 2000, there was a dramatic escalation in the level of violence directed 
against Israelis. The number of terrorist incidents, and Israeli casualties due to such attacks, 
rose sharply during the year compared with the previous year. Nearly 2000 terrorist attacks 
took place during the year. More than 200 israelis were killed and over 1500 injured. The legal 
system often imposes more severe punishments on Arab citizens than Jewish citizens. 
2002: On November 5 labour withdrew from the Government and Prime Minister Sharon 
announced he was unable to form a coalition and asked the President to dissolve the Knesset 
and call for new elections. New elections are scheduled for January 28, 2003. During the year 
there were efforts from the US, Russian Federation, Eu and UN to come to a roadmap with a 
two-state vision.There were nearly 226 terror attacks. During the year 469 Israelis were killed 
and over 2,498 injured, which is an increase from 2001. The legal system often imposes more 
severe punishments on Arab citizens than Jewish citizens. Journalists claim they were restricted 
in their freedom of movement whenever there was violent unrest. 
                                                 
1 This table only deals with Israel and does not deal with the Occupied Territories or the Palestine Authority. 
2 Israeli Arabs have not attained the same quality of education as Israeli Jews. 
3 Israeli arabs have not attained the same quality of housing as Israeli Jews. Israeli Druze and circassian 
community have had less access to social and economic benefits as housing and new-household subsidies 
(primarily because they do not participate in the military draft). 
4 Israeli Arabs have not attained the same quality of education as Israeli Jews. 
5 Israeli arabs have not attained the same quality of housing as Israeli Jews. Israeli Druze and circassian 
community have had less access to social and economic benefits as housing and new-household subsidies 
(primarily because they do not participate in the military draft). 
6 Israeli Arabs have not attained the same quality of education as Israeli Jews. 
7 Israeli arabs have not attained the same quality of housing as Israeli Jews. Israeli Druze and circassian 
community have had less access to social and economic benefits as housing and new-household subsidies 
(primarily because they do not participate in the military draft). 
8 Israeli Arab residents of the village of Ramyeh were ordered to leave their property. They got a compensation 
well below the market price of their property. They were still appealing the decision by year’s end. 
9 Israeli Arabs have not attained the same quality of education as Israeli Jews. A 1992 report by the Comptroller 
criticized governemnt policy which have resulted in the inequality between educational standards of Arabs and 
that of Jews. 
10 Israeli arabs have not attained the same quality of housing as Israeli Jews. Israeli Druze and circassian 
community have had less access to social and economic benefits as housing and new-household subsidies 
(primarily because they do not participate in the military draft). 
11 The residents of Ramyah were still subject to eviction orders. 
12 Police detention centers have become de facto prisons, due to chronic overcrowding. Inmates at these facilities 
are accorded less rights than inmates in regular IPS facilities.Prison conditions are harsher for security detainees. 
Prisons run by the IDF do not meet international minimum standards. Certain camps use unheated tents even in 
severe weather conditions. 
13 Israeli Arabs do not have the same quality of education as Israeli Jews. 
14 In IDF detention camps minors are held with adults. 
15 Israeli Arabs do not enjoy the same standard housing as Jews. 
16 Police detention centers have become de facto prisons, due to chronic overcrowding. Inmates at these facilities 
are accorded less rights than inmates in regular IPS facilities.Prison conditions are harsher for security detainees. 
Overcrowding is the most severe problem. Though the number of detainees dropped sharply, prisons run by the 
IDF do not meet international minimum standards. Certain camps use unheated tents even in severe weather 
conditions. 
17 Israeli Arabs do not have the same quality of education as Israeli Jews. 
18 Israeli Arabs do not enjoy the same standard housing as Jews. 
19 At least six Palestinians died while in custody of Israeli authorities. 
20 Security detainees are subject to a different regime from ‘regular’ inmates, even at IPS (Israeli Prison Service) 
facilities. At holding facilities overcrowding is a problem. In Jerusalem’s Russian Compound there is 
overcrowding and dilapidation. Conditions at police detention facilities can fall below minimum international 
standards. These facilities have often become de facto jails. Inmates of these facilities do not have the same rights 
as those in IPS facilities. IDF administered detention camps are limited to Palestinian security detainees. In many 
cases these camps did not meet minimum international standards. Many camps house inmates in unheated tents in 
severe weather conditions, or in overcrowded and poorly ventilated buildings. In addition visits have been 
prevented are restricted. 
21 Shin Beth use the practice of violent shaking. It is not clear from the report whether the practice is widespread. 
However at one prisoner died of this practice in April. In late December, in response to a detainee’s petition, the 
Supreme Court issued an injunction against the use of physical force in interrogation. 
22 Children’s rights groups express particular concern over the lack of special education facilities for Bedouin 
children. Israeli Arabs are not provided with the same quality of education as Jews. 
                                                                                                                                                           
23 The increasing number of reported cases of child abuse is probably due to increased awareness and not 
necessarily part of a pattern of abuse. 
24 Primarily among Israeli Arabs and new Jewish immigrants. 
25 Civil rights groups have expressed concern about the conditions in which minors are held. They have 
recommended the building of a separate detention facility. Although children are kept separate from adults there 
have been some cases of sexual molestation.  
26 Israeli Arabs do not enjoy the same standard housing as Jews. 
27 Conditions at some national police detention facilities can fall below minimum international standards. 
Conditions are worse for security detainees at police facilities and in IPS (Israeli Prison Service) prisons. After a 
report by a local NGO the government has vowed to improve conditions. They build a new prison closed a very 
old one and made some minor improvements in others. However dilpidation and overcrowding are still problems, 
this is aggravated by the closure of IDF detention facilities in the occupied territories. New legislation on the 
minimum standards for detainees will be enacted in 1997. IDF detention facilities also have poor conditions. 
However the centre that was most criticised was closed down and some improvements were made to existing 
detention centres. 
28 In so-called “ticking bomb” cases security officers can be authorised by the head of Shin Beth to use “moderate 
physical and psychological pressure” in interrogating Palestinian detainees. This was done in several cases and 
include the practice of violent shaking (which is a torture technique). The technique was repeatedly challenged 
before the courts. However the only restriction that has to be applied in using force is that there needs to be a 
showable cause to do it. 
29 Children of foreign workers (many of them illegal workers) have no access to education. Israeli Arabs still do 
not have the same quality education as Jews. Schools in Arab communities are dilapidated and overcrwded, lack 
special education services and counselors, have poor libraries and have no sports facilities. The public school 
curriculum stresses Israel’s Jewish culture and heritage. 
30 The increasing number of reported cases of child abuse is probably due to increased awareness and not 
necessarily part of a pattern of abuse. 
31 Primarily among Israeli Arabs and new Jewish immigrants. 
32 There are several hundred child prostitutes in the country. 
33 Separate sections of holding facilities set aside for the detention of children were overcrowded, had poor 
physical conditions, lack of social workers and denial of visits by parents. Some Israeli minors held in criminal 
cases and juveniles were held among Palestinian detainees. 
34 Israeli Arabs do not enjoy the same standard housing as Jews. 
35 The conflict on the Lebanese border caused between 200,000 and 300,000 lebanese and between 20,000 and 
30,000 Israelis to flee.  
36 In May Israeli forces withdrew from Southern Lebanon. Most casualties occurred prior to the withdrawal. 
37 One Palestinian was beaten to death while in Government custody. 
38 Conditions at some national police detention facilities can fall below minimum international standards. 
Conditions are worse for security detainees at police facilities and in IPS (Israeli Prison Service) prisons. After a 
report by a local NGO the government has vowed to improve conditions. They build a new prison closed a very 
old one and made some minor improvements in others. However dilpidation and overcrowding are still problems, 
this is aggravated by the closure of IDF detention facilities in the occupied territories. New legislation on the 
minimum standards for detainees will be enacted in 1997. IDF detention facilities also have poor conditions. 
However the centre that was most criticised was closed down and some improvements were made to existing 
detention centres. The conditions at the IDF Detention camp, the Russian Compound, have been very much 
criticised and High Court of Justice President Aharon Barak described conditions as “not fit to serve as lock-up”. 
39 Security forces are authorised to apply “moderate physical and psycholoigical pressure” while interrogation 
detainees. These practices often led to excesses. There weresome 46 cases brought to the High Court almost all 
calling for a halt to the torture. It is believed many cases of torture are not brought to theCourt. 
40 Separate sections of holding facilities set aside for the detention of children were overcrowded, had poor 
physical conditions, lack of social workers and denial of visits by parents. Some Israeli minors held in criminal 
cases and juveniles were held among Palestinian detainees. 
41 Children of foreign workers (many of them illegal workers) have no access to education. Israeli Arabs still do 
not have the same quality education as Jews. Schools in Arab communities are dilapidated and overcrwded, lack 
special education services and counselors, have poor libraries and have no sports facilities. The public school 
curriculum stresses Israel’s Jewish culture and heritage. Israeli-Arab students are not eligible to participate in a 
special education program to provide academic assistance to students from disadvantaged backgrounds. A High 
Court special committee is studying the problem. 
42 The increasing number of reported cases of child abuse is probably due to increased awareness and not 
necessarily part of a pattern of abuse. 
43 Primarily among Israeli Arabs and new Jewish immigrants. 
44 There are several hundred child prostitutes in the country. 
45 Israeli Arabs do not enjoy the same standard housing as Jews. 
46 Amal faction leader Hussam Al Amin was killed by Israeli forces in attack in Lebanon. Two Palestinian 
“security” detainees died in custody, one from an alleged suicide attempt. 
                                                                                                                                                           
47 Conditions at some national police detention facilities can fall below minimum international standards. 
Conditions are worse for security detainees at police facilities and in IPS (Israeli Prison Service) prisons. 
Dilpidation and overcrowding are still problems, this is aggravated by the closure of IDF detention facilities in the 
occupied territories. New legislation on the minimum standards for detainees was enacted in 1997, but has had 
very little impact so far. IDF detention facilities also have poor conditions. The conditions at the IDF Detention 
camp, the Russian Compound, have been very much criticised and High Court of Justice President Aharon Barak 
described conditions as “not fit to serve as lock-up”. Since then minor improvements have been made. 
48 The report states that there were some cases of torture. However the report also states that the use of “moderate 
physical and psychological pressure” is permitted. This has often led to excesses. The moderate psychological and 
physical pressure can amount to torture. 
49 Children of foreign workers (many of them illegal workers) have no access to education. Israeli Arabs still do 
not have the same quality education as Jews. Schools in Arab communities are dilapidated and overcrwded, lack 
special education services and counselors, have poor libraries and have no sports facilities. The public school 
curriculum stresses Israel’s Jewish culture and heritage. Israeli-Arab students are not eligible to participate in a 
special education program to provide academic assistance to students from disadvantaged backgrounds. A High 
Court special committee is still studying the problem. 
50 According to press reports an estimated  60.000 women and girls were sexually assaulted or abused, an 
estimated 60% of them were girls under the age of 18.The increasing number of reported cases of child abuse is 
probably due to increased awareness and not necessarily part of a pattern of abuse. 
51 Primarily among Israeli Arabs and new Jewish immigrants. 
52 There are several hundred child prostitutes in the country. The Governemnt is currently trying to evaluate the 
problem. 
53 Separate sections of holding facilities set aside for the detention of children were overcrowded, had poor 
physical conditions, lack of social workers and denial of visits by parents. Some Israeli minors held in criminal 
cases and juveniles were held among Palestinian detainees. 
54 Israeli Arabs do not enjoy the same standard housing as Jews. 
55 Trafficking in women and girls has become a significant problem in recent years. 
56 One Palestinian died in custody. Alledgedly he had a heart condition which was worsened by poor prison 
conditions. 
57 Conditions at some national police detention facilities (which become de facto prisons) can fall below minimum 
international standards. Conditions are worse for security detainees at police facilities and in IPS (Israeli Prison 
Service) prisons. Dilpidation and overcrowding are still problems, this is aggravated by the closure of IDF 
detention facilities in the occupied territories. New legislation on the minimum standards for detainees was 
enacted in 1997. The Government took steps towards implementing the legislation, however serious problems 
remain. IDF detention facilities also have poor conditions. The conditions at the IDF Detention camp, the Russian 
Compound, have been very much criticised and High Court of Justice President Aharon Barak described 
conditions as “not fit to serve as lock-up”. Since 1998 conditions have improved somewhat. 
58 There still were some cases of torture. However a variety of abusive practices, such as violent shaking, painful 
shackling in contorted positions, sleep deprivations for extended periods of time and prolonged exposure to 
extreme temperatures, was prohibited by the High Court. There were no cases of such abuse after the ruling. The 
High Court did leave open the possibility that such practices could be acceptable if authorized by new legislation. 
59 Children of foreign workers (many of them illegal workers) have no access to education. Israeli Arabs still do 
not have the same quality education as Jews. Schools in Arab communities are dilapidated and overcrwded, lack 
special education services and counselors, have poor libraries and have no sports facilities. The public school 
curriculum stresses Israel’s Jewish culture and heritage. Israeli-Arab students are not eligible to participate in a 
special education program to provide academic assistance to students from disadvantaged backgrounds. A High 
Court special committee is still studying the problem. 
60 The increasing number of reported cases of child abuse is probably due to increased awareness and not 
necessarily part of a pattern of abuse. 
61 Primarily among Israeli Arabs and new Jewish immigrants. 
62 There are several hundred child prostitutes in the country. The Governemnt is currently trying to evaluate the 
problem. 
63 Separate sections of holding facilities set aside for the detention of children were overcrowded, had poor 
physical conditions, lack of social workers and denial of visits by parents. Some Israeli minors held in criminal 
cases and juveniles were held among Palestinian detainees. 
64 Israeli Arabs do not enjoy the same standard housing as Jews. 
65 At a demonstration against the destruction of an Israeli-Arab owned house there was use of excessive force. 
66 13 Arab citizens were killed when police used excessive force to disperse demonstrations. Moreover coinciding 
with violence in Israel 3 person were killed when police used excessive force in dispersing demonstration along 
the Israeli-Lebanese border. And 2 Arab citizens were killed when they tried to defend their property against an 
attack by Jewish citizens. It is not clear whether they were killed by police or by jews. In any case the police failed 
to protect the Arab citizens. 
67 Conditions at some national police detention facilities (which become de facto prisons)are poor. Conditions are 
worse for security detainees at police facilities and in IPS (Israeli Prison Service) prisons. Dilpidation and 
overcrowding are still problems, this is aggravated by the closure of IDF detention facilities in the occupied 
                                                                                                                                                           
territories. New legislation on the minimum standards for detainees was enacted in 1997. The Government took 
steps significant towards implementing the legislation, however serious problems remain. IDF detention facilities 
also have poor conditions. The conditions at the IDF Detention camp, the Russian Compound, have been very 
much criticised and High Court of Justice President Aharon Barak described conditions as “not fit to serve as lock-
up”. Since 1998 conditions have improved somewhat. Another problem is that of physical abse against Palestinian 
detainees. In May Palestinian detainees throughout the country began a hunger strike to protest prison conditions 
and their further incarceration (many palestinians are held without charge). The Government agreed to remove the 
prisoners from solitary confinement and to allow family visits. 
68 Since the landmark High Court 1999 decision NGO’s have been unable to substantiate sporadic allegations of 
torture.  
69 Children of foreign workers (many of them illegal workers) have no access to education. Israeli Arabs still do 
not have the same quality education as Jews. Schools in Arab communities are dilapidated and overcrwded, lack 
special education services and counselors, have poor libraries and have no sports facilities. The public school 
curriculum stresses Israel’s Jewish culture and heritage. Israeli-Arab students are not eligible to participate in a 
special education program to provide academic assistance to students from disadvantaged backgrounds. A 
commission on that examined the implementation of the Special Education Law came with recommendations that 
were not taken over by the government by year’s end. A study revealed only 54% of Arab students finish high 
school compared with 89% of Jewish students.  
70 Women’s organisations estimate the number of women and girls sexually assaulted is at 2800 (1200 were victim 
of incest), an estimated 44% of them were girls under the age of 18.The increasing number of reported cases of 
child abuse is probably due to increased awareness and not necessarily part of a pattern of abuse. 
71 Primarily among Israeli Arabs and new Jewish immigrants. 
72 There are several hundred child prostitutes in the country. The Governemnt is currently trying to evaluate the 
problem. 
73 Separate sections of holding facilities set aside for the detention of children were overcrowded, had poor 
physical conditions, lack of social workers and denial of visits by parents. Some Israeli minors held in criminal 
cases and juveniles were held among Palestinian detainees. Chilren’s rights activists won a court battle to get 
separate prison facilities built for Arab and Jewish children. 
74 The Government follows a disproportionally restrictive policy in issueing building permits to Arab citizens, 
resulting in the issuance of proportionally more building demolition orders against Arab-built structures. Also see 
“Political and Historical overview 2000” for problems related to JNF. 
75 Conditions at some national police detention facilities (which become de facto prisons)are poor. Conditions are 
worse for security detainees at police facilities and in IPS (Israeli Prison Service) prisons. Dilpidation and 
overcrowding are still problems, this is aggravated by the closure of IDF detention facilities in the occupied 
territories. New legislation on the minimum standards for detainees was enacted in 1997. The Government 
continued to take significant steps towards implementing the legislation, however serious problems remain (such 
as the care of prisoners with a mental illness). IDF detention facilities also have poor conditions. Following the 
closure of detention centers in the occupied territories in 1995, all security detainees from the occupied territories 
are held in Israel. The conditions at the IDF Detention camp, the Russian Compound, have been very much 
criticised and High Court of Justice President Aharon Barak described conditions as “not fit to serve as lock-up”. 
Since 1998 conditions have improved somewhat. Another problem is that of physical abse against Palestinian 
detainees. Following the violence in September 2000 there were very limited visitation rights (only somewhat 
restored after intervention by the ICRC). Also only Jewish and Palestinian lawyers with a Jerusalem identification 
card were allowed to visit clients. 
76 Despite the 1999 high court decision, HRW, B’Tselem, LAW and the Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners 
reported a sharp increase in the number of allegations that security forces were using torture. 
77 Children of foreign workers (many of them illegal workers) have no access to education. Israeli Arabs still do 
not have the same quality education as Jews. Arab children make up approx. 25% of the public school population. 
Schools in Arab communities are dilapidated and overcrwded, lack special education services and counselors, 
have poor libraries and have no sports facilities. The public school curriculum stresses Israel’s Jewish culture and 
heritage. The government allocated 26% of the school budget for the year for the construction of new classrooms 
for schools in Arab Communities. Israeli-Arab students are not eligible to participate in a special education 
program to provide academic assistance to students from disadvantaged backgrounds. The government still has 
not taken up a special commission’s  recommendations about this problem. However the government did pledge to 
equalize special education ressources by 2005. A HRW report confirmed discrimination in education between 
Arab and Jewish children.  
78 Women’s organisations estimate the number of women and girls sexually assaulted is at 2800 (1200 were victim 
of incest), an estimated 44% of them were girls under the age of 18.The increasing number of reported cases of 
child abuse is probably due to increased awareness and not necessarily part of a pattern of abuse. 
79 Primarily among Israeli Arabs and new Jewish immigrants. 
80 There are several hundred child prostitutes in the country. The Governemnt is currently trying to evaluate the 
problem. 
81 Separate sections of holding facilities set aside for the detention of children were overcrowded, had poor 
physical conditions, lack of social workers and denial of visits by parents. Some Israeli minors held in criminal 
                                                                                                                                                           
cases and juveniles were held among Palestinian detainees. Chilren’s rights activists won a court battle to get 
separate prison facilities built for Arab and Jewish children separate from the adult prison population. 
82 The Government follows a disproportionally restrictive policy in issueing building permits to Arab citizens, 
resulting in the issuance of proportionally more building demolition orders against Arab-built structures. Also see 
“Political and Historical overview 2000” for problems related to JNF. 
83 There was a sharp increase in the number of Palestinian detainees. Those held for security reasons were usually 
held in IDF’s Megiddo prison, in IPS facilities and in special sections of police detention centres. They were 
subjected to a different regime and conditions were poor. Separate sections of holding facilities set aside for the 
detention of children were overcrowded, had poor physical conditions, lack of social workers and denial of visits 
by parents. Some Israeli minors held in criminal cases and juveniles were held among Palestinian detainees. 
Chilren’s rights activists won a court battle to get separate prison facilities built for Arab and Jewish children 
separate from the adult prison population. Problems remained with regard to family visits and access to lawyers. 
Conditions at some national police detention facilities remained poor. They have become de facto prisons and 
inmates at these facilities were not afforded the same rights as those in the IPS system. There were no programs to 
improve prison conditions by year’s end. 
84 Conditions at the Russian Compound were extremely poor. It is the first time the report states the conditions are 
extremely poor. However the exact quote says: “Conditions at the Russian Compound remained extremely 
poor”(emphasis added). 
85 There was a reported in increase in allegations of security force torture. 
86 Approx. 25% of school children are Arab Israelis. Government allocates proportionally less ressources to Arab 
schools than Jewish schools. Many schools in Arab communities were dilapidated and overcroded, lacked special 
education services and counselors, had poor libraries, and had no sport facilities. 26 percent of the school budget 
was allocated to the construction of new classrooms for schools in Arab communities. The public school 
curriculum stresses Israel’s Jewish culture and heritage. Arab students were not eligible to participate in a special 
education program to provide academic assistance to students from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
87 Women’s organisations estimate the number of women and girls sexually assaulted is at 3000 (1000 were victim 
of incest), an estimated 45% of them were girls under the age of 18. The increasing number of reported cases of 
child abuse is probably due to increased awareness and not necessarily part of a pattern of abuse. 
88 The small number of child workers can be found primarily among Israeli Arabs and new Jewish immigrants. 
89 There are several hundred child prostitutes in the country. The Government is currently trying to evaluate the 
problem. 
90 Some security detainees were minors. Separate sections of holding facilities set aside for the detention of 
children were overcrowded, had poor physical conditions, lack of social workers and denial of visits by parents. 
There were separate prison facilities for Arab and Jewish children separate from the adult prison population. 
Children of foreign workers (many of them illegal workers) have no access to education. 
91 The Government follows a disproportionally restrictive policy in issueing building permits to Arab citizens. 
92 In May the Government destroyed 52 Bedouin homes. In addition The Israel Land Administration destroyed 
Bedouin wheat fields with chemical defoliant as the fields had been planted on unrecognized land. 
   
Occupied territories 
(Population: Gaza Strip:1,274,868; West Bank: 2,237,194) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Political 
Terrorscale 4/4 4/3 4/3 4/4 
Conflict Level Low-intensity conflict 
Low-intensity 
conflict 
Low-intensity 
conflict 
Low-intensity 
conflict 
Freedom 
House     
U.S. State 
Department 
E1, p2, T3, AE4, DH5, 
D6 
E7, p8, T9, AE10, 
CL11, D12 
E13, T14, AE15, CL16, 
D17 
E18, t19, AE20, CL21,  
D22 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Political 
Terrorscale 4/4 9/4 9/4 4/4 
Conflict Level 
Low intensity 
conflict (great 
increase in first five 
months) 
 
Low intensity 
conflict (less 
casualties than the 
previous year) 
Low intensity 
conflict (Increase in 
casualties) 
Freedom 
House     
U.S. State 
Department 
E23, t24, AE25, CL26, 
D27 
E28, p, t29, AE30, 
CL31, D32  
e33, p34, t35, AE36, 
CL37, D38 
e39, p40, t41, AE42, 
CL43, D44 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Political 
Terrorscale     
Conflict Level 
Violent political 
conflict (decrease in 
casualties) 
Violent political 
conflict (decrease in 
casualties) 
Violent political 
conflict (decrease in 
casualties) 
low intensity conflict 
(specifically after 
September) 
Freedom 
House     
U.S. State 
Department e
45, p46, t47, AE48, D49 e50, p51, t52, AE53, D54 e55, p56, t57, AE58 E
59, p60, (t)61, D62, 
AE63, FE64 
 
 2001 2002 
Political 
Terrorscale   
Conflict Level 
low intensity conflict 
(sharp increase in 
casualties) 
high intensity 
conflict (around 1150 
casualties)
Freedom 
House   
U.S. State 
Department 
E65, p66, T67, AE68, 
PC69, D70,  FE71, IF72 
E73, p74, T75, D76, 
AE77, IF78 
 
 
Working conditions: 
 
1990: According to international labor organizations, health and safety conditions in some factories do 
not meet industry standards established by the ILO. 
1991: According to international labor organizations, health and safety conditions in some factories do 
not meet industry standards established by the ILO. 
1992: Health and safety conditions in some factories do not meet industry standards established by 
international labour union organisations. 
1993: Health and safety conditions in some factories do not meet industry standards established by 
international labour union organisations. 
1994: The Israeli Ministry of Labor’s Office of Inspection Services has been responsible for enforcing 
safety standards in the West Bank. It maintains that it has undertaken inspections, however, Palestinian 
factories and other businesses in the West Bank and Gaza often do not meet international standards. 
1995: The Israeli Ministry of Labor’s Office of Inspection Services has been responsible for enforcing 
safety standards in the West Bank. It maintains that it has undertaken inspections, however, Palestinian 
factories and other businesses in the West Bank and Gaza often do not meet international standards. 
 
Brief historical/political overview 
1987: In December there is a dramatic outburst of civilian unrest and violence. 
1989: The violence of 1987 continues and it has been far more widespread and intensive than at any time 
before. 432 Palestinians died of intifada-related violence, of whom 304 were killed by Israeli security 
forces and settlers and 128 by other palestinians. 13 Israelis, soldiers and civilians, were killed by 
Palestinians. Important in the 1989 report is the sharp increase in violence between Palestinians. 
Hundreds of curfews, some lasting several weeks, were imposed. These curfews caused severe hardship. 
Crimes against Israelis are punished more severely that crimes against Palestinians. 
1990: The violence and crackdown of this violence from 1987 continued into 1990. The violence 
somewhat declined in July, August and September. However a series of incidents and the support by 
Palestinians of Saddam Hussain led to heightening tensions in the last quarter of the year. There was a 
great increase in the number of killings by Palestinians on Palestinians (165). 130 Palestinians were 
killed by Israeli security forces and 11 by Israeli civilians. In the last part of 1990 endorsements of “all 
forms of struggle” against Israel, including “massive martyrdom” and “suicide operations”, appeared in 
intifada-related literature. These were accompanied by an increase in violence. The number of curfews 
and their length declined during the year. Settlers involved in security violations are treated far more 
leniently than Palestinians. Under the system of dual governance Palestinians are treated less favorably 
than Israeli settlers on a broad range of issues. 
1991: The violence was significantly reduced. As a result of Palestinian support for Iraq during the Gulf 
War Israel imposed a month long 24 hour curfew on Gaza and the West Bank. This caused great 
hardship. Palestinians killed 12 Israeli soldiers and citizens. Four Palestinians were killed by Israeli 
citizens. 97 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces. 140 Palestinians were killed by other 
Palestinians. Settlers involved in security violations are treated far more leniently than Palestinians. 
Under the system of dual governance Palestinians are treated less favorably than Israeli settlers on a 
broad range of issues. Prior to the Gulf War gas masks were distributed to Israeli citizens, but not to 
Palestinians. 
1992: Negotiations, including the subject of elections, between Palestinians are ongoing to establish an 
interim self-governing authority which would give Palestinians greater control over the economic and 
political decisions affecting their lives. Violence continued to subside in 1992. 182 Palestinians were 
killed by fellow Palestinians. 158 Palestinians were killed by security forces, including 45 that were 
killed by undercover units. 23 Israeli soldiers and civilians were killed by Palestinians. Curfews were 
used less extensively. Crimes against Israelis are punished more severely that crimes against 
Palestinians. Palestinians are treated less favorably than Israeli settlers on a broad range of issues. 415 
alleged members of Hamas were deported to Lebanon. 
1993: Violence and confrontation increased dramatically during the first five months of the year. After a 
series of killings and stabbings of Israeli soldiers and civilians in Israel and the occupied territories 
during the first 3 months of the year. Israeli decided to seal of indefinitely West Bank, Gaza from 
Jerusalem and Israel. This caused, among others, a deterioration of the economic situation. On 
September 13 the Declaration of Principles on a gradual transfer of authority from Israel to an interim 
Palestinian self governing authority is signed. The Declaration lays out a timetable for Israeli withdrawal 
from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, scheduled to be completed in the first quarter of 1994. In addition the 
Declaration calls for the redeployment of Israeli security forces away from populated areas in the West 
Bank by as early as July 1994, which is the target date for election of Palestinian Council and for the 
dissolution of the Israeli-military backed CIVAD which has administered the occupied territories since 
1981. Through this process, Palestinians will also assume early responsibility for functions such as the 
health sector, educational, cultural, and socila welfare affairs; tourism; and taxation. The Palestinians are 
also to create a Palestinian police force for the occupied territories. Israelis are to continue to control 
external security, internal security, and public order, in Israeli settlements, foreign relations, and other 
areas until an agreement on permanent status is achieved. All 415 deported alleged Hamas members 
were allowed to return. Six settlers were killed by Palestinians. 8 Palestinians were killed by settlers. 
Curfews were used less frequently in West Bank. However curfews were used extensively in Gaza. 49 
Israelis were killed in the occupied territories by Palestinians attacks. 79 Palestinians were killed by 
fellow Palestinians. 184 Palestinians were killed by security forces. 
1994: In May Israel began transferring most responsibilities for civil government in the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho Area to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Palestinians killed 23 Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza 
and 52 within Israel. Israeli settlers killed 37 Palestinians. (most, 29 killed, in one incident). Palestinians 
killed 65 Palestinians. 108 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces. After 40 Israelis died in a 
series of terrorist attacks the GSS decided in November to allow interrogators greater flexibility in 
applying guidelines established by the 1987 Landau Commission. 
1995: The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (the Interim 
Agreement) is signed on September 28, 1995. Late 1995 Israel begins redeploying its forces from the 
West Bank and turning over major towns and surrounding villages to PA administration. Now the PA 
exercises authority over about 2.2 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Interim 
Agreement also provides for the redeployment of Israeli Forces and modalities for elections for the 
Palestinian Council and the chief executive of its Executive Authority. In January 1996 Palestinians 
voted in their first democratically elected representative body. Arafat was elected chief executive of the 
88-member Palestinian Council, with 89% of votes. Though there were some irregularities the elections 
were generally satisfactory. Number of killings dropped dramatically and the number of confrontations 
between security forces and Palestinians also declined dramatically over the past two years. Four 
palestinians were killed by settlers. Isreali security forces killed 47 Palestinians. Israeli settlers are 
treated more favorably than Palestinians under the laws governing the territories. 
1996: Economic situation deteriorated significantly due to closures. Three Palestinians were killed by 
settlers. 8 Palestinians were killed by other Palestinians. Palestinians killed 4 Osraeli soldiers and 
civilians in the West Bank and PA areas and 58 people in terrorist bombings in Israel. Opening of 
controversial tunnel in Jerusalem’s old city sparks of mass demonstrations and violence. 
1997: Negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories as well as of Jerusalem, borders, Israeli 
settlements, refugees and other matters began in May 1996, were immediately adjourned and have not as 
yet started. At least 25 Israelis killed by Palestinians. 10 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces. 2 
Palestinians killed by other Palestinians. 
1998: Permanent status talks resumed in November. Israel more frequently tightened closures in the 
latter half of the year. Sixteen Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces. Eight Palestinians were 
killed by Israeli citizens. Nine Israelis were killed by Palestinian terrorist groups. 
1999: Permanent status talks continued. Less stringent application of closure policy than in previous 
year. There were no “internal”closures (closures preventing flow of goods and persons between towns 
and villages in the West Bank). Israel’s human rights record improved. PA human rights record 
worsened. One Palestinian was killed by an Israeli citizen. Two Palestinians were killed by Israeli 
security forces. In a shootout one undercover Israeli policeman and one HAMAS terrorist was killed. 
2000: Following the visit, on September 28, to Temple Mount, by oposition leader Ariel Sharon, 
violence erupted. Since this eruption clashes between Palestinians and IDF soldiers occurred daily. The 
uprising is known as the “al-Aqsa Intifada”. Due to the unrest there were a total of 88 days of tightened 
closures and 81 days of internal closures. This is a sharp increase from 1999. The closures severely 
empoverished Palestinians. Israeli human rights record improved slightly during the first nine months of 
the year, but worsened after the outbreak of violence. 307 Palestinians were killed by security forces. 82 
of those killed were under the age of 18. A number of Palestinians were killed in targeted shootings. 7 
Palestinians died in shelling of PA institutions. Pa human rights record worsened after the eruption of 
violence. Several Israelis were killed by PA security forces. Settlers killed 14 Palestinians. Palestinians 
killed at least 18 Israeli civilians. Seven Israelis were killed in bomb attacks. 
2001: Nature of the violence by Palestinians changed, as there were more armed attacks and acts of 
terrorism. Efforts to curb the violence by way of recommendations by the Mitchell Committee and the 
Tenet plan failed. Closures and increased restrictions further empoverished the Palestinian economy. 
There 210 days of total external closures and 155 days of partial external closure. (compared to 88 in 
2000 and 15 in 1999). There were 87 days of limited internal closure and 278 days of severe internal 
closure in the West Bank (81 days in 2000 and none in 1999). There were 361 days of limited internal 
closure and 4 days of severe internal closure in Gaza. Israeli human rights record continued to 
deteriorate. At least 501 Palestinians and 1 foreign national were killed by security forces. This figure of 
501 included: at least 33 Palestinians were killed in targetted killings; at least 18 other persons, including 
4 children, killed by Israeli forces in those operations were bystanders, relatives, or associates of those 
killed; 93 Palestinians were killed in shelling of PA institutions and Palestinian civilian areas; 68 
Palestinians were killed during incursions into Palestinian controlled territory; and at least 32 
Palestinians died because the were refused medical assistance. At least 19 Palestinians were killed by 
Israeli settlers. Palestinians killed 87 Israelis (including 51 by terrorist acts). Palestinians killed at least 
22 Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel. Israel’s Minister for Tourism is killed. Children 
were badly affected by the violent security situation, which interfered with learning and which was 
manifesting itself in lack of focus, nightmares, daytime and nightmare incontinence, and other 
behavioral problems. 
2002: Nature of the violence changed more and was marked by increased military operations and armed 
attacks and terrorism by Palestinians against Israeli targets. By year’s end, Israel reasserted military 
control, which placed all major West Bank cities except Jericho under IDF control. Closures continued 
to affect the Palestinian economy. Poverty and unemployment increased during the year. Israel imposed 
complete external closure on the West Bank and strict internal closure in the West Bank, for the entire 
year. Israeli forces further imposed extended curfews on Palestinian towns or neighborhoods. 990 
Palestinians and 2 foreign nationals were killed by Israeli forces. At least 37 Palestinians were killed in 
targeted killings. During these actions 25 bystanders (including 13 children) were killed. At least five 
Palestinians were killed by settlers. Palestinians killed 189 Israelis (civilians and security personnel). 
Palestinians killed at least 35 Palestinians suspected of collaboration with Isael. Incursion into Jenin: 140 
homes destroyed, 200 others structurally unsound and 52 Palestinians killed (including 22 unarmed 
civilians). Israeli and the PA sanctioned the voluntary agreement of 13 Palestinian gunmen to go into 
exile in Europe and another 35 to Gaza in a negotiated resolution of the standoff at the Church of the 
Nativity in Bethlehem in the spring. Children were badly affected by the violent security situation, which 
interfered with learning and which was manifesting itself in lack of focus, nightmares, daytime and 
nightmare incontinence, and other behavioral problems. 
                                                 
1 Ten detainees died after severe beatings. There are allegations that Israeli security forces or Palestinians working for them 
have intentionally killed Palestinian activists. Israel denies this. Moreover security forces used excessive lethal force trying to 
disperse demonstrations. This resulted in around 400 deaths. 
2 Serious overcrowding in at least one IDF detention centre and conditions in military detention facilities varied. Several 
prison riots and hunger strikes were held to protest against prison conditions.  
3 Severe beatings is torture and several torture techniques were said to be applied by security forces. Although in 1987 the 
Landau Commission condemned the use of torture it did distinguish it from “a moderate measure of physical pressure”. 
4 Israel kept all Palestinian Universities closed during the year. The vocational, secondary and elementary schools in the West 
Bank. closed in January, reopened in July and August, but were closed again in mid-November. Schools in Gaza and East 
Jerusalem were open for most of the year. Alternate, of-campus classrooms organized by parents and teachers were banned 
on security grounds, although some continued to operate. 
5 Discrimination which favors settlers. 
6 During the year 170 houses were demolished or sealed for security reasons (88 demolished, 82 sealed) for security reasons.  
7 Five wanted Palestinian activists were intentionally killed by security forces according to several human rights groups. 
During the year 130 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces. At least a number of those were killed using excessive 
lethal force. During the year Israeli authorities received complaints on 3 Palestinian deaths attributed to beatings. 
8 Serious overcrowding in at least one IDF detention centre and conditions in military detention facilities varied.  
9 The report enumerates a number of interrogation techniques, they are considered torture. Although in 1987 the Landau 
Commission condemned the use of torture it did distinguish it from “a moderate measure of physical pressure”.  
10 Schools, colleges and universities reopened during the year. However they were temporarily closed during certain periods 
and four West Bank and Gaza universities remained closed during the whole year. 
11 Underage labour is used in the agricultural sector and in some West Bank and Gaza factories. 
12 94 houses were demolished and 83 houses were sealed, for security reasons. This is a slight increase from the preious year. 
150 houses were demolished in the West Bank, because they were built without a permit. 
13 27 Palestinians, many of whom were unarmed are known to have been killed by nonuniformed security personnel. 
Palestinian and human rights groups claim that many of these individuals were killed without warning or after surrendering or 
having been subdued. 97 Palestinians were killed by security forces, some of these will have been the result of excessive use 
of force. 
14 There were credible reports of torture. Among these reports were eight allegations of electric shock torture. Many of the 
torture takes place just after arrest or within days after arrest. 
15 Schools were open for 40% of the time, due to strikes and curfews. One university remained closed. 
16 Underage labour is used in the agricultural sector and in some West Bank and Gaza factories. 
17 55 houses were demolished and 62 sealed for security reasons. Israeli authorities report 43 demolitions and 58 sealings. 
18 45 Palestinians,  two-thirds of whom were unarmed, are known to have been killed by nonuniformed security personnel. 
Palestinian and human rights groups claim that some could have been aprehended without killing them. 5 Palestinians were 
killed in custody, two of which apparently were suicides. 158 Palestinians were killed by security forces, some of these will 
have been the result of excessive use of force. 
19 There was widespread abuse, some of which amounted totorture.  
20 Individual schools were closed for periods during the year. The last Palestinian university to be closed was reopened in 
April. Closures affected the possibility of access to education. 
21 Underage labour is used in the agricultural sector and in some West Bank and Gaza factories. 
22 12 houses were demolished and 33 sealed for security reasons. 
23 27 Palestinians were killed by undercover units disguised as Palestinians. Palestinian and human rights groups claim that 
some could have been aprehended without killing them. Some of the deaths could have been extrajudicial killings. 184 
Palestinians were killed by security forces, some of these will have been the result of excessive use of force. At least one 
Palestinian was killed in an extrajudicial killing when in custody of the Israelis. In all six palestinians died in Israeli custody. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Four of which seem to have died from natural causes. However it seems that the lack of prompt and adequate medical 
attention has contributed to three of these deaths. 
24 There was widespread abuse, some of which amounted torture.  
25 Closures disrupted the acces to education. Many Palestinian women face lack of education. Schools reamin overcrowded 
and underfunded, Closings by both Israel and Palestinian activists enforcing strikes have had a negative imact on the access to 
education. 
26 Underage labour is used in the agricultural sector and in some West Bank and Gaza factories. 
27 3 houses were demolished and 27 sealed for security reasons. Houses were also severely damaged and destroyed because of 
the use of heavy weapons by Israelis targeting houses believed to hide security suspects. 220 houses were reportedly 
destroyed or partially damaged. 
28 13 Palestinians were killed by undercover units disguised as Palestinians. Palestinian and human rights groups claim that 
some could have been aprehended without killing them. Some of the deaths could have been extrajudicial killings. 108 
Palestinians were killed by security forces, some of these will have been the result of excessive use of force.  
29 There was widespread abuse, some of which amounted torture.  
30 Most Palestinians encountered problems in getting permits, including permits to study. Closures hampered the flow of 
students. 
31 Underage labour is used in the agricultural sector and in some West Bank and Gaza factories. 
32 1 house were demolished and 5 sealed for security reasons. 12 houses were destroyed when Israeli forces used heavy 
weapons to destroy houses believed to be hiding places for security suspects. 
33 10 Palestians were killed by Israeli undercover units disguised as Palestinians. At least some of the Palestinians were killed 
without an opportunity to surrender and when they could be captured alive. 1 Palestinian died in Israeli detention as a result 
of torture. Some others died apparently, because of a lack of prompt and adequate medical care. 47 persons were killed by 
Israeli security forces, some of which might have been/or were the consequence of excessive lethal force. 
34 Conditions are harsh. Palestinian inmates undertook several hunger strikes. Prisoners criticized overcrowding, 
mistreatment, filthy and deteriorating conditions of cells and tents, inadequate medical care, extended use of solitary 
confinement, and in some cases, lack of visits by lawyers. 
35 There was widespread abuse, some of which amounted torture. Though there was a sharp decrease in the number of arrests 
there was a sharp increase in the number of complaints of torture. Interrogators are allowed to use ‘special measures’ that 
exceed the use of “moderate physical and psychological pressure” allowed in the Landau Commission guidelines when it is 
deemed necessary to obtain information that could potentially save Israeli lives in certain “ticking bomb” cases. There is a 
growing public debate whether some of those “special measures” (also used during the year) constitute torture. 
36 Most Palestinians encountered problems in getting permits, including permits to study. Closures hampered the flow of 
students. 
37 Underage labour is used in the agricultural sector and in some West Bank and Gaza factories. 
38 One house was demolished for security reasons. One staircase in a house was sealed. 5 houses were destroyed in military 
operations. 
39 4 Palestinians were killed by Israeli undercover units disguised as Palestinians. At least some of the Palestinians were killed 
without an opportunity to surrender and when they could be captured alive. One Palestinian was shot by soldiers at a 
checkpoint after having obeyed a stop sign, but put his vehicle in reverse. 2 Palestinians died in Israeli detention as a result of 
torture, one of them seems to have ben tortured by fellow Palestinian inmates. 59 persons were killed by Israeli security 
forces, some of which were the result of excessive lethal force. 
40 Conditions are poor. Facilities are overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and medical care is inadequate. 
41 There was widespread abuse, some of which amounted torture. Israeli authorities also frequently treat Palestinians in an 
abusive manner at checkpoints. Complaints of such abuse increased. 
42 Most Palestinians encountered problems in getting permits, including permits to study. Closures hampered the flow of 
students. 
43 Underage labour is used in the agricultural sector and in some West Bank and Gaza factories. 
44 Eight houses were demolished for security reasons. One house was sealed. Eight houses where suspected/convicted 
suicidebombers lived were destroyed. 
45 2 Palestinians were killed by Israeli undercover units disguised as Palestinians. One of those who died was beaten to death 
and denied medical care for a gunshot wound to the leg. 1 Palestinians died in Israeli detention as a result of a beating. 4 
Palestininas were killed at checkpoints after either having failed to stop or having tried to attack the security forces. 10 
persons were killed by Israeli security forces, some of which were the result of excessive lethal force.  
46 Conditions are poor. Facilities are overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and medical care is inadequate. 
47 There was widespread abuse, some of which amounted torture. Israeli authorities also frequently treat Palestinians in an 
abusive manner at checkpoints. 
48 Most Palestinians encountered problems in getting permits, including permits to study. Closures hampered the flow of 
students. 
49 Eight houses were destroyed.  
50 4 Palestininas were killed at checkpoints after having failed to stop or having tried to attack the security forces, according 
to Israeli authorities. Palestinians dispute these accounts. 16 persons were killed by Israeli security forces, some of which 
were the result of excessive lethal force. Two Palestinian security detainees died in custody. One died from an alleged suicide 
attempt and the other due to inadequate medical treatment and subsequent mistreatment. 
51 Conditions are poor. Facilities are overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and medical care is inadequate. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
52 There was widespread abuse, some of which amounted torture. B’tselem found that a large percentage of Palestinian 
detainees it surveyed  had been tortured while in Israeli detention. Israeli authorities also frequently treat Palestinians in an 
abusive manner at checkpoints. 
53 Most Palestinians encountered problems in getting permits, including permits to study. Closures hampered the flow of 
students. 
54 One house was destroyed.  
55 Three Palestinians were killed at checkpoints after having failed to stop or having tried to attack the security forces, 
according to Israeli authorities. Palestinians dispute these accounts. 2 persons were killed by Israeli security forces, these 
deaths were the result of excessive lethal force.  
56 Conditions are poor. Facilities are overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and medical care is inadequate. 
57 Israeli forces abused, and in some cases tortured detainees. In a September landmark decision by the Israeli High Court of 
Jjustice, the court prohibited the use of a variety of abusive practices, including violent shaking, painful shackling in 
contorted positions, sleep deprivation for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure to extreme periods. Following the 
ruling there were no credible reports of such abuses by security forces. The court explicitely rejected claims by the Israeli 
Government that the practices mentioned were “moderate physical pressure” and therefore permissible under the law, though 
the possibility was left open that such practices might be acceptable if specifically authorized by new legislation. Israeli 
authorities also sometimes treat Palestinians in an abusive manner at checkpoints. 
58 Most Palestinians encountered problems in getting permits, including permits to study. Closures hampered the flow of 
students. Israeli permit policies affect Palestinian schools as they have not always been built with the right permits. 
59 307 Palestinians were killed by security forces, of which 227 (and 4 foreign nationals) were killed after the outbreak of 
violence. In many instances security forces used excessive force. 82 of those killed were under the age of 18. 10 Palestinians 
were deliberately targeted by the IDF. During these incidents 6 Palestinian bystanders were killed. Many Palestinians were 
shot in unclear circumstances. Prior to the outbreak 3 Palestinians were killed at checkpoints. Circumstances surrounding 
these deaths are unclear. One Palestinian died in Israeli custody. 
60 Conditions are poor. Facilities are overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and medical care is inadequate. 
61 Due to the outbreak of violence, Human rights groups have not been able to substantiate sporadic claims of torture. Israeli 
authorities also frequently treat Palestinians in an abusive manner at checkpoints. 
62 Three homes were destroyed by security forces. From late September through the end of the year the IDF destroyed 
numerous citrus orchards, olive and date groves, and irrigation systems on Palestinian-owned agricultural land. Property was 
severely damaged in attacks by Israeli tanks and helicopters. 
63 Most Palestinians encountered problems in getting permits, including permits to study. Closures hampered the flow of 
students. Closures affected student’s ability to attend school. In areas under curfew all classes were cancelled. Furthermore, 
teachers were unable to reach their schools in different villages and towns. 
64 300 Bedouin farmers were expelled from their homes in caves near a jewish settlement. Although the High Court ordered 
that the farmers were allowed back, the IDF issued new deportation orders to those farmers that were not party to the original 
legal suit. The farmers were deported in 1999, but the report of 2000 mentions them for the first time. The High Court 
decision stems from 2000. 
65 At least 501 Palestinians and 1 foreign national were killed by security forces. The security forces frequently used 
excessive force. At least 33 Palestinians were killed in targetted killings. At least 18 other persons, including 4 children, 
killed by Israeli forces in those operations were bystanders, relatives, or associates of those killed. 93 Palestinians were killed 
in shelling of PA institutions and Palestinian civilian areas. 68 Palestinians were killed during incursions into Palestinian 
controlled territory. At least 32 Palestinians died because the were refused medical assistance. A number of persons were 
killed “in ambiguous circumstances that appeared to involve the excessive use of force”. At least two Palestinian prisoners 
died in Israeli custody. 
66 Conditions are poor. Facilities are overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and medical care is inadequate. 
67 There was a great increase in the number of reports of torture. All techniques banned by a Septmeber 1999 High Court 
ruling were used again. 
68 Most Palestinians encountered problems in getting permits, including permits to study. Closures hampered the flow of 
students. Closures affected student’s ability to attend school. In areas under curfew all classes were cancelled. Furthermore, 
teachers were unable to reach their schools in different villages and towns. East Jerusalem schools remained underfunded and 
overcrowded, and many students were denied an education in public schools due to lack of space. 
69 Some 80 minors were held in cells together with convicted adult Israeli criminals. These children were frequently abused 
by the adults and prison staff. 
70 Numerous houses were destroyed by security forces without permission. The IDF destroyed numerous citrus orchards, 
olive and date groves, and irrigation systems on Palestinian-owned agricultural land. Property was severely damaged in 
attacks by Israeli tanks and helicopters. 
71 Bedouin farmers and their families were expelled from their homes in caves near a jewish settlement. In 2000 the High 
Court ordered that the farmers expelled in 1999 were allowed back, the IDF issued new deportation orders to those farmers 
that were not party to the original legal suit. These deportations were given effect in 2001. 
72 Due to the closures there was a shortage of water and food. 
73 990 Palestinians and 2 foreign nationals were killed by Israeli forces. The security forces frequenntly used excessive force. 
At least 37 Palestinians were killed in targeted killings. During these actions 25 bystanders (including 13 children) were 
killed. At least 14 Palestinians died because the were refused medical assistance. 2 Palestinians were killed in custody. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
74 Conditions for Palestinians in Israeli prisons are poor. Facilities are overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and at times food and 
clothing were insufficient. The authorities were ill-prepared for the great number of arrests and failed to accommodate the 
thousands of Palestinians properly. 
75 There was a another increase in the number of reports of torture. All techniques banned by a Septmeber 1999 High Court 
ruling were used again. Many Palestinians were abused at chechpoints. Israeli security personnel on patrol abused and in 
some cases tortured Palestinian civilians. 
76 114 houses were destroyed by security forces as punishment for terror activity. The IDF destroyed numerous citrus 
orchards, olive and date groves, and irrigation systems on Palestinian-owned agricultural land. 
77 Closures and curfews hampered the flow of students. Closures and curfews affected student’s ability to attend school. In 
areas under curfew all classes were cancelled. Furthermore, teachers were unable to reach their schools in different villages 
and towns. East Jerusalem schools remained underfunded and overcrowded, and many students were denied an education in 
public schools due to lack of space. 
78 Curfews caused food shortages and shortage of water. 
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Working conditions: 
 
1996: The Palestinian Authority Ministry of Labour is responsible for enforcing safety standards in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Newer Palestinian factories and other businesses in the West Bank and 
Gaza meet international standards, whereas older ones fail to meet international minimum standards. 
1997: The Palestinian Authority Ministry of Labour is responsible for enforcing safety standards in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Newer Palestinian factories and other businesses in the West Bank and 
Gaza meet international standards, whereas older ones fail to meet international minimum standards. 
There is no specific legal protection afforded to workers that allows them to remove themselves from an 
unhealthy or unsafe work setting without risking loss of employment. 
1998: The Palestinian Authority Ministry of Labour is responsible for enforcing safety standards in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Newer Palestinian factories and other businesses in the West Bank and 
Gaza meet international standards, whereas older ones fail to meet international minimum standards. 
There is no specific legal protection afforded to workers that allows them to remove themselves from an 
unhealthy or unsafe work setting without risking loss of employment. 
1999: The Palestinian Authority Ministry of Labour is responsible for enforcing safety standards in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Newer Palestinian factories and other businesses in the West Bank and 
Gaza meet international standards, whereas older ones fail to meet international minimum standards. 
There is no specific legal protection afforded to workers that allows them to remove themselves from an 
unhealthy or unsafe work setting without risking loss of employment. A fire in an unlicensed workshop 
in Hebron killing 14 young women highlighted the problem of the prevalence of sweatshops. 
2000: The Palestinian Authority Ministry of Labour is responsible for enforcing safety standards in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Newer Palestinian factories and other businesses in the West Bank and 
Gaza meet international standards, whereas older ones fail to meet international minimum standards. 
There is no specific legal protection afforded to workers that allows them to remove themselves from an 
unhealthy or unsafe work setting without risking loss of employment.  
2001: The Palestinian Authority Ministry of Labour is responsible for enforcing safety standards in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Inspections were severely hampered by the closures. Newer Palestinian 
factories and other businesses in the West Bank and Gaza meet international standards, whereas older 
ones fail to meet international minimum standards. There is no specific legal protection afforded to 
workers that allows them to remove themselves from an unhealthy or unsafe work setting without 
risking loss of employment. 
2002: The Palestinian Authority Ministry of Labour is responsible for enforcing safety standards in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Inspections were severely hampered by the closures. Newer Palestinian 
factories and other businesses in the West Bank and Gaza meet international standards, whereas older 
ones fail to meet international minimum standards. There is no specific legal protection afforded to 
workers that allows them to remove themselves from an unhealthy or unsafe work setting without 
risking loss of employment. 
 
Brief historical/political overview 
 
1987: In December there is a dramatic outburst of civilian unrest and violence. 
1989: The violence of 1987 continues and it has been far more widespread and intensive than at any time 
before. 432 Palestinians died of intifada-related violence, of whom 304 were killed by Israeli security 
forces and settlers and 128 by other palestinians. 13 Israelis, soldiers and civilians, were killed by 
Palestinians. Important in the 1989 report is the sharp increase in violence between Palestinians. 
Hundreds of curfews, some lasting several weeks, were imposed. These curfews caused severe hardship. 
Crimes against Israelis are punished more severely that crimes against Palestinians. 
1990: The violence and crackdown of this violence from 1987 continued into 1990. The violence 
somewhat declined in July, August and September. However a series of incidents and the support by 
Palestinians of Saddam Hussain led to heightening tensions in the last quarter of the year. There was a 
great increase in the number of killings by Palestinians on Palestinians (165). 130 Palestinians were 
killed by Israeli security forces and 11 by Israeli civilians. In the last part of 1990 endorsements of “all 
forms of struggle” against Israel, including “massive martyrdom” and “suicide operations”, appeared in 
intifada-related literature. These were accompanied by an increase in violence. The number of curfews 
and their length declined during the year. Settlers involved in security violations are treated far more 
leniently than Palestinians. Under the system of dual governance Palestinians are treated less favorably 
than Israeli settlers on a broad range of issues. 
1991: The violence was significantly reduced. As a result of Palestinian support for Iraq during the Gulf 
War Israel imposed a month long 24 hour curfew on Gaza and the West Bank. This caused great 
hardship. Palestinians killed 12 Israeli soldiers and citizens. Four Palestinians were killed by Israeli 
citizens. 97 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces. 140 Palestinians were killed by other 
Palestinians. Settlers involved in security violations are treated far more leniently than Palestinians. 
Under the system of dual governance Palestinians are treated less favorably than Israeli settlers on a 
broad range of issues. Prior to the Gulf War gas masks were distributed to Israeli citizens, but not to 
Palestinians. 
1992: Negotiations, including the subject of elections, between Palestinians are ongoing to establish an 
interim self-governing authority which would give Palestinians greater control over the economic and 
political decisions affecting their lives. Violence continued to subside in 1992. 182 Palestinians were 
killed by fellow Palestinians. 158 Palestinians were killed by security forces, including 45 that were 
killed by undercover units. 23 Israeli soldiers and civilians were killed by Palestinians. Curfews were 
used less extensively. Crimes against Israelis are punished more severely that crimes against 
Palestinians. Palestinians are treated less favorably than Israeli settlers on a broad range of issues. 415 
alleged members of Hamas were deported to Lebanon. 
1993: Violence and confrontation increased dramatically during the first five months of the year. After a 
series of killings and stabbings of Israeli soldiers and civilians in Israel and the occupied territories 
during the first 3 months of the year. Israeli decided to seal of indefinitely West Bank, Gaza from 
Jerusalem and Israel. This caused, among others, a deterioration of the economic situation. On 
September 13 the Declaration of Principles on a gradual transfer of authority from Israel to an interim 
Palestinian self governing authority is signed. The Declaration lays out a timetable for Israeli withdrawal 
from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, scheduled to be completed in the first quarter of 1994. In addition the 
Declaration calls for the redeployment of Israeli security forces away from populated areas in the West 
Bank by as early as July 1994, which is the target date for election of Palestinian Council and for the 
dissolution of the Israeli-military backed CIVAD which has administered the occupied territories since 
1981. Through this process, Palestinians will also assume early responsibility for functions such as the 
health sector, educational, cultural, and socila welfare affairs; tourism; and taxation. The Palestinians are 
also to create a Palestinian police force for the occupied territories. Israelis are to continue to control 
external security, internal security, and public order, in Israeli settlements, foreign relations, and other 
areas until an agreement on permanent status is achieved. All 415 deported alleged Hamas members 
were allowed to return. Six settlers were killed by Palestinians. 8 Palestinians were killed by settlers. 
Curfews were used less frequently in West Bank. However curfews were used extensively in Gaza. 49 
Israelis were killed in the occupied territories by Palestinians attacks. 79 Palestinians were killed by 
fellow Palestinians. 184 Palestinians were killed by security forces. 
1994: In May Israel began transferring most responsibilities for civil government in the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho Area to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Palestinians killed 23 Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza 
and 52 within Israel. Israeli settlers killed 37 Palestinians. (most, 29 killed, in one incident). Palestinians 
killed 65 Palestinians. 
1995: The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (the Interim 
Agreement) is signed on September 28, 1995. Late 1995 Israel begins redeploying its forces from the 
West Bank and turning over major towns and surrounding villages to PA administration. Now the PA 
exercises authority over about 2.2 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Interim 
Agreement also provides for the redeployment of Israeli Forces and modalities for elections for the 
Palestinian Council and the chief executive of its Executive Authority. In January 1996 Palestinians 
voted in their first democratically elected representative body. Arafat was elected chief executive of the 
88-member Palestinian Council, with 89% of votes. Though there were some irregularities the elections 
were generally satisfactory. Number of killings dropped dramatically and the number of confrontations 
between security forces and Palestinians also declined dramatically over the past two years. Four 
palestinians were killed by settlers. Isreali security forces killed 47 Palestinians. Israeli settlers are 
treated more favorably than Palestinians under the laws governing the territories. State security courts  
are installed to try security cases. 
1996: Economic situation deteriorated significantly due to closures. Three Palestinians were killed by 
settlers. 8 Palestinians were killed by other Palestinians. Palestinians killed 4 Israeli soldiers and 
civilians in the West Bank and PA areas and 58 people in terrorist bombings in Israel.  
1997: Negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories as well as of Jerusalem, borders, Israeli 
settlements, refugees and other matters began in May 1996, were immediately adjourned and have not as 
yet started. At least 25 Israelis killed by Palestinians. 10 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces. 2 
Palestinians killed by other Palestinians. The court system in general is recovering from years of neglect; 
many of the problems predate Palestinian jurisdiction. Judges and staff are underpaid and overworked 
and suffer from lack of skills and training; court procedures and record-keeping are archaic and chaotic; 
and the delivery of justice is often slow and uneven. 
1998: Permanent status talks resumed in November. Israel more frequently tightened closures in the 
latter half of the year. Sixteen Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces. Eight Palestinians were 
killed by Israeli citizens. Nine Israelis were killed by Palestinian terrorist groups. The court system in 
general is recovering from years of neglect; many of the problems predate Palestinian jurisdiction. 
Judges and staff are underpaid and overworked and suffer from lack of skills and training; court 
procedures and record-keeping are archaic and chaotic; and the delivery of justice is often slow and 
uneven. 
1999: Permanent status talks continued. Less stringent application of closure policy than in previous 
year. There were no “internal”closures (closures preventing flow of goods and persons between towns 
and villages in the West Bank). Israel’s human rights record improved. PA human rights record 
worsened. One Palestinian was killed by an Israeli citizen. Two Palestinians were killed by Israeli 
security forces. In a shootout one undercover Israeli policeman and one HAMAS terrorist was killed. 
Lack of due process is a problem. PA does not always respect court decisions. Municipal elections were 
to be held in June, however they were not held. 
2000: Following the visit, on September 28, to Temple Mount, by oposition leader Ariel Sharon, 
violence erupted. Since this eruption clashes between Palestinians and IDF soldiers occurred daily. The 
uprising is known as the “al-Aqsa Intifada”. Due to the unrest there were a total of 88 days of tightened 
closures and 81 days of internal closures. This is a sharp increase from 1999. The closures severely 
empoverished Palestinians. Israeli human rights record improved slightly during the first nine months of 
the year, but worsened after the outbreak of violence. 307 Palestinians were killed by security forces. 82 
of those killed were under the age of 18. A number of Palestinians were killed in targeted shootings. 7 
Palestinians died in shelling of PA institutions. Pa human rights record worsened after the eruption of 
violence. Several Israelis were killed by PA security forces. Settlers killed 14 Palestinians. Palestinians 
killed at least 18 Israeli civilians. Seven Israelis were killed in bomb attacks. Lack of due process is a 
problem. PA frequently does not respect court decisions. The state security court often adjudicates cases 
that fall far short from the original mandate. 
2001: Nature of the violence by Palestinians changed, as there were more armed attacks and acts of 
terrorism. Efforts to curb the violence by way of recommendations by the Mitchell Committee and the 
Tenet plan failed. Closures and increased restrictions further empoverished the Palestinian economy. 
There 210 days of total external closures and 155 days of partial external closure. (compared to 88 in 
2000 and 15 in 1999). There were 87 days of limited internal closure and 278 days of severe internal 
closure in the West Bank (81 days in 2000 and none in 1999). There were 361 days of limited internal 
closure and 4 days of severe internal closure in Gaza. Israeli human rights record continued to 
deteriorate. At least 501 Palestinians and 1 foreign national were killed by security forces. This figure of 
501 included: at least 33 Palestinians were killed in targetted killings; at least 18 other persons, including 
4 children, killed by Israeli forces in those operations were bystanders, relatives, or associates of those 
killed; 93 Palestinians were killed in shelling of PA institutions and Palestinian civilian areas; 68 
Palestinians were killed during incursions into Palestinian controlled territory; and at least 32 
Palestinians died because the were refused medical assistance. At least 19 Palestinians were killed by 
Israeli settlers. Palestinians killed 87 Israelis (including 51 by terrorist acts). Palestinians killed at least 
22 Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel. Israel’s Minister for Tourism is killed. Children 
were badly affected by the violent security situation, which interfered with learning and which was 
manifesting itself in lack of focus, nightmares, daytime and nightmare incontinence, and other 
behavioral problems. 
2002: Nature of the violence changed more and was marked by increased military operations and armed 
attacks and terrorism by Palestinians against Israeli targets. Closures continued to affect the Palestinian 
economy. Poverty and unemployment increased during the year. Israel imposed complete external 
closure on the West Bank and strict internal closure in the West Bank, for the entire year. Israeli forces 
further imposed extended curfews on Palestinian towns or neighborhoods. 990 Palestinians and 2 foreign 
nationals were killed by Israeli forces. At least 37 Palestinians were killed in targeted killings. During 
these actions 25 bystanders (including 13 children) were killed. At least five Palestinians were killed by 
settlers. Palestinians killed 189 Israelis (civilians and security personnel). Palestinians killed at least 35 
Palestinians suspected of collaboration with Isael. Incursion into Jenin: 140 homes destroyed, 200 others 
structurally unsound and 52 Palestinians killed (including 22 unarmed civilians). Israeli and the PA 
sanctioned the voluntary agreement of 13 Palestinian gunmen to go into exile in Europe and another 35 
to Gaza in a negotiated resolution of the standoff at the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem in the 
spring. By year’s end, Israel reasserted military control, which placed all major West Bank cities except 
Jericho under IDF control. In late 2001, Arafat invoked a state of emergency that granted him broader 
powers to make arrests, prohibit demonstrations, and take action against political oponents. On May 14, 
Arafat signed the long-pending Independence of the Judiciary Law and on May 29 the PA Basic Law 
(however neither law was fully implemented). Children were badly affected by the violent security 
situation, which interfered with learning and which was manifesting itself in lack of focus, nightmares, 
daytime and nightmare incontinence, and other behavioral problems. The judicial system was not 
sophisticated in the protection of children. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1 At least one extrajudicial execution. Excessive force was used in a confrontation with demostrators leading to the deaths of 
16 persons. 
2 PA took over control of detention facilities in Gaza and Jericho from Israeli security forces in May 1994. The physical 
conditions at these facilities do not meet minimum international standards. Food and clothing are inadequate. One prison for 
example was dilapidated and overcrowded. 
3 Underage labour is used in the agricultural sector and in some West Bank and Gaza factories. It is unclear under whom’s 
responsibility this problem falls. 
4 Five Palestinians died in custody of Palestinian police. One of the deaths was accidental, one was due to a preexisting 
medical condition. Three others are still being investigated. One detainee was reportedly handed over by the police to the 
‘Fatah Hawks’ after which he was shot in full public eye, apparently because he was accused of being a collaborator. 
5 PA took over control of detention facilities in Gaza and Jericho from Israeli security forces in May 1994. The physical 
conditions at these facilities do not meet minimum international standards. Food and clothing are inadequate. One prison for 
example was dilapidated and overcrowded. 
6 PA security forces abused and sometimes tortured detainees. This took place after arrest and during interrogation. The Gaza 
civil police commander issued a circular that forbids torture. 
7 Underage labour is used in the agricultural sector and in some West Bank and Gaza factories. It is unclear under whom’s 
responsibility this problem falls. 
8 Four Palestinians died in custody. Two were certainly killed through torture, one apparently hanged himself, another was 
shot and killed. 
9 Facilities are overcrowded and dilapidated. Food and clothing is inadequate. Overall conditions were very poor. 
10 PA security forces abused and sometimes tortured detainees. This took place after arrest and during interrogation. Four 
Palestinians died in custody, two of torture. 
11 Because of early mariages girls often do not finish the mandatory level of schooling. 
12 Underage labour is used in the agricultural sector and in some West Bank and Gaza factories. 
13 Seven Palestinians died in custody of the PA, two of them as a result of torture. The other deaths could also be of torture as 
the PA reportedly treis to cover up incidents claiming that several deaths were the result of heart attacks or suicides. One 
palestinian woman was killed by undercover police when she failed to stop her vehicle, the officers responsible were 
convicted of death through negligence. Two land dealers were killed during the year. The PA announced the death penalty for 
people who gave “one inch” to Israel, but deny any involvement in the killings. 
14 Facilities are overcrowded and dilapidated. Food and clothing is inadequate. Overall conditions were very poor. 
15 PA security forces abused and sometimes tortured detainees. This took place after arrest and during interrogation.  
16 Because of early mariages girls often do not finish the mandatory level of schooling. 
17 A significant number of Palestinian children under the age of 16 and many under the age of 12 are engaged in some work 
activities. Most of this employment is believed to involve work on family farms, in family shops, or as urban street hawkers. 
Some mployment also occurs in small manufacturing enterprises. The law does not specifically prohibit forced or compulsory 
labor by children. The PA’s capacity to enforce existing laws is limited. 
18 The PA security forces were responsible for several extrjudicial executions. Two palestinians died in custody. At least one 
died of torture. The other alledgedly committed suicide. Two Palestinians were killed by firing squad after being convicted by 
the Special Security Court. There are grave concerns that the defendants were not accorded due process. Two Palestinians 
accused of selling land to Jews were killed in suspicious circumstances. 
19 Facilities are overcrowded and dilapidated. Food and clothing is inadequate. Overall conditions were very poor. Conditions 
did improve.  
20 Though the report continues its use of the “standard” sentence, “PA security forces abused, and sometimes tortured, 
Palestinian detainees”, it continues by saying, “International human rights groups have documented widespread arbitrary and 
abusive conduct by the PA. Human rights groups say that Palestinian prisoners frequently are tortured.” 
21 Because of early mariages girls often do not finish the mandatory level of schooling. 
22 A significant number of Palestinian children under the age of 16 and many under the age of 12 are engaged in some work 
activities. Most of this employment is believed to involve work on family farms, in family shops, or as urban street hawkers. 
Some mployment also occurs in small manufacturing enterprises. The law does not specifically prohibit forced or compulsory 
labor by children. The PA’s capacity to enforce existing laws is limited. 
23 Three Palestinians were killed in confrontations with security forces. The PA security forces were responsible for several 
extrjudicial executions. Two palestinians died in custody. One died after being shot while being interrogated. The other died 
allegedly of a heart attack, however family of the victim and a human rights organization said the victim was tortured. One 
Palestinian was killed by firing squad after being convicted by the Special Security Court. There are grave concerns that the 
defendant was not accorded due process.  
24 Facilities are overcrowded and dilapidated. Food and clothing is inadequate. Overall conditions were very poor.  
25 International human rights groups report torture is widespread and no longer confined to security detainees. The strong 
reliance on confessions (because the PA does not have enough equipment to collect evidence) hightens the possibility of 
torture. 
26 Because of early mariages girls often do not finish the mandatory level of schooling. Israeli permit policies affect 
Palestinian schools as they have not always been built with the right permits. 
27 A significant number of Palestinian children under the age of 16 and many under the age of 12 are engaged in some work 
activities. Most of this employment is believed to involve work on family farms, in family shops, or as urban street hawkers. 
Some mployment also occurs in small manufacturing enterprises. The law does not specifically prohibit forced or compulsory 
labor by children. The PA’s capacity to enforce existing laws is limited. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
28 Palestinian security forces killed several Israeli security forces. It is unclear whether PA officials authorized shootings 
against security forces and civilians. One Palestinian died in custody, because of torture. 
29 Facilities are overcrowded and dilapidated. Food and clothing is inadequate. Overall conditions were very poor.  
30 International human rights groups report torture is widespread and no longer confined to security detainees. The strong 
reliance on confessions (because the PA does not have enough equipment to collect evidence) hightens the possibility of 
torture. 
31 Because of early mariages girls often do not finish the mandatory level of schooling. Cultural restrictions sometimes 
prohibit women from attending colleges and universities. Closures affected student’s ability to attend school. In areas under 
curfew all classes were cancelled. Furthermore, teachers were unable to reach their schools in different villages and towns. 
32 A significant number of Palestinian children under the age of 16 and many under the age of 12 are engaged in some work 
activities. Most of this employment is believed to involve work on family farms, in family shops, or as urban street hawkers. 
Some mployment also occurs in small manufacturing enterprises. The law does not specifically prohibit forced or compulsory 
labor by children. The PA’s capacity to enforce existing laws is limited. 
33 Eleven Palestinians were killed in clashes with PA security forces. Members of the security forces and Arafat’s Fatah 
faction participated in violent attacks against Israeli settlers, civilians and soldiers. However it is not clear to what extend 
these attacks have been authorized by PA and PLO officials. 5 Palestinians died in custody. Two of which alledgedly died 
from attempted suicide. 
34 Facilities are overcrowded and dilapidated. Food and clothing is inadequate. Overall conditions were very poor.  
35 PA security forces regularly torture detainees. 
36 Because of early mariages girls often do not finish the mandatory level of schooling. Cultural restrictions sometimes 
prohibit women from attending colleges and universities. In rural areas boys often leave school early to work to support their 
families. Closures affected student’s ability to attend school. In areas under curfew all classes were cancelled. Furthermore, 
teachers were unable to reach their schools in different villages and towns. Test scores had dropped significantly in West 
Bank and Gaza schools.  
37 A significant number of Palestinian children under the age of 16 and many under the age of 12 are engaged in some work 
activities. Most of this employment is believed to involve work on family farms, in family shops, or as urban street hawkers. 
Some mployment also occurs in small manufacturing enterprises. The law does not specifically prohibit forced or compulsory 
labor by children. The PA’s capacity to enforce existing laws is limited. 
38 Due to the closures there was a shortage of water and food. 
39 One Palestinian killed as a result of excessive force. Seven Palestinians killed in custody. Six of the victims were arrested 
on charges of collaboration with Israel, and vigilantes subsequently killed them. The PA security services either failed to 
protect the prisoners from attack or actively turned them over to their killers. One prisoner may have been tortured and killed. 
40 Facilities were old, dilapidated and neglected. Most prison facilities and detention centers were destroyed during the current 
conflict, and prisoners were kept informally in houses or other buildings. 
41 Torture and abuse were widespread. Article 13 of the PA Basic Law prohibits torture for the first time.  
42 Because of early mariages some girls in rural areas did not finish the mandatory level of schooling. Cultural restrictions 
sometimes prohibit women from attending colleges and universities. In rural areas and refugee camps boys often leave school 
early to work to support their families. Closures affected student’s ability to attend school. In areas under curfew all classes 
were cancelled. Furthermore, teachers were unable to reach their schools in different villages and towns. Test scores had 
dropped significantly in West Bank and Gaza schools. For the first time in years  
43 Curfews caused food shortages and shortage of water. 
A. LEGEND OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS:  
 
 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
 
e = Some extrajudicial executions 
E = Many extrajudicial executions   
p = Poor prison conditions 
P = Very poor prison conditions 
t = Some cases of torture  
T = Many cases of / systematic torture 
Note: Deaths as a result of torture will be noted under “torture”, however these are 
also considered “extrajudicial killings”. 
 
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
 
AE  = No or insufficient access to education (this may also include 
discrimination in schools/the education system of children of a certain  
origin)  
CA  = Child abuse (excluding abuse in prisons) 
CL  = Child labour 
CP  = Child prostitution  
CS  =  Child soldiers  
FL = Forced child labour 
PC = Poor/very poor prison conditions for children (including abuse in  
prisons) 
S  =  Presence of great number of street children  
TL  = Trade in children for forced labour 
TP = Trade in children for prostitution 
 
RIGHT TO HOUSING  
 
D = Destruction of houses/property  
DH = Discrimination in housing 
FE = Forced eviction 
R = No right to return to house and property 
 
RIGHT TO FOOD 
 
IF = No or insufficient access to food and/or drinkable water 
 
(If any of the findings is between brackets there is a reasonable suspicion) 
 
 
 
B. EXPLANATION OF POLITICAL TERROR SCALE: 
 
Political Terrorscale:  
 
Raw information comes from the United States Department of State(s) and Amnesty 
International. Distances between level are not equal, but a country on level one is 
doing better than a country on level two. 
1. Countries live under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their 
views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extraordinarily 
rare.  
2. There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. 
However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional 
Political murder is rare.  
3. There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such 
imprisonment. Executions or political murders and brutality may be common. 
Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted.  
4. The practices of level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, 
disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, 
on this level violence affects primarily those who interest themselves in 
politics or ideas.  
5. The violence of level 4 has been extended to the whole population. The 
leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with 
which they pursue personal or ideological goals.  
 
1989 – 1996: Numbers from Purdue University. Purdue University political 
terrorscale is used. First number indicates the political terrorscale according to 
Amnesty International, the second number indicates the political terrorscale according 
to the U.S. State Department. 
 
1997 – 2002: Numbers from the PIOOM World Conflict and Human Rights Maps 
(there are four such maps: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001/2002). PIOOM numbers are based 
mainly on the annual reports of the U.S. State Department. PIOOM uses the five-point 
Purdue University political terrorscale.  
 
Maps/political terrorscale: 
 1996:  situation in 1995 
 1998:  situation in 1997. 
 2000:  situation in 1998 according to U.S. State Department. 
 2001 – 2002: situation in 2000 according to U.S. State Department. 
 
 
C. EXPLANATION OF  CONFLICTS LEVEL: 
 
Conflict Level: 
 
 
- MC1: Violent political conflict: armed conflict that causes less than 100 deaths 
(not necessarily battle related) during a period of one year. Conflict parties 
gradually shift from non violent to violent strategies. Confrontations that occur 
may involve small scale violence. Terorist movements with an action oriented 
leadership exist. The legitisamacy of the government is clearly questioned.  
- MC2: Low-intensity conflict: armed conflict that caused 100 – 1000 deaths 
(non necessarily battle related) during a period of one year. In this phase there 
is open hostility and there are armed clashes between conflicting parties, 
depresseion is used to set due or deter insurrection. There may be a gradual 
shift from guerreilla warefare to conventional warefare. 
- MC3: High-intensity conflict: an armed conflict with inceased levels of 
violence and depression causing the threshold of 1000 deaths (not necessarily 
battle related) during a period of one year. Open hostilities are characterized 
by massive destruction and a higher level of displacement. The category 
includes mass killing of unarmed civilians. 
 
Maps: 
1996:   deaths occurred in 1996. 
1998:   deaths occurred between mid-1997 and mid-1998. 
2000:  deaths in conflict level 5 occurred between mid-1998 and mid-
2000 deaths in conflict level 3 and 4 occurred between mid 
1999 and mid  2000. 
2001 – 2002: deaths occurred between mid-2000 to mid-2001. 
 
 
D. EXPLANATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS FROM FREEDOM 
HOUSE: 
 
The numbers indicate respectively: 
- The level of political rights 
- The level of civil liberties 
- The status of the country 
The levels range from 1 to 7. The status is either Free (average of the first two 
numbers is between 1 and 2,5), Partly Free (average of the first two numbers is 
between 3 and 5,5), or Not Free (average is between 5,5 and 7). Freedom House does 
not see the averages a s absolute. This means a country that scores 3 can still be 
marked as Free. A considerable problem is posed by countries with averages of 5,5. 
Some countries will be marked as Partly Free, others as Not Free.  
Political Rights 
Countries and territories which receive a rating of 1 for political rights come closest to 
the ideals suggested by the checklist questions, beginning with free and fair elections. 
Those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties or other political groupings, 
and the opposition plays an important role and has actual power. Citizens enjoy self-
determination or an extremely high degree of autonomy (in the case of territories), 
and minority groups have reasonable self-government or can participate in the 
government through informal consensus. With the exception of such entities as tiny 
island states, these countries and territories have decentralized political power and 
free sub national elections.  
Countries and territories rated 2 in political rights are less free than those rated 1. 
Such factors as gross political corruption, violence, political discrimination against 
minorities, and foreign or military influence on politics may be present and weaken 
the quality of democracy.  
The same conditions which undermine freedom in countries and territories with a 
rating of 2 may also weaken political rights in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5. Other 
damaging elements can include civil war, heavy military involvement in politics, 
lingering royal power, unfair elections, and one-party dominance. However, states and 
territories in these categories may still enjoy some elements of political rights, 
including the freedom to organize quasi-political groups, reasonably free referenda, or 
other significant means of popular influence on government. 
Countries and territories with political rights rated 6 have systems ruled by military 
juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. These regimes may 
allow only a minimal manifestation of political rights, such as competitive local 
elections or some degree of representation or autonomy for minorities. Some 
countries and territories rated 6 are in the early or aborted stages of democratic 
transition. A few states are traditional monarchies that mitigate their relative lack of 
political rights through the use of consultation with their subjects, toleration of 
political discussion, and acceptance of public petitions.  
For countries and territories with a rating of 7, political rights are absent or virtually 
nonexistent due to the extremely oppressive nature of the regime or severe oppression 
in combination with civil war. States and territories in this group may also be marked 
by extreme violence or warlord rule which dominates political power in the absence 
of an authoritative, functioning central government.  
Civil Liberties  
Countries and territories which receive a rating of 1 come closest to the ideals 
expressed in the civil liberties checklist, including freedom of expression, assembly, 
association, and religion. They are distinguished by an established and generally 
equitable system of rule of law and are comparatively free of extreme government 
indifference and corruption. Countries and territories with this rating enjoy free 
economic activity and tend to strive for equality of opportunity. 
States and territories with a rating of 2 have deficiencies in three or four aspects of 
civil liberties, but are still relatively free. 
Countries and territories which have received a rating of 3, 4, or 5 range from those 
that are in at least partial compliance with virtually all checklist standards to those 
with a combination of high or medium scores for some questions and low or very low 
scores on other questions. The level of oppression increases at each successive rating 
level, particularly in the areas of censorship, political terror, and the prevention of free 
association. There are also many cases in which groups opposed to the state engage in 
political terror that undermines other freedoms. Therefore, a poor rating for a country 
is not necessarily a comment on the intentions of the government, but may reflect real 
restrictions on liberty caused by nongovernmental terror.  
Countries and territories rated 6 are characterized by a few partial rights, such as some 
religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, and 
relatively free private discussion. In general, people in these states and territories 
experience severely restricted expression and association, and there are almost always 
political prisoners and other manifestations of political terror. 
States and territories with a rating of 7 have virtually no freedom. An overwhelming 
and justified fear of repression characterizes these societies. 
 
